STAVKA

[herwin]

I wasn't lucky--I was working with Simpkin. Then he had a stroke. [:(][:(][:(]

You're aware Stalin was working up to another great purge when he died?

[Nemo121]

Re: Simpkin: I'm sorry to hear that. [:(]


Re: Stalin: Wasn't he always [:D] Instead, Vasiliy, the son got purged. From general flying fighter jets to medically unfit and alcoholic cirrhosis in 12 months. The problem for the Red Army was that Beria's sexual rampancy gave Stalin all the leverage over him that he needed and so Stalin always felt secure knowing that in the Troika of power in the Soviet Union he could count on two of the legs ( NKVD/KGB and the Communist Party ) to support him against the third leg ( the Red Army ). Of course he had to make sure the Army never got powerful enough to tackle both the internal security forces and the party together - and so he purged, and purged and purged. Of course he was aided in this by the complacency of the generals. Zhukov's actions post VE Day were particularly stupid in terms of ensuring his continued survival --- and so he got posted to that hive of activity and importance, the Odessa military district [:D]

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: Nemo121

Re: Simpkin: I'm sorry to hear that. [:(]


Re: Stalin: Wasn't he always [:D] Instead, Vasiliy, the son got purged. From general flying fighter jets to medically unfit and alcoholic cirrhosis in 12 months. The problem for the Red Army was that Beria's sexual rampancy gave Stalin all the leverage over him that he needed and so Stalin always felt secure knowing that in the Troika of power in the Soviet Union he could count on two of the legs ( NKVD/KGB and the Communist Party ) to support him against the third leg ( the Red Army ). Of course he had to make sure the Army never got powerful enough to tackle both the internal security forces and the party together - and so he purged, and purged and purged. Of course he was aided in this by the complacency of the generals. Zhukov's actions post VE Day were particularly stupid in terms of ensuring his continued survival --- and so he got posted to that hive of activity and importance, the Odessa military district [:D]

I was really sorry to get that letter from Dick's wife.

About Stalin--as my sister once said about another individual--he was a real piece of work. Zhukov was taking cover at that point.

[herwin]

My youngest says my copy of Deep Battle is at my Virginia condo. Do you want it?

[Crackaces]

You are quite correct Nemo -- I am Western trained and thus that is my only context ...

I can only cite two instances that has influenced my line of thought.

1. Destruction of Army Group Center: From a Western point of view the simplest way to the objective -- Berlin -- is to drive Minsk, -->Warsaw --> Berlin. However, the Soviet plan makes a series of encirclements focused solely on the destruction of an entire Army Group for which Minsk falls. [and so does everyting else [8D] ]

2. The Balkin/Baltic campaign. Here the Soviets invest quite a bit to provide a false impession that Bucharest and Sofia are the Primary objectives [where the Allies used blow-up air filled balloons that look like tanks to deceive the Germans in thinking Calis -- the Soviets presented real armored units]. Once these forces comitted and the Germans responded by moving units .. the real attack cut a swath into the Baltic States but not directly at Riga [where I propose a western minded General might go ]-- but instead at the point where the greatest numbers of forces would be cut off and produce the greatest chaos.

Thus my context that the Soviet docterine would be more focused on the disablement of key units rather than seizing a certain road, bridge, or city for that matter unless such a move enabled forces to increase the size of the chaos produced and decrease the ability for the enemy to resist.

My context for causuality absorbtion in terms of modern LIC/MIC is primarly Afghanistan 1979 - 1988. Here the Soviets continully operated motorized units in shock attacks against what they thought would bring reserve units into battle and occupy enemy supply points. Alas, their enemy continually picked the time and place of engagement with horrid results. Yet I understand these losses were viewed as a part of the overall plan. One might argue that 15K is nothing compared to 50K the US lost in Vietnam -- however from the standpoint of Russian mothers .. it was the breaking point.

Just my context. However, your posting has given me great reasons to rethink [;)] I would be very interested to understand how this context fits/opposes the broader view held from a Soviet perspective.

[Cribtop]

Nemo,

I have spent quite some time studying Japan's strategic dilemma and can't find a way out of it absent auto victory (which is difficult to achieve in Scenario 1), player morale loss or survival until game end. Arguably the last two results mean the Japanese got their wish - a negotiated settlement.

After seeing what you did in the Downfall scenario I was intrigued by your approach and wanted primarily to better my game. A secondary objective was the hope that if I looked at things through fresh eyes I would find a way out of the box Japan is in once it decides to initiate war with the West. I am not surprised to hear you say that good doctrine can't by itself solve all strategic problems. For example, the best doctrine in the world couldn't prevent the fall of Lichtenstein in 1941.

However, studying this has been and will continue to be a worthwhile exercise to improve my game and my understanding. I've spent my life since age 5 studying military history, strategy and tactics and this is a new approach to this effort.

[Nemo121]

Herwin,
PM on the way....


Cribtop,
Well good doctrine well executed and in support of a cohesive strategy will certainly give you more success than poorly executed doctrine poorly executed and in support of a non-cohesive strategy. My view when I play either side is to do better than I did the last time, eradicate mistakes, achieve greater efficiencies of force and thus be able to run more operations simultaneously or commence offensive operations with forces others would find wholly inadequate. I also set a different theme for each game so as to practice different skillsets. The process becomes the goal, not the outcome. I think that may be the conclusion you are coming to also? I'm not sure, hence the question mark.

For Japan in 1941 I think the player can play with better doctrine, execute their operations more effectively and efficiently and in support of a more cohesive, longer-term strategy than was the case in real life. However the key thing missing from the first line of my answer ( the good doctrine, well executed sentence ) is the word viable. I think that as a Japanese player you can improve in every level - tactically, operationally, strategically and economically BUT at its very basis the Japanese national objectives were unattainable and thus the viability of any strategy designed to attain them is under question right from the start.

Operational Art is the art of accepting and declining battle in order to achieve strategic objectives. Strategic Art also involves, sometimes, declining engagement. In 1941 Japan may very well have been much better off to bend its knee to some rather crude Western pressure and just focus on exploiting China, Korea and Manchuria while the rest of the world was absorbed with the conflict vs Hitler. I think this is a situation where no matter how well you play you are probably stuck in a situation in which there is no viable strategy for a clear victory. If Japan were being rational it should have accepted some humiliation and not started wars against Western Powers. For multiple reasons that wasn't something the military was very open to and so Japan stumbled into war through miscalculation and hubris.


I think though that players recognise that Japanese victory is probably unattainable ( leaving aside VP ) and so a Japanese player who gets into 1945 and can still offer a challenge ( or who holds out to 1946 ) is recognised as being a top-notch player. Let me pose you a question: I'm sure you can name the location of the battle where the Spartan co-King Leonidas led his personal guard to their deaths in a significant defeat. Can you name the battle which caused Xerxes to retreat back to Asia or the battle the next year in which the ground forces he left behind to complete the conquest of Greece were defeated by the combined Greek forces? We remember a pretty rough defeat but forget the victories which followed because the defeat said more about the character of the defenders than did the victories. Sometimes life is like that, IMO.


Crackaces,
I find it interesting that you view the objective of Bagration as being the destruction of Army Group Centre. I always thought the objective was to create a breach between Army Group North and Army Group Centre and exploit to the Vistula River and get some bridgeheads. Obviously getting to the Vistula meant killing and capturing hundreds of thousands of Germans but I think it is interesting that with your Western experience you are focussing on force destruction whereas I think the Soviets would have looked at the
a) the capture of the vital road net nexuses and the crossing of the major river obstacles (dislocating the German front ) and
b) the sundering of the joins between the armies in Army Group Centre and later the junction between Army Group Centre and Army Group North - which furthered the dislocation of the German front and prevented it coalescing to provide cohesive resistance )

as being the crucial factors. Obviously if you split an Army Group into little pieces those small pieces will be overwhelmed or surrender and you'll have a huge haul of troops and material but they weren't focussed on force destruction so much as they were on dislocation. Their thinking was that if they dislocated the front then the huge hauls of prisoners etc would follow.


As to Minsk: Well, it was the crucial nexus of the road and rail net. When breaking through Minsk was the obvious strategic objective for the initial phase of Bagration in order to allow the larger strategic objective - splitting Army Group North and Army Group Centre and getting across the Vistula ready for the war-ending Spring 1945 offensive. Sure, when the Soviets found the remnants of 4th Army stuck east of Minsk they weren't going to let them away but don't forget that they didn't just stop and pocket 4th Army. Their mobile elements continue pushing north-west and south-west from Minsk even as 4th Army was trapped and then fought its way out. I would argue that they weighted the north-western thrust more heavily because in the long run they wanted to split Army Groups from eachother, not just Armies within Army Groups ( as had happened at Minsk ).

As an end result of these dislocations it was, of course, expected that large German formations would be left bereft when their mobile reserves, supply trains and HQs were over-run but the focus of the mobile forces was always to go as deep as possible as quickly as possible ( geography and tempo ) rather than on the troops. Of course geography, tempo and enemy resistance are all interlinked but a Soviet exploitation force commander who allowed his forces to get bogged down with non-mobile reserves wouldn't have kept his job ( or head ) for long.


Maybe others with an interest in Deep Battle or Western doctrine could pop in at this stage to give their read on that intrepretation? A good US proxy was Air Land Battle which was basically the US version of Deep Battle although it did focus a lot more heavily on force destruction than geography for obvious reasons.

[Cribtop]

Love the Xerxes analogy. Reminds me of the scene in Gilligan's Island where Thurston Howell talks about studying the campaigns of Lee, Rommel, Hannibal and Napoleon. "All losers!" was the retort.

Or, more eloquently, this quote about what my own ancestors attempted in the lost cause department:

It's all now you see. Yesterday won't be over until tomorrow and tomorrow began ten thousand years ago. For every Southern boy fourteen years old, not once but whenever he wants it, there is the instant when it's still not yet two o'clock on that July afternoon in 1863, the brigades are in position behind the rail fence, the guns are laid and ready in the woods and the furled flags are already loosened to break out and Pickett himself with his long oiled ringlets and his hat in one hand probably and his sword in the other looking up the hill waiting for Longstreet to give the word and it's all in the balance, it hasn't happened yet, it hasn't even begun yet, it not only hasn't begun yet but there is still time for it not to begin against that position and those circumstances which made more men than Garnett and Kemper and Armistead and Wilcox look grave yet it's going to begin, we all know that, we have come too far with too much at stake and that moment doesn't need even a fourteen-year-old boy to think This time. Maybe this time with all this much to lose than all this much to gain: Pennsylvania, Maryland, the world, the golden dome of Washington itself to crown with desperate and unbelievable victory the desperate gamble, the cast made two years ago; or to anyone who ever sailed a skiff under a quilt sail, the moment in 1492 when somebody thought This is it: the absolute edge of no return, to turn back now and make home or sail irrevocably on and either find land or plunge over the world's roaring rim.


You are correct in your assumption about my thinking. I'm re-defining victory as getting better and hopefully surviving into 45 while still offering meaningful resistance. IRL Japan couldn't solve the problem of China and thus felt constrained to fight the West, a foolhardy undertaking. After Khalkhin Gol they were afraid to take on the Soviets, and rightly so, but probably should have either attacked no one or attacked Russia in 1941 in hopes of losing the battle but having Hitler win the war. In many ways they were trying to build a 19th Century style colonial empire just as the time of those empires was passing away.

[Nemo121]

Japan and fighting the West to solve the Chinese problem.... "Oh look I've injured my fist on this wall, let me stick my other arm into a woodchipper to see if that solves the problem." [8|] [8|] [8|]

[vettim89]

I cannot help to find the irony in the fact that the best example of an army employing the Deep Battle strategy other than the Sovs themselves would be: the Israelis in 1973. If you read the narrative of the Suez counterattack, it reads like something out of the STAVKA manual. The only thing that stopped them was the political/diplomatic interference by the US and the Sovs. (Well, let's not ignore the fact that if the Israelis would have pressed the issue, WWIII might have broken out with very early use of nukes)

Still, they opened a breach in the weak point between the 2nd and 3rd Egyptian Armies then rolled what could easily be called an OMG through the breach. End result was 3rd Army encircled and the Israelis rolling throught the strategic rear getting to within 110 km of Cairo. Of note, the Egyptians did not use the Deep Battle strategy in the 1973 war but the Syrians tried. In fact, the Syrians darn near succeeded

[JeffroK]

ORIGINAL: vettim89

I cannot help to find the irony in the fact that the best example of an army employing the Deep Battle strategy other than the Sovs themselves would be: the Israelis in 1973. If you read the narrative of the Suez counterattack, it reads like something out of the STAVKA manual. The only thing that stopped them was the political/diplomatic interference by the US and the Sovs. (Well, let's not ignore the fact that if the Israelis would have pressed the issue, WWIII might have broken out with very early use of nukes)

Still, they opened a breach in the weak point between the 2nd and 3rd Egyptian Armies then rolled what could easily be called an OMG through the breach. End result was 3rd Army encircled and the Israelis rolling throught the strategic rear getting to within 110 km of Cairo. Of note, the Egyptians did not use the Deep Battle strategy in the 1973 war but the Syrians tried. In fact, the Syrians darn near succeeded

Having read "Bren's" book it seemed more like a tactical battle rather than strategic. The foces were Brigades and Battalions. Maybe heading on to Cairo would have cut off all Egyptian forces on the Canal and been a true copy of the Soviets.

But the Soviets didnt think of anything new, like Jomini, Clausewicz etc they put together already well proved strategy and tactics under a new title.

For a recent version of their plans, look at Allenby in Palestine 1918.

[Crackaces]

ORIGINAL: vettim89

I cannot help to find the irony in the fact that the best example of an army employing the Deep Battle strategy other than the Sovs themselves would be: the Israelis in 1973. If you read the narrative of the Suez counterattack, it reads like something out of the STAVKA manual. The only thing that stopped them was the political/diplomatic interference by the US and the Sovs. (Well, let's not ignore the fact that if the Israelis would have pressed the issue, WWIII might have broken out with very early use of nukes)

Still, they opened a breach in the weak point between the 2nd and 3rd Egyptian Armies then rolled what could easily be called an OMG through the breach. End result was 3rd Army encircled and the Israelis rolling throught the strategic rear getting to within 110 km of Cairo. Of note, the Egyptians did not use the Deep Battle strategy in the 1973 war but the Syrians tried. In fact, the Syrians darn near succeeded

Golda had something to do with that US/Soviet friction and meddling .... "If Isreal should fall ... I have US provided F4F Phantom's loaded with special weapons that can reach the Caucasus ..." Re: Conversation between Kissenger and Golda Meir .. Great Play BTW "Golda's Balcony ..." The Soviet miscalculation is reported to be the closest we have come to WWWIII -- DEFCON II ....[X(]

This posting sort of reinforces my contention that a true deep battle context between the US/Soviet forces in the Fulda Gap especally in the period of 1980 - 1988 would have resulted in miscalculation & annihilation .... Reagan decentralized NCA .. only to have Clinton recentralize NCA and we have kept that paradigm today. Well today Nemo's thought on 72 hour delay might be true .... "I am sure its all a misunderstanding and if we dialoge ..." "Mr President the Commander of the 20th Guards Army is asking for your surrender ..."

[JeffroK]

que!

[vettim89]

ORIGINAL: JeffK

ORIGINAL: vettim89

I cannot help to find the irony in the fact that the best example of an army employing the Deep Battle strategy other than the Sovs themselves would be: the Israelis in 1973. If you read the narrative of the Suez counterattack, it reads like something out of the STAVKA manual. The only thing that stopped them was the political/diplomatic interference by the US and the Sovs. (Well, let's not ignore the fact that if the Israelis would have pressed the issue, WWIII might have broken out with very early use of nukes)

Still, they opened a breach in the weak point between the 2nd and 3rd Egyptian Armies then rolled what could easily be called an OMG through the breach. End result was 3rd Army encircled and the Israelis rolling throught the strategic rear getting to within 110 km of Cairo. Of note, the Egyptians did not use the Deep Battle strategy in the 1973 war but the Syrians tried. In fact, the Syrians darn near succeeded

Having read "Bren's" book it seemed more like a tactical battle rather than strategic. The foces were Brigades and Battalions. Maybe heading on to Cairo would have cut off all Egyptian forces on the Canal and been a true copy of the Soviets.

But the Soviets didnt think of anything new, like Jomini, Clausewicz etc they put together already well proved strategy and tactics under a new title.

For a recent version of their plans, look at Allenby in Palestine 1918.

True the size of the forces were smaller than the Central Europe scenario but the concept was in place. The Israelis attacked on a very narrow front, punched a hole through it and pushed exploitation forces through it. Without the diplomatic influences there is no reason to think they couldn't have pushed through to Cairo or at least threatened it. In a sense it was the perfect execution of the Sov Central Europe strategy which was to penetrate into NATO's rear causing a collapse of the political structure of the Alliance thus ending the war. A example of this in literature would be in Ralph Peters' book Red Army

[bigred]

edit: off topic

[modrow]

ORIGINAL: Nemo121
Maybe others with an interest in Deep Battle or Western doctrine could pop in at this stage to give their read on that intrepretation? A good US proxy was Air Land Battle which was basically the US version of Deep Battle although it did focus a lot more heavily on force destruction than geography for obvious reasons.

Well, whereas my knowledge on these complicated things is very limited (even more limited than how to tend my lawn properly [;)]), I would add a personal (perhaps I should say psychological, but there are more expert people around as well [:D]) meta-comment not on the doctrines but on our perception thereof.

In general, we think in our boxes. One example for this in Nemo's post in his statement relating to Japan not being rational by not accepting humiliation. I think there may be (cultural) reasons why accepting humiliation was out of the question; thus what appears irrational from an outside point of view or a result-oriented approach may be based on reason after all. Otherwise, any defence of priciples as such may be considered irrational.

I think that when trying to understand deep battle we need to think outside our box. I believe that most of us (perhaps all of us that did not get a sufficient share of "Soviet" thinking) have a tendency to think too tactical and not sufficiently operational. That may have a systematic and a personal reason: Somewhere in our training and/or background, there is a root of Clausewitzian focus on destruction on the battlefield as an immediate result of the operation one conducts (systematic reason) and probably only few of us have received proper military training covering strategic and/or operational aspects including the application thereof (personal reason).

One thing that seems to illustrate this aspect is the discussion of analogies on "Blitzkrieg" (which IMHO is not a sound, complete doctrine anyway, but that is another issue) in my "armchair strategist's club" thread. To me, it seems like the attempt to describe, summarize or illustrate this concept essentually leads to analogies inspired by tactical principles (e.g., water flowing past a stone is an image that I first heard in the context of infiltration tactics).

I also think that this focus on tactical aspects is relevant for our perception relating to, e.g., use of/care for the forces used. On a tactical level, flexibility is probably more restricted in the framework of deep battle, which creates additional operational flexibility. But this restriction of tactical flexibility leads to a more rigid approach than the one we are used to, incurring losses that may be avoided by a different, more western tactical approach.

I believe that in order to understand, apply and transfer principles of deep battle, we need to leave that box. Yes, a properly conducted operation according to deep battle can bring about the immediate destruction of the enemy. But my understanding is that the "ideal" application of deep battle would look different. I think this best illustrated by a quote attributed to Triandafillov:

The outcome in modern war will be attained not through the physical destruction of the opponent but rather through a succession of developing manoeuvres that will aim at inducing him to see his inability to comply further with his operational goals. The effect of this mental state leads to operational shock or system paralysis, and ultimately to the disintegration of his operational system.

Perhaps some of Nemo's former opponents may provide 1st hand reports on how operational shock feels [8D]...

As always, just my 2cts.

Hartwig

[JeffroK]

Hartwig
 
One thing that seems to illustrate this aspect is the discussion of analogies on "Blitzkrieg" (which IMHO is not a sound, complete doctrine anyway, but that is another issue) in my "armchair strategist's club" thread.
 
IFF the campaign in Poland ended the war, would Blitzkrieg  be a sound strategy.
 
Does the fact it was only 1 campaign in a long war lessen its credibility?
 
Arguably, the 6 Day War was a "Lightning War" in that it was a complete war rather than just a small part.
 

[Cribtop]

I think it's possible to recognize that blitzkrieg was an incomplete doctrine (and as others have pointed out something of a media creation) that was employed at times very hesitantly (see OKH's constant fears that Rommel and Guderian had gone too far too fast in France in 1940) while still acknowledging that it's effects were revolutionary.

A world scarred by WWI trench warfare operated on assumptions that offensive action could not be decisive. The Germans proved those assumptions wrong, and shocked the world in so doing. However, they were often quite haphazard and ad hoc in many cases, often winning by default due to the incompetence of their foes.

[Wirraway_Ace]

ORIGINAL: Nemo121


Also I'd make the point that in Deep Battle the objective was pretty much always geographical. Destroying x armoured divisions might be welcome but a Soviet commander who turned down an opportunity to blow the entire German front open by running for Arnhem and, instead, chose to carry out some lateral attack against 9th or 10th SS forces south of the river would have been taken out and shot - and rightfully so.

Nemo, do you think the geographical focus was a strength of the Deep Battle doctrine? I have my reservations, although it provides a clear objective for subordinate commanders.

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: Wirraway_Ace

ORIGINAL: Nemo121


Also I'd make the point that in Deep Battle the objective was pretty much always geographical. Destroying x armoured divisions might be welcome but a Soviet commander who turned down an opportunity to blow the entire German front open by running for Arnhem and, instead, chose to carry out some lateral attack against 9th or 10th SS forces south of the river would have been taken out and shot - and rightfully so.

Nemo, do you think the geographical focus was a strength of the Deep Battle doctrine? I have my reservations, although it provides a clear objective for subordinate commanders.

I'm not Nemo, but as I recall, it gave NATO the willies.