Our appreciation of the strategic situation and the enemy's options is based on the following observations:
1. The enemy has consistently demonstrated a focus on offensive operations.
2. He is aware of the need to inflict as much damage as possible on our forces before winter.
3. His previous planning/conduct of operations indicated an intention to enter the Kuban during 1941 via the Crimea and he appears fixated on this as a war winning strategy.
4. All of his armour is already concentrated in the south and his rail state will probably not support transfer of these units to AGC with time remaining for a full refit before the snows come. On the same basis, a shift of forces to AGN is even less likely.
5. He will assume that an attack on a single axis toward Moscow is unlikely to succeed given the depth of our defenses.
6. An attack towards Stalingrad will expose him to a pincer movement come winter.
7. Therefore his only options are to dig in or strike at the oil of Caucasus. Digging in is unlikely, as this equals surrender.
8. A strike at the Caucasus entails a major river crossing with weakened forces who have large numbers of enemy units on their flank.
9. To provide security for this advance the enemy must simultaneously cross the Kerch Peninsular into the Kuban from the west and we note the presence of strong armoured forces in the Crimea.
On this basis, we envision that the enemy will continue to take the southern approach, thus creating the necessary conditions for Operation Moon to commence in January 1942.
Signed: Zhukov
