Pacific Battles in BfTB

[jimcarravall]

I have been looking into creating a scenario built around the American Invasion of Betio / Bititu Island in the Tarawa Atoll.

The BfTB's ability to map terrain down to the yards / meters per pixel level, the ability to either implement command and control at the unit command or to supercede that with control at the subordinate unit level, and the nature of the battle of Tarawa where advances of 100 yards were considered "victories" for a day seems to support using the BfTB engine to recreate the battle.

I've obtained some loose information on the Japanese order of battle for the island defenses, and have extensive notes on the Marine OOB for the assault forces.

But, I note, in a thread started by Joubarbe that there are issues with doctrine focusing on the West Front conflict affecting opposing forces that could hinder building an alternate story under which either a face to face opponent conflict or a programmed opponent component could function.

Before doing further into the research of the battle (which requires creating a Japanese Order of Battle at least equal to, or hopefully better than a surrogate based on Naval Landing Force structure), I'm wondering if the doctrine issue is capable of being resolved in the game editor.

Thanks in advance for any help.

jim

[simovitch]

I believe that you can go pretty far with modeling some unique national characteristics in the game. Here is a list of the editable traits for each unit, and the unit's commander:

UNITS:
Experience refers to the amount of combat experience the unit has. Given the relative short period of the battle there is only a very slight chance of a unit’s experience level being increased and no chance of it being decreased (unless the unit gets destroyed, of course). Units with lots of experience are better at retaining and regaining morale, retaining and recovering cohesion, firing their weapons, changing formation and facing, deploying and digging in and processing orders.

Training refers to the amount of military instruction and exercising the unit has undertaken. This will not vary during the period of the battle. Highly trained units are better at retaining and recovering cohesion, firing their weapons, changing formation and facing, deploying and digging in and processing orders.
Training complements experience. In some ways one can compensate for the other. The best units are both highly trained and seasoned veterans.

Fitness reflects the physical stamina and conditioning of the troops. Fit units move faster, tire less and recover freshness quicker. Some elite units, like paratroopers and mountain troops, were extremely fit and are capable of marching further and faster with less sleep than ordinary troops.
It is not a good idea to issue orders with the Speed set to Fastest to units with very low fitness.

Aggression ( aggro ) refers to how aggressive or assertive the unit is and how much initiative the unit is likely to exercise. Units with high aggro lose less morale and are more likely to fire or attack.

Stubbornness refers to how stubborn the unit can be in defence and to how determined the unit can be to fulfil its order. When you need to hold a location under attack, then look for a very stubborn unit. However, these units are not what you want when you want to break contact and withdraw.

COMMANDERS:
Leadership - refers to the commander’s ability to inspire his troops to follow him in battle and to how well he can organise and deploy his forces tactically – i.e.. fight a battle. A well-led unit is less likely to suffer reductions in morale and cohesion and will be quicker to rally from retreat or rout and quicker to reorganize.

Efficiency – refers to how organised and quick the commander is in processing orders. Efficient commanders can process orders quicker and are quicker to react to enemy actions.

Determination – refers to how motivated the commander is to fulfil his orders. A determined commander is less likely to abandon a task, more likely to initiate an attack to take the objective or to attempt to blow the bridge he has been ordered to deny the enemy. A determined commander also reduces the probability of a force losing morale or surrendering.

Aggro – refers to how aggressive or assertive the commander is and to how much initiative he is likely to exercise. Aggressive commanders are more likely to initiate attacks, less likely to bypass enemy opposition and reduce the probability of their unit suffering morale loss.Note that commanders of units you have directly ordered are restricted in using their initiative. They cannot launch attacks nor bypass. You must order them.

Judgement –refers to how sound the commander is at making decisions. A commander with good judgement is more likely to pick the best option, the best assault approach, the best advance route, the best formation, the best facing. He is more likely to break contact at the correct time when ordered to delay and more likely to determine the best time to blow a bridge.

Staff Quality – refers to the ability of the HQ staff to turn the commander’s decisions into formal orders and transmit those to their subordinate units, and to their ability to provide accurate intelligence and situation reports to the commander. HQs with high staff quality will process orders faster and will cope well with attached units; HQs with poor staff quality are slow to respond and may have trouble organising their organic subordinates, let alone any attachments.

[jimcarravall]

This is all good information, but I believe the Tarawa concept may be outside the bounds of reason for BfTB.

I was intrigued by what at first appeared to be BfTB's ability to model a map at an extremely large scale suitable to the Betio combat area where mere yards of advance were critical. But, the map I get modeling at 4-meters per pixel creates an image much too small for planning or operating even if accurately reflecting the island on which the troops operated.

In addition, Betio was decided by a significant amount of individual small unit maneuvers and small command instant decisions, obscuring the control the battle at a large unit command (company and above) level that BfTB provides. A commander either needs to decimate his command structure to issue orders at a small unit scale to replicate the developments which resulted in the battle's completion and remain involved, or issue orders at a macro scale too large for the map and simply sit back and watch developments unfold.

The battle is better replicated at an Operational Art of War or even a Campaign Series management level where each unit's activities are scrutinized by a commander and controlled at scheduled increments.

All that said, I also picked up a project from an old friend who wanted to do some academic research on pre-Civil War American land acquisition and economic development activities that distracted me from any significant research into resolving the mapping or command and control issues.

I may return, but only after the land acquisition and economic development research subsides.