Victory conditions for either

[javats]

suggestion; instead of extra points when capturing a capital (Ger/Russ),
just step down victory levels, example; a major becomes a Decisive and minor is now a major.

Example, a Decisive German points is 290, anytime Moscow is captured
then a Decisive German points is now 260 and if Moscow is taken back by Soviets
then a Decisive German points goes back to 290.
The lost of either capital was a major impact for both sides, more than +5

[Aurelian]

ORIGINAL: Dark_Star


The lost of either capital was a major impact for both sides, more than +5

Based on what?

The Sov gov't wasn't there.

If the city was going to fall, Stalin and Co would of left.

The Sovs were going to fight on.

Hitler stated before the invasion that Moscow wasn't important.

He wasn't interested until his original hope of destroying the Red Army, causing the collapse of the regime, proved a chimera.

The dedicated Marxists who controlled Soviet Russia beleived that the basis of all power lay in the control of the means of production. Not whether a capital, especially one that isn't nailed down, falls or not.

[elmo3]

Moved this out of tech support since it's not a bug report.

[kg_1007]

ORIGINAL: Aurelian

ORIGINAL: Dark_Star


The lost of either capital was a major impact for both sides, more than +5

Based on what?

The Sov gov't wasn't there.

If the city was going to fall, Stalin and Co would of left.

The Sovs were going to fight on.

Hitler stated before the invasion that Moscow wasn't important.

He wasn't interested until his original hope of destroying the Red Army, causing the collapse of the regime, proved a chimera.

The dedicated Marxists who controlled Soviet Russia beleived that the basis of all power lay in the control of the means of production. Not whether a capital, especially one that isn't nailed down, falls or not.

Those "dedicated Marxists", for the record, were ready to ask the Bulgarians to intercede with the Germans to come to terms, before the Bulgarians told them just to hold out because their Axis allies would not be able to win in the long haul. 1941 and summer of 1942, things were very definitely hanging in the balance, it was not until late 1942 that they began to think they would really win(the Soviets, I mean). This faltering of faith in those dedicated Marxists was caused by the sledgehammer blows in the war's first days, and increased by the German arrival outside of Moscow, and likely would have ended as total disruption, had Sorge not informed the Soviets that the Japanese had decided not to attack the USSR, and instead to attack into the Pacific, which thus released fresh Siberian divisions hitherto guarding against an expected Japanese attack, and released them on the Germans fighting for Moscow.

[Michael T]

IIRC there was also some talk of a truce prior to Kursk in 1943.

[jaw]

ORIGINAL: kg_1007


Those "dedicated Marxists", for the record, were ready to ask the Bulgarians to intercede with the Germans to come to terms, before the Bulgarians told them just to hold out because their Axis allies would not be able to win in the long haul. 1941 and summer of 1942, things were very definitely hanging in the balance, it was not until late 1942 that they began to think they would really win(the Soviets, I mean). This faltering of faith in those dedicated Marxists was caused by the sledgehammer blows in the war's first days, and increased by the German arrival outside of Moscow, and likely would have ended as total disruption, had Sorge not informed the Soviets that the Japanese had decided not to attack the USSR, and instead to attack into the Pacific, which thus released fresh Siberian divisions hitherto guarding against an expected Japanese attack, and released them on the Germans fighting for Moscow.

Please cite your source of this information as it directly contradicts how Stalin assessed the military situation by the fall of 1941. BTW, the divisions from the Eastern Military Districts started transferring west in September long before the Germans were anywhere near Moscow. The notion that the Siberians showed up in the nick of time to save Moscow is a myth.

[kg_1007]

ORIGINAL: jaw

ORIGINAL: kg_1007


Those "dedicated Marxists", for the record, were ready to ask the Bulgarians to intercede with the Germans to come to terms, before the Bulgarians told them just to hold out because their Axis allies would not be able to win in the long haul. 1941 and summer of 1942, things were very definitely hanging in the balance, it was not until late 1942 that they began to think they would really win(the Soviets, I mean). This faltering of faith in those dedicated Marxists was caused by the sledgehammer blows in the war's first days, and increased by the German arrival outside of Moscow, and likely would have ended as total disruption, had Sorge not informed the Soviets that the Japanese had decided not to attack the USSR, and instead to attack into the Pacific, which thus released fresh Siberian divisions hitherto guarding against an expected Japanese attack, and released them on the Germans fighting for Moscow.

Please cite your source of this information as it directly contradicts how Stalin assessed the military situation by the fall of 1941. BTW, the divisions from the Eastern Military Districts started transferring west in September long before the Germans were anywhere near Moscow. The notion that the Siberians showed up in the nick of time to save Moscow is a myth.

Actually look up Sorge, my friend. The entire reason he is regarded as a hero in Russia still, is because his intelligence from Japan re: their decision not to attack Russia, allowed those Soviet divisions to be reassigned. Try reading also people such as Beevor, etc who have researched a great deal (also the Bulgarian question, he is one of many sources on that).

[Aurelian]

ORIGINAL: kg_1007

ORIGINAL: jaw

ORIGINAL: kg_1007


Those "dedicated Marxists", for the record, were ready to ask the Bulgarians to intercede with the Germans to come to terms, before the Bulgarians told them just to hold out because their Axis allies would not be able to win in the long haul. 1941 and summer of 1942, things were very definitely hanging in the balance, it was not until late 1942 that they began to think they would really win(the Soviets, I mean). This faltering of faith in those dedicated Marxists was caused by the sledgehammer blows in the war's first days, and increased by the German arrival outside of Moscow, and likely would have ended as total disruption, had Sorge not informed the Soviets that the Japanese had decided not to attack the USSR, and instead to attack into the Pacific, which thus released fresh Siberian divisions hitherto guarding against an expected Japanese attack, and released them on the Germans fighting for Moscow.

Please cite your source of this information as it directly contradicts how Stalin assessed the military situation by the fall of 1941. BTW, the divisions from the Eastern Military Districts started transferring west in September long before the Germans were anywhere near Moscow. The notion that the Siberians showed up in the nick of time to save Moscow is a myth.

Actually look up Sorge, my friend. The entire reason he is regarded as a hero in Russia still, is because his intelligence from Japan re: their decision not to attack Russia, allowed those Soviet divisions to be reassigned. Try reading also people such as Beevor, etc who have researched a great deal (also the Bulgarian question, he is one of many sources on that).

Cite you sources of the of the information requested.

Oh, and Stalin at one point also said he would welcome American troops under American command anywhere along the front. Needless to say, such thoughts never lasted very long with oe Joe.

The Soviets were prepared to fight on if Moscow ws lost. And more than likely, would of taken it back during their winter offensve. Operation Uranus in 1941.

[rvseydlitz]

As Kg seems to not be online, and as some people seem to have difficulty doing their own research, I will point out the easier one at least. Anyone who has ever studied history knows that Sorge's spying for Russia gave them one great piece of information, that the Japanese would not attack, and that the reason this was a great piece of information, was that it allowed the Soviets to transfer Siberian divisions west away from their easter defenses, and they hit the German divisions in the blizzard of 1941 just in time to save Moscow. Here is the wiki link, which also gives its sources.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_Sorge

[rvseydlitz]

Ahh, and the Bulgarian one took all of a few seconds to find as well. Anthony Beevor in "Stalingrad" and he sites Soviet STAVKA notes.

[javats]

Ok, were are game suggestions listed ??

[Walloc]

ORIGINAL: Dark_Star

Ok, were are game suggestions listed ??

tm.asp?m=2788580

[javats]

psychology
Why did Stalin stay in Moscow when the government started leaving ?
Why did Hitler stay in Berlin and not retreat to the mountains ?
Why do players give up at the first sign things are not going to plan ?
psychology, as someone once said morale is 3 to one all other things

[rvseydlitz]

ORIGINAL: jaw

ORIGINAL: kg_1007


Those "dedicated Marxists", for the record, were ready to ask the Bulgarians to intercede with the Germans to come to terms, before the Bulgarians told them just to hold out because their Axis allies would not be able to win in the long haul. 1941 and summer of 1942, things were very definitely hanging in the balance, it was not until late 1942 that they began to think they would really win(the Soviets, I mean). This faltering of faith in those dedicated Marxists was caused by the sledgehammer blows in the war's first days, and increased by the German arrival outside of Moscow, and likely would have ended as total disruption, had Sorge not informed the Soviets that the Japanese had decided not to attack the USSR, and instead to attack into the Pacific, which thus released fresh Siberian divisions hitherto guarding against an expected Japanese attack, and released them on the Germans fighting for Moscow.

Please cite your source of this information as it directly contradicts how Stalin assessed the military situation by the fall of 1941. BTW, the divisions from the Eastern Military Districts started transferring west in September long before the Germans were anywhere near Moscow. The notion that the Siberians showed up in the nick of time to save Moscow is a myth.

If indeed it was a myth, it is one that is missed by most well regarded historians as I referenced above. Also, if those divisions began transferring in September, that somehow was missed by pretty much everyone on the planet except for you, so you must certainly have the mother of all sources at your disposal, perhaps you should post references as you asked others to do?

[javats]

11 Oct 1941
Thousands fled Moscow, Russia based on rumors of an imminent German capture of the Soviet capital. To the west, the enveloped Soviet troops at Vyasma suffered a heavy artillery and air bombardment that caused heavy casualties
14 Oct 1941
Moscow, Joseph Stalin briefed 23 senior Soviet military and civilian officials between 1530 and 1815 hours on a plan to evacuate the city in an orderly fashion; he ordered four theater groups (Lenin State Theater, Maxim Gorkiy Artistic Academic Theater, Little Academic Theater, and Vakhtangov Theater) to be evacuated first.
16 Oct 1941
Tanks of SS Reich Division and 10th Panzer Division attacked the Mozhaysk Line at Borodino, Russia 125 kilometers west of the Soviet capital of Moscow; lacking infantry support, Soviet troops halted the attacks. While thousands of civilians continued to flee the city, the Soviet government and diplomatic corps moved to Kuibyshev 1,500 miles to the east; Joseph Stalin, however, chose to stay.

"Moscow will be defended to the last."

-Joseph Stalin, Order of the day, Oct. 1941

http://ww2db.com/battle_spec.php?battle_id=37
Battle of Moscow, C.Peter Chen

The point is what the people believe, At sometime a decision is made to stay, which means the the question was asked

Now back to the Game, comments about the suggested rule are ???

[jaw]

I could recommend several authors but why not just go with the best: David Glantz at the link below

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Glantz

You'll find several books on the War in the East in general and Barbarossa in particular. I also have a pdf of an article written by him on the state of the Red Army in June, 1941 and its mobilization. One look at the sheer number of formations the Russians put into the field in the summer and fall of 1941 and you will realize how ludicously small the Siberian divisions were to the total strength of the Red Army. If you are interested send me your email address and I will send it to you.

Jim Wirth

jawirth@comcast.net

[Michael T]

Like an American would know more about a war fought by Germans and Russians. Do you realize that most of those formations were mere shells?
 
I honestly think there is some kind of mass misinformation campaign going on around here about the German capacity to win the war. Why don't you read some material written by people who actually fought that war.

[Aurelian]

ORIGINAL: rvseydlitz

ORIGINAL: jaw

ORIGINAL: kg_1007


Those "dedicated Marxists", for the record, were ready to ask the Bulgarians to intercede with the Germans to come to terms, before the Bulgarians told them just to hold out because their Axis allies would not be able to win in the long haul. 1941 and summer of 1942, things were very definitely hanging in the balance, it was not until late 1942 that they began to think they would really win(the Soviets, I mean). This faltering of faith in those dedicated Marxists was caused by the sledgehammer blows in the war's first days, and increased by the German arrival outside of Moscow, and likely would have ended as total disruption, had Sorge not informed the Soviets that the Japanese had decided not to attack the USSR, and instead to attack into the Pacific, which thus released fresh Siberian divisions hitherto guarding against an expected Japanese attack, and released them on the Germans fighting for Moscow.

Please cite your source of this information as it directly contradicts how Stalin assessed the military situation by the fall of 1941. BTW, the divisions from the Eastern Military Districts started transferring west in September long before the Germans were anywhere near Moscow. The notion that the Siberians showed up in the nick of time to save Moscow is a myth.

If indeed it was a myth, it is one that is missed by most well regarded historians as I referenced above. Also, if those divisions began transferring in September, that somehow was missed by pretty much everyone on the planet except for you, so you must certainly have the mother of all sources at your disposal, perhaps you should post references as you asked others to do?

They were certainly missed by the Germans. And anyone else who relied on German versions of history.

[Aurelian]

http://operationbarbarossa.net/Myth-Bus ... ters3.html

The decision to move the 24th Army from Siberia with its six rifle divisions had already been made before Barbarossa started, and by this time the 24th Army was already in Stavka reserve. The 24th Army’s rifle divisions had all arrived west of Moscow by 7th July 1941 and these were all committed before the end of the month. All these divisions were formed in the Siberia Military District and so by rights could be called ‘Siberian’ divisions. The 91st and 166th were completely destroyed in the Vyazma pocket in October 1941, whilst the remaining divisions were mere skeletons of their former selves by October 1941.

*Yep. Just in time.*

Another thing apparent from the table above is how early these divisions transferred. Most sources claim the information from Sorge’s spy ring came in October 1941 at the earliest and November 1941 at the latest. Yet it is apparent that the decision to move the vast majority of available divisions west was made well before this time and no new rifle divisions were actually shipped after October.

*Yep. Just in time.*



So the question is; who stopped the Germans in December 1941 if it couldn’t possibly have been hordes of newly arrived Siberian or East Front troops? The answer is a massive number of newly mobilised and deployed divisions and brigades. The Soviet land model shows that 182 rifle divisions, 43 militia rifle divisions, eight tank divisions, three mechanised divisions, 62 tank brigades, 50 cavalry divisions, 55 rifle brigades, 21 naval rifle brigades, 11 naval infantry brigades, 41 armies, 11 fronts and a multitude of other units were newly Mobilised and Deployed (MD) in the second half of 1941. If Mobilized and Not Deployed (MND) units are included then this list is considerably higher.(2) Even if the few Siberian divisions exhibited a higher than average combat proficiency in the winter of 1941/42, their contribution was almost insignificant compared to the mass of newly mobilised units. There is no doubt that the 1941 Soviet mobilisation programme was simply the largest and fastest wartime mobilisation in history. The multitude of average Soviet soldiers from all over the USSR that made up these units saved the day, and definitely not the existing units transferred west after June 1941, or the mostly non-existent and mythical Siberian divisions.

It seems very likely the term ‘Siberian’ was applied to any division that exhibited an above average proficiency or resilience in combat. This was similar to, but less official than, a ‘Guards’ designation which the Stavka started awarding to such divisions in 1941. Ultimately it cost nothing to name a division ‘Siberian’, ‘Guards’ or ‘elite’, and if it enhanced morale, scared the enemy and enabled better divisions to be easily identified then it was certainly worth while. It is easy to forget that all combatants in WWII were waging a morale and propaganda war alongside the real one. Unfortunately much post WWII history calls on the same propaganda based stories as the basis of historical fact. This then results in certain war stories, legends and myths become cemented over the years as unquestioned historical events.

[rvseydlitz]

Your information goes contrary to 99% of historians..perhaps you are correct, but that would be an amazing feat for "mythbusters" to gain knowledge that most people who studied, fought, or otherwise were involved in this war, failed to gain.
The Seydlitz in my name is actually my last name, and I had a relative who fought in this war, and was of some note, so excuse me if I fail to be impressed by an American who is, as most of the posters here, famous for being a Soviet apologist (Glantz)