Early-game Allied Gamey Tactics

[Nemo121]

Alfred,

Strategic options are about possibility not player strength. To every strategy there is a counter-strategy. To get caught up in the idea that someone didn't use counters in a specific game invalidates the basic concept that there are always counters is, IMO, incorrect.

Also, I would state the following to the points you made:
2. Since I held Rangoon I supplied Burma and CHina via sealift, not supply movement through the jungles. As a result I don't believe the recent changes materially effect the lessons to be learnt.
3. Manchukuo was gutted for troops.
4. Aye, certainly he bet a lot on his artillery but he also brought all the Manchukuo tanks and many of the infantry divisions with him. He didn't JUST bring artillery and then have nothing else available. He tried several attacks with regular forces.
5. True.
6. Not true. I know that was mentioned at some stage but I was also told that he would do his damnedest to beat me. I think what we have here is a bit of PR going on in case things went badly for him. After all, who can be expected to win a "test" game. He and I were very clear that this was a game being played to be won, even if one of the other goals was to test the mod in a live fire game.
7. LOL! I don't think he gave free intel. I think he tried to manage expectations by saying different things in different arenas ( something which is perfectly within his rights and acceptable IMO ). I wouldn't base an argument re: the viability of strategy on a player's PR efforts.

[John 3rd]

Interesting Discussion.

The 'find an opponent you feel comfortable with' argument holds great sway. Instead of gaminess I think the best campaigns occur when the two players feel comfortable enough to talk with each as the game develops and evolves. If that basis starts with openness, trust and communication 95% of any issues that develop will get resolved in a good, equitable manner.

This being said, I do think that some HR are occasionally needed if there is in fact an issue. Dan mentioned two earlier in this thread. I've got a pair running right now in my RA Campaign currently that have been very effective at a perceived issue within the game itself:

1. Altitude Caps: We decided to work on an incremental increase in the maximum allowed altitude for fighters during the war. In theory this reflects, newer tactics, improved technology, and better aircraft.

2. Burma/Eastern India Monsoon: Having read several of the Burma Campaign books and participated in a couple of spirited Thread discussions we decided on an extreme Monsoon Rule where NO OFFENSIVE movement, combat, and limited air sorties (due to base size) are allowed through the Monsoon months. This has truly slowed down the pace of operations in a hyperactive (my view) area of AE.

These HR are simple attempts to address perceptions within the game. Are they truly needed? It is player opinion but I thought it might be fun to contribute to the discussion with these thoughts...

[Nemo121]

Aye, player you feel comfortable with is the key. Everyone's perception of what is reasonable is different so you just need to find someone whose perception is pretty similar to your own.

[Fallschirmjager]

Me and DivePac are currently playing a game with virtually no house rules. So far the game is pretty much historical. The only divergence so far is that he nabbed Port Blair four turns ago with a paradrop. But I had not reinforced it either. We are in the last few days of December and things are progressing down a pretty historical path.
But both of us are cautious players. I have not needlessly thrown away my units like a lot of Allied AAR's that I read. He is also very cautious in that he keeps his operations in line with his capabilities and every operation has ample air and sea cover.

[mike scholl 1]

ORIGINAL: Alfred

It is all well and good to advise picking a compatible opponent but some of the regulars are quite competitive. I can well envisage a player wanting very much to test their skills against a strong player even though they are not really compatible in terms of both sharing the same outlook about what is OK in the game.

Alfred

They certainly can be..., but if you chose to play against them then you should be ready to face such opposition without complaint. I was referring to someone seeking a game they would enjoy by playing in a manner they felt comfortable with. Seeking a game with an opponant who is skillfull and aggressive in applying game options "imaginatively" is something to be sought only by those desiring this type of challange in their game experiance.

[Blackhorse]

ORIGINAL: Canoerebel

Up until recently I thought two house rules were necessary in the game:  (1) no movement of units across national borders without paying PP, and (2) no strategic bombing in China until 1944.

I am now pretty sure that the first of these isn't necessary, and an argument can be made that the second isn't necessary either, though I'm not positive on that one yet.

All the other house rules can be dismissed, as there are direct counters and indirect counters that can negate the "abuse" or the abuse really isn't that big a deal.

I would certainly consider playing a no house rules game against any decent opponent, with only strat bombing in China giving me any real concern.

A point of clarification:

Would "no house rules" include the freedom for the Allied player to move all ships/planes/land units on turn 1?

[crsutton]

As the Allied player I know a few things about the Japanese dispositions. I also know that I am going to get my ass handed to me at Pearl Harbor on turn one. So far, I have yet to figure out a way to game this one....

[Fallschirmjager]

ORIGINAL: Blackhorse

ORIGINAL: Canoerebel

Up until recently I thought two house rules were necessary in the game:  (1) no movement of units across national borders without paying PP, and (2) no strategic bombing in China until 1944.

I am now pretty sure that the first of these isn't necessary, and an argument can be made that the second isn't necessary either, though I'm not positive on that one yet.

All the other house rules can be dismissed, as there are direct counters and indirect counters that can negate the "abuse" or the abuse really isn't that big a deal.

I would certainly consider playing a no house rules game against any decent opponent, with only strat bombing in China giving me any real concern.

A point of clarification:

Would "no house rules" include the freedom for the Allied player to move all ships/planes/land units on turn 1?

I know you were not asking me. But there are two rules that I consider to be understood enough to not even be worth mentioning as house rules. And those are 'no moving anything for the Allies on turn 1 unless it is already in a TF' i.e. it is ok to move your carriers and TF Z but it is not ok to move anything out of Manila or Pearl.
And the second rule that is to be understood is no carrier hunting on turn 1. The Japanese player can easily split up KB and cover the area SW of Pearl on turn 1 and nail both TFs even if you move your carriers. Allied TF's don't get a movement bonus so there is only a limited radius in which they can move.

[CV 2]

ORIGINAL: Blackhorse

A point of clarification:

Would "no house rules" include the freedom for the Allied player to move all ships/planes/land units on turn 1?

My point of view on this is simple: If the Japanese deviate from "historical" why cant the allies? If Japan leaves the home waters with their BBs, the allies would know about it. For the most part their diplomats were looking out the window and seeing what was where in mainland Japan. If a large Japanese force was headed for say Java on turn 1, you dont think the Dutch / British / Americans would alert forces and position them to intercede? You bet they would (Watch Tora Tora Tora and see how much interest there was in 5 troop ships headed in the direction of Malaya). Signals int, civil air flights, and civilian boats would warn of a Japanese landing force headed for say Rabul. Remember that Wake, Guam and others were pit-stops for Pan Am Airlines flying regular routes through the area. Not to mention scads of "unaccounted for" military transport aircraft of all types coming and going. The Pearl Harbor striking force took the route they did to avoid these possible civilian spotters.

[Mac Linehan]

ORIGINAL: Bullwinkle58

ORIGINAL: Nikademus

Multi day turns help reduce this Hand of God type command ability. I recommend 2 days as the optimal balance. If you REALLY want a challenge do 3 day turns. Most frown severely at 3 days, but I played a 3day campaign back in Stock days......it was difficult but it WAS dooable and i never had a WitP game go faster (in real time terms) Within several weeks myself and my opponent were in the third quarter of 1942. As most players know.....most Grand Campaign games, due to size and scope, rarely get past 1942 before someone resigns. 1943 is more rare.......44 still more. VERY FEW have actually completed a full PBEM grand campaign from start to finish (1941-45) You can probably count them on one hand (1 finger per pair of players)

This point isn't made often enough. So much forum bandwidth going over and over and OVER the percieved sins of 1942 on the gaminess spectrum, when so few players ever see much beyond that. A shame.

As an Allied player who has gotten to late 1944 twice, and August 1945 once, I say let the Japanese do player do ANYTHING he wants in 1942. Every decision he makes has a counter and unless there's an auto-vic nothing, absolutley nothing, the Japanese side can do in 1942 will matter by mid-1945. The Allied whiners just need to play long enough to get there and see what a Thor's Hammer they will wield.

Moose -

Well said. My pbem is a modded campaign game, with some serious changes and additions to both sides. I want the Japanese to be a very difficult and challenging opponent for as long as possible. There are no house rules, just the "rule of reason" and a Gentleman's trust and honor, between players.

Edit - I must add, after reading further into this thread (all good stuff, Gents!), that, on turn one, I will only move existing TF's. We do discuss various issues, and neither one of us hesitates to ask regarding any concerns we might have. Communication is very important.

Mac

[Local Yokel]

I take it as read that the Allied player should not be obliged to expose Force Z to air attack by Indo-China based land attack planes. I also wonder whether a Japanese decision to forego a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor might be encouraged by a VP bonus. If nothing else, it might promote some variation of the usual course of events if the US retains the ability to implement the Rainbow warplans.

On the subject of Force Z, it has always seemed to me that the Japanese were taking a big risk by reliance as a countermeasure only on 22 Air Flotilla's naval attack capability. Where is the sense in putting two WW1 battlecruisers at risk of an encounter with a 1941-vintage battleship (Prince of Wales)? The folly of doing just that was clearly revealed eleven months later at Guadalcanal II. For my money, there's a good case for one or both Nagato class battleships moving south and taking the place of the two Kongos as soon as the Japanese get wind of Force Z's arrival at Singapore on 28 November. So far I've found no way of reproducing such a move in-game, other than by editing ships' starting locations.

This isn't the only oddity of initial Japanese dispositions. Why, for example, are the Manado and Ternate invasion groups located at Hainan rather than the Palaus? Makes no sense to me.

[CV 2]

Force Z did not arrive at Singapore until 2 Dec 41. The other light forces in the area (British, Dutch, and US) would have been no match for the cover force the Japanese had.

Interesting link on the subject: http://www.forcez-survivors.org.uk/

This question and answer makes me seriously question the op losses in the game:
"Q- What were your total losses in aircraft in these three squadrons up until they captured JAVA?

A- Altogether GENZAN lost two, MIHORO one, KANOYA three."

Out of 3x36 plane units, from the beginning of the war until the capture of Java, they lost a total of 6 aircraft. 4 of the 6 in the attack on Force Z.

[Deca]

ORIGINAL: Bullwinkle58
This point isn't made often enough. So much forum bandwidth going over and over and OVER the percieved sins of 1942 on the gaminess spectrum, when so few players ever see much beyond that. A shame.

As an Allied player who has gotten to late 1944 twice, and August 1945 once, I say let the Japanese do player do ANYTHING he wants in 1942. Every decision he makes has a counter and unless there's an auto-vic nothing, absolutley nothing, the Japanese side can do in 1942 will matter by mid-1945. The Allied whiners just need to play long enough to get there and see what a Thor's Hammer they will wield.

Well said.

That's one of the best points I've seen in a very long time as well as something that I am also in complete agreement.

[Local Yokel]

ORIGINAL: CV 2

Force Z did not arrive at Singapore until 2 Dec 41. The other light forces in the area (British, Dutch, and US) would have been no match for the cover force the Japanese had.

I beg your pardon; you are quite correct. I had been thinking of the date on which, according to Lt Iki Haruki of the Kanoya Kokutai, the Japanese learned that Force Z was en route Singapore via Colombo. My point being that the Japanese had the opportunity, had they wished, of despatching to the South China Sea warships that would be the equal of those in Force Z prior to commencement of hostilities. Put another way, Prince of Wales trumps Kongo/Haruna, but Nagato/Mutsu trump Prince of Wales.

[CV 2]

But the main 6 BBs couldnt leave Japanese home waters as it would tip the allies off that something was up, and they knew it. Which goes back to what I was saying originally. If the Japanese player changes "the plan", the allies should be allowed to react to those changes. Depending on what they are of course. If the Jap player stays far enough away from allied bases (say 5+ hexes for an example) and limits movements south and east of Kwajalein) then no problem. I had 1 game in WitP where Japan invaded Kendari, Java, and Midway on turn 1. I think the allies would have seen that coming [;)]

[ilovestrategy]

CV 2, that's why you talk to your potential pbem opponent before choosing him.

[Local Yokel]

In what sense does the arrival of Nagato and Mutsu at Cam Rahn Bay "tip the allies off that something was up" any more than the southward movement of troop transports to which you've already drawn attention? To the suggestion that these ships' appearance is a further signal of hostilities' imminence, the Japanese retort is "So what?" The Allied powers have no practical way of levelling the imbalance of naval power in the S. China Sea within the timescale to which the Japanese are working.

[CV 2]

Well, not having lived though the times in the early 40s myself, all I can go by is what Ive read and what are considered "well researched" movies of the time (such as Tora, Tora, Tora), and what I have heard from my parents (dad was in the 96th division on Leyte and Okinawa, and mom was in the USO at camp Adair, both deceased now). In that particular movie at least they seemed to place a huge amount of interest in where the Japanese BBs were. And seemingly didnt feel there was much of a real threat of immediate attack because those BBs were "still in home waters". This is what I base my opinion on.

I think they were alarmed that the Japs were moving stuff around to be sure, but the fact that the BBs "were still in home waters" led them to believe that an attack was not imminent. Im guessing that the feeling at the time was the Jap BBs would spearhead any offensive action by the Japanese.

[PaxMondo]

ORIGINAL: CV 2

I think they were alarmed that the Japs were moving stuff around to be sure, but the fact that the BBs "were still in home waters" led them to believe that an attack was not imminent. Im guessing that the feeling at the time was the Jap BBs would spearhead any offensive action by the Japanese.

I beleive that was very much the thinking of pre-Dec 7, 1941 ...

[dr.hal]

I think CV2 has a strong point, it is almost impossible to step back into the minds of folks and their pre 7 Dec 41 thinking, much like now it is increasingly difficult to think of a pre 9/11 world and what we COULD do then. In my readings of the period, and despite such events as Taranto and a swordfish aircraft winging the Bismark (which still needed other BBs to "finish off") the mindset of most decision makers of importance was that the Battleship (see Willmott's "Battleship") was supreme. "National Intentions" were "read" by looking toward those ships, not the aircraft carriers (although they were certainly watched). Witness the Japanese reaction to the US battleship divisions moving to Pearl. So the Nagoto's, et al, move south might have triggered more reaction than we are giving minds of the time credit for. Of course this is speculation, but it is speculation based on some other events of the time.