The armchair strategists club of temptations – Hartwig (A) vs. Aztez (J), no Aztez

[Wirraway_Ace]

Simpkin is still findable, but at a premium price. I have never read Harrison's book on Isserson.

I read some papers published by Glantz while I was being trained as staff officer. I was not a fan of those writings at the time, but I have recently picked up his books on the Manchuria Campaign which came recommended by some exceptionally well read Forum members.

I am very interested in what Nemo comes up with. It may indeed take a brain of a psychiatrist to apply Tukhachevsky well to deep operations in the Pacific Theater.

Mike

[Nemo121]

I've had a think about this today and I think it is really a multi-post answer. I think I'd have to explain the development of Deep Battle, the theoretical underpinnings and then how it worked in practice before moving it from the Ostfront to the Pacific. Also I'd caution that deep battle in 1942 is a very different thing than deep battle in January 1945 due to the advances on the technical/tactical axis.

One other thing: Alfred's thread on good players and my concept of also nominating sensei ( those who are worth listening to when discussing various levels ) made me think about how many good posts discussions are lost as AARs drift down the page. I was wondering if you'd mind me starting a thread to post the answer with a view to acting as a repository for good questions and answers. Since it would deal with discussion of AARs it could fit in the AAR section as there is precedence.

What do you think? I'm a bit leery of writing long replies and having them lost forever just a week later only to have the same thing pop up 6 months later and there being no way to find the original posts.

[modrow]

Nemo,

I would have assumed there would be no more fitting place than the armchair strategist's club for such a discussion, but if you prefer starting a separate thread, just go ahead and do so.

I should add, though, that I saw the thread Alfred started and your contribution to it. As a matter of fact, when the discussion shifted to possible matches I was close to add my dream 2x2 combination (Alfred and Hortlund vs jrcar and you), but refrained in the end from doing so because I think that everyone should find out for himself who is worth listening to. The material to find out is readily available in these forums.

But apart from that aside, feel free to post wherever you wish.

Hartwig

[racndoc]

Wirraway_Ace....would you consider Patton's breakout and pursuit with 3rd Army......after 1st Army punched a hole in the German 7th Army's line in Operation Cobra....a good example of the American version of Deep Battle? How about the US XVIII Airborne Corps penetration into Iraq during Operation Desert Storm?

[desicat]

Alfred, Not that you need any praise from someone like myself but the two quotes I stole from you posted below are quite insightful.

You were quite correct to say in post #8 that on the AE forums, much which passes for discussion as strategy is really at best only tactcs only some of it being truly operational planning in nature. Eventually Nemo will discover this AAR and probably comment as strategic matters greatly interest him. If you ran an AE poll, I have no doubt that he would be voted overwhelmingly as the best AE game strategist. That would be a result I would not quibble with except for one point, albeit in my view very critical. Most of Nemo's writings deal with and his great game results demonstrate, his superior operational planning rather than strategic insights. As I said in post #12 operational planning is really tactics. It is however useful to assess his operational plans against others to ascertain why his level of success is not generally replicated by others.

Nemo's operational pre-planning is meticulous, but then so is other players' operational planning. It is very much mated to logistical considerations, an area which very few other players match to the same degree. His operational planning focusses on optimal objectives which are pursued ruthlessly. Too many other players direct their operational planning towards sub-optimal objectives and are diffident in their execution. Above all else, what distinguishes Nemo's operational planning and play from the maority of AE players is that it is always truly subordinated to and consistent with his grand strategy. At this point i would remind you again of what i said in post #12.

Strategy is the plan to bring victory. Tactics is the means adopted to implement the adopted strategy.


Nemo may very well dispute my assessment but I believe that he would agree that compared to the real world, the freedom to formulate and pursue various grand strategy options in AE is limited. At it's centre, the game is much more about operational planning. To me, his games have limited variation in strategy (a function of the game's limits) but considerable variety in operational play. His operational play is so closely tied to his grand strategy, that it is easy for others to mistake one for the other.
------------------------------------------------------
One needs to be aware that real world strategy and game strategy is not the same thing. the same definition for one will not be adequate for the other. Partly this because a geopolitical/military game is always an abstraction of the real world. In a game, one simply does not have available all the tools (tactics) available in real life. The pressures of the real world are also not present in a game.

I agree that much of what is discussed as strategy is in fact a tactical discussion that may fringe on the operational level. I will disagree that Nemo dabbles mostly in the Operational realm.

I would argue that Grand Strategy does play a major impact on the efforts put forth by upper level players due to the numerous theaters that players can conduct operational campaigns in. To conduct sequential campaigns in separate theaters requires the prioritizing of logistical assets to project the kind of combat power that allows for sequential tactical encounters. This is one area that separates players by skill level, can they capitalize on a tactical victory and turn it into a series of sequential tactical victories (a campaign).

Many Japanese players start with a plan and stray from it as seemingly great tactical victories drag their forces from place to place, they seek to extend the execution of maintaining the initiative. It takes great discipline to stay on task when juicy targets present themselves, and a good grand strategy driving an operational campaign in the chosen theater of operations is the secret to success. Nemo seems to me to set a strategy and then do the logistical groundwork to ensure the opportunity for success. In the course of his AAR's you can read how he notes his opponents changing their plans based on tactical events...much to their later regret. I would argue that Nemo's ability to conduct multiple campaigns in separate theaters demonstrates his use of strategic planning to drive his operational efforts.

(In the battle(s) of the Wilderness Lee tried to derail Grant's campaign plan via a series battles that the South could claim as tactical "victories". Grant ignored the tactical setbacks and resultant casualties and used his superior logistics and manpower to complete an Operational level victory by staying on task. Grants grand strategy was decisive and it could be presented to Lincoln logically so he could understand and accept the huge tactical losses.)

I too agree that the game allows players to execute strategies that would be impossible in a political environment. A "Brave Sir Robin" would bring about a political collapse of one or more Allied governments and would potentially persuade theater "Allied" countries to go over to the seemingly victorious Japanese. The Japanese proved IRL that brutal losses in personnel and military assets could be sustained and not bring down the ruling government, I doubt the Allies had the same luxury (hence the atomic bomb). Many Allied players win victories at a far greater cost than would be remotely acceptable IRL, not having the option to sustain fearsome losses would cause a huge change in the way the Allies are currently played.

[desicat]

It has been 20 years since I last tried to write on this topic--the role of Deep Battle in the defence.

I always caution people that the Soviet writings on deep battle were elegant, compelling, but never practiced.

Instead I find the German Uboat campaign against the US East Coast in 42 and the Pearl Harbor attack as good examples of attacking the enemy throughout his operational and strategic depth in order to disrupt his ability mass against you. Against more evenly matched opponents, both operations might have been decisive.

The only deep battle campaign of WW2 that was arguably both decisive and cost effective was the US submarine campaign against Japan.

In game, submarines are certainly a key deep battle weapon, but a one dimensional offense is easily thwarted. Carrier strikes are an option against forward bases in the enemy's operational depth, but the risk has to be carefully accessed to these strategic assets. Surface TFs of cruisers and destroyers can make very effective deep attacks, penetrating through airsearch gaps and striking at logistics hubs with moderate risk. That being said, the long range 4-engine bombers are the Allies' primary deep battle weapon (along with the submarine). Massed 4Es can strike forward air, naval and ground troop concentrations, making it more difficult for the enemy to mass, contributing to earlier culmination. Protect these assets, train them, and employ them only in mass.

Interesting, I would classify the German (and American) submarine campaigns as economic warfare attempting to collapse the enemy economy at the strategic level. This same thought process could apply to the strategic bombing campaign against Germany. (The collateral attritional damage to German fighter aircraft and pilots would actually qualify as an operational deep battle effect if it had in fact been a planned activity instead of a by product.)

Ironically the Japanese attempted use of their submarines to strike at US Capital ships could be argued as an attempt at "deep battle" at an Operational level. I think Nemo's example or Arhnem or the US WW III Fulda Gap war plan would be plans attempting tactical deep battle.

[Wirraway_Ace]

ORIGINAL: AdmSpruance

Wirraway_Ace....would you consider Patton's breakout and pursuit with 3rd Army......after 1st Army punched a hole in the German 7th Army's line in Operation Cobra....a good example of the American version of Deep Battle? How about the US XVIII Airborne Corps penetration into Iraq during Operation Desert Storm?

AdmSpruance,

I agree these are both good examples, however with some differences as you might expect. The 3rd Army's breakout and pursuit was similiar to German concepts of blitzkreig and the schwerpunkt. XVIII Airborne Corps was manuever against an exposed flank into the enemy's operational depth. Air Supremacy in both cases greatly contributed to deep operations which disrupted the enemy's ability to mass reserves against the rapidly moving spearheads of mechanized forces. These deep operations, fighterbombers for Patton, fixed wing and rotary wing attacks and air assualts ahead of McCaffrey's rapidly moving tanks in the case of XVIII Airborne Corps were critical to the overall operational success of these campaigns.

[Wirraway_Ace]

ORIGINAL: desicat

Interesting, I would classify the German (and American) submarine campaigns as economic warfare attempting to collapse the enemy economy at the strategic level. This same thought process could apply to the strategic bombing campaign against Germany. (The collateral attritional damage to German fighter aircraft and pilots would actually qualify as an operational deep battle effect if it had in fact been a planned activity instead of a by product.)

Ironically the Japanese attempted use of their submarines to strike at US Capital ships could be argued as an attempt at "deep battle" at an Operational level. I think Nemo's example or Arhnem or the US WW III Fulda Gap war plan would be plans attempting tactical deep battle.

desicat, I would say it a little differently. The warmaking potential of the enemy is a strategic target. The submarine campaigns were operational and tactical plans to attack that target. They were, I would argue, classic examples of deep operations in the enemies strategic depth to disrupt movement of resources, but also movement of troops, supplies and fuel with the intent to cause the enemies offensive operations to culminate. Later, the sub campaign in the Pacific would severly limit the Japanese ability to effectively mass against US Amphib operations. The subs in the DEI did significant damage to the Japanese fleet as it left Palembang, before it could ever come to grips with the US forces at Leyte.

Another aspect of deep operations, or the threat of them, is to draw off enemy combat power from the decisive point. Sometimes pinning reserves or simply reducing available enemy combat power through economy of force operations. Subs are ideal for this in terms of naval combat power.

Japanese sub operations were certainly a type of deep battle, but their objective was possibly poorly chosen.

All this being said, one must consider the available weapon systems, the targets and the timing of deep operations, in conjunction with a deception plan, as part of the overall operation at the theater or front level. I see many players who conduct very skillful deep operations that are not supporting a major operation intent on defeating the enemy in his tactical and operational depth. These are but pin-pricks.

[Alfred]

ORIGINAL: hartwig.modrow

ORIGINAL: Nemo121

Artillery and infinite amounts of shells [:D]

Hm. That would have been my guess for Soviet LCUs.

In any case, there is a notably increased amount of supplies at PM. We will see how long it will last. Details are still postponed though, but I sent back the turn yesterday evening, so that the next slot of time can be used to provide the promised picture... ahem screenshot.

Hartwig

Surely for American GIs, the requisite commodities were:

(a) Coca Cola

(b) Chewing gum

(c) for bartering with the local population subsequently when on R & R, nylons and chocolate[:)]

Alfred

[Alfred]

ORIGINAL: desicat

Alfred, ... the two quotes I stole from you posted below are quite insightful...

Insightful about:

(a) moi

(b) assessment of Nemo's style

(c) how AE is generally played

(d) the fundamental issue raised by hartwig

You do realise that sitting in those big comfy red chesterfields at the club, having imbibed an appropriate beverage, one can say almost anything and the club members will just nod their sage acquiesence to anything said which is half coherent.[:D]


Now where has that club attendant gone with the cognac.

Alfred

[desicat]

ORIGINAL: Wirraway_Ace

All this being said, one must consider the available weapon systems, the targets and the timing of deep operations, in conjunction with a deception plan, as part of the overall operation at the theater or front level. I see many players who conduct very skillful deep operations that are not supporting a major operation intent on defeating the enemy in his tactical and operational depth. These are but pin-****s.

I think where you state that "the timing of deep operations" is where I make my differentiation between Strategic and Deep battle. The U-boats in the Pacific, US subs in the Pacific, and strategic bombing in Europe and Japan were all open ended time wise - when the enemies economies or war production capacity collapsed the effect would have been achieved. I would think these are examples of Strategic Warfare.

Deep battle to me would have a specific time frame attached to it and be part of a expanding upon a tactical victory to enable sequential follow on tactical events. An example would be using air power to enable a breakout and pocket creation (blitzkrieg) or denying an enemy the ability to bring in reinforcements or supply - isolating defensive forces for piecemeal destruction (Gulf War I and the plan for Cobra).

[desicat]

ORIGINAL: Alfred

ORIGINAL: desicat

Alfred, ... the two quotes I stole from you posted below are quite insightful...

Insightful about:

(a) moi

(b) assessment of Nemo's style

(c) how AE is generally played

(d) the fundamental issue raised by hartwig

You do realise that sitting in those big comfy red chesterfields at the club, having imbibed an appropriate beverage, one can say almost anything and the club members will just nod their sage acquiesence to anything said which is half coherent.[:D]


Now where has that club attendant gone with the cognac.

Alfred

Yes.

[modrow]

Gentlemen,

thanks for the manifold of interesting contributions. However, what struck me as strange when reading them is that we actually don't find any mention of a Soviet operation for a Soviet doctrine. This makes me a bit wary whether we are currently discussing based on a sufficiently precise definition of deep battle (which was developed in the framework of a national situation). Not every approach striving to achieve deep penetration in order to wreak havoc in the rear classifies as deep battle, and concepts like Blitzkrieg (even though this does most likely not even qualify as a doctrine) or the combined arms approach.

So perhaps it would be useful to define what is the characteristic of deep battle are and how they distinguish deep battle from other approaches. Any takers?

Thanks for your interest

Hartwig

[modrow]

Gentlemen,

I truly hate interrupting the debate, but I think I should mention briefly that I received and sent back a turn yesterday evening. It was quite devoid of action, the sight of my plywood navy at PM sent the enemy invasion back without a single shot being fired during the first phase of our two day turns.

Well, the real reason was that aztez made a mistake with his TF movement orders. I offered a redo, but he declined, because he stated that a few days won't make a difference at PM.

In other news, the Japanese 115th Inf. Rgt. was beaten up by three Chinese corps ganging up on it. Not quite as badly as I would have liked, but I'll take what I can get [8D].

But now, back to imbibing appropriate beverages

Hartwig

[desicat]

ORIGINAL: hartwig.modrow

Gentlemen,

thanks for the manifold of interesting contributions. However, what struck me as strange when reading them is that we actually don't find any mention of a Soviet operation for a Soviet doctrine. This makes me a bit wary whether we are currently discussing based on a sufficiently precise definition of deep battle (which was developed in the framework of a national situation). Not every approach striving to achieve deep penetration in order to wreak havoc in the rear classifies as deep battle, and concepts like Blitzkrieg (even though this does most likely not even qualify as a doctrine) or the combined arms approach.

So perhaps it would be useful to define what is the characteristic of deep battle are and how they distinguish deep battle from other approaches. Any takers?

Thanks for your interest

Hartwig

Sir, I pulled one of my books (Rethinking the Principles of War, Chapter 10, Operational Art and Doctrine, Milan Vigo, pg 183) off the shelf to get you a quote concerning Soviet Deep Battle concepts.

"The Soviets adopted the "deep battle" concept......This concept imagined forces no larger than corps attacking the enemy simultaneously over the entire depth of his fielded forces, first to isolate him and then to encircle and ultimately destroy him. This concept was developed to solve the problem of how to restore maneuver to a battle field that had become static."

Vigo notes in the article that while the Soviets developed the Deep Battle doctrine and officially adopted it in 1936, they didn't really have the technology nor educated officer corps to successfully apply it at the time.

Later in the article he brings up the 1990's US Marine Corps concept of Operational Maneuver from the Sea - a "deep battle" concept using air, sea, and land components. This may be what you are looking for. There have been several official pamphlet's issued on OMFTS and its follow on concepts - here is a link.

http://www.dtic.mil/jv2010/usmc/omfts.pdf

[modrow]

Desicat,

thanks for the interesting link and the summary you provide by reference - the latter is interesting, because it deviates a lot from what my current understanding of deep battle is based on what I tried to read so far. One thing that leaves me quite confused is that it appears to relate only to the tactical level (as indicated by the statement "no larger than corps" and omission of the entire shock army concept), whereas I currently believe that one of the characterizing aspects of deep battle is the shift of the intended effect from the tactical level to an operational level.

Anyway, Nemo went ahead and started a -as it looks unfortunately short-lived- thread, as announced, called "Meditation and temptation" in the AAR section which contains very interesting information.

As this subject is discussed elsewhere for now, I'll be back with information from the front when it is ready (waiting for a turn).

Hartwig

[Nemo121]

Bah, there's no point discussing things out there. It just turns into a nightmare of people questioning motives and justifying why they shouldn't intervene when someone gets attacked. I tell you, I could do with some good alcohol right now though [8D]

[modrow]

Nemo,

ORIGINAL: Nemo121

Bah, there's no point discussing things out there. It just turns into a nightmare of people questioning motives and justifying why they shouldn't intervene when someone gets attacked. I tell you, I could do with some good alcohol right now though [8D]

as you are a well-liked club member, not doubt the sommelier will haste to your red chesterfield as soon as you even start raising your eyebrow. If you need something stronger, as you know from my post #15 my recommendation would be Caol Ila.

Cheers !

Hartwig

[Nemo121]

Well sadly all I have is coca cola and champagne. So be it, that'll do the trick [8D]

Well that and an unscrupulous hitman . That might solve quite a few more of my problems.

[modrow]

Nemo,

ORIGINAL: Nemo121
Well that and an unscrupulous hitman . That might solve quite a few more of my problems.

did you read "Beat the Reaper" by Josh Bazell? If not, it is a nice fun read. Nothing deep, but fun.

Hartwig