Quantifying exactly what effect the fuel shortages had on combat is, at least for me, hard. But in terms of the Allied landings on D-day, their aggressive air interdiciton and total air superiority probably had as much to do with limiting German operations as did the basic lack of fuel. A fairly good number of AFVs were abandoned (like that Tiger) due to running out of fuel in retreats rather than destroyed in combat.
But even in east in 42 and 43 the Germans had to make large parts of their lines static to keep the fuel concentrated where they wanted it. The units in France rebuilding were nearly always "static" divisions as well. I would assume the biggest impact is on air operations, where I know the Luftwaffe's planes were dissadvantaged due to lack of high octane avgas. Up until 42 so far as I recall since they had captured a fair amount of fuel/oil in the western campaign they were doing ok-ish. But at some point that reserve would have had to been used up and then the fuel crunch would start. At what point the fuel situation tipped over the cliff I honestly don't know. Even for something like Manstein's attempt to break the 6th Army out in early 43 I have never read that fuel was a major issue. But I have no idea how much "robbing peter to pay paul" was going on inside their logistics network.
They had fuel equal to 70-80% of their needs in 41-43 so by priotization they could keep it where they needed it the most. But that is a lot different then the games current model where they are in a situation of having a surplus every turn. While I don't think it is a major issue to bring the game economy in line with the real world reality...that may well be not the case.
OIL
Moderators: Joel Billings, Sabre21, elmo3
RE: OIL
As you probably know, the Allied Airforces basically dropped every bridge over every river within a couple of hundred klicks of the beaches and kept them dropped ... that must have had a major effect on German supply and maneuver!
And I read somewhere that the Germans were making operational level (i.e. brigade and divisional level) decisions based on their shortage of POL from 1942, if not sooner ... as you say, dunno when it really started to bite, but it started to have an impact very early on.
Phil
And I read somewhere that the Germans were making operational level (i.e. brigade and divisional level) decisions based on their shortage of POL from 1942, if not sooner ... as you say, dunno when it really started to bite, but it started to have an impact very early on.
Phil
Author, Space Opera (FGU); RBB #1 (FASA); Road to Armageddon; Farm, Forge and Steam; Orbis Mundi; Displaced (PGD)
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Email: aspqrz@tpg.com.au
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Email: aspqrz@tpg.com.au
RE: OIL
The allies air campaign to isolate the Normandy landing beaches and keep supply flow to the region to a minimum was a resounding sucess. After having played Atomic Games "Sword, Juno and Gold" game (I also played the Utah Beach one they produced) I am pretty much of the opinion it would have been better to leave the SS Pz divisions with AGC and take some of the more beat up infantry divisions off the eastern front to reinforce France. Another option would be to let the local commander command of course...overriding Romel's instructions to the Panzer divisions wasn't one of Hitler's better judgement calls.
But while I know that the lack of fuel had impacts the logisitcs people of the Wehrmacht seemed to be pretty damn good about making due. But when you consider that in 42 during the summer a sizable fraction of the army was static (more than 20%) it is likely they could keep the mobile part in fuel. Plus major operations were always performed after accumulation of stockpiles to support the operation. I'm not sure how well the logistics in the game reflects such a thing since you can't designate a HQ as a priority for supply...other than via the HQ build up command and that isn't the same thing.
The above system would break down the moment your entire line starts to move (which is what happened after 43) as there is no more a quiet sector you can starve for fuel to feed the "beast" elsewhere.
In terms of the game I think the problem lies in that fuel use seems dependent on movement there probably should be a much higher basic cost in fuel (as the units are considered to be engaging in low level combat and patroling which at least for mechanized units means fuel use) and the same for the airforce. Fighters flew every day doing CAP and such. Pilot training was consuming about 4000 tonnes a week according to the figures listed somewhere above. And each point of heavy industry should require some amount of fuel as well as resources...lubricants, trucking etc I think those sorts of changes would help fix the glut without necessitating major code changes.
But while I know that the lack of fuel had impacts the logisitcs people of the Wehrmacht seemed to be pretty damn good about making due. But when you consider that in 42 during the summer a sizable fraction of the army was static (more than 20%) it is likely they could keep the mobile part in fuel. Plus major operations were always performed after accumulation of stockpiles to support the operation. I'm not sure how well the logistics in the game reflects such a thing since you can't designate a HQ as a priority for supply...other than via the HQ build up command and that isn't the same thing.
The above system would break down the moment your entire line starts to move (which is what happened after 43) as there is no more a quiet sector you can starve for fuel to feed the "beast" elsewhere.
In terms of the game I think the problem lies in that fuel use seems dependent on movement there probably should be a much higher basic cost in fuel (as the units are considered to be engaging in low level combat and patroling which at least for mechanized units means fuel use) and the same for the airforce. Fighters flew every day doing CAP and such. Pilot training was consuming about 4000 tonnes a week according to the figures listed somewhere above. And each point of heavy industry should require some amount of fuel as well as resources...lubricants, trucking etc I think those sorts of changes would help fix the glut without necessitating major code changes.
RE: OIL
ORIGINAL: wulfgar
ORIGINAL: randallw
I'm guessing industry and oil do have an impact on the game, for the Axis side. [:'(]
No, they tend to have a nice healthy surplus of fuel production as with the soviets.
Agreed. This has actually been tested by various people in the past. It's also been commented upon in a number of threads before this one. Folks playing PBEM games where Ploesti was captured early in the game have indicated that they were seeing no ill effects on the Axis -- even after prolonged play.
RE: OIL
ORIGINAL: Paul McNeely
The allies air campaign to isolate the Normandy landing beaches and keep supply flow to the region to a minimum was a resounding sucess. After having played Atomic Games "Sword, Juno and Gold" game (I also played the Utah Beach one they produced) I am pretty much of the opinion it would have been better to leave the SS Pz divisions with AGC and take some of the more beat up infantry divisions off the eastern front to reinforce France. Another option would be to let the local commander command of course...overriding Romel's instructions to the Panzer divisions wasn't one of Hitler's better judgement calls.
But while I know that the lack of fuel had impacts the logisitcs people of the Wehrmacht seemed to be pretty damn good about making due. But when you consider that in 42 during the summer a sizable fraction of the army was static (more than 20%) it is likely they could keep the mobile part in fuel. Plus major operations were always performed after accumulation of stockpiles to support the operation. I'm not sure how well the logistics in the game reflects such a thing since you can't designate a HQ as a priority for supply...other than via the HQ build up command and that isn't the same thing.
The above system would break down the moment your entire line starts to move (which is what happened after 43) as there is no more a quiet sector you can starve for fuel to feed the "beast" elsewhere.
In terms of the game I think the problem lies in that fuel use seems dependent on movement there probably should be a much higher basic cost in fuel (as the units are considered to be engaging in low level combat and patroling which at least for mechanized units means fuel use) and the same for the airforce. Fighters flew every day doing CAP and such. Pilot training was consuming about 4000 tonnes a week according to the figures listed somewhere above. And each point of heavy industry should require some amount of fuel as well as resources...lubricants, trucking etc I think those sorts of changes would help fix the glut without necessitating major code changes.
Agreed. It's very easy to find wartime production figures of oil and fuel for both the Germans and Soviets. I’d therefore assume that the oil\fuel productions figures we are seeing in-game are historically reasonable. Although I haven't really bothered checking the in-game numbers vs. historical figures. The massive accumulation of fuel stores that occur in-game would lead me to the same conclusion as you have indicated above -- i.e. that in-game rates of fuel consumption are off the mark.
RE: OIL
I was looking at one of my russian rifle divisions and it has a fuel need of 3, for a week. 3000 l of fuel for a week for a division (I guess that is what 3 is...3 tonne of fuel). I just went to the Neihorster site and looked at a 41 russian rifle division (I am in 42 so this isn't the same TOE) and without even going into all the units and looking in great detail I have found:
23 trucks, 12 "special vehicle", 2 motorcycles, 1 tractor, 5 motor cars, 2 radio vehicles (there are more but I'm not going to look in every unit in the division to find them).
I would think that they would go through a lot more than 400 l of fuel in one day especially as the support units have a lot of trucks attached that isn't included in that total which I'd think could go up easily to 100 vehicles or more. Basically though this is one for the designers and playtesters to bat around.
23 trucks, 12 "special vehicle", 2 motorcycles, 1 tractor, 5 motor cars, 2 radio vehicles (there are more but I'm not going to look in every unit in the division to find them).
I would think that they would go through a lot more than 400 l of fuel in one day especially as the support units have a lot of trucks attached that isn't included in that total which I'd think could go up easily to 100 vehicles or more. Basically though this is one for the designers and playtesters to bat around.
RE: OIL
Not to belabor this anymore than it has been – but I actually think fuel and supply expenditures and the logistical model in general requires more ‘belaborment’ ;o)
I recall a paper I read recently on German Staff Planning during Barbarossa. Apparently their pre-invasion planning for fuel consumption by mechanized units was based upon operational experiences in France\Poland\Yugoslavia, etc. However, during combat operations in the Soviet Union the Germans were finding that actual fuel consumption by Panzer and motorized formations was on the order of the three to four times that of their pre-invasion calculations. This was partly a function of the lack of roads as well as the overly poor condition of “roads” in eastern-Poland, the Ukraine, Belorussia, Russia etc.
There are numerous pre and post war TMs and FMs from various armies that detail fuel consumption and methods by which logistical staffs should go about calculating such requirements. These are founded heavily in data collected for operational studies -- conducted during and post war on such matters. It's not a particularly difficult subject to research.
I recall a paper I read recently on German Staff Planning during Barbarossa. Apparently their pre-invasion planning for fuel consumption by mechanized units was based upon operational experiences in France\Poland\Yugoslavia, etc. However, during combat operations in the Soviet Union the Germans were finding that actual fuel consumption by Panzer and motorized formations was on the order of the three to four times that of their pre-invasion calculations. This was partly a function of the lack of roads as well as the overly poor condition of “roads” in eastern-Poland, the Ukraine, Belorussia, Russia etc.
There are numerous pre and post war TMs and FMs from various armies that detail fuel consumption and methods by which logistical staffs should go about calculating such requirements. These are founded heavily in data collected for operational studies -- conducted during and post war on such matters. It's not a particularly difficult subject to research.
RE: OIL
ORIGINAL: Paul McNeely
I was looking at one of my russian rifle divisions and it has a fuel need of 3, for a week. 3000 l of fuel for a week for a division (I guess that is what 3 is...3 tonne of fuel). I just went to the Neihorster site and looked at a 41 russian rifle division (I am in 42 so this isn't the same TOE) and without even going into all the units and looking in great detail I have found:
23 trucks, 12 "special vehicle", 2 motorcycles, 1 tractor, 5 motor cars, 2 radio vehicles (there are more but I'm not going to look in every unit in the division to find them).
I would think that they would go through a lot more than 400 l of fuel in one day especially as the support units have a lot of trucks attached that isn't included in that total which I'd think could go up easily to 100 vehicles or more. Basically though this is one for the designers and playtesters to bat around.
Well this British military document gives some figures for divisional oil consumption.
http://www.fischer-tropsch.org/Tom%20Re ... m%201J.pdf
For an armored division in static front mode, it might use less than 50 tons of oil a day. Heavy fighting could triple that.
- Jeffrey H.
- Posts: 3154
- Joined: Fri Apr 13, 2007 6:39 pm
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RE: OIL
ORIGINAL: wulfgar
ORIGINAL: Paul McNeely
I was looking at one of my russian rifle divisions and it has a fuel need of 3, for a week. 3000 l of fuel for a week for a division (I guess that is what 3 is...3 tonne of fuel). I just went to the Neihorster site and looked at a 41 russian rifle division (I am in 42 so this isn't the same TOE) and without even going into all the units and looking in great detail I have found:
23 trucks, 12 "special vehicle", 2 motorcycles, 1 tractor, 5 motor cars, 2 radio vehicles (there are more but I'm not going to look in every unit in the division to find them).
I would think that they would go through a lot more than 400 l of fuel in one day especially as the support units have a lot of trucks attached that isn't included in that total which I'd think could go up easily to 100 vehicles or more. Basically though this is one for the designers and playtesters to bat around.
Well this British military document gives some figures for divisional oil consumption.
http://www.fischer-tropsch.org/Tom%20Re ... m%201J.pdf
For an armored division in static front mode, it might use less than 50 tons of oil a day. Heavy fighting could triple that.
Interesting document, I think it's American though.
History began July 4th, 1776. Anything before that was a mistake.
Ron Swanson
Ron Swanson
