Great discussions guys!
I have been playing against PointLuck now for 7 months. He has played the IJN and I the USN/Allies. As he mentioned earlier, we play a custom scenario.
On the subject of massing subs, I rarely have more than 2 subs in any hex at a time. Yes, occasionaly I have more, but not often.
Why do I do this? Because 1) I want to win just as PointLuck wants to win, and 2) a sub is built to sink enemy shipping. I have found that turning my subs over to the AI results in next to no return, whereas when I can guide them I can acheive some results. Now, if Pointluck ran his convoys more like the AI did, I might have different results.
As has been mentioned, for every action, there is a reaction - PointLuck has been very effective in countering this tactic, consequently, I don't employ it often or in the same place. It is effectivve only for a short period of time, then the tide turns against me. PointLuck has made me pay when I get greedy and on a couple occasions has sucked my subs into a ASW trap.
The downsides to this type of tactic are, IMHO, 1) it increases the opponents ASW effectiveness once he figures out how to counter, 2) it means I'm not somewhere else, and 3) PointLuck has a few less things to wonder about.
Regardless, it's a good game and I enjoy hearing all the different views.
Happy, and Safe, New Year to All!!!
Sub Vulching!
To mass or not to mass, that is the question....
Thanks
Shawn
Bartlesville, OK
Shawn
Bartlesville, OK
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johnbruning
- Posts: 13
- Joined: Wed Jan 01, 2003 11:22 am
- Location: Oregon
Sub Vulching
Historically, in 1942, U.S. Navy submarine operations relied heavily on patrolling very close to Japanese naval bases. A small example:
The USS Pollack spent one of its many war patrols running between Japanese naval bases in the Central Pacific. At times, through the periscope, the crew could see the masts of ships in various harbors.
This was done, I think, in part because through 1942, the USN had very little understanding or knowledge of Japanese convoy routes & systems. Without knowing where the enemy would be on the open sea, the USN relied on scouting and attacking ships near known bases to a greater degree in 1942 and early 1943 than the rest of the war. Even so, there are many examples of "Sub vulching" into the latter stages of the war. To stay with USS Pollack, in mid-1943, her crew engaged a Japanese convoy right at the entrance to Tokyo Bay. They were so close, the crew could see the shore.
That said, it is true that the ASW assets were always strongest nearest key bases. However, for the Japanese in 1942, this is not saying much at all, as their ASW efforts that year border on pathetic. Everything from their ability to track and attack a target, to their limited settings on their depth charges, to the sheer lack of ASW-dedicated assets made things much easier for Allied submarines. Mark Parillo wrote a great book that covers this in detail called "The Japanese Merchant Marine in WWII."
Regards,
John Bruning
The USS Pollack spent one of its many war patrols running between Japanese naval bases in the Central Pacific. At times, through the periscope, the crew could see the masts of ships in various harbors.
This was done, I think, in part because through 1942, the USN had very little understanding or knowledge of Japanese convoy routes & systems. Without knowing where the enemy would be on the open sea, the USN relied on scouting and attacking ships near known bases to a greater degree in 1942 and early 1943 than the rest of the war. Even so, there are many examples of "Sub vulching" into the latter stages of the war. To stay with USS Pollack, in mid-1943, her crew engaged a Japanese convoy right at the entrance to Tokyo Bay. They were so close, the crew could see the shore.
That said, it is true that the ASW assets were always strongest nearest key bases. However, for the Japanese in 1942, this is not saying much at all, as their ASW efforts that year border on pathetic. Everything from their ability to track and attack a target, to their limited settings on their depth charges, to the sheer lack of ASW-dedicated assets made things much easier for Allied submarines. Mark Parillo wrote a great book that covers this in detail called "The Japanese Merchant Marine in WWII."
Regards,
John Bruning
Re: Sub Vulching
You would think with the example of what the Germans did to the UK in WWI and were already doing to them in WWII the IJN would have paid more attention to protecting its mechant marine, especialy since this is one of the main reason for sea power in the first place. I guess it wasn't glamous enough for Samurai. And then again hindsight is always 20/20Originally posted by johnbruning
snip...
That said, it is true that the ASW assets were always strongest nearest key bases. However, for the Japanese in 1942, this is not saying much at all, as their ASW efforts that year border on pathetic. Everything from their ability to track and attack a target, to their limited settings on their depth charges, to the sheer lack of ASW-dedicated assets made things much easier for Allied submarines. Mark Parillo wrote a great book that covers this in detail called "The Japanese Merchant Marine in WWII."
Regards,
John Bruning
Gunner's Mate: A Boatswain's Mate with a hunting license.
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johnbruning
- Posts: 13
- Joined: Wed Jan 01, 2003 11:22 am
- Location: Oregon
Good point! The Japanese had no powerful ASW advocates on their general staff between the wars. They were fixated on combat power and the "Decisive Battle" and thus neglected the protection of their lines of communications. It just wasn't glamorous.
Unfortunately, the same can be said for the U.S. Navy to a certain degree. Witness what happened on the Eastern Seaboard and the Gulf coast in the opening months of 1942--what the U-boat skippers called "The Second Happy Time."
JohnB
Unfortunately, the same can be said for the U.S. Navy to a certain degree. Witness what happened on the Eastern Seaboard and the Gulf coast in the opening months of 1942--what the U-boat skippers called "The Second Happy Time."
JohnB
Second Happy Time
JohnB,
I blame congress and the coastal state/local goverments for this. As an example it was months before blackouts were instituted (they were resisted by the local goverments). The U-Boat skippers sure loved that city glow that back lighted their targets for them
I also blame the US Army and Army Air Force who where in charge of costal defense. No USAAF air crews were trained for ASW yet they demanded they do it not the USN And of course the US Coastal Artillery command has its share of blame for taking on a mission it wasn't equipped to handle :rolleyes: although they did do a decent job of harbor defense :p
Sorry JohnB, didn't mean to go off on a rant but boy did it feel good 
I blame congress and the coastal state/local goverments for this. As an example it was months before blackouts were instituted (they were resisted by the local goverments). The U-Boat skippers sure loved that city glow that back lighted their targets for them
I also blame the US Army and Army Air Force who where in charge of costal defense. No USAAF air crews were trained for ASW yet they demanded they do it not the USN
And of course the US Coastal Artillery command has its share of blame for taking on a mission it wasn't equipped to handle :rolleyes: although they did do a decent job of harbor defense :p Sorry JohnB, didn't mean to go off on a rant
but boy did it feel good Gunner's Mate: A Boatswain's Mate with a hunting license.
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johnbruning
- Posts: 13
- Joined: Wed Jan 01, 2003 11:22 am
- Location: Oregon
Tanjman,
Boy you are right on with everything you pointed out. The idea that the coastal cities didn't want to douse their lights because it would affect the tourist trade was just sickening. As if the corpses, oil and debris on the beaches weren't going to do that anyway.
However, the Navy did resist instituting a convoy system along the Eastern Seaboard until the losses became simply appalling.
It was one of those maddening things that showed just how unprepared we were for total war in early 1942. Not only did we not have the weapons, personnel and doctrine needed, the military did not have a "total war" mindset yet. A lot of pre-war officers who were totally unsuited for wartime had to be weeded out of every service before a wartime mentality really could set in.
In the meantime, a lot of guys died for their errors.
John
Boy you are right on with everything you pointed out. The idea that the coastal cities didn't want to douse their lights because it would affect the tourist trade was just sickening. As if the corpses, oil and debris on the beaches weren't going to do that anyway.
However, the Navy did resist instituting a convoy system along the Eastern Seaboard until the losses became simply appalling.
It was one of those maddening things that showed just how unprepared we were for total war in early 1942. Not only did we not have the weapons, personnel and doctrine needed, the military did not have a "total war" mindset yet. A lot of pre-war officers who were totally unsuited for wartime had to be weeded out of every service before a wartime mentality really could set in.
In the meantime, a lot of guys died for their errors.
John
Good points. In the IJN, ASW warfare was considered unworthy of the Samurai tradition as was any sort of defensive warfare. This arm, as a result suffered from lack of competent personell. Japanese radar technology suffered as a well for this very same reason.
Of course the USN could have learned a great deal from our British "cousins" but traditional rivalries and prejudices prevented the Americans from gaining much insight. As a result American ASW tactics suffered early in the war as well. Yet the Americans did have access to the latest technology and were much better at learning on the job.
In the end, the real glory goes to the code breakers both in the Pacific and Altantic theaters. The Allies pretty much knew where to find the enemy subs and pursued them relentlessly. In some cases not sinking all the subs that they could to prevent the enemy from realizing that their codes were compromised.
Of course the USN could have learned a great deal from our British "cousins" but traditional rivalries and prejudices prevented the Americans from gaining much insight. As a result American ASW tactics suffered early in the war as well. Yet the Americans did have access to the latest technology and were much better at learning on the job.
In the end, the real glory goes to the code breakers both in the Pacific and Altantic theaters. The Allies pretty much knew where to find the enemy subs and pursued them relentlessly. In some cases not sinking all the subs that they could to prevent the enemy from realizing that their codes were compromised.
I am the Holy Roman Emperor and am above grammar.
Sigismund of Luxemburg
Sigismund of Luxemburg
Re: ....on the other hand
Originally posted by Canoerebel
(I have now replied to my own post indicating I have way too much time on my hands).
You are not playing enough UV.
I leave my subs on automatic except for special missions such as minelaying or special patrols. And at this I only use two to three subs at the most. And when finished I return them to computer control. The general management of sub forces is very time consuming. I don't concentrate subs in shallow hexes because of the losses sustained when doing this.
I too use my subs for minelaying under human control and once that function is completed turn them over to the computer. I get more results from laid mines than I do from actual torp attacks (however this is for the Japanese).
Col Saito: "Don't speak to me of rules! This is war! It is not a game of cricket!"
That's kinda funny, I -rarely- park my subs in an enmy port, and at last tally, my subs were respsponsible for fully 30% of enemy ships killed (including a crippled CV that would have made it home had SS-40 not run 2 torps into her).
I hate parking subs in ports, because (at least in my experience playing my brother), it guarentees their death. In our last game, Knavey and I were popping each other's subs off left and right, because we could guarentee there would be subs at Buna, Gili-Gili, PM, Rabaul, Shortland... etc.
Both of us learned to make extensive use of hunter-killer groups, combined with local air assets. Personally, I've got at least one group of 6 ASW vessals in every port I use (and I know Knavey is close to the same), for the EXPLICT purpose of smacking the he11 out of any subs anywhere near my port (esp any foolish enough actually enter my port hex).
Furthermore, I commonly use my less experienced short-ranged bombers (maybe the A-20s or the A-24s) for sub spotting before committing them to full service. They spot the sub, I send the hunter-killers to kill it. Or if I've got a good squadron that is kinda banged up and needs to rest/pair, I'll set them to ASW with maybe 30% and maybe they'll actually go after the bugger while the other planes are being repaired. Again, they spot the sub, the hunter-killers go after it.
FWIW however, Knavey is playing IJN sub-doctrine on (we just wanted to see how MUCH it affects things), and he hasn't take as many shots (but again, he's not sitting in my ports waiting for me to kill him either). Frankly, I think he's using them more for mining duties, as I've already discovered a couple of fields. The only sub I use for mines is Argonaut. I pay my skippers to shoot torpedoes!
-F-
I hate parking subs in ports, because (at least in my experience playing my brother), it guarentees their death. In our last game, Knavey and I were popping each other's subs off left and right, because we could guarentee there would be subs at Buna, Gili-Gili, PM, Rabaul, Shortland... etc.
Both of us learned to make extensive use of hunter-killer groups, combined with local air assets. Personally, I've got at least one group of 6 ASW vessals in every port I use (and I know Knavey is close to the same), for the EXPLICT purpose of smacking the he11 out of any subs anywhere near my port (esp any foolish enough actually enter my port hex).
Furthermore, I commonly use my less experienced short-ranged bombers (maybe the A-20s or the A-24s) for sub spotting before committing them to full service. They spot the sub, I send the hunter-killers to kill it. Or if I've got a good squadron that is kinda banged up and needs to rest/pair, I'll set them to ASW with maybe 30% and maybe they'll actually go after the bugger while the other planes are being repaired. Again, they spot the sub, the hunter-killers go after it.
FWIW however, Knavey is playing IJN sub-doctrine on (we just wanted to see how MUCH it affects things), and he hasn't take as many shots (but again, he's not sitting in my ports waiting for me to kill him either). Frankly, I think he's using them more for mining duties, as I've already discovered a couple of fields. The only sub I use for mines is Argonaut. I pay my skippers to shoot torpedoes!
-F-
"It is obvious that you have greatly over-estimated my regard for your opinion." - Me
IJN ASW assests pretty much suck, I would be curious to know of anyone who has successfully employed them effectively. I did manage to kill one of Feinders subs in the last turn, but only because he got a bit greedy and tried to move against the landing force at Guadacanal. It is contrary to his normal doctrine of sitting in choke points. Managed to kill it with conventional DDs, but haven't really been all that effective at killing them when they are in deep water.
I do know that everyonce in a while, my petes and jakes will prosecute a contact, and maybe eventually I will get one of them to score a hit.
I do know that everyonce in a while, my petes and jakes will prosecute a contact, and maybe eventually I will get one of them to score a hit.
x-Nuc twidget
CVN-71
USN 87-93
"Going slow in the fast direction"
CVN-71
USN 87-93
"Going slow in the fast direction"
Yeah, I got greedy. Phhhttttt. But when you've got 20 subs, you can get a little greedy... :^)
You do realize bro that every time you make a bombardment run on PM or Gili-Gili, I'm gonna put a torps into something. Lemme see here... In channel to Gili-Gili alone, so far I've sent home 2 CAs, a CL, and a couple of DDs... One of these days I'm gonna put a pair into that bastage Mutsu... (*GRIN*)
Now if I could only get MY hands on effing battleship... THAT I could use!
:^)
You do realize bro that every time you make a bombardment run on PM or Gili-Gili, I'm gonna put a torps into something. Lemme see here... In channel to Gili-Gili alone, so far I've sent home 2 CAs, a CL, and a couple of DDs... One of these days I'm gonna put a pair into that bastage Mutsu... (*GRIN*)
Now if I could only get MY hands on effing battleship... THAT I could use!
:^)
"It is obvious that you have greatly over-estimated my regard for your opinion." - Me
I don't think there is a problem with subs concentrating on certain port hexes. Aside from concentrating your ASW patrols/aircraft at these ports, the game seems to be doing some of the policing. Recently, I have noticed:
1) That it is very hard to get a sub to attack enemy ships if the combat is in a hex with a port size of 3 or larger. This makes sense to me, since this size port allows ships to enter a shelterd harbor. Smaller ports or over-the-beach landing leaves the ships exposed. This seems historical to me, since few subs ever actually entered enemy harbors.
2) It seems that every time a sub has to "dive" now, it uses a lot of fuel and stresses the ships systems. For example, I just played a turn in a game, where I sent a sub with 8 system damage to plink at an enemy convoy unloading at a base. The sub made two attacks in the last turn, hitting one ship. It had to "dive" twice. In diving, it seems the sub has used about 2000-3000 fuel units in these two attacks, and the system damage has gone from 8 up to 11 now. All this was in one turn.
If anything, I think this is a little extreme.
1) That it is very hard to get a sub to attack enemy ships if the combat is in a hex with a port size of 3 or larger. This makes sense to me, since this size port allows ships to enter a shelterd harbor. Smaller ports or over-the-beach landing leaves the ships exposed. This seems historical to me, since few subs ever actually entered enemy harbors.
2) It seems that every time a sub has to "dive" now, it uses a lot of fuel and stresses the ships systems. For example, I just played a turn in a game, where I sent a sub with 8 system damage to plink at an enemy convoy unloading at a base. The sub made two attacks in the last turn, hitting one ship. It had to "dive" twice. In diving, it seems the sub has used about 2000-3000 fuel units in these two attacks, and the system damage has gone from 8 up to 11 now. All this was in one turn.
If anything, I think this is a little extreme.
Estaban,
I believe you are correct about the size 3 thing (I think it's in the manual somewhere). It's supposed to represent the defenses that a "real" harbor would have, such as sub and torpedo nets. But if a TF is "docked" at a size 0 - 2 port (I guess it's little more than a lagoon), you actually attack them with Naval Attack. But if they're docked at at size 3 or larger, you actually have to use Port Attack. I'm fairly sure that the planes won't use torps while attacking ships in a size 3 port (only bombs) because of the torp nets etc.
Frankly, I thot that ships in a size 3 port were supposed to be protected from suface action also, but I had a convoy at PM that was in the middle of unloading get hit by an IJN bombardment TF. Kinda surprised by that, but oh well.
-F-
I believe you are correct about the size 3 thing (I think it's in the manual somewhere). It's supposed to represent the defenses that a "real" harbor would have, such as sub and torpedo nets. But if a TF is "docked" at a size 0 - 2 port (I guess it's little more than a lagoon), you actually attack them with Naval Attack. But if they're docked at at size 3 or larger, you actually have to use Port Attack. I'm fairly sure that the planes won't use torps while attacking ships in a size 3 port (only bombs) because of the torp nets etc.
Frankly, I thot that ships in a size 3 port were supposed to be protected from suface action also, but I had a convoy at PM that was in the middle of unloading get hit by an IJN bombardment TF. Kinda surprised by that, but oh well.
-F-
"It is obvious that you have greatly over-estimated my regard for your opinion." - Me
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ganthony91
- Posts: 4
- Joined: Sun Aug 18, 2002 7:21 am
- Location: Key West, FL
I have had opponents place massed subs at some of my more significant ports, which can be effective if agressive counter measures are not employed. If I have carriers nearby in port and do not expect to use them in the short term, I fly the Torpedo planes and dive bombers to the infested port (if nearby) and place them all on 100% ASW. The same goes with land based tacair not otherwise actively engaged.
I will also try to build a large surface action task force composed of as many ASW capable vessels as possible (a dozen plus). Seems the subs will attack 15+DD's and SC's as readily as a few unescorted transports (this is what Darwanism is for).
Even if the sub does pop a DD with a torpedo or two, the destroyers dozen buddies all get to take a shot at the sub. Then I simply detach the damaged vessel from the task force and disband it in what is normally the large port which normally is able to save the vessel (I can stomach the loss of a SC in exchange for a SS easily). Worst case it suffers enough damage to require sending back to Tokyo or Pearl.
Sub infestation over!!!
As for should people be allowed to stack subs like that; it is where the Navy Crosses and Medals of Honors grow!!!
I will also try to build a large surface action task force composed of as many ASW capable vessels as possible (a dozen plus). Seems the subs will attack 15+DD's and SC's as readily as a few unescorted transports (this is what Darwanism is for).
Even if the sub does pop a DD with a torpedo or two, the destroyers dozen buddies all get to take a shot at the sub. Then I simply detach the damaged vessel from the task force and disband it in what is normally the large port which normally is able to save the vessel (I can stomach the loss of a SC in exchange for a SS easily). Worst case it suffers enough damage to require sending back to Tokyo or Pearl.
Sub infestation over!!!
As for should people be allowed to stack subs like that; it is where the Navy Crosses and Medals of Honors grow!!!
"Have gone to Florida to fight Indians. Will be back when war is over"
A. Henderson
Col. Commandant
A. Henderson
Col. Commandant
Originally posted by ganthony91
I have had opponents place massed subs at some of my more significant ports, which can be effective if agressive counter measures are not employed. If I have carriers nearby in port and do not expect to use them in the short term, I fly the Torpedo planes and dive bombers to the infested port (if nearby) and place them all on 100% ASW. The same goes with land based tacair not otherwise actively engaged.
I will also try to build a large surface action task force composed of as many ASW capable vessels as possible (a dozen plus). Seems the subs will attack 15+DD's and SC's as readily as a few unescorted transports (this is what Darwanism is for).
Even if the sub does pop a DD with a torpedo or two, the destroyers dozen buddies all get to take a shot at the sub. Then I simply detach the damaged vessel from the task force and disband it in what is normally the large port which normally is able to save the vessel (I can stomach the loss of a SC in exchange for a SS easily). Worst case it suffers enough damage to require sending back to Tokyo or Pearl.
Sub infestation over!!!
As for should people be allowed to stack subs like that; it is where the Navy Crosses and Medals of Honors grow!!!
*Claps* Well said! I to find it VERY easy to rid myself of those pesky IJN sub packs......6 DDs (thats enough in my experiance) with ASW of "6" or "8" will make mince meat of any IJN subpack in shallow water. Infact I would much rather that all my IJN PBEM players stacked their subs....it would make my sub hunts a lot easier!
Never argue with an idiot, he will only drag you down to his level and beat you with experience.