Strength reports as of middle of August: Infantry divisions all fit for operations. Combat strength about 66 percent. Between 20 and 27 August replacements totaling 63,000 men crossed the German frontier. This means that of 380,000 casualties, 175,000 will have been replaced (including replacements from field replacement battalions).
Deficit of motor vehicles (16 August): 38,000. 50 percent in armored forces, and 25 percent each in GHq. troops and one-fourth in infantry divisions.
Tank Situation:
Armd. Gp. 1: Average, 50 percent (16th Mot. Div. poorest)
Armd. Gp. 2: 10th. Armd. Div., 83 percent
18th Armd. Div., 57 percent
All other armd. divs., average 45 percent
Armd. Gp. 3: 7th Armd. Div. has only 24 percent left
All other divs., average 45 percent
Armd. Gp. 4: Best (Czech materiel!), on an average between 50 and 75 percent.
Source: The Halder War Diary, 28 August 1941, quoting from General Buhle.
a. The eastern army has a shortage of 340,000 men, i.e., 50 percent of the combat strength of its infantry. Company combat strength is 50 to 60 men.
b. Current losses and returning convalescents approximately offset each other at this time. Gaps can be filled only by disbanding some divisions.
In Germany we have only 33,00 men available. The bulk of the replacements are not yet broken in to the front-line routine and so have limited combat value.
c. Trucks: Serviceability, at most 60 percent.
d. Time needed for the rehabilitation of an armored division is six months. Units should therefore be returned to Germany for refitting as soon as possible.
e. We cannot replace even 50 percent of our motorcycle losses.
f. Truck replacements available are sufficient to:
Equip three divisions (22d, 23d, 24th) - 100 percent
Equip two motor infantry divisions slated for conversion to armored divisions - 50 percent
Rehabilitate four more infantry motorized divisions - 50 percent
Rehabilitate two more armoured divisions - 75 percent
We have completely new equipment for five armoured divisions.
We can convert one infantry division into a motorized division.
....
h. I veto the proposal to deactivate one army Hq.
Source: The Halder War Diary, 30 November 1941, quoting from General Buhle.
1. Effect of winter battles:
a. Personnel: 1.11.1941 - 1.4.1942, including sick: 900,000 losses, 450,000 replacements. These numbers include almost total use of the 1922 year and strong encroachment on the economy.
b. Material: 1.10.1941 - 15.3.1942: loss of 74,183 vehicles and 2,340 tracked vehicles; addition of 7,441 vehicles (10 percent) and 1,847 tracked vehicles (80 percent).
Weapons: shortages include 28,000 rifles, 14,000 machine guns, 7,000 AT guns, 1,900 guns.
Horses: 15.10.1941 - 15.3.1942: losses of 179,609, additions of 20,000
....
3. Vacancies 1.5.1942: in the east, short 625,000 men. South: Each infantry division short about 2,400; motorised units 1,000 to 2,000. Will probably be made good by start of operations. Middle: Infantry divisions 6,900; motorised divisions less. North: Infantry divisions 4,800, motorized divisions similar. On 1.5. the southern units are 50 percent and in the north 35 percent of their original infantry combat strength.
....
5. Tank status: South: Close to level; Center and North: one battalion for each armored division. AT equipment will iin the course of the summer compare favorably.
....
7. Loss of battle worthiness through losses of experienced officers and NCOs. Loss of experienced specialists. Fatigue of personnel, horses, and equipment. Irregularity of combat value.
Source: The Halder War Diary, 21 April 1942, quoting notes for a presentation to Hitler made on that day.
re. What proportion of a division does the majority of the fighting - the rifle companies. 9 rifle companies per division at this time, establishment of roughly 200 men. Those are the guys who'll take the vast majority of all combat casualties (outside of military disasters of course). So when Halder talks of company strength being at 50 to 60 men you can see just how far replacements of 'teeth' units is falling behind the casualties. To prop the numbers up in the rifle companies, most divisions ended up cannibalising their support arms, and even consolidated rifle companies so that they only had 6 rifle companies, ultimately leading to the 'official' 1942 standard divisions purely because there was no way on earth Germany was going to find the manpower to replace its losses from 41/early 42. Course, if you pull all your mechanics into rifle companies then it does tend to have a knock on effect on the divisions trucks starting to break down etc.
re. German numbers generally - there may have been a retroactive attempt to pin the tail on the donkey. Someone respected in a history forum claimed to have such a document and was using it as the basis of his thesis and gave the following numbers for strength of the Ostheer:
Jun 41 2765276
Jul 41 2650626
Aug 41 2579879
Sep 41 2539110
Oct 41 2381337
Nov 41 2362463
Dec 41 2112002
Jan 42 1981356
Feb 42 2044692
Mar 42 2130239
Apr 42 2240876
May 42 2324717
Source cited: RW 6/535 (NB: Not been to Freiburg to check it for myself, but no reason to disbelieve its existance, albeit one wonders at its accuracy). Just a general caution with the numbers - remember that you need to factor in replacements flowing in (both as riflemen and as whole divisions) as well as flowing out when playing with 'overall' figures such as these.
