Tokyo Rose was a Hussy! Chez (J) vs. Canoe (A)

[Cribtop]

Agreed on the impact. Just not enough force by Japan, resulting in losses and stalemates without benefitting their strategic situation.

[princep01]

Considering the size of the IJN TF they fought, your cruiser TFs did very well. They also smacked the transport TFs around. Were there any casualties when the trans went down are were they down to supply only at the point of their demise? Even if the latter, the IJA troops will be eating their boots soon enough unless the IJN comes back for more, Maybe some Allied BBs will be in positions to wreck such a move?

It just gets worser and worser for the LYBs:).

[Capt. Harlock]

DD Decoy, Shell hits 3, Torpedo hits 1, and is sunk

She doesn't seem to have fully lived up to her name . . .[;)]

[paullus99]

That is bad news for Chaz. It would seem that task force represents a significant portion of his remaining effective surface elements & the damage he took is going to make it pretty much a one shot deal for the current campaign.

[vettim89]

ORIGINAL: Capt. Harlock

DD Decoy, Shell hits 3, Torpedo hits 1, and is sunk

She doesn't seem to have fully lived up to her name . . .[;)]

Or perhps she did. Only Indianapolis was sunk.

[paullus99]

The DEI - where the IJN goes to die......

[Canoerebel]

11/18/42
 
Japanese Invasion:  The full KB is in a sea hex between Singapore and Singkep - narrow, shallow waters.  Allied strike aircraft - mainly TBFs, Swordfish, and Beuforts, sortied ineffecitvely.  Escorts were too light and too eneffective, even though Allied 4EB did mix it up with the CAP.  On the day, the Allies lost 58 aircraft to a-2-a.  Japan lost zilch.  No Japanese ships are left at Muntok.  Neither Japanese amphibiuos force attacked (I think the force at Singkep is too weak and I think the force at Muntok is badly disrupted and low on supply - to answer princep's question, the latter did lose alot of troops when their transports were sunk).  The Allies have shifted sub patrol routes in hopes of getting a lucky shot vs. the KB.  As for the two islands, it appears to me that Japan should be able to take Singkep, but not Muntok.  CL Dauntless took a TT, but made it to Oosthaven in good shape. A bunch of damaged and out-of-ammo combat vessels will depart Oost tonight to make for Colombo.  Meanwhile, reinforcements including CA Pensacola, CLAA Atlanta and CL Detroit should reach Oost in about three or four days.  (The Allies still have three combat TFs in theater - two at Oost and one at Billiton Island.)
 
Allied Countermoves:  The Allies have three transports TFs at sea ready to rush troops to Pontianak in order to move expeditiously on the undergarrisoned IJ base at Singkawang.  This is, to me, the deciding move of this entire battle.  If the Alllies take Singkawang, everything else is icing on the cake.  I don't think the Allies have to fear interdiction by enemy combat vessels now, but the threat of strike aircraft from the KB is high.  So I'll overload Pontianak's level two airfield with short-range righters while P-38s provide LRCAP from Billiton and/or Ketapang.  In three or four days I think the Allies will begin the move from Pontianak to Singkawang with whatever troops are on hand.  At a minimum that will be 350 AV.  At max it might be 800 AV.  Japan has four units, 6k strong.
 
Burma:  The Allies are going to sniff around Prome and Pegu to see if there are any weaknesses to exploit.
 
NoPac:  100k+ supply at Paramushiro, with base- and fort building progressing nicely.  As soon as the Allies buy the final Indian division at Cochin, India (1300 AV needed, 1200 on hand), the next priority is troops to reinforce Para and Onne.  (In part, this is because this is a high prioirty, in part it's because the DEI, which is even higher, has already stripped India - there's nothing left to buy there now).

[Lomri]

One thing I struggle to get my head around is proper TF setup. I know you want to group similar speed ships and similar ranged guns. I've read that "8" might be a sweet spot for TF size. And I really don't know IJN armaments (or even speeds). But he's got 16 ships in that one TF with just seems unwieldily. I have read that Japan has somewhat more homogenous guns so those CL's might "sync" well with the BB's but I'm not sure CL's really belong in a BB TF. (Please correct me if I'm wrong, perhaps they add something I am missing. Perhaps they have a higher RoF to deal with escorts?).

Allied grouping looks like a typical mis-mash of various Allied navies. Did you factor in speeds and gun ranges? (Not always a luxury you have, but you both are focused on this area so I imagine you have the toys you want here). Course this could also go into the "too much micromanagement, it'll all shake out in the wash" category!

[Canoerebel]

I set up my combat TFs at Oosthaven awhile back as best I could (matching speed and gun-range), but over time that has degraded a bit.  A recent surface action (the one involving CA New Orleans), for instance, sent a large number of ships back to the yards at Colombo.  So my TFs aren't particularly maximized, but I wil say that CA TFs seem to perform better than do TFs with slow battleships. 
 
As for Steve's combat TF, it did not perform well at all.  Not a single IJN torpedo strike in a night engagment?  That seemed odd.

[Lomri]

ORIGINAL: Canoerebel

As for Steve's combat TF, it did not perform well at all.  Not a single IJN torpedo strike in a night engagment?  That seemed odd.

My academic thoughts on this (not based on lots of game evidence) is that a Big Gun TF isn't going to get in nice and close for a torpedo salvo. My guess is that if you have a TF that is gun heavy your TF will want to get to the max range of the shortest non-escort ship's main gun. But a cruiser (torpedo heavy) TF might close for a torpedo knife fight. The first engagement was 8k, don't know the second - you had a torpedo hit Decoy in the second engagement.

Of course you likely had the faster TF so you would be the primary range driver.

[BBfanboy]

ORIGINAL: Lomri

One thing I struggle to get my head around is proper TF setup. I know you want to group similar speed ships and similar ranged guns. I've read that "8" might be a sweet spot for TF size. And I really don't know IJN armaments (or even speeds). But he's got 16 ships in that one TF with just seems unwieldily. I have read that Japan has somewhat more homogenous guns so those CL's might "sync" well with the BB's but I'm not sure CL's really belong in a BB TF. (Please correct me if I'm wrong, perhaps they add something I am missing. Perhaps they have a higher RoF to deal with escorts?).

Allied grouping looks like a typical mis-mash of various Allied navies. Did you factor in speeds and gun ranges? (Not always a luxury you have, but you both are focused on this area so I imagine you have the toys you want here). Course this could also go into the "too much micromanagement, it'll all shake out in the wash" category!

I think leader and ship's crew skills play a very large role in the outcomes of these combats. I the early war when allied TF commanders had little experience they lined their TFs up nicely for the long lance torpedoing alley. By late 1942 they were well aware of the dangers of approaching closely and manoevering long lines of ships for a broadside gunnery shot against IJN cruisers and destroyers. I think the game simulates this by reducing the odds of torpedo hits if the allied commanders and crews have high naval skills. OTOH, the allies shooting would also be better, even if the IJN TF was a couple of knots faster. Not sure if there was a radar bonus for any of the ships in the last battle.

One thing I have consistently found - any ship that starts out as the slowest in the battle or receives engine damage that slows it down is much more likely to be hit by gunnery. In night battles, the first on fire is also a shell magnet.

Re: "size matters", I remember seeing something [perhaps in the manual??] that said in a larger TF, not all the ships will be in a position to engage. Makes sense - the lead ship will be several miles away from the trailing ship. That tend to confirm keeping the TF at about 8 ships is a good idea. More TFs of fewer ships, engaging sequentially, gets better results.

[Miller]

I usually go 10 ships max per TF. If I was Chez I would have split that single TF into two, with the BBs in one and the CAs in the other.

[Chickenboy]

ORIGINAL: Miller

I usually go 10 ships max per TF. If I was Chez I would have split that single TF into two, with the BBs in one and the CAs in the other.

Agreed. Anything over 15 is a real waste of ships. I wouldn't mind having a BB and a CA in the same TFs, but the size of this TF was counterproductive.

[BBfanboy]

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

ORIGINAL: Miller

I usually go 10 ships max per TF. If I was Chez I would have split that single TF into two, with the BBs in one and the CAs in the other.

Agreed. Anything over 15 is a real waste of ships. I wouldn't mind having a BB and a CA in the same TFs, but the size of this TF was counterproductive.

IIRC, the manual warns that over 15 ships in a TF [other than a convoy] gets a higher risk of collision and other penalties to combat abilities. Having said that, I have had several warship collisions in TFs in the 11-15 ship range. The advice to stay below 10 ships is very good.

[Canoerebel]

A few thoughts about Singkawang. I have previously expressed the importance the Allies attach to this base. In this game, Oosthaven was the First Key to victory. Singkawang is the Second. Apparently, though, Steve does not agree, which I do not understand. Undoubtedly, this is due to my Allied-centric view, but I do think I'm right and he's wrong.

See the map below, which represent the situation in the region in early November 1942. We're now at November 18, but things are pretty much the same.

Note that as long as Japan holds Singkawang, which is a level five airfield, the Allied position in the Java Sea does not have "wide shoulders." That is, Singkawang poses a big threat and forces the Allies to act cautiously. That airfield, alone or in tandem with the KB, can inflict nasty harm, thus leaving the western Java Sea contested territory.

Upon conquering Singkawang, though, the Allied position suddenly converts to "wide shoulders." They will have a secure grip on the western Java Sea, ringed by large airbases with no enemy airfields in proximity. At that point, Allied combat ships can be based in the area and strike forward at relatively low risk. Allied bombers will also be able to reach out for quite some distance without impediment posed by enemy airfields.

Right now Japan is focused on Muntok and Singkep. I stood down my infantry at Muntok two days ago (after a high-end 1:1 attack) to keep Steve focused there. My hope is that he'll concentrate on the ongoing battles to the south while the Allies concentrate on Singkawang. If he doesn't reinforce this base, I believe it will fall to the Allies in two weeks or less.

[obvert]

ORIGINAL: Canoerebel

A few thoughts about Singkawang. I have previously expressed the importance the Allies attach to this base. In this game, Oosthaven was the First Key to victory. Singkawang is the Second. Apparently, though, Steve does not agree, which I do not understand. Undoubtedly, this is due to my Allied-centric view, but I do think I'm right and he's wrong.

See the map below, which represent the situation in the region in early November 1942. We're now at November 18, but things are pretty much the same.

Note that as long as Japan holds Singkawang, which is a level five airfield, the Allied position in the Java Sea does not have "wide shoulders." That is, Singkawang poses a big threat and forces the Allies to act cautiously. That airfield, alone or in tandem with the KB, can inflict nasty harm, thus leaving the western Java Sea contested territory.

Upon conquering Singkawang, though, the Allied position suddenly converts to "wide shoulders." They will have a secure grip on the western Java Sea, ringed by large airbases with no enemy airfields in proximity. At that point, Allied combat ships can be based in the area and strike forward at relatively low risk. Allied bombers will also be able to reach out for quite some distance without impediment posed by enemy airfields.

Right now Japan is focused on Muntok and Singkep. I stood down my infantry at Muntok two days ago (after a high-end 1:1 attack) to keep Steve focused there. My hope is that he'll concentrate on the ongoing battles to the south while the Allies concentrate on Singkawang. If he doesn't reinforce this base, I believe it will fall to the Allies in two weeks or less.

I agree completely. Playing the IJ Singkawang is the key early base to gain some control over the approaches to Singapore, Sumatra and Java. It's importance doesn't change over time if this area is still contested. Time and again your opponent seems to have chosen the tactical over the strategic element to focus his attention and forces. You've consistently used this to your advantage by recognizing it early, (or most often before the fact).

This is a similar case. While it must be fun to at least see some action in you main area of interest again, this will turn into a rout within the month if you do capture Singkawang and build it up. Have fun breaking and burning things!

[Canoerebel]

11/19/42
 
KB:  Gato duds a torp on Hiyo as the KB retires north from near Singapore into the South China Sea.  Based upon "daitai" reported over the past few days in the big air battles, the full KB is present in the South China Sea, including:  Junyo, Zuikaku, Shokaku, Soryu and Kaga.  That's all remaining fleet carriers, meaning the Pacific (most importantly NoPac) is protected by no more than the handful of CVE/CVL Steve has remaining. 
 
BB:  Five of Japan's eight remaining BBs are confirmed in the South China Sea:  Hiei, Kongo and Yamato damaged (especially the latter) in the Battle of Muntok; Nagato and Kirishima with KB.  That leaves only Hyuga, Yamashiro and Musashi (due in December) unaccounted for.  Again, this means the Allies should be okay in the key areas in the Pacific, where a variety of slow BBs are posted.
 
Borneo:  Another detachment of 23rd Marines ashore at Pontiak, with a bigger convoy bringing a large part of 25th Indian Division in tonight (two combat TFs will provide protection - one led by BB Royal Sovereign).  Another large TF bringing 20th Indian Div. will hang back, while the last TF in the "train" - carrying heavy equipment remnants of most units, is two days back.  If the Allies are able to protect these TFs, everything should be ashore at Pontianak in four or five days.  The move on Singakwang commences then.
 
The Contested Islands:  The Allies will try a probing deliberate attack at Singkep tomorrow, preceded by all 4EB based at Oosthaven targeting the Japanese troops.  A probing attack at Muntok, too, but this one I hope doesn't succeed as I would like Steve to be concentrating on how to reinforce his troops there.  (Once he decides Muntok and Singkep are lost causes, he might begin thinking more defensively, and his defensive needs begin at Singkawang).  I think Steve was counting on quick contests of Muntok and Singkep to be followed by a big invasion of Sumatra (SigInt reports 6th Guards Div. prepping for Palembang still at Cam Ranh Bay).
 
Damaged Allies Ships and Replacements:  Most of the Allied ships damaged in the recent battle have successfully disengaged from the front lines - they are enroute from Oost to Colombo.  A good CA/DD TF flagged by Pensacola is inbound to Oost.  The Allied carriers and escorts at Colombo will be done upgrading in ten days.
 
NoPac:  Things look good here:  110k supply at Para; heavy equipment remnants of the Onne garrison have arrived and are unloading (after spending most of the war in the Aleutians).  The Allies will spend 1350 PP on an Indian division in two days (prepping for Singkawang, but hopefully won't reach theater in time to take part in the conquest of that base).  In three days, the Allies begin to accumulate PP to buy Canadian units slated to reinforce Para and Onne.

[Canoerebel]

Two more things:
 
1.  The Allies have occupied Merauke and re-supplied Horn Island.  Both bases need alot of attention and are not even minimially secure.  But I can see the day not too far off in which the Allies will begin to work the southern coast of New Guinea.  Japan hasn't given this region the slightest attention and the "coast is open" all the way to the western tip.  If that continues, the Allies will eventually be ready to start a small second front in the DEI.
 
2.  Steve expressed frustration over the failure of the KB to launch strike missions during the recent activity in and around Muntok.  I understand both his frustration and why he didn't get the launches he was looking for.  A month ago, the KB was position near Kuching and launched some nice raids against exposed Allied shipping moving toward Pontianak and Ketapang. This time, the KB didn't launch even though it took position the same general area.  The differnce maker was that the Allies had two new airfields (Keta and Pont) occuped by fighters, plus alot more fighters based at much bigger Billiton Island.  It is often hard in AE to get strike aircraft to see past an outer screen of airfields into an interior area that is also decently protected.  (Miller and I saw this kind of thing repeatedly during our hot-and-heavy combat in the DEI in 1943.)  If you want carriers to launch against enemy shipping in a "sea" that include multiple enemy airfields with CAP, you have to "close the deal."  You can't hang back on the periphery.  You've got to "suck it up" and penetrate inside the perimeter, even though doing so carries risks.  Proximity is everything in this situation.

[paullus99]

He'd actually be better off having the KB act as its own "CAP trap" since he can put up more and better fighters at this point & rely upon your need to escort your bombers in & leave a much smaller escort to get his own bombers through to the targets.

Since this is Scenario #2, he can replace his losses (albeit with not necessarily the best) much more easily than you can, plus it would attrit your bombers at exactly the time he needs to, if he is going to start a serious campaign against Sumatra.

He is still extremely timid & is already wilting in the face of even a semi-active defensive / offensive posture.

[Miller]

ORIGINAL: paullus99

He'd actually be better off having the KB act as its own "CAP trap" since he can put up more and better fighters at this point & rely upon your need to escort your bombers in & leave a much smaller escort to get his own bombers through to the targets.

Since this is Scenario #2, he can replace his losses (albeit with not necessarily the best) much more easily than you can, plus it would attrit your bombers at exactly the time he needs to, if he is going to start a serious campaign against Sumatra.

He is still extremely timid & is already wilting in the face of even a semi-active defensive / offensive posture.

It would be a very brave or foolish IJN commander use the KB in a CAP trap role whilst not knowing the location of the Allied carriers..........

Sure he can replace his air losses, but not the flight decks they fly from, even in scn 2......