Air Exploit?

[ComradeP]

Air superiority in autumn/spring and winter is less important than in summer, due to the decreased chance that aircraft will actually carry out their missions (which in turn means there are fewer planes to deal with).

Keeping a limited amount of fighter squadrons at the front, which you rotate from time to time with fresh ones would be enough.

You can't really expect to keep bombing air bases at a regular pace in bad weather turns to begin with.

[Mehring]

Keeping a limited amount of fighter squadrons at the front, which you rotate from time to time with fresh ones would be enough.

Enough to nerf the Luftwaffe?

[ComradeP]

Enough to contest air superiority. As said, due to the chance that missions are cancelled, bombing air bases becomes more problematic as the weather worsens.

[Mehring]

When do Russian fighters get to contest air superiority with the Luftwaffe in 41-42, let alone in the limited numbers you suggest? Sounds like the piecemeal destruction of the Russian fighters to me- target practice for German fighters, and regardless of weather, which affects both sides, if they want it, the German bombers too.

Even according to your scenario, Germany has uncontested air superiority all through summer 1941. In reality, their superiority will continue at least into 1942.

[Nikademus]

Here is some information that might be useful to the Devs (if they don't already have it of course). Let me repeat that I have not had the pleasure yet of playing the game but own it. I'm hoping to get some time later this year. The subject is interesting to me as I did alot of work on "air" within the WitP team along with some minor input for AE. The situation described, as mentioned, bears some similarities to challenges faced with the air model of AE.

Anyway.....These figures kind of serve to further chargrin me in realizing that Gary Grigsby had it right the first time in regards WitP. (some changes i pushed through years ago ultimately proved to be ill advised in regards airbase attack. [:)] )

The first set of data is based on German records for early 1942. What makes 1942 facinating in regards to this topic is the dearth of ground losses for both sides in comparison to 1941 during Barbarossa.

Luftwaffe losses. (A2A/Ground)

Jan 42..138/20
Feb 42..176/10
Mar 42..192/30
April 42..111/14
May 42.. 230/22
June 42..199/28

Total: Jan 42 - June 42: 1,046 planes lost A2A and 124 planes lost on the ground.

Soviet losses** (A2A/AA/Ground)

Jan42..207/43/77
Feb42..554/106/232
Mar42..1040/100/251
Apr42..443/98/111
May42..1394/308/108
June42..1561/267/76

Total:

5,199 planes lost A2A
922 planes lost to AA
855 planes lost on Ground

**German estimates. Soviet sources dispute the ground losses in particular. NorthWestern Front as a printed example, cited only 34 planes lost on the ground in this same period of time.

Per the Author, the ground loss estimate is approx a ten-fold exageration (whilst the A2A is around 2:1) so this would estimate Soviet ground losses via airbase attack at around 100-150ish in a six month period. Per the author, the Soviets in particular had learned the lessons well in dispersing and camaflauging their aircraft on the ground so as to not suffer a repeat of the VVS catastrophy in 41.

The following figures are from July42 - Nov42:

Luftwaffe (A2A/Ground)

July 42..252/12
Aug 42..269/40
Sept 42..265/19
Oct 42..106/14
Nov 42..147/11

Total: 1,039 planes lost A2A and 96 lost on ground (airbase attacks)

Soviet (A2A/AA/Ground)

July42..1282/148/214
Aug42..2256/593/119
Sept42..2548/621/98
Oct42..892/150/32
Nov42.. 437/130/24

Total:

7,415 planes lost A2A
1,642 planes lost to AA
487 planes lost on ground (airbase attack)


Author comments:

Both sides paid close attention to carrying out airbase raids. In any event only rarely did they result in any signifigant success from the attackers point of view, most notably during the summer of 42, on 7/27/42 when 28 Soviet aircraft were put out of commission at Illarionovskoye and on the night of 10/11 aug 42 when 25 German aircraft were put out of commission at Dugino Airdrome. It is noteworthy that the Luftwaffe failed to bring about any repeat performance of it’s extremely successful airbase raids that occurred during the summer of 41, Thus through sept 42, 1VA [1st Air Army] filed only 3 aircraft as destroyed through German airbase raids. When the Soviets carried out such raids in daylight they frequently cost the attackers very high losses.

My thoughts:

I think it is noteworthy to mention that even the claims posted for ground losses would hardly cause either side to "run out of planes" The admitted losses, even entertaining the possibility that they underestimate actual losses (as Soviet sources are often accused of having been scrubbed for propaganda purposes) on the ground, it still seems obvious given this, the biggest air/ground conflict of WWII, was a battle where the attrition was suffered largely over the battlefield in the air. It's also noteworthy that both sides DID try continually to hit each other's airbases so the argument that well.....maybe they just needed a diff strategy or needed to try harder would result in what is being reported in WitE, also doesn't seem to bear out.

I mentioned Gary. Originally, as was the case with Pacific War.....WitP saw few and infrequent actual plane losses after airbase attacks. Thus, both sides were able to keep going and it took time and effort to suppress bases, mainly via a2a combat and airfield damage (not by destroyed planes per se) IIRC, it was also pretty hard to consistantly take out planes on the ground with the original WiR as well.

Sources tapped:

Black Cross/Red Star The air war over the Eastern Front volumes II and III by Christer Bergstrom, Andrey Mikhailov, Andrey Dikov and Vlad Antipov.

[Ketza]

Wasnt the core issue for the Germans a pilot issue and not a plane issue from 42 on?

[Speedysteve]

Even more so from 43 onwards.......

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: Ketza

Wasnt the core issue for the Germans a pilot issue and not a plane issue from 42 on?

generally speaking, yes. The start of the USAAF bombing campaign in 43 did result in loss of numbers, primarily fighters over the Eastern front which helped the VVS obtain air superiority as the Jagdwaffe units were transferred to defend the Reich. Ultimatley while production ramped up (at least in terms of fighter planes), the attrition rate and loss of fuel plants resulted in the German training program not being able to cope with the demand. In other words, what happened to Japan happened to Germany, it just took longer.

Bergstrom does note however that even in victory the Luftwaffe was slowly but surely being worn out and ground down in the Eastern Front because the Soviets just never quit and their pilots' morale remained high...in spite of massive losses at times. For example, from June 41 to Dec 41, the Luftwaffe lost 13,742 men, including ground personel. (of these 3231 were killed, 2028 missing and 8453 injured). Material wise, during the same period the Luftwaffe lost 2,093 planes (758 bombers, 568 fighters, 170 dive bombers, 330 recon planes and 267 miscellaneous) *plus* another 1,362 planes damaged (including 473 bombers and 413 fighters) So during this period of the 4,653 Luftwaffe planes destroyed or damaged in the war, 3,827 were lost/damaged on the Eastern Front.

For the Luftwaffe, this was a staggering attrition....and this was while they were WINNING. The VVS determination to keep fighting also caused severe morale issues within the Luftwaffe. Whilst they had had a good taste of what it's like to square off against an opponent that refuses to lie down in England in 1940, the sheer scale of the Eastern Front and the dramatic determination of the VVS, even after staggeringly lopsided losses to keep fighting, including the use of Taran (ramming tactics) severely depressed German bomber and fighter crews alike. It was unsettling.

[Mehring]

Good information. What about losses through exceeding engine life and the like? Is this adequately represented in game?

[ComradeP]

When do Russian fighters get to contest air superiority with the Luftwaffe in 41-42, let alone in the limited numbers you suggest? Sounds like the piecemeal destruction of the Russian fighters to me- target practice for German fighters, and regardless of weather, which affects both sides, if they want it, the German bombers too.

Even according to your scenario, Germany has uncontested air superiority all through summer 1941. In reality, their superiority will continue at least into 1942.

It seems we're talking about different periods now. I'm talking about recovering from the losses from Luftwaffe attacks during bad weather turns and leaving only a relatively small number of fighter/fighter bomber groups near the front. You contest the air superiority during the summer. Early on, losses in aircraft, like in tanks, are not too important for the Soviets as they can recover them during the bad weather turns. You can bomb the VVS to keep it fairly small, but it will take the Luftwaffe a lot more time to replace their highly experienced crews than it will take the VVS to train mediocre pilots. It's a war of attrition and with the current air model, a clever Soviet opponent can win an air base bombing war of attrition, especially when the German bomber production downsizes significantly in 1943.

-

Nikademus: the figures you posted should be put into perspective, as only then will it be clear how the Luftwaffe performed when facing both Western Allied air forces and the VVS, which is needed if the losses the VVS could inflict are to be judged.

Although they might seem high, they're much lower than the losses in the active months of the campaign in the West in 1940. The average monthly losses on the Eastern Front in 1941 of, according to Murray, 714 planes per month destroyed/damaged are about half that of what the Luftwaffe suffered in the west, where ~617 planes were destroyed per month alone and close to 800 were damaged.

Output of aircraft was not the main problem after the first increases in production, the main problems were pilot quality related to constant reductions in training time and fuel shortages. Although the Luftwaffe had lost air superiority by 1943, it was still contesting control of the skies and the USAAF didn't really deal knockout blows until 1944.

Between January 1941 and June 1944, 31.000 Luftwaffe pilots and other crew members were lost in the air. Between June 1944 and October 1944 the Luftwaffe lost 13.000 pilots and other crew members. Daytime USAAF fighter operations downed 3706 planes in 1944. In terms of aircraft output, even that was somewhat sustainable as long as there were some periods of rest, but the pilots and other crew members could never be replaced.

What about losses through exceeding engine life and the like? Is this adequately represented in game?

Higher reliability ratings should lead to more crashes and more damaged aircraft.

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: ComradeP
Nikademus: the figures you posted should be put into perspective, as only then will it be clear how the Luftwaffe performed when facing both Western Allied air forces and the VVS, which is needed if the losses the VVS could inflict are to be judged.

It was not my intention to compare the preformance of the Luftwaffe between the Eastern and Western Fronts. I was mainly interesting in comparing what the players are desrcribing in terms of successful airbase attacks vs. what both sides (Luftw and VVS) were recording on the ground/over their own airbases in 1942.

The information would seem to support the authors (Bergstrom and company) contention that airbase attacks in 1942 were not very effective and often costly to the attacker in the caes of the VVS. An interesting factoid is that in 1942 the VVS bomber force largely confined itself to night bombing and was largely absent from daylight sorties. The few times they did....such as when attempting to hit Luftwaffe airbases and/or support their ground forces, they got cut up badly by the Jagdwaffe. "If" players are able to ground down the Luftwaffe by a succession of continual daylight airbase attacks in 42 without suffering a level of attrition that even the VVS cannot afford...then i'd say there's a problem.

[ComradeP]

Historical air field attacks tended to be (much) smaller in size than the missions we can launch in the game. Currently, even though more planes are participating than was historically normally the case, the result is still as if only a handful of planes are participating (low numbers of destroyed and damaged aircraft).

Air base bombing missions shouldn't be too deadly in terms of aircraft destroyed on the ground, but they should in my opinion at the least result in more damaged aircraft and more interceptors shot down in the air when the attacker sends a large number of aircraft (100+) over.

[ComradeP]

I have absolutely no idea how or why, but my air base bombing mission results have gotten a lot better suddenly, whilst I haven't changed any settings. This is puzzling to say the least. I bombed 400 planes last turn, when I stopped because my own losses were at 81 for the turn (Soviet toal losses were at 555, excluding the ~200 planes that were destroyed during training missions).

[davetheroad]

Maybe there should be a 'bug out' setting on the air doctrine screen?
When units are below a certain level they withdraw to the rear.
This takes place DURING the turn
Having to suffer for several days because command decisions are only made Tuesdays looks crazy to me!.

as it appears that, apart from the first turn or so, airfield attacks were not causing many casualties.
The 'problem' is the player will launch dozens of attacks on the same airbase which the historical command
would not do.

Introduce the law of diminishing returns and count the number of attacks
Applies from turn 2

attack 1 - normal, bombers which reach the target bomb
attack 2 - half the bombers reaching the target attempt to bomb
attack 3 - quarter of the bombers attempt to bomb
attack 4 - eighth of bombers etc etc
etc
etc

so you can burn all those resources and continue to attack but it will be a pointless exercise and just give you RSI!

[davetheroad]

Got bored last night so did some internet delving plus tossed a few bones and raked about in some entrails

apparently the russian oil production went from 31 million tons in 1940 to 19.3 million tons in 45

they had great difficulty in producing high octane avgas, only about 25% of their avgas was suitable for modern planes

they relied heavily on lend lease for high octane stuff

on average from domestic/LL sources 0.55 million tons of high octane per year.

742.5 million litres

10,000 Yak9D flying ONE max range sortie consume 6.5 million litres

calculate calculate

114 sorties PER YEAR

You might have a 10,000 sized airforce but you certainly can't fly it all the time!

Question. how does the game handle AVGAS ?

[Tarhunnas]

ORIGINAL: davetheroad

Got bored last night so did some internet delving plus tossed a few bones and raked about in some entrails

apparently the russian oil production went from 31 million tons in 1940 to 19.3 million tons in 45

they had great difficulty in producing high octane avgas, only about 25% of their avgas was suitable for modern planes

they relied heavily on lend lease for high octane stuff

on average from domestic/LL sources 0.55 million tons of high octane per year.

742.5 million litres

10,000 Yak9D flying ONE max range sortie consume 6.5 million litres

calculate calculate

114 sorties PER YEAR

You might have a 10,000 sized airforce but you certainly can't fly it all the time!

Question. how does the game handle AVGAS ?

Good point and interesting data! You would have to add lend lease to that, have no Idea of the amount, but I think I have it in a book somewhere, I'll check when I find it.

[Mehring]

Question. how does the game handle AVGAS ?

It doesn't AFAIKS, and its another aspect of logistics that needs modelling.

[davetheroad]

LL avgas is included

LL delivered about 1.2? million tons of avgas for the war.

I don't have the annual delivery figures

My figures are very approximate but it is interesting that this subject ties in well with the front wide offensive thread.

All the data should be out there somewhere

The western allies experience might be helpful as well as a plane fuel tank is a plane fuel tank. russian planes don't have higher miles per gallon ratings.

[ComradeP]

It seems I have to retract my statement regarding casualties from air base attacks, as I'm now able to destroy 400-500 planes on the ground/in the air over the air fields per turn. I still don't know why I suddenly started to get better results, maybe I ran into some kind of glitch. The "right click" way to launch the mission seems to cause more casualties than the "shift right click and select air groups" way. Damaged aircraft still seem a bit low, but the casualties seem reasonable.

Results of the air campaign thus far at the end of turn 15.

[Mehring]

There ya go. I'm not sure the shift right click has so much to do with it, I always use that. I guess this system is full of vagueries as you can't see the dice rolls or even know what rolls are being made, a cause of much frustration but also part of it's attraction.