ORIGINAL: Local Yokel
One thing this thread has suggested to me is that there was greater merit than met the eye in the ‘tax’ upon resource production that was imposed by manpower’s need to be fed in the original WitP game. In order to generate manpower points, the number of resources at a location had to exceed 10 times the number of manpower centres. If this condition was satisfied, 5 manpower points per centre were added to the pool, but at a price in resources of double the manpower points added. There was nothing you could do to prevent this deduction of ‘tax’ on a location by location basis. Arguably it better represented the cost of feeding the civilian economy than does the present construct of LI doing so. Still, spilt milk…
Don’t have any great problem with removal of refineries’ supply generation capability.
One of the original premises of this thread was that the Japanese economy was defective due to its failure to put sufficient stress upon the mercantile marine. There are a couple of points about Treespider’s proposed mod that trouble me:
1) Remedying the understress on Japan’s merchant ships seems to have morphed into a desire to reduce her supply output by nearly 22%, with the comment “You can make up the 4420 pt supply difference produced in the Home Islands with daily allotments if you feel these are necessary...” What exactly are these daily allotments, and how are they produced? More importantly, what empirical evidence is there to demonstrate that the Japanese economy can accommodate such a 22% reduction in supply? To me, the most obvious area in which this is likely to have a potentially catastrophic impact is on Japan’s ability to repair damage – whether that be to new factories, oil and resource centres, or whatever. Before any such change is made to supply output, I would want to know what the effects of such a reduction will be.
Daily Supply allotments appear out of the mist and are assigned in a data slot in the editor. So in the case of my Mod if I choose to keep the supposed supply production capabilities of Stock AE I would need to add 4420 points of supply to be added to Japanese bases. Think of those points as the product of rural cottage industries and could be spread out amongst the various bases in the Home Islands.
2) Mention is made of Japan having to import an additional 3,175,000 resource points, but nothing is said about where that extra is to come from. That raises three issues:
(a) where are the extra resources located?
(b) how much extra should there be?
I did not look at Resource point deficits or surpluses in Manchuria or China...but I will certainly do so when i get home from the office this afternoon.
So you are suggesting there are not sufficient resources being produced on Mainland Asia to cover the extra 3,175,000 points per year needed to be imported?
(c) what is the impact upon Japan’s fuel position of the resulting demand for extra shipping?
Hopefully substantial. From everything I've read Fuel consumption weighed heavily on strategic decisions made by IGHQ.
On the ‘where’ question there have been hints from posters that the extra should be coming from resource centres captured in the SRA – it was even suggested that a capture of North Australia (no doubt Pt Hedland-Corunna Downs in particular) might become de rigeur for the Japanese player. No! As I’ve posted elsewhere, the only significant resource of which the Empire was short at the war’s start, aside from petroleum products, was bauxite stocks, so, with that exception, there should be no question of the Japanese having to make good resource shortfalls by capturing centres in the SRA.
IndoChina was a substantial source of tonnage of "resources" imported...
On the ‘how much’ question, Japan’s economic potential is limited from the outset by the rate at which resources are generated outside the home islands. Evidence that the rate of resource point generation may be a problem can be seen from an examination of what resources the Empire is producing as at 7 December 1941. On that date, the aggregate daily resource production of the Empire is 5,100 points less than the daily amount required to run its starting industry – 1.8% short of the Empire’s aggregate daily resource need.
Which is why the went to war...Is IndoChina factored into these numbers?
I do not know the extent to which resource centres’ outputs have been matched to historical output figures (or have they been determined merely by reference to HI/LI demands?), but I get the strong impression that Japan could have imported greater quantities of raw materials than she actually did, yet failed to do so.
Resource points were based on historical figures of output as pointed out earlier in this thread....
In particular, I have the impression that there was a falling away of N. China coking coal imports that is not readily explicable by submarine sinkings of colliers in the Yellow Sea, and an even more inexplicable drop in the quantity of good quality coal imported from the Karafuto mines. My point is that, as it stands, the rate of generation of resources by ‘inner zone’ Empire resource centres may be acting as an unwarranted brake upon its economic potential. Given the undifferentiated nature of resources, this poses two issues:
1) how far the number of such ‘inner zone’ resource centres need to be increased to cover the increase in resource imports made necessary by a higher input : output ratio of resources to HI; and
2) how much additional resource generation capacity (if any) should be located in the ‘inner zone’ to reflect the fact that Japan did not import raw materials to the full extent that she was apparently able.
One last grouse: JWE has proposed an increase in the amount of fuel having to be imported to Japan to run her heavy industry. Sorry, John, but I disagree. Whilst I can see justification for a minimal input of petroleum products to make HI run, any significant increase in HI’s fuel requirement would imply its wider spread use as the source of the power required by HI, and I’m confident that if you were to survey the power houses of Japan’s wartime factories you would find that the vast majority of their boilers were fired by coal rather than by oil – it was, after all, Japan’s native fuel. As I see it, Japan’s perceived need of oil as the fuel for her ships rather than for those power houses was by far the most important reason for her advance into the Indies – so leading me back to the question: what will be the impact on Japan’s fuel position of an increase in demand for merchant ships that results from an increase in resource hauling requirements?
Sorry if this post adopts an unduly tetchy tone, but not feeling at my best [:(]
I'll do the RP analysis this afternoon.