Here come the Rebels! (Canoe v. Q-Ball)

[vettim89]

ORIGINAL: Bullwinkle58

ORIGINAL: Canoerebel

From the perspective of a conservative Allied player, Midway in the hands of the Japanese is daunting, at least in Scenario Two.

So I must respectfully disagree with you lads. I would hate for Brad to take Midway at this point in the game. It would really trouble the Allies. For that reason, Brad should target it even if it wasn't of great benefit directly to him.

Not speaking to your game, but in general . . .

My point is, don't let him have it, not it's not useful (I guess, for six months or so, in a limited way.) By 1943 Midway is in your front yard, not deep in any sort of Japanese area. Every bit of strategic and tactical balance is in your favor if he decides to try to take it and/or hold it. You can, with very little loss or risk, kill any land or sea forces he sticks that far out especially any supply TFs. By that date Midway is an order of magnitude farther east than his defense perimeter should be.

Anything he sends to Midway should die. Which is why I predict he won't go there, nor should he. He should be digging furiously on Kwaj, Truk, Ponape, Eniwetok, Saipan, and Iwo, not expanding his area or responsibility.

I am going with the moose on this one. AE's troop limits on small atolls are a game changer as far as Midway goes. The Allies can maybe afford to keep a garrison slightly more than 6000 there, but even then you would have to devote a lot of ships to moving a continuous supply stream there. Unless Brad wants to devote his entire fleet fleet to the defense of an outpost, it will become untenable for him. Its proximity to PH would mean you could limit his ability to even build forts because you could constantly bombard the base or just build up Layson Island and pound it with SBD's and/or TBF's. Three months to fully prep a Marine Div and it would be Allied again. At this stage of the game you could at best class it as a diversion.

By the way, all the facts I just stated make the case for you to leave Marcus Island alone. It is too far away from supporting bases and Brad could just take it right back. It could become your Hougoumont

[Canoerebel]

11/15/42

Midway: I maximized this garrison many months ago. It has 200 AV, just a tad over 6k troops (which doesn't affect supply level at all), five forts, an ACM, and mines. The garrison consists of an Army RCT and a Marine CD. That's the best I can do. I hear you guys, but I believe you're wrong. At least in Scenario Two when the Japanese have carrier superiority well into '43 and possibly into '44, Midway in their hands is bad news for the Allies if the Allies want any chance of moving in CenPac (and, to a much lesser but still tangible degree, NoPac).

Marcus: Vettim, you're exactly right about Marcus Island, but I'm considering taking it with the full expectation that I won't hold it. Why? Four reasons: (1) I'll garrison the island with a RCT and a Marine CD, which means it will exact a toll on the Japanese in re-taking it; (2) If I take Wake and Marcus, Brad's full attention is going to be that way for awhile; I think this will help the Allies move on Tarawa (forces already prepped at Pearl); (3) according to SigInt, Brad has had just 2k troops at Iwo since the start of the war - attack Marcus and I'll have Brad beefing up security there, an any troops siphoned off the real targets is a bonus; and (4) I want these moves to lend the appearance (along with my build up in the Aleutians) that the Allies are looking this way - CenPac and NoPac. This will be critical come early '43 when the Allies commit a large feint toward the Kuriles while actually moving on Sumatra. Despite all those "worthwhile" goals, I'm still not positive I'll go through with the Marcus invasion.

India: 6th Guards/C evaporated, freeing up those Allied units. They will report to Poona, from where they'll redeploy. Allied troops continue to move forward in all sectors. No signs that the enemy will make a stand anywhere in India, and given Allied air superiority that comes as no surprise (I doubt the Allies would have superiority if Brad committed an equal force to India, but I gather he's focusing on other theaters now). I've moved USN and RN divebombers squadrons to Mangalore, hoping to catch some lingering shipping at nearby Madras.

Oz: The vanguard armored unit is south of Daly Waters, while most of the infantry are three or four hexes east. As the infantry arrive, the armored unit will slip behind, hoping to spook the enemy garrison into retreating. That's the plan, anyhow.

CenPac: The two invasion forces will be crossing into Indian territory in two or three days. Picket services are being provided by several small cargo ships and one destroyer. D-Day at Wake could be as soon as one week, though I'm trying to time this to take place after Brad becomes aware of the threat to Noumea and the presence of the Allied carriers there.

SoPac: The Allied carriers will be just east of Auckland tomorrow, where they'll rendezvous with AOs, bombardment and combat TFs, ASW, and the troop transports. Additional picket ships, including destroyers, are moving toward positions around and north of New Caledonia. Brad's radar should light up with activity over the next three days. If I do this properly, and if Brad isn't way ahead of me through clever deductions and good guesses, he'll think something major is up in SoPac - but my worry is that subs might have given him a whiff of the moves in CenPac.

Wotje: Some empty transports are moving west towards Wotje, and could show up on the radar screens in four days or so. That's the last bit of deception I'm trying.

[Canoerebel]

NYGiants: I can't help you very much with RAF and RN ASW aircraft. So much costly aerial warfare has taken place in India, which has been the major theater of operations from March 1, 1942 to the present day, November 15, 1942, that I've had very little opportunity for training.

When the Japanese struck early, the British air forces were on their own with inferior aircraft. I lost nearly all bombers and fighters worth fueling, including most of the Hurricanes, Wellington, and Blenheims. I did have a few Audax squadrons and the like, but I tried to hide them at the map's edge, even withdrawing them at times because they were taking up precious airfield space. What was left were committed to frontline duty - no time for training.

As we went into later 1942, the Americans arrived in huge numbers, taking on nearly all responsibility for the air war. The British were eventually able to contribute a few Blenheim squadrons (even with decent pilots and in strikes of 24 and more, these bombers often inflict zero casualties on ground troops) and, of late, some very useful and effective Liberator squadrons.

The patrol squadrons have been very busy flying out of ports like Bombay, Socatra, Surat, and Karachi.

[Bullwinkle58]

ORIGINAL: vettim89


Three months to fully prep a Marine Div and it would be Allied again. At this stage of the game you could at best class it as a diversion.

By the way, all the facts I just stated make the case for you to leave Marcus Island alone. It is too far away from supporting bases and Brad could just take it right back. It could become your Hougoumont

You could land two divisions of any stripe with 20-30 prep and wipe it clean in a couple of weeks. They get experience, and back at PH re-build quickly if PacFlt is there.

Your comment on the 6000 man limit being a game-changer is spot-on. If you have base forces needed to do constructive work you can't defend the place, and vice versa.

Glad you brought up Marcus I. I've thought that same thing. Too soon, too deep. Those guys are sacrificial lambs.

Edit: wrote this before reading CR's two posts above.

[Canoerebel]

Bullwinkle, you'd better back up a few posts to read why I'm targeting Marcus (if I actually do).

Oops, posted this before the Bullwinkle edited his, so now I have to edit mine.

[Panther Bait]

CR,

Regarding Midway, you might be placing a lot of emphasis on Brad taking Midway because you need/want him focused on CenPac to carry out the Sumatra invasion later. So, you have a reason why you want him to be interested in Midway, but does he have reason to be interested there?

If Brad has no ambitions in CenPac or NorPac (which this late in the game and after the focus on India he almost certainly doesn't) and doesn't feel especially threatened by a move into CenPac or NorPac (right or wrong), then he has little reason to fight you for Midway. He has other options to keep an eye on Pearl. Subs have been so anemic in this game overall that he has little reason to fear an Allied sub-base at Midway, nor a burning desire to create a Japanese one.

Just my thoughts on the matter.
Mike

[witpqs]

ORIGINAL: Bullwinkle58

ORIGINAL: vettim89


Three months to fully prep a Marine Div and it would be Allied again. At this stage of the game you could at best class it as a diversion.

By the way, all the facts I just stated make the case for you to leave Marcus Island alone. It is too far away from supporting bases and Brad could just take it right back. It could become your Hougoumont

You could land two divisions of any stripe with 20-30 prep and wipe it clean in a couple of weeks. They get experience, and back at PH re-build quickly if PacFlt is there.

Your comment on the 6000 man limit being a game-changer is spot-on. If you have base forces needed to do constructive work you can't defend the place, and vice versa.

Glad you brought up Marcus I. I've thought that same thing. Too soon, too deep. Those guys are sacrificial lambs.

Edit: wrote this before reading CR's two posts above.

If you are talking about Midway, not exactly. Either they win on the first day or they attack thereafter without supplies, unless you land supplies daily. This is because two divisions is way beyond the point where all supplies ashore will be taken at the end of the turn by the over stacking penalty.

But - two divisions ought to blast away all enemy forces upon landing. The only reservation I have is that with 20-30% prep I wonder if they will suffer such disruption that even such large forces would be unable to handle a regiment.

[Canoerebel]

witpqs is right.

Defending small atolls is a booger. You can post just more than 6,000 troops there. It's a real challenge to shoe-horn in enough infantry to defend the place, not to mention some base forces to permit flight operations, and some engineers to build up the forts and any facilities.

That's why I pulled the base force out of Midway. Given it's remote location, all I needed was defensive firepower.

Due to the garrison limit, the defenses on an atoll are almost always going to be light. This should allow a successful attack relatively easily, but the attacking player had better plan ahead to extract the troops in excess of the limit as soon as the island is taken, and to bring in enough supplies to cover any wastage.

[JohnDillworth]

Brad's radar should light up with activity over the next three days. If I do this properly, and if Brad isn't way ahead of me through clever deductions and good guesses, he'll think something major is up in SoPac - but my worry is that subs might have given him a whiff of the moves in CenPac.

Maybe you'll get his attention if the carriers show up outside of Minsk

[Canoerebel]

Minsk....[:(]

Brad has started a second WitE PBEM game; this one complete with AAR.

In this game, he's actually keeping up a steady turn-around of a turn a day, and occasionally more; so I really can't complain at this point...though I wish the time he was devoting to Russia was instead going to the game. We'd be well into 1943 by now.

[vettim89]

ORIGINAL: witpqs

ORIGINAL: Bullwinkle58

ORIGINAL: vettim89


Three months to fully prep a Marine Div and it would be Allied again. At this stage of the game you could at best class it as a diversion.

By the way, all the facts I just stated make the case for you to leave Marcus Island alone. It is too far away from supporting bases and Brad could just take it right back. It could become your Hougoumont

You could land two divisions of any stripe with 20-30 prep and wipe it clean in a couple of weeks. They get experience, and back at PH re-build quickly if PacFlt is there.

Your comment on the 6000 man limit being a game-changer is spot-on. If you have base forces needed to do constructive work you can't defend the place, and vice versa.

Glad you brought up Marcus I. I've thought that same thing. Too soon, too deep. Those guys are sacrificial lambs.

Edit: wrote this before reading CR's two posts above.

If you are talking about Midway, not exactly. Either they win on the first day or they attack thereafter without supplies, unless you land supplies daily. This is because two divisions is way beyond the point where all supplies ashore will be taken at the end of the turn by the over stacking penalty.

But - two divisions ought to blast away all enemy forces upon landing. The only reservation I have is that with 20-30% prep I wonder if they will suffer such disruption that even such large forces would be unable to handle a regiment.

Yeah I wouldn't want to chance it either. Failure to blow through the defense on day 1 would lead to a very ugly stalemate that you might find hard to resolve. Could easily become a Gallipoli in the Pacific (I have now reference two different conflicts in my last few posts. I will now endeavor to make a reference in as many future posts as possible. Just kidding)

Dan, you are in a peculiar situation here. One one hand your are best served by preparing for all eventualities. On the other hand, there is the danger of becoming "captured by the system". By that I mean allowing your own views of how you see the game progressing to influence your planning. Historically the best examples of this would be the Pearl Harbor attack and 9/11. In each case the planners knew that such an attack was possible but considered it beyond the capabilities of their opponents.

I just say this as this is the point where you can set yourself up by closing your mind to the possibilities of what your opponent can accomplish. This is especially true considering this is a Scenario 2 game. I give you Yubari's experience in the Ocean of Blood AAR as an example. Of note, chronlogically you are at almost the same exact point that he was when he had his hat handed to him in the Adaman Sea. I think you might want to take a step back and reevaluate this situation. Brad has not suffered any attritiion of his naval strength at all to this point. Yes, it is time to start pushing back but I think you should slow down a second and reevaluate the implications of Scenario 2's OOB. To ghost SUluSea quoting Bob Marley, "Emancipate yourselves from mental slavery, none but ourselves can free our minds".

[Canoerebel]

Well, darn it, even somebody as eloquent, resolved, svelte, and humble as I am has been unable to sway the onlookers. Shoot, I hate it when my omnisicence proves flawed.

But I don't think I'm biting off more than I can chew, nor risking too much here. These operations are low risk (in the sense that I'm not commiting or exposing vital assets) nibbling along the periphery.

Committing my carriers would be a major mistake, but I don't plan on doing that. There is a risk that Brad could leap forward with the KB and surprise me, but I'm keeping that risk as low as possible without sending my carriers back to Capetown. The use of picket ships, patrol aircraft, and the restriction of my carriers to waters close to home should prevent such a calamity from occuring.

My carriers will only be used to support an invasion of Noumea if the KB ends up hitting my Marcus or Wake TFs. This is the point - to be ready to gain some ground where the enemy aint by committing non-vital assets at two extreme points.

You guys are right about the IJN and IJAF being as strong as ever, so I don't want to tangle anytime soon. But I do want to feint, and probe, and commit to low-risk operations that can apply some pressure.

[witpqs]

CR,

You are right to value the taking of risks. I mean actual risks, not just actions that you think your opponent will perceive as risky. The difference is, if you are trying to be perceived as taking risks but in reality are playing timid with some faux risks out there, your opponent will catch on.

When your opponent knows that you are willing to risk, and you are willing to risk, that greatly enlarges the scope of your actions that he must consider.

[Bullwinkle58]

ORIGINAL: witpqs

But - two divisions ought to blast away all enemy forces upon landing. The only reservation I have is that with 20-30% prep I wonder if they will suffer such disruption that even such large forces would be unable to handle a regiment.

Yes, I meant the blasting part. The two weeks is prep and transit. As soon as he takes Midway, you proceed to take it back. With a 6000 man limit I wouldn't say he could be at more than 2 Forts by then, and probably 1 if he worked on an airfield in parallel. And if he has a regiment htere, he probably doesn't have fort-building unit(s).

[Bullwinkle58]

ORIGINAL: JohnDillworth

[Maybe you'll get his attention if the carriers show up outside of Minsk

Oooooh, cruel. I like it. [:)]

[Canoerebel]

11/16/42

CenPac: The two Allied invasion aramada's are entering Indian country, the Marcus group to the NW of Midway, the Wake group just to the SSW. Picket ships are to the front. Combat ships and CVE TFs trailing. My ships are dispersed enough that a KB-sized ambush wouldn't catch them in one net. This operation depends on surprise, dispersal, and speed. I issued orders for the Wake TFs to proceed. D-Day is probably about four days away. No signs of detection.

SoPac: Darn it, by issuing orders to certain TFs to begin following the carriers, the carriers just froze in their tracks, a day SE of Auckland. B-17s hit the airfield at Noumea, and picket ships nudged a bit closer to their main posts, with more heading out from Auckland at flank speed, including a pair of two-DD TFs. In a few days, B-17s will hit Noumea from both Suva and from Lord Howe Island. The sudden increase should catch Brad's attention. No signs of actual detection of my carriers or other major TFs.

India: The Allies took Jamedshpur, just three hexes west of Calcutta. The divebombers at Mangalore didn't sortie vs. shipping at Madras.

SigInt: Had a report of CA Kinugasa at Nauru Island a day or two back. I'm evaluating this as escort for an important supply or reinforcement convoy, though it might be part of a surface combat TF centrally posted to raid or react.

[Capt. Harlock]

India: 6th Guards/C Div. will evaporate tomorrow; 48th Div. moved a hex west off any road into a jungle/coastal hex. Is there any reason Brad can't use subs or amphibious patrol aircraft to lift these troops out? I'll get troops there to finish them off as soon as possible. In the meantime, aircraft and bombardment TFs will pay them a visit. To the south, an IJA remant stack aouth of Goa retreated after another attack.

To use another Civil War analogy, this would look something like Lee's retreat from Petersburg -- except the IJA units have no intention of surrendering.

[vettim89]

ORIGINAL: witpqs

CR,

You are right to value the taking of risks. I mean actual risks, not just actions that you think your opponent will perceive as risky. The difference is, if you are trying to be perceived as taking risks but in reality are playing timid with some faux risks out there, your opponent will catch on.

When your opponent knows that you are willing to risk, and you are willing to risk, that greatly enlarges the scope of your actions that he must consider.

Huh? I think only Vincini could understand that

[Canoerebel]

Hey, I understood it! [:)]

I think witpqs is right - there is merit in attacking for the sake of attacking as long as it's part of a well-thought-out plan and not just flying off the handle. Two things I can think of:

1) As witpqs is points out, it can put the notion into the opponent's head that you're willing to attack.
2) Sometimes, an attack has totally unforeseen consquences: the opponent makes a mistake, or overreacts, or does something rash. Heck that's what happened with the Doolittle Raid - a huge risk of a rare and valuable Allied asset to do something that really couldn't be done and wouldn't accomplish much even if it was done...only that it was done and led directly to the Battle of Midway.

Well, I've just stated the obvious. Sorry guys, I know you know all this stuff. But sometimes we forget to factor in item two merely because we CAN'T predict something of the sort happening. But I saw it happen in my games with Miller and John III, where wacky Allied attacks ended up prompting my opponents to do something wacky that really cost them.

Sometimes, bringing pressure to bear is worthwhile in and of itself.

[Chickenboy]

Hey, CR-

Try to have some discipline on the high seas, will 'ya? Your navy in India needs some help on the whole seamanship thing, dude.

http://www.ndtv.com/video/player/news/t ... ire/189725