ORIGINAL: TulliusDetritus
ORIGINAL: Rasputitsa
Japan did not expect to defeat the USA, they planned to make the recapture of lost territories so costly that the US would would recoil from that price, historically they were wrong.
You are using an euphemism here. If you bring the Americans to the negotiation table it's because the latter are admitting DEFEAT... That was the idea behind the Midway Operation. American carriers sunk = Americans might give up (the hordes of American CVs would only be ready in 1943-44) [:)]
Capture of Moscow in WitE and Midway captured and CVs annihilated in WitP would be the excuse to say "hey, they might have surrendered / sued for peace"...
I personally believe both the Germans and Japanese grossly underestimated their enemies... especially their WILL to fight to the end.
Obviously the Axis totally underestimated the will to fight of the Allied Nations, dictators often do. Their strategy meant that victory could only come if their major opponents gave up, rather than being able to force a defeat on them and I think they knew that.
Only the actual events can be proved, because they happened, anything else is conjecture, or worse. However, how do we limit the effect of hindsight in the game, the certain knowledge what is coming next?
I am trying to characterise the thoughts of the Germans and Japanese, which resulted in them attacking the Soviet Union and the US, not validating them. If you want to put yourself into the shoes of the commanders of the day (common thread - how am I doing against the performance of the real Germans/Russians), surely it would help to introduce a level of doubt. If I give away too much ground, suffer too many casualties might I lose. If I push on further might I win, rather than just play 300 turns to see which month Berlin falls.
The point is, subject to the devs, it's a possible option that nobody has to use, if they don't need it.[:)]
PS - euphemism - is that the one with strings, or do you blow it.[&:]






