Fire control (revisited)

[LargeSlowTarget]

I have a question regarding fire control devices like gunnery radar, directors etc. (I have searched the forum and found threads on this topic, but no definite answer).

I know that these things are not modelled as devices (i.e. like guns, mines etc.) in the game.

But is there something in the code that models these things, making Allied gunnery more precise later in the war than early-on (factors like crew experience considered equal)?

Since I have not yet managed to play AE past 1942, I have no experience...

[castor troy]

Going with what I´ve experienced so far, it is ship crew experience that matters far more than any technical advantages the Allied should have from 43 on. The IJN still usually whipes the floor (not always, just like it doesn´t always do in Dec 41) with the USN late war because their high experience is rocking and usually still is 20 points higher than Allied exp (night exp that is). The total USN technical advantage - aka radar controlled naval gunnery - is not really coming into play in the game and you just can´t bring up your ships into the superman spheres the IJ sailors are experience whise.

[Sardaukar]

ORIGINAL: LargeSlowTarget

I have a question regarding fire control devices like gunnery radar, directors etc. (I have searched the forum and found threads on this topic, but no definite answer).

I know that these things are not modelled as devices (i.e. like guns, mines etc.) in the game.

But is there something in the code that models these things, making Allied gunnery more precise later in the war than early-on (factors like crew experience considered equal)?

Since I have not yet managed to play AE past 1942, I have no experience...

Those have been discussed on Scenario Design forum and you'd get information there from JWE etc. if they feel so dispositioned. It's bit futile to ask about it here, because those who know about that stuff are not going to engage into discussion here on General level forum. You could also PM JWE and ask nicely. [8D]

[Jakerson]

Unlike US Naval forces, the Japanese navy drilled and practiced night fighting extensively as well as conducting frequent night gunnery live fire drills and exercises.  

USA had problems of using radar effectively early in the war because of radio and communication problems when one ships detected something with radar they had problems communicating it to other ships as radio operating crews were inexperienced and communicating procedures of radar detections on the radio were incomplete. Even when radio operators send radar detection report other ships didn’t understand the message and it took long time to reach commander. Commanders of the task forces on the other hand didn’t think radar as reliable or accurate way of detecting targets and trusted more conventional ways of detecting targets and many times ignored reports they got. These are the reason why radar was not used very effectively. USA had radar but they think it is defective technology and dint use it early in the war.
 

[crsutton]

I have two campaigns going. Aside from the early months, I have not noticed any real imbalance between Japanese surface gunnery and Allied. The real heart breaker is of course, the long lance. Experience is a factor and the Allied experience for veteran ships does not really go up. However, this is more than compensated in later days by better ships. Any Allied warship that comes into the theater after 1944 usually has very good day and night experience-typically over 70. Those that come before that date are saddled with less experience. But in numerous surface fights it has been pretty even for me. I have no complaints.

I think most will tell you that the Fletcher class DD is very good and seems to do very well vs all opposition. A flock of Fletchers, with working torpedoes and a good commander on a dark night is pretty much unbeatable in my book.

[LargeSlowTarget]

@ Sardaukar: True - I did not take into consideration the "can of worms" potential of my question [;)].

@ Jakerson: True. My question was actually triggered by my current "bedtime reading" - Eric Hammel's book on the Battle of Guadalcanal and his description of the different equipment and fire control methods used on different ships. It also contains a vivid description of the radar / spotting / communication confusion and the mindset of the commanders regarding radar.  

[mdiehl]

Unlike US Naval forces, the Japanese navy drilled and practiced night fighting extensively as well as conducting frequent night gunnery live fire drills and exercises.

The boldfaced part is incorrect. The USA did train extensively at night fighting, both prior to the war and on the initiative of individual captains and commodores. For example, USS Augusta was probably in 1940 the most extensively trained night-combat-ready cruiser in the world, at least with respect to surface gunnery.

My impression is that in fact the USN gunners were better trained at night *gunnery* than the IJN gunners. But the IJN's advantages lay in their reliance on torpoedoes from their CAs (USN DDs were also torpedo-doctrine-"enabled" if you will, from the outset, but were doctrinally slaved to whatever commodore was in charge, and said commodore was often directing things from a CA that lacked torpedoes). The other Japanese advantage was that their CArons had experience training TOGETHER.

USN Commodores made up for that on the fly. For example, Adm. Scott spent a considerable amount of time drilling his disparate units, all of which were quite well trained, in working together, and in pushing the advantage with radar.

What you see is that some of the older USN Desrons that had ships that had worked and trained together for years were on occasion simply superior to Japanese surface combat elements, as at, for example, the Battle of Balikpapan.

Commanders of the task forces on the other hand didn’t think radar as reliable or accurate way of detecting targets and trusted more conventional ways of detecting targets and many times ignored reports they got. These are the reason why radar was not used very effectively. USA had radar but they think it is defective technology and dint use it early in the war.

It is inaccurate to say that it was not used effectively. It was used quite effectively in air search mode from the outset. The organization of US combat air patrol, despite the occasional bumps, was far better than anything mustered by KB at any time in 1942. For night combat, the effectiveness of radar really depended on the commodore. Ching Lee and Norm Scott were both radar devotees and it showed in their successes around Guadalcanal. They used it effectively and well.

Of course, as the war progressed, all USN ships made radar not only the linchpin of detection and early firing solutions, but slaved radar to the gun directors positions as well. By 1944, the USN was simply vastly superior at surface combat of all kinds... night or day, detection at night or in bad weather or sunlight, gunfire accuracy, and torpedo accuracy, than the IJN. That is why the IJN was so horridly ambushed, drubbed, held by the nose and kicked in the ass at Surigao Strait, and why during the daylight action at Samar, the USN DDs and DEs were more combat effective than the Japanese CAs. Radar made it possible for USN ships to punch far above their weight class.

[LargeSlowTarget]

Mmhhh - everything I have read about pre-war training says that the IJN had far superior realistic training exercises with a doctrine of night engagements in all kinds of weather, not shying from suffering damage and casualties, while the USN prepared for Jutland-style daylight long-range action, trained under much more docile conditions, in calm weather, not taking risks that may result in damage or loss of life, and that night battle exercises were not much more than night cruising exercises. The USN did not even test their torps under live conditions, much less at night.

[mdiehl]

It may well be that most of what you read is incorrect. USN DDs had a night torpedo doctrine similar to the one used by the IJN. When allowed to employ it (when not slaved to a gun line) they used it very well, in the first instance in January 1942. USN daylight gunnery was quite accurate, with extensive and intensive daylight training. Some USN ships also trained extensively at night combat, particularly those that had at one time or another been assigned to Asiatic fleet.

Torpedo exercises were regularly carried out before the war. The problem was that for exercises the torpedoes carried an inert warhead, which was packed with substance that had a different weight than the torpedo explosive. That and the position of the torp's sensor caused live shots to run at much different depths than practice shots.

In any case, the proof is in the doing. In the first three major night surface engagements the USN went 2 wins and 1 loss (Savo). In the first six, it was USN 4 vs IJN 2 (Savo and Tassafaronga). After 1942 the drubbings became even more lopsided in favor of the USN, culminating in complete failures of Japanese night time and daylight combat at Surigao Strait and Samar.

[Treetop64]

An interesting topic.  It's hard to overstate just how badly mauled the Japanese southern force was at Suriago.  They were being peppered by highly accurate, over-the-horizon radar-controlled fire before they even knew where their enemy was.  The level of technical and martial proficiency by the US Navy at this stage was staggering, even by today's standards.

[mdiehl]

Yes. But that sort of thing happened also to the Japanese in 1942. It is why I think that "EXP" in the sense used by WitP really really really gets it wrong. A whole lot depended on the initial conditions (force readiness for battle, knowledge of enemy disposition, exhaustion state of crews) *in addition to* technical and technological proficiency.

Suffice it to say that IMO, Balikpapan (a USN win), and Savo Island (a lopsided Japanese win) were predictable outcomes, in hindsight, without having any expectations about "experience" at all, merely because of situational information.

By mid 1943, of course, the USN was simply ALOT more competent at assembling information on a strategic, operational, local, and tactical scale. Radar was a big leap forward tactically, but the USN was simply better at the higher levels of information gathering by mid-1943 than the Japanese ever were.

Of course, some of that came about because of glaring information failures, such as Savo, and glaring errors on the part of TF commodores to appreciate the advantage given by radar (Btl of Friday 13th, Tassafaronga).

The Japanese in contrast didn't learn anything from Balikpapan. The fact that a bunch of USN DDs sailed into their formation at night, in January 1942, torpedoed a bunch of ships, shot up a bunch more, and sailed away without damage, never seemed to register on them at all. So you get repeated subsequent Japanese information failures straight through to the end of the war and in plenty in 1942. Friday the 14th. Empress Augusta Bay. Cape Esperence. Samar. Coral Sea. Midway. Santa Cruz. "Learning from experience" was not really part of the IJN mindset. Or perhaps, learning from BAD experiences was not.

[freeboy]

I think that fire ontrol, the systems etc are, i am guessing, rolled into two catagories.. accuracy for the weapons and experience

[LargeSlowTarget]

mdiehl, I rest rather inclined to believe what distinguished historians have said on the subject, which is that IJN training was more realistic than the USN training in general and especially in regard to night battles. Let us just agree to disagree, I am in no mood to argue.

To get back on topic - confirmed by PM from Don, the gunfire accuracy is determined by four factors:

Firing Ship's surface search radar (the eff value)
Target ship size and speed (evasion)
Firing weapon accuracy
Firing Ship's crew experience rating

Thus search radar gives a gunnery advantage - and it is assumed that the fire control radars are being upgraded together with the search radars.

If despite this - judging from the comments of more experienced players - the mid- to late-war advances in USN radar controlled gunnery do not really come into play in the game, then I see only one practical way for modders to tweak things - device upgrades for guns (simulating fire control radar) which raise the weapon accuracy.

[Jakerson]

ORIGINAL: Treetop64

An interesting topic.  It's hard to overstate just how badly mauled the Japanese southern force was at Suriago.  They were being peppered by highly accurate, over-the-horizon radar-controlled fire before they even knew where their enemy was.  The level of technical and martial proficiency by the US Navy at this stage was staggering, even by today's standards.

And in battle of Savo Islands smaller force of Japanese ships sunk 5 USA Heavy Cruisers (one as scuttled) and suffered only minor damages and no ship losses during night time combat. Japanese launched Float planes at night and illuminated USA ships with flares and started turkey shoot of them.

As far as I know USA inexperienced crews thought using of float planes at night to illuminate ships as impossible strategy as it would endanger pilots unable to return at night.

This is just one example of Japanese skills in night time surface battle.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Savo_Island

[Cavalry Corp]

So would launching FP on search at night 0 range help in a surface action????

[pompack]

ORIGINAL: cavalry

So would launching FP on search at night 0 range help in a surface action????

Well, it's been stated before that night searches increases DL (if they find anything) and increased DL improves surface combat. The trouble is that I am not sure if the night search sub-phase occurs before or after combat; if before it would be an advantage.

[mdiehl]

And in battle of Savo Islands smaller force of Japanese ships sunk 5 USA Heavy Cruisers (one as scuttled) and suffered only minor damages and no ship losses during night time combat. Japanese launched Float planes at night and illuminated USA ships with flares and started turkey shoot of them.

A similar thing happened to the Japanese at Balikpapan in 1942, with USN DDs delivering torpedoes against a surprised force with a defense in disarray. In both instances, the problem was primarily one of lack of information and battle readiness on the part of the defender.

As far as I know USA inexperienced crews thought using of float planes at night to illuminate ships as impossible strategy as it would endanger pilots unable to return at night.

Prior to that engagement, the USN crews had the same amount of combat experience as the Japanese ones. Use of flot planes to illuminate *WAS* part of USN doctrine. The problem at Savo was that the USN vessels were under the "assurance" that there was no possibility of combat that night. Tactical intel from earlier air searches had not been passed down the chain of command. In many ways a very similar situation to Balikpapan.

This is just one example of Japanese skills in night time surface battle.

It is a poor example. Again, one may note, in 1942 the USN won the first two out of three major night surface engagements. The Japanese major advantage was fast torpedoes. And it *was* an advantage, until USN commodores made RADAR their priority. After that, the advantage evaporated. It's hard to credit the Japanese with the all-pervailing awesomeness some here accord them, given the very poor performances the IJN turned in at night at Balipapan, Cape Esperence, and the Battles of Nov 13-14 and 14-15. To say nothing of the drubbings they received in surface combat starting in 1944.

[LargeSlowTarget]

Never said the IJN were supermen.

But USN wasn't as good as you make them sound either.

Surprise / bad use of intel / lack of battle readiness work both ways.

The examples you cite I do not consider proof of USN night fighting skills being equal or superior resp. of very poor performances of the IJN.

Balikpapan: USN surprise attack, but poor hit rates of US DDs while shooting at sitting ducks > they were lucky that the IJN screen commander assumed a submarine attack and sent his force the wrong way.

Cape Esperance: USN surprise attack, IJN did not expect opposition, Scott crossed the T > nevertheless, IJN almost gave as good as they got (1 CA + 1 DD lost by IJN, 1 DD lost and Boise nearly lost by USN)

Battle of Nov 13: both sides surprised, only 2 out of 13 USN ships left in condition to fight, the rest sunk or heavily damaged > mission kill only because Adm. Abe chose to disengage (had enough forces left for a bombardment), but cannot be called a USN "win", considering the losses

Battle of Nov 15: saved by performance of Washington, Lee knew how to exploit radar, but nevertheless lost his entire DD screen sunk or heavily damaged and South Dakota crippled


How about the performance of the IJN in the Battle of Badung Strait, Savo and Tassafaronga?

Ooops - darn, didn't want to be dragged into an argument...

[mdiehl]

I know you didna say they were supermen. I was, ah, directing some of that comment at a more recent post.

We may be talking past each other a little. I would not suggest that in 1942 the USN were the beall and endall. I'm simply asserting, by way of looking at the outcomes of night engagements, that the notion that the Japanese were fantastic at it or the USN particulatly bad at it is not correct. I think it's fair to call that notion "received wisdom" from "eminent historians." I just tend to be the kind of guy who thinks historical claims are worth reinvestigating, along with the motives of the people who made those claims. But I digress.

My major point, which you seem to agree with, is that the outcomes of both Savo Island and Balikpapan were less about "training" or "experience" than they were about circumstances leading up to the battle. In both cases, exhausted crews on the defending ships. In both cases, perceived lack or immediate likelihood of action despite, in both cases, air search intel to the contrary. In both cases, utter surprise achieved by the attacker against defending ships in a complex dispersement -- resulting in confusion on the defenders' part, both as the the nature of attack and the identity of vessels being observed at the time. The nearest brush with the USN 4-stackers at Balikpapan was at about 700 meters. Yet no one in the IJN escort force correctly identified the USN attackers for what they were. Not even after the USN attackers had fired the last of their torps and were engaging in gunfire.

Fatigue. Battle Readiness. Information. These had much more to do with the outomes of both Savo and Balikpapan than did experience or night training.

As the war progressed, the USN became MUCH MUCH better at the information and battle readiness side. Especially the information. That's why USN CVs began to have separate command centers for CAP/control with direct access to radar data in the combat air director's station. Likewise USN ships gave direct access to radar sata to fire control officers even before the end of the fighting at Guadalcanal, for the purposes of fire control. Bob Hagen is an interesting example of that.

The result was that by 1944 the IJN was hopelessly outclassed at ANY kind of surface action, day or not, clear or poor visibility. The USN was simply vastly superior at it.

I'd say in 1942 they were on rather equal footing. The IJN's torpedo doctrine superior, when it worked (recall that the median and modal hit rates for torpedo volleys was ZERO percent for the IJN) and the USN's radar doctrine superior, when USN commodores bothered to make use of it (as Adm. Scott did, and Adm. Lee did, and Adm. Callaghan did not). Which was sketchy in 1942, and not sketchy in 1943 or thereafter.

[mdiehl]

How about the performance of the IJN in the Battle of Badung Strait, Savo and Tassafaronga?

Different circumstances each. I would not call the battle of Badung Strait much of an example of a great Japanese job. Shot at each other for a while, torpedoed a Dutch CL, took a battering from two USN DDs and another dutch CL, and had a Japanese DD crippled and towed back to safety. Rather chaotic by any standards, and no evidence of great surface gunnery on the IJN part.

Savo, a matter more of circumstances than anything. If a bunch of USN DDs had sailed against a defender under those circumstances, the results would have been similar. We know that because USN DDs did that sort of thing seven months prior to Savo.

Tassafaronga combined the excellent Japanese torpedo with a completely stupid USN Commodore who threw away a positional advantage and excellent torpedo solution for his DDs at the start of the fight.

As I said, in 1942, the two were in my view equals at night combat. By 1944 the Japanese were hopelessly outclassed at it. Night combat. Day combat. Didn't really matter, the USN was simply much better at it.