Tokyo Rose was a Hussy! Chez (J) vs. Canoe (A)

[Cribtop]

Don't mess with Armadillos. Unless it's from Oklahoma. They're better eating than the Texas version but not as good in a fight. [:D]

[Canoerebel]

2/21/42

NYGiants: Thanks for the suggestion. I was able to convert one of my Dutch groups from Hawks to Hurricane IIbs. Since the pilots have 55 exp., this will be a decent squadron. None of the other squadrons can update, yet. I'll check the bomber squadrons tomorrow.

Western DEI: The Allied fighter trap at Singapore worked. As hoped, Steve sent his Zeros against the CAP at Palembang, while his bombing raid against Singers was escorted by Oscars. The resulting melee cost Japan at least 39 Netties. An IJ sub was sghted south of Sabang, so I think now Steve is trying to gauge sea traffic between India and Sumatra. I've noticed a flurry of posts in his thread today. I can only speculate it might be about his growing awareness of the situation in Sumatra. He's going to get lots of suggestions, one of which will be to consider bypassing Sumatra and hitting India. That would be hard to do, as we've discussed recently, but I have to be on my toes.

Eastern DEI: Mini-KB still remains posted at Kendari. RN carriers and USN carriers are perhaps three days from a rendezvous SW of Timor. I think the combined forces will be in a position to patrol and seek a target of opportunity in about five to six days.

China: Just waiting to see where the IJA stack late of Changsha heads.

Luzon: No IJA attack at Clark Field.

[Nemo121]

Canoerebel,

Alfred was giving you a pretty big hint as to something you don't seem to be considering as an operational ploy your opponent can use to attempt to negate Southern Sumatra. You might want to reread his post.


Alfred,
You are right of course as regards the possibility of that ploy. On the other hand CDJ seems like he might get the suppression/exploitation allocation of forces wrong. This will allow Canoerebel to continue raiding his SLOCs and doing additional harm.... such raiding being the types of operations he's had huge difficulty with already.

Of course, if he COULD get the allocation of forces right it'd make for a formidable option, but he won't. So long as Canoerebel gets things less wrong then he'll be fine.

[Canoerebel]

Nemo, I re-read Alfred's post, but I came away with the same conclusion I did the first time: That an IJ player can move into the Bay of Bengal (and against India if he wishes) in a big way once he controls Singapore and the ports on the Malacca Strait, ignoring and isolating Palembang after attending to the smaller Allied garrisons at Benkolen and Oosthaven (so that the Allies aren't in a position to reinforce later).

If there's something more there, please speak slowly and clearly so that I will get it this time.

I'm not really good at looking into an opponent's mind, but I doubt Steve will consider that an option. I think he's going to evaluate three options and choose among the first two:

1. Decide his strategic initiative has been greatly blunted due to ongoing problems and the prospect of Palembang; then decide to throw everything at Palembang (and Singapore) and to then pretty much go on the defensive (IE, no big plays for India or Oz).

2. Not really think about the long-term strategic initiative, but just conclude that he wants to attend to Singers and Palembang first and then see what options he has.

3. Decide to bypass Palembang and tto counter the Allied gambit by moving on India, Oz, or (much less likely) Hawaii.

At this point, I believe he'll go for Singers and Palembang. I think this will probably require a minimum of eight to ten divisions by the time he's ready to move.

My long-term plan is to continue reinforcing Sumatra as long as possible, try to jump a vulnerable carrier or capital ship TF with my carriers; and continue the American reinforcement flow to India (for defensive reasons in the short term and offensive in the long term).

[Nemo121]

Obviously for Option 1 you need to be preparing offensive options. I, personally, found that April 1942 was the earliest it was really feasible to mount a major counter-invasion ( by major I mean the recapture of Malaysia and a drive into Thailand with a view to creating a land corridor from Singers to China ).

For option 2 you are pretty much prepping already.

Option 3:
CAN a player really axxess India without securing Southern Sumatra? Surely that's a conclusion based on some assumptions, assumptions which you can negate through your actions? The question is whether or not you are prepping for those actions.

In my game I created an unholy trinity of location, sea and air which really hurt my opponent. I had Allied CLs and DDs basing out of Palembang ( which is an upriver port so no IJN BBs or CAs could come to dig them out ), protected by PT Boats at sea and a huge horde of fighters in the air ( often 200+ fighters ). The Japanese had to choose between abandoning Singers, accepting attritional losses, losing several hundred planes in the air in order to break my CAP and then sink the CLs/DDs or sending in a dozen or more CLs and DDs and accepting attritional losses to the fleet on terms very much in my favour. Any of those four options worked more in my favour than theirs --- which is why I'd set it up that way.

So, I think the question comes down to: If he bypasses and suppresses what are your plans to make that suppression an attempt and not a success?

[witpqs]

I thought that CAs could go upriver but no BBs. What is the rule, is it a tonnage limit, then?

[John 3rd]

CAs should be able to reach Palembang. Dan--You said you've moved CD into Sumatra. Which ports?

[princep01]

Nemo, et al, I think I read missives from you that discourage the Allies from engaging in attritional air combat in 1942. Doesn't the development of the Palembang fortress defense encourage exactly that while the Japanese are at their strongest in pilot and A/C quality? Is this a persuasive reason to adopt a different defense or is the strategic value of Palembang such that it clearly outweighs the air attrition issue? Comments from et al welcome too.

[witpqs]

One thing that holding the DEI long enough allows for is the use of the Dutch aircraft upgrades. With Dutch aircraft, of course, are Dutch pilots. The better (i.e. upgraded) planes and longer trained pilots should take a bigger bite out of the Empire.

[Alfred]

I see there are a few unaddressed issues.

(1) ships above 15k tons cann't sail up navigable rivers (manual page 39).

(2) whilst there is some benefit in having the Dutch ariforce survive long enough to be able to upgrade its aircraft, this benefit mainly accrues to its bomber and patrol pilots. Those pilots will enjoy the benefit of longer training and can be deployed in the few Dutch units which arrive much later to serve with the RAF and RAAF. The production run for fighters which can be used by Dutch fighter pilots is too short to make much difference, in February/March 1942 most Dutch fighter pilots will still be inferior in quality compared to the Japanese and therefore will lose too many airframes.

(3) I think everyone has forgotten this game has PDU OFF. That will adversely impact upon the festung Palembang viability. Some of the adverse affects are;
(a) significant limitations on the ability to cannabilise restricted air units back in CONUS in order to supplement the limited early war production of frontline Allied airframes
(b) in order to maintain the skies above southern Sumatra blanketed with Allied fighters, recourse to obsolete plane models will be necessary

(4) with every Sumatran AF north of Djambi under Japanese control, very few Allied bomber models will have the legs to reach the Strait of Malacca and then they will be unescorted. Enemy Nates will do just fine over the Strait of Malacca

(5) the Strait of Malacca is a freeway to the Bay of Bengal, but it is also a freeway with other turnoffs. More significantly Singapore is not the only on ramp to the freeway

(6) festung Palembang is essentially a static disposition, it leaves Japan with the strategic initiative and mobility. This situation is amplified if USN CV bombers are "dismounted". A good Japanese player should start drooling at the possibilities which present themselves.

(7) There is far too much frontal assault thinking. Where is it preordained that during the Japanese amphibious bonus period, Japan can only disembark where CD guns are present.

(8) a strength can be turned into a weakness. Transporting more men, equipment and ships strengthens an area - it also results in many more mouths to feed

(9) a festung Palembang which is essentially a one shot wonder will fail. If it can be reloaded indefinitely then it can become a war winning weapon.

If I had to place any money on it now, I would bet that Japan will think too much along orthodox lines and fail to find an answer to the festung Palembang ploy. Unfortunately most will simply take that to mean the festung Palembang is the silver bullet for the Allid player. It isn't because there is always a counter to any plan.

Alfred

[paullus99]

The best way to defeat a fortress is not to let it be built in the first place - I assume, moving forward, that Japanese players will be much more aggressive in the DEI to not allow the allied time to consolidate in this fashion. They have the ships, they have the men (especially in scenario 2) & if they concentrate effectively, they should be able to seize key AFs, get their Betties & Netties in place & shut down the SLOCs aided by the Mini-KB.

Aggression begets aggression - if a Japanese player is faced with a forward defense early in the game, they should immediately take the steps necessary to cut those locations off (the early advantage in the air & with subs helps immensely) and reduce as quickly as possible or potentially leave them to rot and make more aggressive moves to counteract whatever buildup he finds (attacking India or Australia can create the kind of situation that no allied player can ignore).

Canoerebel has made some good moves & his opponent hasn't quite realized what is in the offering yet - we'll have to see how the Sumatran campaign opens - which should be a very good indication who has the initiative (a concentration of allied carriers, backed with sufficient land-based air is going to be a big problem for any Jap advance).

[Canoerebel]

Lots to chew on, but time for just a few comments:

1) I intentionally haven't sent my ships forward yet to Palembang, or raiding in that area, yet. Things have been mostly quiet in this theater, which greatly helps the Allies, so I didn't want to end up encouraging Steve to allocate more ships and forces to the region. The quiet is allowing my troop transports to come and go totally unmolested. Occasionally, I stage my fighters forward to Singapore, but that's the only real aggressive action I've taken (other than the temporary bomber concentration that got Shoho).

2) Alfred is right about PDU off. I am not positive about the overall impact this will have on both forces. As I stated yesterday, I am not confident the Allies can win the air war over Sumatra long term. I am confident they can sting from time to time; I'd really like them to coordinate with the navies to oppose any invasions and to coordinate with any carrier actions close to land.

3) I"m not assuming the enemy has to land at beaches with CD guns. I know Japan can land at a more lightly-held Padang. But dooing so will commit them to a longer campaign over the tough-to-supply yellow roads. Since buying time is an important consideration, that would suit me.

4) I agree with Nemo that the Allies probably can't go on the offensive until April (maybe later depending upon enemy force disposition). As noted yesterday, the Americans are heading to India, first for defensive reasons, but for offensive reasons if I decide they aren't needed to defend India (or, in the same spirit, if I decide that the best defensve for India involves an offensive in Malaya or Burma). In my opinion, it is increasingly likely that the Allies will hold Palembang long enough that they will be in a posiition to want to open a second front in the theater to take advantage to a vacuum likely to occur if Japan concentrates everything against Sumatra for a time.

5) I'm not absolutley positive yet that all of this will yield a net Allied victory, but those chances are building.

6) paullus99 is right. Fortress Palembang is best stopped before it starts. I think Japan can easily attend to it and in the vast majority of games will do so. In other words, it's an oddity of the game engine (due to the supply generation) that probably doesn't require tweaking. It forces Japan to move with certain speed in the DEI, which is historic and applies a little pressure to attend to business.

7) As I mentioned a few days ago, I'm getting the impression that my opponent is just now becoming aware of what's going on. I also mentioned that we may have a situation where his style of gameplay leads him to exclaim: "WTF???!!! This bears no resemblance to WWII and I'm in this for the simulation!" Or thoughts to that effect. IE, we may have to essentially incompatible fundamental approaches to AE. I don't think either is right or wrong, but they probably don't mix well. So that's a situation that might require some frank discussion between us.

[Nemo121]

princep01,

It is all about prioritisation and subordinating the tactical to the operational, the operational to the strategic and the strategic to the national policy objective.

So, in early 1942 a player who begins an attritional approach to air combat is likely to lose so much more than the Japanese that, effectually, they are going to train IJAAF and IJNAF pilots whilst losing so much that they never are able to field fully trained pilots without a large ( 3 months long ) operational pause later in 1942. Of course since such a pause is possible in 42/43 this is often what Allied players do. It is, however, a sub-optimal approach and relies more on sheer numbers than any contribution from player skill.


Your next question relates to aerial attrition over Palembang... Why would you need to put a CAP over Palembang? Put enough AAA there and it will act as a massive FlaK trap for Japanese bombers, shooting them down cheaply - on the few occasions I was attacked by IJAAF bombers I shot down 1/3rd+ of the attacking bombers using just FlAK. Putting CAP up occasionally to protect your raiding TFs as they refuel and re-arm is a very different thing than keeping CAP there day after day to be whittled away. I am talking about putting CAP there something like once a week on average. The rest of the time, let them bomb it.


So, obviously you can brute-force things and just heap ships and troops and planes into Palembang and try to hold that way OR you can be a bit more subtle and get away with the same effect whilst using and losing far fewer troops, planes and ships. That's where skill comes in.

Obviously the more subtle you are with your defence then the stronger you can be elsewhere ( which is the primary risk of a Festung Palembang defence ).


I think it might be useful to people to re-read the AAR in which I did the first Festung Palembang. I went all-in fairly early BUT I was always clear that Palembang couldn't expect to be decisive unless I conducted a large number of other operations in other theatres in order to support it.

So, in order to support Festung Palembang I:
1. Launched a sacrificial SC attack into a the 4 CAs spearheading the IJA drive down to Rabaul and the Solomons, sinking all 4 CAs and allowing me to hold Rabaul.

2. I launched an invasion of the Kuriles in January 1942 IIRC just to draw forces away from Palembang and the Marshall Islands.

3. In February 1942 I invaded the Marshalls and recaptured them all, isolating Truk and raiding it routinely afterwards, forcing its abandonment about 8 weeks later by the IJN.

4. I created a massive deception in China which drew the Japanese where I wanted before launching an attack which joined the northern and southern fronts, trapped 5,000 AV of Japanese troops and threatened Shanghai.

5. I re-inforced Mindanao and was building up forces there preparatory to an Australian + US invasion of the Phillippines in July 1942.

6. A week after the game finished I was due to invade Iwo Jima and some of the islands around Saipan with a USMC Corps. They were just about 500 miles from landing when the game was called.


All of those operations were begun with a view to supporting Palembang initially and, later, transitioning, onto a mini-Canae double envelopment where the short hook would be my forces running south from Burma to Saigon and north from Oz to northern Borneo while the long hook was my Chinese Army reaching the coast of CHina while the US and Ozzies were retaking the Phillipines. The goal was to draw them in with Southern Sumatra and then slowly but surely cut their LOCs until such time as I could force a seaborne rout which I could attrit from the flanks with SC TFs and land-based air.

My point with the above is that just dumping forces into Palembang won't save it or break Japan. It needs to form a part of a greater, multiple theatre plan.

Basically Palembang is the crucial point along the Japanese western Strategic Direction. On the other hand Japan has 4 other Strategic Directions - China, South ( Oz to Pago Pago or suchlike ) and East ( Aleutians to the hinge with the southern Strategic Direction). Each of these strategic directions is sub-divided further into Fronts obviously but you get the idea.

So, Palembang won't achieve its grand strategic potential ( to utterly break Japan ) unless the other strategic directions support it and it is in support of them. With an integrated multi-Strategic Direction plan operating on a phased basis ( a la Bagration ) I think Palembang is an excellent way to break Japan. Just chucking thousands of men into a base at Palembang isn't.


THAT dichotomy is what I and Alfred had been hinting at for a while now - Alfred please pipe up if I'm summarising you poorly. I know it doesn't encompass everything you're getting at but it gives the basic gist, sufficient for the discussion to continue IMO.


Alfred,
As to your points.
1. True. Thus my shorthand of CAs. Some are probably below that but, hell, that's why you have mines .

2. Dutch airforce is pretty inferior. I, in the end, had two good squadrons which could shoot the Japs down with ease. The rest were flying Buffaloes and were my Night CAP over my bases, a job at which they did well. I ended the game with about a dozen Dutch aces... and these were guys mostly flying against Oscars and Zeroes, not bombers. I did, however, pick my fights.

3. "In order to maintain the skies above southern Sumatra blanketed with Allied fighters"... Well, your conclusion is true but I'd argue that with some skill there should be no need to blanket the skies with fighters. A few ambushes from time to time can keep the Japanese honest and scared in my experience. Obviously, this changes against a good player who will simply eschew an emotional response, do the math and send in whatever number it takes to whittle the Allied fighters down. ChezDaJez will not, IMO, do such a unemotional assessment though.

4. True, but don't hit the Japanese ships over Malacca. Hit them when they port at Singers or before they reach Singers. Attempting to send bombers into the Malacca Straits is a death sentence unless you own the Borneon airfields on the west of the straits.

5. True. I think we both agree CJD is likely to get fixated on the nearest obstacle and not, the greatest reward. In this case the plan fits the man, as all good plans must.

6. Aye, but there should be a lot more significant pinning operations going on. That's one of the primary differences between this and my game under similar conditions. To be fair though, CDJ's, mis-allocation of resources is achieving the same end-point. Were he to get some good advice though on what to prioritise and how to do a strategic re-assessment ( not what to prioritise or the conclusion but just how to conduct the thought processes underlying these ) then he might change his modus operandi and the equation would change. I amn't following his AAR so can't very well go over there and do this. You free and in the mood to sandbox him?

7. Hell, never even mind that, where is it stated they have to disembark at a port? Or even in southern Sumatra?

8. True, a while back there was a suggestion to ship another 100,000 to 150,000 tons of supplies in. It was oblique, I'm not sure if it was followed up on.

9. True. I would also point out that a gun, no matter how good, is NO USE unless it is integrated into a cohesive fireplan. I'm not sure, here, if Palembang can be reloaded and I am uneasy re: the extent of its integration into the fireplan. It is, as the Russians would say, one hell of a firesack but what happens if the enemy goes right? [:D]


Conclusion: I agree with your conclusion. I also agree with you regarding the erroneous conclusions which will be drawn although I think less so now.


I will say though it is nice to see the critical analysis going on in this thread. For a while it was almost totally absent from the forums.



Paullus99,
The best way to defeat an enemy is to allow him to do something he thinks will be devastating for which you have a counter he hasn't considered and then to allow him time to over-commit becoming so enamoured of the plan that he views it in too narrow a context.

Then, when the fortress is so full of men that it can never be properly assaulted it is bypassed, constrained by a sufficient screen to keep the fortress hemmed in while disease and starvation take their toll as the bulk of one's army takes the entirety of the region the castle was built to protect. Fortresses are there to serve a strategic goal, not to be impregnable in and of themselves. Making a castle impregnable is not necessarily the right thing to do with a castle. Of course it isn't the wrong thing either, so long as you do the other stuff to prevent bottling up.


Canoerebel, interesting though. But I've got the first turn of a new game so I have to run. I'll reply later if you'd like.

[princep01]

Nemo, thanks for the lengthy explanation of the air war model over Palembang. I see the rationale. I was a bit confused by some earlier comments regarding using A/C over Palembang to protect ships/raiders in that port and contesting Japanese air power over the fortress generally. Those comments (by several writers) seemed to contradict the thought you had offerred that it was not in the Allies' interest to engage in general air attrition with the Japanese in 1942. Again, thank you for the clarification and further analysis.

CR, your last paragraph concerning your opponent's state of mind are right on point in my view. I totally agree with your assessment. Again, I am not reading his AAR, but I believe you gained a pychological victory very early in the game and it is still in place. Judged solely by his moves to date, it appears you clearly caused the diversion of troops back to the Phillipines from some other destination(s). Has this been enough to force abandonment of any thoughts about an auto victory? We may have to await the end of the game to know that, but, if I were betting on it, I'd say affirmative to that.

I am concerned about your comments regarding different views on why we play AE and how that might affect this game. Are you receiving comments to the effect that he thinks your playing style is so ahistorical as to cause him to consider quitting? I sure hope that does not happen. This is a superb AAR and I have enjoyed following this game as much as any AAR I have followed here.

[Canoerebel]

princep, Steve hasn't voiced any concerns since very early in the game when a couple of unusual Allied strategies caught his eye (sending Luzon ships east towards Midway and a combat ship raid against his shipping at Babeldoab).  I believe he's a fan/student of the actual war and tends to enjoy a game that is a decent reflection of what happened in the Pacific.  I think he's just putting things together about Sumatra.  If he is indeed a traditionalist, he's not going to like the total non-traditional nature the game is taking.  That's my assessment, anyhow, and I could be wrong.  He may turn out to love the challenge, but I'm guessing he will be chagrined and enter into a period of re-evalutation to determine if this is the kind of game he enjoys.  But he's also a reliable player with a stellar record who will want to see things through unless some mutual agreement is reach at some point. 

[Canoerebel]

Nemo points out that the Allies aren't currently pressing the enemy on other fronts that would produce synergistic efforts disrupting to the enemy. That is true. But it isn't because I failed to understand the importance of such operations as outlined in his AAR. Rather, it's because I'm not quite as gifted a player (that's just an honest assessment) and because this is a different game and I felt I had to do a few things differently. Allow me to explain.

I had absoltuely no idea what kind of player Chez Da Jez would be. I knew he was experienced. I knew he was reliable. But whether he was a Q-Ball/Nemo-type threat to achieve auto victory I didn't know. I had to assume, though, that he posed a threat of auto victory. This assumption was necessary because I knew he would have the benefit of Q-Ball's experience (from the game between Q-Ball and I). I also knew several capable players were bowing out of my AAR to follow Steve's. Therefore, they would be acting as a "brain trust."

I had initial ideas as to how I would approach a possible enemy auto victory threat to Oz or India. Slowly at first, but then rather rapidly, those ideas gave way to the Fortress Palembang approach. This was first suggested by Nemo early in the game (around December 9, 1942). At first, I intended it to be a local operation comprised mainly of DEI troops, but as the game continued and conditions warranted, it morphed into a more elaaborate Fortress idea drawing troops from India.

Nemo and Alfred (and others) had detailed in Nemo's AAR how Japan might handle a Fortress Palembang sitaution. I had to assume their insights would flow through to Chez, either through his readng or through counsel from his "brain trust." For that reason, I was naturally concerned about the threat to India. Pulling all the Oz and UK troops from there (plus some Indian units) would leave the subcontinent vulnerable. To fill that gap, I decided to commit American troops. This suited me also because my long-term plan in the game (disclosed here for the first time) was to wage war in Burma/Malaya as soon as possible.

Because I was sending all the American troops possible to India (via Capetown), that left me with very little in reserve in the eastern Pacific and West Coast. I have essentially nothing with which to wage an offensive war in the Pacific at this date. The only non-restricted troops are those in Hawaii (I will commit them at some point, but not yet). I did take a stab at Amchitka Island, and I have lots of troops prepping for that base. However, they are all restrictied and I think it would be inefficient to use precious PP to buy them. I'd much rather have units available in India with which to invade Malaya or Burma.

As things have developed (remember, we're not yet three months into the game - it's still very early), I am more convinced now that Steve would definately be thrown off by a major Allied move in NoPac or somewhere else that's important to him (the Solomons would do, I think). It is increasingly likely that a major Allied invasion somewhere imprtant would throw a real kink into his thinking and reduce the likelihood of a move on India. But I had already committed and don't have the necessary PP or unrestricted troops at this point.

The situation in the DEI is developing nicely, however. As a side benefit, the chances are good that the Allies will be able to deliver an effective strike against enemy capital ships. I think such a strike would be as shattering to the enemy as would a successful invasion of the Kuriles or a major base in the Solomons.

There is a chance that the Allies can hold Sumatra throughout the war, depending upon whether the enemy dallies very long or possible even ignores it to his destriment. The more troops I commit, the better the chances. And with the Americans arriving to fill the vaccuum to the rear, I think I can continue to reinforce. Already, I think it would take Japan eight to ten divisions to attend to Palembang in a reasonable amount of time. Even if Steve committed that and began orchestrating the force today, I believe it would take him at least two or three months to finish the job and be ready to move on. So we're already getting into the summer of '42 before he could pose a threat elsewhere if he chooses a Palembang first policy.

Further delays by Japan, further strengthening by the Allies, or bloody defeats for Japan will only lengthen this timetable to the benefit of the Allies.

If Japan bypasses Palembang, there's a chance it could survive into late '42 at which time the Allies can consider going to its rescue.

I'm pretty sure the Allies are going to emerge victorious from this exercise as a totality.

[Canoerebel]

2/22/42

Allied Carriers: Have essentially rendezvoued south of Java, where they'll patrol (protected by a line of picket ships) seeking a chance to strike a large concentration of capital ships. Fuel, as always, is a concern, but I have a fleet of oilers (mostly small ones) that are busy going to and from ports like Oosthaven and Batavia.

Eastern DEI: Some capital ships reported at Kendari; no signs of the Mini-KBs this turn. Since Steve just landed at Koepang, the next major operations might be Java or NW Oz. The former would be more likely to create an opportunity to pounce.

Western DEI: 19th Aussie Bde. is mostly ashore at Benkolen. Lots more units on the way including more Aussies and quite a few support units (base forces, engineers and AA units). The occasional Allied fighter ambushes at Singapore have had the added benefit of disrupting enemy bombing raids, sometimes for many days at a time. As a result, base building has continued. Forts are 3.84. If I can coax that up to four, it probably adds a week to the defense of Singapore.

India: The first American unit is ashore - an AA unit at Bombay. This is significant, because I've stripped most of the Commonwealth and UK AA units from Ceylon and India and sent them to Sumatra.

China: Don't yet know where the IJ stack late of Changsha is heading, but Steve may be playing with a bit of fire. Holding the Japanese MLR in front of Henyang to Changsha are a scattering of troops much to weak to handle 8,000 Chinese AV. The Chinese are working on a plan for an offensive.

Luzon: Yet another "too-soon" IJ deliberate attack at Clark Field comes off at 1:2. The Allied garrison is getting weak, but impatience is costing the Japanese time and troops.

[String]

How many high-level (above 10k ft) AA guns do you have at Palembang?

[JohnDillworth]

India: The first American unit is ashore - an AA unit at Bombay. This is significant, because I've stripped most of the Commonwealth and UK AA units from Ceylon and India and sent them to Sumatra.

What became of the UK 18th Division (I think). The UK division that is on the way to Singers? I always hate to use that Division. Heck, I even hate to use it because you can't rebuild it for years.

[Canoerebel]

2/23/42

18th Division: Parked at Palembang (except the Recce unit, which is at Benkolen but prepping for Palembang).

AA Units: Right now, Palembang has just one additional AA unit (3rd KNIL from Java). Two heavy AA units from Ceylon are on the way (the transprots are making the last stretch of the run now). I don't know how to tell which can fire above 10k feet, but I'm assuming the "heavy" designation is a good thing.

Small Things: Steve recently lost a bunch of Netties at Singapore. He'd like to bring in new bombers, but he needs them right now to hit Clark Field. Thus, the protracted seige at Clark is having the beneficial effect of buying time at Singers, which is now up to 3.87. It may take another week to get up to 4, but at this point I'd probably commit my fighters if needed to get some extra building time. I think that additional level of fortifications could buy the Allies another week at Singers, which in turn will help Sumatra (and possibly any Allied plan to invade Malaya or Burma).

Western DEI: A heck of alot of transprorts are inbound to Benkolen and Oosthaven at the moment. Most of 19th Aussie Bde. is ashore at Benkolen.

Eastern DEI: No signs of Mini-KBs or capital ships congregations. Allied carriers have rendezvoued and are steaming in circles south of Java awaiting a chance.

India: First USA Army RCT arrived at Capetown and is heading for Bombay (but prepping for Georgetown).

China: Still monitoring the Japanese stack and awaiting an opportunity to strike.