Tokyo Rose was a Hussy! Chez (J) vs. Canoe (A)

[Canoerebel]

The Allies could have taken Shikuka had I the political points to buy more units - SigInt showed it to be very lightly guarded. However, there's really no benefit in taking Shikuka unless you also take Toyohara and take both in great strength. It's too easy for Japan to counterinvade under massive LBA cover.

I'm going to do a snap invasion of the dot island south of Onnekotan Jima tomorrow with one xAP and troops having nine AV. As soon as I take Onne and Para tomorrow, I'll consider whether it's worth invading Ketoi Jima (vacant) and Shimishura Jima (garrisoned by a small engineer unit). If I'm going, I need to go immediately. I'm not sure yet, as going for Shimishura will almost certainly result in transport losses to LBA from Hokkaido.

I'm leaning towards going for Amchitka as it improves my position in NoPac and since it will dovetail with my plans to reinforce my MLR. But I have a good five days, maybe longer, before I have to make the decision to buy the Canadians.

As for SigInt, I've never doubted the accuracy of garrison reports. If SigInt reports xx number of men at Goo-Goo Shima, or the Plankton Defense Force at Ichegoomee, those are gospel.

[Smeulders]

An invasion of Amchitka does seem worthwhile, even if there is 240 AV there. Your analysis seems spot on, if you are planning a long stay in the Kuriles you can't afford to have him spotting every convoy moving to or from the area.

[Nemo121]

So, if it is there you should take it. Interesting.

Operational and strategic art is comprised of a purposeful stringing together of acceptances and declinations of combat in pursuit of a higher goal. The declinations are at least as important as the acceptances.

I would ask you what benefits accrue to you from capturing Amchitka and what benefits accrue from not invading it.... Afterward I'll put forward some of my thoughts. Mine my well be wrong of course but I don't think the case is quite as clear-cut as an unlimited upside due to clearing your SLOCs from recon.

[Saros]

The infantry groups are generally pretty bad as combat units. From what I recall they lack any real heavy weapons and don't have great XP/Morale. They are pretty much exactly what their name says. Giant blobs of infantry. A couple of them combine with a rgt/art/rcn unit to make a lightweight division sometime in '43 I think.

[Canoerebel]

Well, Nemo, I've read and re-read, considered and reconsidered, your cryptic (from my point of view) comments. 
 
First, Amchitka is a target not because it's there, but because it's important and the risk is low.  It's important because it's on my LOC and because holding it will encourage Steve to reinforce or to go for other Aleutian bases once he attends to the Kuriles.  If the Allies retake Amchitka, I don't think Steve will ever move against the Aluetians - he'll assume they are strongly fortified, dangerous, and not worth the cost.  Amchitka is low risk because it almost surely won't be contested at sea or in the air.
 
So Amchitka is a worthy objective.  The Allies have the shipping in theater to handle the expedition, and have a high priority on expending PP to buy units to reinforce the Kuriles bases.  Three inexpensive units happen to be prepped for Amchitka, allow the Allied to mount a sequential operation - take Amchitka and then reinforce the Kuriles.
 
The upside to "not accepting battle" at Amchitka is that the Allies could save the 400 or 500 PP needed to buy three Canadian units (or more PP if the Allies get bogged down and need reinforcements).  I think the expenditure is worthwhile.  My PP priorities at present:
 
1)  500 or so needed to reinforce the Kuriles (and invade Amchitka).
2)  2,000 needed at Capetown to buy 27th USA Div. and 4th Marine Regiment.
3)  2,000 or more needed to buy units for planned operations in the Gilberts and at Baker Island.
 
So, the use of 500 in NoPac basically pushes back the other priorities by about 10 days, but I'm not close to needing or being prepared to use the units in categories 2) and 3).  So from a PP standpoint I see no reason not to proceed.
 
What am I overlooking, Nemo?  Or, how am I mis-evaluating things?
 
P.S.  No cryptic or inscrutable replies permitted.  You'll have to write clearly and plainly if I'm missing something quite obvious or important.

[paullus99]

Cano - I think you're looking at this with the correct perspective. If you are able to quickly mop up this small garrison & still be able to move those units to reinforce the Kuriles, then by all means go ahead with it. Of course, you also don't want to get distracted at a time when you've successfully given your opponent another theater to deal with, concurrent with some of your other operations.

Just continue to dot each i & cross each t and you'll be just fine.

[Smeulders]

Maybe Nemo is referring to alternative methods of eliminating Amchitka as a listening post ? It would be relatively easy to shut down the airfield there, but does that stop float planes from operating out of that base ? If it does, than that is probably the preferred method of doing things, your don't risk getting bogged down in a long fight and still achieve your primary objective; denying a recon base to your opponent.

[Canoerebel]

Amchitka's been an enemy listening post since the first month of the war. It has been pretty ineffective, probably due to low supply, but Japan could attend to it and make it more effective in the future. Allied air and sea power could temporarily eradicate Amchitka's utility as listening post, but that would not be a permanent solution if Japan wanted it badly enough.

My primary desire in taking out Amchitka, though, is security of the Aleutians. If Amchitka falls, Steve won't ever venture back. Once he recliaims the Kuriles, he'll be satsified to establish his MLR there and he won't want to stick his nose into what will seem to be a strong Allied MLR in the Aleutians.

Well, the call won't be made on on Amchitka for awhile, so I'll continue to mull things over.

[paullus99]

It may also help to portray a position strength as well - keep your opponent guessing that you're committing a lot more than you are in reality (therefore amplifying his concerns up north, when the real battle is down south).

[Smeulders]

ORIGINAL: Canoerebel
My primary desire in taking out Amchitka, though, is security of the Aleutians. If Amchitka falls, Steve won't ever venture back. Once he recliaims the Kuriles, he'll be satsified to establish his MLR there and he won't want to stick his nose into what will seem to be a strong Allied MLR in the Aleutians.

And is there any problem if he wants to take the Aleutians ? Best case scenario its a good subs/raiding base for operations against the West Coast. It's not going to hurt the Allied position much otherwise, unless you're planning on going for a second round of invasions in the Kuriles. Otherwise it's just more real estate that he'll need to supply and garrison.

As to him strengthening Amchitka, he probably won't be able to until the Kuriles fall, after that I don't think it matters that much. Of course, if you think he can reinforce the island enough so it becomes a viable recon base before you are kicked out of the Aleutians, then there is a good reason to take it.

ORIGINAL: paullus99
It may also help to portray a position strength as well - keep your opponent guessing that you're committing a lot more than you are in reality (therefore amplifying his concerns up north, when the real battle is down south).

That's true, more noise in the North won't hurt.

[Canoerebel]

3/29/42

Kuriles: Para and Onne fall to the Allies. Starting tonight, ACMs will drop mines and then service the two bases. Several TFs carrying the second waves - coastal defense, artillery, engineers and a base force - will arrive. Single DD TFs are patroling to the south to watch for enemy activity. All the APs are already well to the NE and shouldn't have any problems making the journey back to Dutch Harbor. BBs Warspite and Colorado and CL Trenton will replenish from AEs based at Dutch. BBs Tennessee, Maryland and Idaho will remain behind to offer protection. A PBY unit has taken station at Para - I hope patrol activity finds an enemy ship or two so that Steve is aware of it's presence, for that's always a sobering development to the Japanese player - patrol aircraft operating in the Home Land.

Aleutians: I think I will proceed with the second plan - do a snap invasion of Amchitka with the small brigade (85 AV) at Dutch Harbor that's 100% prepped for the target. That doesn't require any PP and it will allow me to gauge the strength of the enemy garrison. It's possible the small brigade and repeated bombings/bombardment runs might be sufficient for the job.

China: The Chinese stack caught and punished IJA 104th Divsiion, which fought with an adjusged AV of zero. All 73 infantry squad casualties were "destroyed," so this division is in bad shape. Supply is the only explanation for its utter falling apart. The Chinese have a 4,000-AV stack roaming the countryside east of Hengyang. They'll take a stab at lightly-defended Kukong, but they're in a race with two IJA units of unknown strength. I want to punish the enemy as much as possible to create the appearance of trouble Japan's southern flank, but I'm very leary of taking on any sizeable Japanese force right now.

Singapore: This base survived another 1:1 attack despite the first enemy air raid in weeks. Steve's probably chewing nails, but his force will take the base very soon (he'll have another division here within the week).

Western Sumatra: The Sabang invasion force is nine hexes out after steaming six hexes this turn. So D-Day should be the day after tomorrow. One well-respected reader categorized this as a "bee sting," but this move is important. Holding Sabang for some time to come will keep secure the Allied shipping lanes from India to eastern Sumatra. The sudden appearance of American regiments, tanks, and a Marine raider battaliion should also cause Steve to wonder just how much the Allies have in theater, complicating his ability to accurately analyze the situation. He'll have to organize a sizeable counter-invasion to regain the lost territory, thus forcing him to allocate between all the important missions pending.

Eastern Sumatra: Osthaven airfield just increased to level five. The big transport TF bringing three American engineer units to Oosthave arrives tonight. Still no obvious enemy move towards Java or Sumatra. A TF with two "CV" reported (but showing 0 fighters, 0 bombers, and 10 auxilliary, which has to mean it's not the KB) is reported moving north from Singkawang into the South China Sea. (I'm trying to minotor shipping to see if I can determine whether Steve diverts his fleet to NoPac or keeps it in place in the DEI).

[Cribtop]

Hey, bee stings hurt! [;)]

[Nemo121]

Well, I don't want to give the answers since that removes the impetus to original thought... PLUS it isn't like most people will, even if I give them a cohesive, structured COA, choose to actually enact that COA. It often isn't even a right or wrong thing its just a style thing.


Let us look at it from basics.
You say you want to take Amchitka because it is a base from which your opponent can gather intelligence.

Maskirovka operations during the Great Patriotic War often involved up to 1/3rd of the total units involved ( that's the ratio I usually aim for in my maskirovkas, 1/3rd supporting the maskirovka, 1/3rd doing the attack and 1/3rd in an OMG directly under control of the Strategic Direction and not the subordinate Front commanders.) in any operation.

The hint in my previous post was around the acceptance and declination of battle. What I was hinting at was that in terms of intelligence a FULL maskirovka both denies and feeds the enemy intelligence and successes/failures in order to build a narrative which will not be dissonant with the enemy's preconceptions/hopes etc. You MOST destabilise an enemy when you let him slowly but surely build a picture which he is comfortable with and then suddenly shift the picture entirely such that you introduce massive amounts of psychologically crippling cognitive dissonance. At this point in time you've invalidated most of your opponents previous OODA cycles and necessitate him completely beginning again from scratch - something hugely stressful for him to do and something which few do successfully. As a result he tries to modify the previous, comfortable plans and falls further and further behind the necessary orientation with the end result that by the end of the battle/campaign his actions are completely contrary to the situation on the ground. A particularly artful way of doing this is to create a situation such that his dissonance drives inappropriate actions which drive him to use his own initiative to drive himself into prepared traps.


Anyways, you are focusing on Amchitka as a means of denying him intelligence. What about using it as a means of controlling your opponent subtly so that he sees what you want him to see and draws the conclusions you wish him to draw from what he sees. In such a situation you can control his observations, influence his decisions and either punish or reward his actions such that you significantly impact his orientation for the next cycle. Eventually, as several cycles complete you gain more and more control over him until such time as you are controlling his orientation and letting him see what you want, when you want, draw the conclusions you want and make the decisions you want - decisions you reward when they feed into your plan and punish when they don't.


Taking Amchitka takes a relatively useless island and robs him of the ability to see what is going on around the Aleutians. Keeping AMchitka alive but suppressed doesn't increase the aerial risk to your forces BUT does allow you to feed information to your opponent as and when you wish. Combine Amchitka with a few other similar setups in other portions of the front and you can begin feeding your opponent a cohesive, logical, comforting picture which is also a complete lie .... said lie only being unveiled at the point in time he is under maximum psychological pressure. This, of course, is designed to bring about a dislocation from his OODA and inappropriate decisions and actions.



Amchitka is an excellent opportunity to begin building the false picture which leads, misleads and undermines your opponent. That's a far greater gain than simply taking some worthless island in order to create a little more unreconned space on the map.


Of course, you may prefer not to play that sort of game but this drive to deny intelligence to the enemy strikes me as strong. YOu can far more easily manipulate someone through choosing what to show them and what not than through simply dropping a veil over everything.



Imagine a narrative in which you suppress Amchitka and bomb it with carrier-based planes which are supporting convoy drives into the Kuriles ( except, of course, you can have carrier-based planes there without them flying from carriers ), bemoan his recon, talk about how it messes with your resupply efforts, are even "seen" to abandon several resupply efforts when spotted... since you fear KB.... and generally commit lots of force to killing the floatplanes operating out of Amchitka. Even post a thread talking about how difficult it is to kill floatplanes at a seabase and question the historicity of this. Your opponent will attribute meaning to such a thread, which is as you wish. Then raise the ante by running a couple of convoys in despite their being spotted. Sacrifice some ships. Change tactics to sending in single ships. Make an offhand mention of supplies being a problem.
Then you invade Amchitka... but something goes wrong with the invasion and onyl 100 or 200 men unload. They are immediately destroyed. You curse the amphibous unloading doctrine and complain about having to read those threads again. Of course you only ever loaded 200 men onto that huge amphibious TF... Men drawn from 3 separate divisions. Let him see you unloading that TF in the Aleutians and draw the appropriate conclusions. YOu are desparate to reinforce the Kuriles, you are sending multiple divisions to take Amchitka and later reinforce the Kuriles but if he moves FAST he can take the Kuriles back first and then move on the Aleutians, trapping multiple divisions if he can impose a sea blockade. But he'll need to commit KB to do it.

At the point in time that he does that the USN invasion TFs which have been sitting it out with the other 99% of those divisions and your CVs attack the central Pacific holdings he has, thus, uncovered and failed to reinforce as he has sent the infantry he has bought out north-east to face your main thrust --- which comprised a couple of regiments and 200 men from 3 divisions as well as some sacrificial xAKs. A cheap diversion which dislocates his forces, his suppositions and his faith in his own strategic appreciation.


I would suggest that something like that would be more beneficial than taking Amchitka and rolling westward. It is a compelling story, requires fewer resources than you would invest and, I think, would draw more IJN/IJA resources and introduce greater cognitive dissonance into your opponents plans when you do unveil it once he has fully committed and hit nothing but empty air.

Of course, each to their own. There's more to winning than strength though. You've won this one as far as I'm concerned. It may be time to practice writing a compelling narrative which promotes opponent buy-in and allows you to begin manipulating him more completely and easily. Might as well practice it in an already decided game where mistakes have minimal repercussions. I think if you talk to most of my opponents most of them usually thought I was up to something very different than I was actually up to and a big part of that was the committment of major forces to actively feeding them a narrative I'd designed to manoeuvre them into a specific situation 3 or 6 months later. Amchitka could be one of the places you begin to do this. I wish to be clear that I'm not holding out my play as the acme of this. I'm on record as saying I just apply the basics strictly. Anyone could do it and I'm sure many could do it better if they had the discipline to simply do the basics well every time.

Again though, taking Amchitka isn't a weak move at all. It just is the same old denial of intelligence stuff... People handle a lack of information ( and adapt to it ) a lot better than they do to finding their entire situation was a fantasy. Since I prefer to try to play the weaker side or run more and more concurrent operations with smaller and smaller tolerances/reserves in order to keep things interesting, the ability to create a situation where the crushingly superior enemy mass is doing something irrelevant while a small force sneaks in and wrecks all their plans appeals to me. But, of course, it may not suit everyone. There's no right or wrong way to play. I think though that you are clearly seeking to improve your play and so I hinted at a more subtle way of dealing with Amchitka so you could consider it.

It may, of course, be something you prefer not to do or find inappropriate or too unlikely to work. You must do what you feel right doing.

[Canoerebel]

Well, Nemo, I just read your post with a slack jaw. Because I see the depth and effectiveness of such a move, but it's one that never occurred to me.

I have run operations like that before. I even had one in mind for Amchitka - BBs Colorado and Warspite, the only two battleships that Steve saw during the invasion - are retiring to Dutch Harbor to replenish. They they're going to bombard Amchitka, so that Steve may think I've left the Kuriles without heavy protection, when in fact Maryland, Tennessee and Idaho are there now.

So, I had come up with a simple little plan that may work and could be effective, but it certainly lacks the immense depth of your plan. You're right, such a move against Amchitka might allow the Allies to dance into the Gilberts almost unopposed.

I'll give this further thought. You were kind to share such detailed thoughts. At the risk of appearing ungracious, I don't want to adopt your suggestions, thus interjecting you into the game in rather dramatic fashion. But I will mull over the depth of your approach and see what I can learn from it, thus helping me not only here, but in crafting maskirovka's in the future.

There may also be factors peculiar to this game that would make it hard or perhaps impossible to engage in what you propose. In the first place, I don't have any unrestricted divisions anywhere close. (Political points are really giving me fits.) I could do it with other units, though. I also want to see if Steve reacts violently to the invasion, throwing the KB or a massive combat force into the area in short order. I think he will either come immediately or he will wait until he has the DEI under better control. As soon as I know that, I'll know whether I have some freedom and space to do stuff, or whether I need to hunker down in the Kuriles while operating more freely and boldly in the DEI. Whichever area he doesn't attend to will get alot of activity.

I hope I made it clear, Nemo, that I am impressed with your analysis and ideas. After your previous post, I really gave the situation alot of thought and came up with some pretty good analysis and plans. But my stuff was high school level while yours iwas part of a doctoral thesis. Thank you.

[Nemo121]

I'd add... Why do you even want to hold the Aleutians? Maybe those three units you mention could be used offensively elsewhere?

P.s. No problem. No need for the hyperbole either. It actually makes me uncomfortable.


I will say that I post here because it is clear that you are trying to and, importantly, ARE improving. It is also clear that you listen and consider all viewpoints put forward. That sort of reflection makes posting worthwhile. I won't say I know better ways of doing things but sometimes I've come up with a few new wrinkles which may be of use when you're in similar situations ( or not, depending on the game and player ).

So, I don't post for you to take the plan. If you were to do that frequently I wouldn't post as I believe in helping others consider new approaches, not telling them what to do. So, no ungraciousness. It is merely something for you to consider and use at a later stage when suitable. I'm glad you took it in the spirit it was intended. Sometimes on here people just choose to lash out rather than think... which makes me reluctant to post in most of the AE forums/threads. Its nice to have a calm place to discuss some stuff.

[Canoerebel]

If Steve elects to ignore the Kuriles invasion to instead focus on the DEI, I want to concentrate on building a truly defensible position in the Kuriles and in the Aleutians. In that event - if Steve keeps his main force down south - it's possible the Allies can fight down there long enough (possibly even prevail) to buy time to reach November. If the Allies still hold the Kuriles when winter arrives, Japan won't retake them (or doing so will cost them dearly there and elsewhere).

If, on the other hand, Steve diverts the KB to the Kuriles immediately, there is no way for the Allies to hold those bases long term (but the Allies would be fairly compensated by the opportunities that would then occur in the DEI and elsehwere).

So, I'm willing to lose the Kuriles and the Aleutians unless Steve basically ignores them long enough for the Allis to turn them into a fortress right above the Home Islands.

[Canoerebel]

You're right about the hyperbole. One time months ago, another forumite pointed out that I was using polemics. Polemics and Hyperbole! Sounds like a Greek law firm. Well, anyhow, I told him I'd tone it down. I'll work on the hyperbole too.

[Nemo121]

And since you'll lose them anyway if he commits significant forces and since there's no way he'll try for them without significant forces your garrisons accomplish what?

He won't go in light so they don't force him to commit more. But if he goes in heavy they won't survive. It seems to me that their impact on the size of his committment will be minimal and their impact on the outcome will also be minimal?

So, is their negligible impact on his committment and losses worth the cost of losing them and the opportunity cost of using them elsewhere?

Just because he attacks something doesn't mean you have to defend it. Him taking the Aleutians won't change this game one whit. So, why commit forces to something which doesn't matter and which won't force him to commit even more disproportionate forces? Just some musings....

[Canoerebel]

That's the debate I'm trying to articulate, Nemo. If Steve shifts his focus from the DEI to the Kuriles, I want to withdraw some of my troops - mainly 41st Division. I'd leave mainly coastal defense behind. But if he keeps his focus on the DEI, there's a chance the Allies can hold the Kuriles. The trick comes in discerning which way he'll go soon enough to have time to extract whatever I want to extract. That's why I noted in my post for 3/29 the IJ carriers reported moving north from Singkawang. That's one of many potential clues I could use to put together a picture of how he'll react.

My hunch is that he's going to attend to the Kuriles immediately, while relying on LBA to cover the Java invasion and postponing the Sumatra invasion. As soon as I feel strongly enough about that hunch, I'll act on it.

[Nemo121]

Yes, I believe you are correct. LBA to cover DEI, KB to faff around doing something strategically irrelevant in the meantime. A true failure to concentrate forces strategically.

P.s. Polemics and Hyperbole... If they were a law firm I bet they'd be great [8D]