Midway

[Chickenboy]

ORIGINAL: AW1Steve

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

Guys-that approach isn't called for...come on now. [:-]

I couldn't agree more![:(]

Why can't you do a Midway scenario and expect different results? We have Coral Sea and the Kiska/Attu invasions. And you definately won't get those to come out as in real life. (In fact if you try it in the Thousand Mile war , you'll definately get your head handed to you!). I for one would like to see a lot more short sceanrios. And I applauld anyone making them. [&o]

Again, Steve-you talk sense. That's twice in one day too! [;)]

I agree.

[mdiehl]

Let's see what the game actually does. Ney?

Sure, why not? Just as long as you don't attempt to generalize about plausible history using the results that the game produces.

[steamboateng]

Herwin's point is right on!
Regardless of the viabilty of the USN op plan (quite simple and direct); or the failure of the IJN op plan (complicated and unreliable): the game mechanics cannot reflect the actual tactical realities.
Nimitz/Fletcher/Spruance relied on catching the IJN CV's in the vulnerable position of engaging Midway's defences. Again, a simple and sound tactical plan.
Yamamoto/Nagumo relied on available and faulty intel regarding the location of the US CV's. The IJN was tardy in forming a cordon around Pearl Harbor to track US CV movements. Yamamoto assumed the US carriers were still
at Pearl. Nagumo followed the IJN timetable, seeking surprise, and committed his carriers to a strike at Midway, prior to confirming no US carriers were present.
In game terms, it matters not how well either of these fleets had planned prior to battle. All things being equal, in the 24 hour turn of the battle; search planes away, airgroupes set for Naval Atack, weather, etc. etc.; the results will not
reflect the realities of the tactical situation (save for some mighty lucky US dice rolls).

[herwin]

I'm also interested in Nimitz rating a level 4 airbase (with adequate supply, support, and squadrons) as roughly equivalent to a carrier. That gives us a calibration point for the game, especially as there was a second calibration point (reported by Hughes) that two carriers were needed to defeat one carrier.

[vettim89]

ORIGINAL: herwin

ORIGINAL: vettim89

The problem with any Midway scenario is that the RL results were predicated on Yamamoto's plan being executed flawlessly. The prime facets of that plan that didn't go Yamamoto's way was that the USN was laying in wait for the IJN CVTF when they arrived off Midway. They were supposed to be at PH and only sortie either right before or immediately after the island fell into Japanese hands. Ergo, the first strikes from KB went to neutralizing Midway's AB. As players using a "Midway" scenario, we would know the except dispositions of both fleets. It would be highly unlikely that you could achieve even a draw for the USN under those conditions.

You can achieve Midway like results in AE but the will need to be set up in a similar situation: USN surprises the IJN by being some where they were not expected

Nimitz, knowing the Japanese fleet dispositions, expected a draw. Hughes's analysis is similar. Given enough replications we can see how balanced the game really is and identify the sources of imbalance.

Harry,

I respectfully disagree. AE was a game designed to simulate the entire PTO in WWII. The relevant parts of the Battle of Midway started at 0430 when the scouts were launched and ended at 1705 when Enterprise's SBD's hit Hiryu. Asking a simulation that is designed to cover 1346 days (or more) of the war to accurate portray less than thirteen hours is not rational. Basically you seem to be saying if AE cannot accurately reflect the events 1/2 of one turn that it needs to be modfied. I respect your right to hold that opinion but it seems not to be reality based in my mind

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: vettim89

ORIGINAL: herwin

ORIGINAL: vettim89

The problem with any Midway scenario is that the RL results were predicated on Yamamoto's plan being executed flawlessly. The prime facets of that plan that didn't go Yamamoto's way was that the USN was laying in wait for the IJN CVTF when they arrived off Midway. They were supposed to be at PH and only sortie either right before or immediately after the island fell into Japanese hands. Ergo, the first strikes from KB went to neutralizing Midway's AB. As players using a "Midway" scenario, we would know the except dispositions of both fleets. It would be highly unlikely that you could achieve even a draw for the USN under those conditions.

You can achieve Midway like results in AE but the will need to be set up in a similar situation: USN surprises the IJN by being some where they were not expected

Nimitz, knowing the Japanese fleet dispositions, expected a draw. Hughes's analysis is similar. Given enough replications we can see how balanced the game really is and identify the sources of imbalance.

Harry,

I respectfully disagree. AE was a game designed to simulate the entire PTO in WWII. The relevant parts of the Battle of Midway started at 0430 when the scouts were launched and ended at 1705 when Enterprise's SBD's hit Hiryu. Asking a simulation that is designed to cover 1346 days (or more) of the war to accurate portray less than thirteen hours is not rational. Basically you seem to be saying if AE cannot accurately reflect the events 1/2 of one turn that it needs to be modfied. I respect your right to hold that opinion but it seems not to be reality based in my mind

I respect your opinion, but if that's what you want to play, I can recommend Mark Herman's Empire of the Sun or Victory Games Pacific War. [8D]

[Bill Durrant]

I respect your opinion, but if that's what you want to play, I can recommend Mark Herman's Empire of the Sun or Victory Games Pacific War.

Excellent = where are the forums for these games so we can discuss the issues there. Meantime, back to WitP AE

[AW1Steve]

I second the nomination that someone create the scenario! And lots more too! More! More! [:D]

[Shark7]

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

Well, I guess it sounded like you're saying you can't really tell who'd have won the Battle of Midway based on the operational plans. If that's what you're saying, then we don't agree. Yeah, small things could have been different, but absent throwing the entire Japanese operational plan into the toilet and coming up with a completely different plan, the overwhelming central tendency would be (in any similar situation) for the USN to win. Not because it's the USN, but because the Japanese operational plan stunk.

Their recon plan stunk because their CVs did not do their own recon. ONE USN CV could mount more search a.c. as a matter of doctrine than the entire Japanese strike force at Midway, and the USN had three carriers and the PBYs and B-17s to draw upon for that purpose.

Changing the Japanese recon plan requires that you imagine that Japanese did not use CVs and CAs, together, at all the way that they trained to use them for decades. So you're entering the realm of, IMO, implausible fantasy. Kind of like "what if the USN torpedoes had all been extensively tested so that all air and sub torps were as reliable as the British or Japanese ones" assumption. It's an interesting "what if," but it's really outside the parameter of things like operational planning and general strategy. So, there's "scenarios" in which you get to change all of that. But from a historical pov they are, in my view, implausible.

So when you say "change 1 float plane's search result and you get different results" then we agree. But in my view the range of plausible variation, at Midway, on that date, with the forces and plans as intended, the overwhelming central tendency would be a crushing US victory. That the US won, there, comes as no surprise at all, to me.

Then I have another anecdotal observation. Apart from Midway, the USN and IJN had carrier clashes in three battles in 1942. In *none* of them did the Japanese walk away with a victory of any kind. They lost more A6Ms to F4Fs in head to head engagements between the two types. They failed in all of their strategic objectives. And the Japanese received crippling setbacks to their CV and pilot force in EACH of those engagements to force the substantial withdrawal of carrier support in contested theatres. In every instance the US was able to maintain a working carrier in the area, despite being outnumbered, deck-wise, in every battle.

I think Midway was no fluke. No quirk. No complex adaptive system highly sensitive to small perturbations etc. IMO it was the most likely outcome, BY FAR, given the forces deployed in that place and at that time. I can easily see the Japanese losing all 4 CVs and the US not losing a single one or even having one substantially damaged. A substantial victory where the IJN sinks three or even two USN CVs for each Japanese CV sunk strikes me as so implausible as to be not worth modeling.

You missed it. I'll be shorter. All I'm saying is that you can never know the outcome until it is resolved. However, it is possible to predict the outcome in game due to the mechanics involved.

[ilovestrategy]

I always thought of Midway like an American football game where the losing team did not lose but rather gave the game away due to poor planning and preparation. Are like Apollo Creed talking on the phone and planning after game receptions instead of training hard to get ready to fight Rocky Balboa. 

[mdiehl]

All I'm saying is that you can never know the outcome until it is resolved.

In the real world? Yes, you cannot know the real world outcome until it is resolved. But you can accurately predict a range of outcomes if you know what you're doing. Like Midway, Pickett's charge had a predictable outcome given the orders of battle and the circumstances of their engagement. The US army knew it and waited out a substantial confederate bombardment in order to use artillery to crush Pickett's brigade. Pickett knew it and objected to the orders he was given at the time.

The IJN knew what the likely result of Midway would be if the USN showed up with CVs at the wrong moment. They predicted the outcome and then ignored their own predictions. The USN knew the likely outcome, predicted same, and achieved more or less what they expected to achieve.

Sure, things could have been somewhat different in either case, but they could not have been much different.

However, it is possible to predict the outcome in game due to the mechanics involved.

That I believe.

[mdiehl]

the game mechanics cannot reflect the actual tactical realities.

Sure it could. It just has not attempted to do so very well.

How to explain what I mean. So, in 1942, BOTH the IJN and the USN recognized as a general operational reality, a small number of CVs attacking a substantial land base, lacking the element of surprise, was very vulnerable. Both navies recognized that attacking such a land base with enemy CVs in the area was a formula for disaster.

The Japanese Op Plan at Coral Sea was to get the US carriers first, before proceeding to invade Moresby. They failed, and they withdrew. In the early war raids by USN CVs the targets were either attacked by surprise as in the trans-Owens Stanley raid, or were tiny little fringe bases on the periphery of the EMpire when the Japanese carriers were known to be very likely elsewhere. Faced with attacking Rabaul in Feb 1942, detected USN CV withdrew.

At Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz both CVs knew as their first priority that their targets should be the other CVs.

At Midway the IJN and USN knew the same.

So before one designs a WW2 consim set in the PTO, the correct procedure is to ensure that attacking substantial island bases with a handful of CVs and lacking operational surprise is a risky proposition. THAT was the empirical reality. Whether you do it by giving a "strike bonus" to a CV force that isn't trying to accomplish several conflicting missions at the same time or just throw in a fudge factor doesn't matter. Either choice would be closer to accurately simulating reality than all the fiddley bullshit about altitude settings, EXP indexed to nothing real and apropos of nothing, etc.

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: Bill Durrant

I respect your opinion, but if that's what you want to play, I can recommend Mark Herman's Empire of the Sun or Victory Games Pacific War.

Excellent = where are the forums for these games so we can discuss the issues there. Meantime, back to WitP AE

ComsimWorld.

[steamboateng]

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

the game mechanics cannot reflect the actual tactical realities.

Sure it could. It just has not attempted to do so very well.


With all due repect, I beg to differ.
Game mechanics, in a 24 hour period, will reflect the tactical situation as a series of die rolls. modified by such factors as weather,a variety of leadership and experience factors, fleet composition, airgroup composition, search arc results, etc. Predictable game results will have the USN CV's suffer sorely at IJN hands.
This does not reflect very well that the US CV's had a 2+(?) hour jump on the IJN before being discovered.
The IJN was then only minutes away from being clobbered.
The crux of the USN plan; jump the IJN CV's before being discovered, cannot be implemented with any reliability in a standard WitP CV face-off.
Of course I realize the game is strategic in nature. Some tactical components, specifically timing, spotting, weather, and such variables, are predicated on dice rolls, not planning.

[zzodr]

I think a lot of this is a pointless argument.

One thing WITP:AE does not simulate and could not be expected to simulate is reload time of planes for different ordnance loadouts.

If you have your planes set for ground attack (bombs), then change your mind for naval attack (torps) it is instant, it takes no time at all.
Which IIRC was big factor for Nagumo at Midway.

Also WITP is a turn based game..not real time. So there is no time pressure to make decisions.
Imagine a real time version where you had a timer countdown for changing weapon loadouts/refuelling etc... that would be a hell of game. [:)]

Battles are usually won by the side which makes the fewest mistakes.

[jeffs]

I think what Herwin and mdiehl are (in my opinion) trying to correctly state is the game does not simulate strategic surprise (or the allied use of superior intel) well.
 
The US prepared an ambush that in spite of short comings of the US CV fleets of its day (mid 1942) succeeded. The US limitations are fairly well modeled in the game (strike coordination is bad).
 
The issue seems to be that IJN limitations
A. Poor recon
B. Stupidly falling into a trap
 
Are not effectively modeled in the game.
 
It seems pretty obvious that this is true. In 1942 the allies, even if well set up, can rarely pull off a Midway like positive result.
 
It can be asked that given the complexity of the war (and the nature of the simulation where carrier warfare is just 1 bit of a much larger picture) is it even possible to do much better than AE in simulating
the war overall.
 
That said, it would seem pretty much impossible to pull a midway in the game unless we are dealing with an IJN idiot (ie, no CAs do seach...At all!)

[Erkki]

ORIGINAL: jeffs

I think what Herwin and mdiehl are (in my opinion) trying to correctly state is the game does not simulate strategic surprise (or the allied use of superior intel) well.

The US prepared an ambush that in spite of short comings of the US CV fleets of its day (mid 1942) succeeded. The US limitations are fairly well modeled in the game (strike coordination is bad).

The issue seems to be that IJN limitations
A. Poor recon
B. Stupidly falling into a trap

Are not effectively modeled in the game.

It seems pretty obvious that this is true. In 1942 the allies, even if well set up, can rarely pull off a Midway like positive result.

It can be asked that given the complexity of the war (and the nature of the simulation where carrier warfare is just 1 bit of a much larger picture) is it even possible to do much better than AE in simulating
the war overall.

That said, it would seem pretty much impossible to pull a midway in the game unless we are dealing with an IJN idiot (ie, no CAs do seach...At all!)

Japanese were pretty much idiots, in game terms, with the plan they had and how it was executed, right?

Theres always the dice roll. Even in the game, the critical float search plane might crash at landing or get damaged in the AM phase and not fly PM, or be still in maintenance or repair after the day before. Or bad weather might prevent it from launching.

[Puhis]

If one wants to recreate Battle of Midway's AM air phase, about half of japanese bombers should be set to airfield or ground attack. And I'm pretty sure that setup is going to end in tears for IJN.

[AW1Steve]

ORIGINAL: jeffs

I think what Herwin and mdiehl are (in my opinion) trying to correctly state is the game does not simulate strategic surprise (or the allied use of superior intel) well.

The US prepared an ambush that in spite of short comings of the US CV fleets of its day (mid 1942) succeeded. The US limitations are fairly well modeled in the game (strike coordination is bad).

The issue seems to be that IJN limitations
A. Poor recon
B. Stupidly falling into a trap

Are not effectively modeled in the game.

It seems pretty obvious that this is true. In 1942 the allies, even if well set up, can rarely pull off a Midway like positive result.

It can be asked that given the complexity of the war (and the nature of the simulation where carrier warfare is just 1 bit of a much larger picture) is it even possible to do much better than AE in simulating
the war overall.

That said, it would seem pretty much impossible to pull a midway in the game unless we are dealing with an IJN idiot (ie, no CAs do seach...At all!)

The INJ can be FORCED to have the equivalent of surprise. Like the Coral Sea scenarion, they will have to sieze Midway by a specific date or they lose on points. In both the Coral sea and Thousand mile war scenarios , the invader is FORCED to invade early or lose the game (no matter how many CV's sunk). It won't matter if the INJ attacks Midway due to there being no USN CV's around , or to beat the ticking clock , they must take Midway. Or lose the game by default.[:)]

The INJ player need not be an idiot, just a leader constrained by the politics of his leaders. As I've said again and again, the only "gamey" feature about this game is that all commanders work in "lock step". The creation of a "Grand Pubah" , so to speak. I reality, military commanders are far more likey to be told "take that hill, do it now and don't give me any excuses", than being allowed to plan the whole war at his lesuire or convienance. "Everybody" has a master , that imposed constraints and forces you to do things you object to. Even FDR was influenced by politics. Nimtz,MacArthur,and King and Marshall certainly were. So why not Nagumo or Spruance/Fletcher? The general staff gives you your instructions, what,where and WHEN it expects things done. THERE'S your handicap. [:)]

[Shark7]

ORIGINAL: jeffs

I think what Herwin and mdiehl are (in my opinion) trying to correctly state is the game does not simulate strategic surprise (or the allied use of superior intel) well.

The US prepared an ambush that in spite of short comings of the US CV fleets of its day (mid 1942) succeeded. The US limitations are fairly well modeled in the game (strike coordination is bad).

The issue seems to be that IJN limitations
A. Poor recon
B. Stupidly falling into a trap

Are not effectively modeled in the game.

It seems pretty obvious that this is true. In 1942 the allies, even if well set up, can rarely pull off a Midway like positive result.

It can be asked that given the complexity of the war (and the nature of the simulation where carrier warfare is just 1 bit of a much larger picture) is it even possible to do much better than AE in simulating
the war overall.

That said, it would seem pretty much impossible to pull a midway in the game unless we are dealing with an IJN idiot (ie, no CAs do seach...At all!)

Well you have hit on another game limitation...more due to hindsight than mechanics. No competent Japanese player is going to get himself into a Midway situation.

1. They simply don't attack Midway.
2. They keep KB together rather than splitting the force to run a diversion.
3. They will use their range advantage to help prevent getting into a situation where you must face short range LBA and carrier a/c in the same turn.
4. They extensively scout and recon the area to avoid getting trapped or surprised.

In my PBEM I'm into 1943 and haven't lost a carrier, and I did take Midway. However, I was careful about it and used a plan of overwhelming force rather than a complicated plan of deception.