OT: Japanese vs the Russians video

[Nikademus]

It wasn't a failure. Belton Cooper however made a good argument that it could have been replaced by a more survivable model thus saving many tanker's lives and speeding up the campaign. I found support for this in Zagoda's book on the Sherman which went into detail on the muddied world of armaments procurement. Often becomes a "flame" issue because it gets rated as either Failure or Success. I'd rate it as "Success(*) as part of a massive industrial-military complex that steamrolled Europe" [:)]

As far as Manchuria goes....it was all about the logistics and planning, keeping the men supplied, the tanks gassed and armed. Glantz's mammoth study of the Operation is mind numbing....as is the degree of the Soviet planning. It was suprising for me to learn that so successful was it that it has been studied ever since as one of the ultimate examples of Operational planning and was (per Glantz) the inspiration for the Coalition 1991 operation in Iraq....named "Desert Storm" in honor of the plan it was largely based on. The fact that the Kwangtung Army was a shell of what it used to be didnt' take away from the efficiency and careful throughness of the Soviet plan.....which proved that there was more to the Bear than bunching men forward and making mass frontal assaults.

[Q-Ball]

I agree with Wirraway ace on two totally separate points.

First, the IJA performed well in early campaigns, and Burma is a excellent example of the skill and flexibility of the Japanese Infantryman. The IJA's defeats were due to lack of airpower, and most importantly due to logistics, one area that the IJA failed completely. The IJA also suffered from "victory disease" like many of their cousins in the Navy, but I think with proper logistical support, the IJA was a very good opponent. At the small unit level, the IJA was excellent, and that was my point.

The Sherman was a successful design for the kind of war the US Army was fighting. Like all US AFV designs, it prioritized ease of manufacturing, ease of transport, ease of maintenence, and mobility over other qualities. It was undergunned, but was adequate in large numbers, which is exactly what it was designed to do: Appear in large numbers.

You could even argue that the IJA tank designs weren't a complete failure. I won't defend the Chi-Ha and other tanks that by European standards are laughable, but for light operations in rough terrain against an opponent with limited AT capability, they were just fine. And that's exactly the type of fight they had early in the war. Japanese tanks were successful in Malaya on that basis, because they were better than what the British had.....bupkus.

[Wirraway_Ace]

ORIGINAL: goran007


I dont agree, the best way to limit losses was and stil is: to win quickly and decisevly.

I don't agree. The best way to limit losses is to strike from outside the enemy's effective range to strike back, or, if you have to close to within effective range, use overwhelming force.

The was nothing notable about Soviet doctrine that attempted to limited their own casualties. They did focus on winning. The morality of winning in order to maintain one form of government, and those who wielded absolute power within it, at the expense of the people that make up the nation is, however, logically suspect whether you are from the East, West or anywhere in between. Objectively, the choice between being ruled by Stalin's government or Hitler's is a coin flip. In either form there will be a millions of dead people for no reason other than ethnicity or thoughts against those in power. Maybe even fewer under Hitler. One thing is for sure, there would be a lot more dead Americans and Brits if the Red Army and Red Air Force had not disagreed with me....

[Jorge_Stanbury]

Sherman limitations were also due to the tank destroyer doctrine (they were supposed to avoid tank vs tank combat), and therefore carried initially a low velocity gun, adequate for infantry support role; and as already mentioned, once they added better guns (like 105mm) it became capable of taking care of T-55s and T-62s

Also important to mention that it was good enough against the most likely adversaries: Pz IV and StuG IIIs
Panthers and Tigers were super sophisticated, but difficult to mass produce, and therefore, only 6,500 and 2,000 were built (respectively)... that is a lot less than the 50,000 Shermans built. And in total war, quantity have intrinsic quality

Also, by 1944, air superiority was so vast that, assuming good weather, any panzer concentration would be destroyed from the air as soon as it was spotted

So, definitively not the best, but good enough to win the war

[TulliusDetritus]

ORIGINAL: Nikademus
The Soviets wern't just attacking Japan, they were seeking a political objective. They succeeded.

Given that I can't the see a big prize seized (southern part of Sakhalin Island and Kuril Islands = fishing rights in the very exotic Soviet backdoor, not really ambitious demands if you ask me), perhaps the Soviets were simply honouring the alliance? [;)] As stated, the British and Americans (especially the latter) had requested the intervention of the Red Army in the Far East...

[MarkMohrifield]

ORIGINAL: Wirraway_Ace



As to soldiers complaining about the quality of their equipment....take these opinions with a significant grain of salt....Soldiers by their nature almost invariably believe the enemy has better weapons.

I've read that on the Russian front, both sides preferred their opponents submachineguns.

[goran007]

ORIGINAL: Wirraway_Ace

ORIGINAL: goran007



Where did exactly Japanise fought well, if we talk to about IJA? Few Islands? They were pushed aside with ease in burma, manjuria, Philippines? Every major operation against them was huge success. Mith about fighting for Tokyo would be as hard as for Iwo Jima is without any basis.

I assume you are just baiting, but on the off chance you are not, I recommend reading the handful of accounts on the entire Burma campaign. Allen"s is probably the best available in english. It really opened my eyes about how skilled and well the Japanese infantryman fought. Slim's account, while excellent, does not conceal his contempt for his enemies and does not cover the multitude of defeats in the same detail as the victories. To be fair to Slim, he was not involved in many of the defeats...

The Japanese defense of Peleliu and Okinawa were ultimately fruitless because of the strategic situation, but very skillful.

It was the nature of the defense of Okinawa that most influenced the way the war with Japan ended...

Mike

Level of organisation/expertise needed for defense where you cant be outmanuvered is very limited. Its very hard to judge capability of a force if it doesent conduct offense. Untrained old men and ladies could offer capable defense.

Competent army would find a way to occupy whole china before Perl in a matter where their forces would be free. They could find a way to emplace puppet regime and reduce the need for policing population. Something what they did earlier in Manchuria...

Competant army would have incite revolt in India and eventually take it over in 1942
Competant army would have taken Australia or at least secured flank by capturing Darwin.
They would help Germans and took Soviet provinces.

What you state is a proof of good army because of fighting in Burma i call huge blunder. In a time of British post 'Darkest hour', where convoys couldnt get through and Brits had skeleton force IJA was bogged down in Burma...

Only way to defeat determined landing force is and always was on beaches. Its beyond comprehension why they thought that by bleeding few tenths of thousands dead they would stop US by fighting inland...

They always thought they will be fighting russians, saw their tanks in Finland and German experience from 1941 and they did nothing/or even worse acchieved nothing in modernisation.

[pharmy]

ORIGINAL: Wirraway_Ace

ORIGINAL: icepharmy


The Sherman was widely admitted to be a failure even by American generals and was most definitely not a compromise design. The usage of a detuned gasoline powered Wright Whirlwind engine was bizarre and I think due to the emphasis of maneuverability over armor. It was also undergunned due to the separate TD destroyer doctrine the US employed. In other words it was a very fast infantry support tank.
To me they resemble the Betty bomber, Ronson Lighters the Brits called them while the Germans called them Tommy cookers. Recently saw a discovery or history channel special were the veterans talked about how they hated their Shermans

EDIT : http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1A9Ic_g7xNM History Channel Engineering disaster

For what it is worth, I will offer a slightly different opinion....
While the Sherman was not as good a basic medium tank design as either the T34 or Panther, it seems very hard to objectively argue it was a failure. It was easy to build, fast, reliable, but much more importantly in the US strategic position, easy to transport (light and narrow) and supply (gasoline = single theater fuel type) from LOCs measured in many thousands of kilometers. It is worth noting, the Sherman was built with diesels, but limited to use by the Marines in the Pacific. The Marines often had to find a way to use equipment the other services refused....

Fireflys or M4A3E8s with gun stabilization and variable speed electronic turret traverse, were competent Panther killers.

Shermans served well in Korea and Isreali Shermans performed successfully against post war Soviet designs.

As to soldiers complaining about the quality of their equipment....take these opinions with a significant grain of salt....Soldiers by their nature almost invariably believe the enemy has better weapons.

Bottom line: The Sherman was not a great tank, but it was adequate with the quantities produced and the quality of the crews, to be successful against even the most skilled opponent with excellent equipment.

you do have a point, even the T-34 which I praised had a terrible loss ratio due to bad optics, early war bad tactics, undergunned midwar and badly trained crew. Point in case this study http://operationbarbarossa.net/Myth-Bus ... ters2.html

[Wirraway_Ace]

ORIGINAL: Nikademus

It wasn't a failure. Belton Cooper however made a good argument that it could have been replaced by a more survivable model thus saving many tanker's lives and speeding up the campaign. I found support for this in Zagoda's book on the Sherman which went into detail on the muddied world of armaments procurement. Often becomes a "flame" issue because it gets rated as either Failure or Success. I'd rate it as "Success(*) as part of a massive industrial-military complex that steamrolled Europe" [:)]

Agreed. A more survivable model could and should have been achieved given the capabilities of US industry. But like the lack of a decent squad LMG and aircraft 20mm cannon, these were warts on scale hide of a colossus.

ORIGINAL: Nikademus
As far as Manchuria goes....it was all about the logistics and planning, keeping the men supplied, the tanks gassed and armed. Glantz's mammoth study of the Operation is mind numbing....as is the degree of the Soviet planning. It was suprising for me to learn that so successful was it that it has been studied ever since as one of the ultimate examples of Operational planning and was (per Glantz) the inspiration for the Coalition 1991 operation in Iraq....named "Desert Storm" in honor of the plan it was largely based on. The fact that the Kwangtung Army was a shell of what it used to be didnt' take away from the efficiency and careful throughness of the Soviet plan.....which proved that there was more to the Bear than bunching men forward and making mass frontal assaults.

It was a very extensively studied campaign at Leavenworth during the Cold War era. Every US Army staff officer up until the fall of the Soviet Union I suspect had been exposed to it. Those who studied it, and those who experienced it on the IJA side, were probably all shocked at the degree of sophisticiation the Red Army demonstrated. That being said, it was intended to be a show piece. By that point in the war, there was a lot of that going on....

*edited for spelling

[TulliusDetritus]

ORIGINAL: Nikademus
which proved that there was more to the Bear than bunching men forward and making mass frontal assaults.

Which proves the Cold War did its homework... minimizing what the Red Army did. Still, what happened in Manchuria is nothing compared to what happened to the Germans in Urkraine and then during Operation Bagration circa 1944 [8D] And no, pushing men forward ain't enough. The Chinese (vs Japan that is) might tell you why...

[pharmy]

ORIGINAL: Jorge_Stanbury

Sherman limitations were also due to the tank destroyer doctrine (they were supposed to avoid tank vs tank combat), and therefore carried initially a low velocity gun, adequate for infantry support role; and as already mentioned, once they added better guns (like 105mm) it became capable of taking care of T-55s and T-62s

Also important to mention that it was good enough against the most likely adversaries: Pz IV and StuG IIIs
Panthers and Tigers were super sophisticated, but difficult to mass produce, and therefore, only 6,500 and 2,000 were built (respectively)... that is a lot less than the 50,000 Shermans built. And in total war, quantity have intrinsic quality

Also, by 1944, air superiority was so vast that, assuming good weather, any panzer concentration would be destroyed from the air as soon as it was spotted

So, definitively not the best, but good enough to win the war

I used to agree with that completely, as far as I was aware Stukas and Sturmoviks were incredibly effective, though this site gives food for thought : http://operationbarbarossa.net/Myth-Bus ... ters4.html
Regarding Normandy - I think Antony Beevor already mentioned the terrible destruction amongst soft skin vehicles, but almost none on Panzer IVs to VIs

[Wirraway_Ace]

ORIGINAL: icepharmy

I used to agree with that completely, as far as I was aware Stukas and Sturmoviks were incredibly effective, though this site gives food for thought : http://operationbarbarossa.net/Myth-Bus ... ters4.html
Regarding Normandy - I think Antony Beevor already mentioned the terrible destruction amongst soft skin vehicles, but almost none on Panzer IVs to VIs

The web article seems to support the argument that Allied players should be using 4Es in ground attack During the Normandy campaign, carpet bombing destroyed more Tigers than all other tacair sortes combined....

[Historiker]

edit and deleted...

Almost everything I typed was already said... Should read everything before posting.

[Wirraway_Ace]

I will offer a few differing opinions as part of a dialog, hopefully not an argument

ORIGINAL: goran007


IJA/IJN was outclassed by huge margin and on every aspect, fight was never fair.
Just imagine firepower difference between JS2 120mm gun main gun, ISU 152mm on one side and
mainly type Type 95 tanks:
(Early versions of the Ha-go were armed with the Type 94 37mm cannon and the 6.5mm Type 91 machine gun. From 1937 both of these guns were replaced. The 37mm Type 97 cannon had a longer barrel than the Type 94, which increased the muzzle velocity from 575m/sec to 675m/sec. The 91 machine guns were replaced with 7.7mm Type 97 machine guns.)

JS2 with its armor was hard target to destroy even for dreaded 88mm german anty tank/air gun. Japanise hardly had anything to destroy t34 and couldn't even scrape the paint of IS2.
As IJA in manjuria was not used to operate without air supremacy sturmoviks were truly devastating and probably quite hard suppressed the area of advance.

While I don't debate the IJA was completely outclassed in tanks and AT guns, remember that the firepower of a tank is dependent on many variables. Size of the bore and velocity are important, but rate of fire, number of rounds carried, sites, radios, and most importantly, crew training, are all critical. Note the JS2 was not the model the post war Soviet Army eventually settled on for a main battle tank. T62s, T64s, T72s, and T80s had a lot more in common with an upgunned T34 than a JS2 or JS3. As a side note, I always felt the Soviet late war and post war designs sacrifced too much crew room (and thus efficiency) in the turret to achieve a low silhouette while US designs were at the other extreme with too high a profile. The Brits seemed to learn from German designs and take the most balanced approach to tank design post war. Possibly the British Army aphorism, "one has not tasted the full measure of war until they have fought the Germans" had something to do with it....

ORIGINAL: goran007

Compared to Soviets we could raise a question weather the long and costly landings on tarawa, Iwo etc.. were consequence of lack of firepower/will to commit and sustain on attack.

Tarawa and Iwo were both primarily US Marine Corps operations. The Marines fully ascribed to the concept of closing aggressively with the enemy and demonstrated, as an overall force, extreme willingness to do so. The US Army had a more passive reputation for the conduct of its infantry in general. Marine squads by the time of the Iwo landings had tremendous firepower and they were well supported by additional assets at all levels, including naval gunfire. Even a Soviet Tank Corps would have an unpleasant day on the recieving end of a battleship bombardment.

A Soviet Field Marshall might question whether the Iwo landings contributed to a strategic goal however...

ORIGINAL: goran007

Lack of firepower: Shermans with with 75mm guns and garrand riffles are not suitable for close combat battles especially if you compare them to 120mm IS and 152 SU TD's which are designed especially for point blank strong point suppression.

Both the Soviet and American armies were very luxuriously equipped in terms of firepower by the standards of all armies. The Sherman and the Garand armed rifleman were by no means the only bunker busting tools.

ORIGINAL: goran007

The PPSh-41 fired the standard Soviet pistol and submachine gun cartridge, the 7.62x25mm (Tokarev). Weighing approximately 12 pounds (5.45 kg) with a loaded 71-round drum and 9.5 pounds (4.32 kg) with a loaded 35-round box magazine, the PPSh was capable of 900 rounds per minute, a very high rate of fire in comparison to most other military submachine guns of World War II. It was a durable, low-maintenance weapon made of low-cost, easily-obtained components, primarily stamped sheet metal and wood. The final production PPSh had top ejection and an 'L' type rear sight that could be adjusted for ranges of 100 and 200 meters.

Submachine guns are very useful in room-to-room fighting, though grenades are still king within a bulding. However, submachine guns have the trajectory like a rainbow and little penetrating power (even leaves, branches, and drywall will cause trouble for these bullets in terms of hitting with knockdown power what you are aiming at). In the jungle, in the fields, in the woods, of all the major weapons issues to common soldiers during the war, give me an M1 Garand. Reliable, accurate out to 400m with a good rate of fire (for the time). In combat, in my experience, blazing away in the general direction of the target is much less effective than hitting the target you have selected. The guy with the funny hat [bang]; the guy with his collar up [bang]....

ORIGINAL: goran007
Lack of commitment prolonging the siege and not doing all out assault regardless of initial losses in the long term could cost much, much more in terms of human lives.

This theory is not born out by military history. The siege of an isolated enemy is one of the best ways to cause high casualties among your enemy (captured) while minimizing your own. Note that Soviet deep battle doctrine was focused on disrupting the enemy front in order to create isolated pockets that could be reduced at liesure.

Bottom line, consider the big picture. Consider the codominant positions the Soviet Union and the USA achieved in the world as a result of the war. Consider the number of lives of their own population they spent to achieve that position. Consider the economic cost of the war. Which way would you prefer to wage war if your life or those of your children were at stake?

Mike

[TulliusDetritus]

ORIGINAL: Wirraway_Ace
Bottom line, consider the big picture. Consider the codominant positions the Soviet Union and the USA achieved in the world as a result of the war. Consider the number of lives of their own population they spent to achieve that position. Consider the economic cost of the war. Which way would you prefer to wage war if your life or those of your children were at stake?

What you say is rather Machiavellian [:)] Both the US and the UK were relatively safe behind oceans. Therefore they could choose when and where to attack (as opposed to being attacked, invaded).

That's a luxury the Soviet Union could not afford to begin with... The country was forced to mobilize, assemble their forces, evacuate industry whilst their enemies were invading their country, trapping and destroying the frontier districts armies in the process... A "passive" doctrine (à la US Army) would have meant one thing and only one thing: the annihilation of the Red Army, a total German victory.

After all, look at the Italian Campaign... At that incredibly slow pace the Red Army would have NEVER got to Berlin! Hell, they would not have kicked the Germans out of Russia in the first place...

In other words, the US and UK could afford these amazing slow tempos. That's the main difference which explains why both the Germans and Soviets suffered many casualties. What could you expect? There were massive, savage, epic and non-stop combats since day one of invasion... Now think about the many inactivity in the west...

[Wirraway_Ace]

ORIGINAL: TulliusDetritus

ORIGINAL: Wirraway_Ace
Bottom line, consider the big picture. Consider the codominant positions the Soviet Union and the USA achieved in the world as a result of the war. Consider the number of lives of their own population they spent to achieve that position. Consider the economic cost of the war. Which way would you prefer to wage war if your life or those of your children were at stake?

What you say is rather Machiavellian [:)] Both the US and the UK were relatively safe behind oceans. Therefore they could choose when and where to attack (as opposed to being attacked, invaded).

That's a luxury the Soviet Union could not afford to begin with... The country was forced to mobilize, assemble their forces, evacuate industry whilst their enemies were invading their country, trapping and destroying the frontier districts armies in the process... A "passive" doctrine (à la US Army) would have meant one thing and only one thing: the annihilation of the Red Army, a total German victory.

After all, look at the Italian Campaign... At that incredibly slow pace the Red Army would have NEVER got to Berlin! Hell, they would not have kicked the Germans out of Russia in the first place...

In other words, the US and UK could afford these amazing slow tempos. That's the main difference which explains why both the Germans and Soviets suffered many casualties. What could you expect? There were massive, savage, epic and non-stop combats since day one of invasion... Now think about the many inactivity in the west...

While the initial losses during the first disasterous months of the campaign could not been avoided (only minimized), I disagree with your contention that the Soviets could not trade distance for time and choose to attack on their own terms after moving their manufacturing to beyond reach. The vastness of Russia and the ability to trade enormous space for time is the central theme of warfare in Russia in since Napoleon.

Soviet doctrine did not value the individual soldier. They could not vote, nor could their families. It valued victory.

The pace of Soviet operations as the climactic endgame approached was greatly influenced by the vision of Stalin of the post war geopolitical situation, not the Germans. After Kursk, the Soviets dictated the operational tempo of the theater.

As to the Italian campaign, everybody but Churchill and Mark Clark thought it was a diversion...


Mike

[danlongman]

I wonder what the Italians thought? If it weren't for Mark Clark the Italian campaign might have been a disaster for the Germans.
Anyway it is a Good Thing the Soviet citizens couldn't vote because they likely would have voted themselves out of the war.
Then we (the western allies) would have found ouselves in an unenviable situation indeed.
What would that extremely intense Normandy battle have been like with twice as many Germans and uncertain control of the air?
Anyway we discuss this with a hindsight that was not available to the participants. They had to play to their percieved strengths
and against what they saw as the enemies weakness. Stalin had some idea of what he wanted europe to look like when the war
was over. Churchill appeared to sense some of this and tried to do some maneuvering. Most americans seemd to think they
were going to lick the Nazis and go home. It was a whole lot more complicated than that.
And here we are today.
cheers

[Wirraway_Ace]

ORIGINAL: danlongman

I wonder what the Italians thought? If it weren't for Mark Clark the Italian campaign might have been a disaster for the Germans.
Anyway it is a Good Thing the Soviet citizens couldn't vote because they likely would have voted themselves out of the war.
Then we (the western allies) would have found ouselves in an unenviable situation indeed.
What would that extremely intense Normandy battle have been like with twice as many Germans and uncertain control of the air?
Anyway we discuss this with a hindsight that was not available to the participants. They had to play to their percieved strengths
and against what they saw as the enemies weakness. Stalin had some idea of what he wanted europe to look like when the war
was over. Churchill appeared to sense some of this and tried to do some maneuvering. Most americans seemd to think they
were going to lick the Nazis and go home. It was a whole lot more complicated than that.
And here we are today.
cheers

On the merits of the Italian Campaign, you will have to convince me.

As to where we are today, well, the Soviet Union collapsed under its own weight two decades ago while Germany and Japan are generally pacifist and two the America's best trading partners. China and India, both under foreign rule during WW2, are independent and rapidly growing in prosperity. Australia and New Zealand, who on a per capita basis contributed mightly to the Allied victory, are economically strong. Seemed to turn out all right, although Britain may be viewed as an exception. It entered the war as a great power and ended the war much diminished.

All this is, however, a long way from the topic of warfare between IJA and Red Army in 1945, for which I apologize.

Mike

[danlongman]

Not really off topic at all. The war in Manchuria from 1939-45, with a breather while Japan went and poked the other
giant, was of momentous consequence and has been largely ignored in the west. It led pretty much directly to the current
Korean situation among many things. It is time it got the study and attention it warrants. There was an awful lot going
on at the time and a lot of western leaders had no idea where they were going and no concept of how things would turn out.
I know that the western allies wanted Stalin's assistance for what was envisioned as a long drawn out struggle for Japan.
A short time later the same people thought it wasn't such a good idea.

[pharmy]

ORIGINAL: Wirraway_Ace

ORIGINAL: danlongman

I wonder what the Italians thought? If it weren't for Mark Clark the Italian campaign might have been a disaster for the Germans.
Anyway it is a Good Thing the Soviet citizens couldn't vote because they likely would have voted themselves out of the war.
Then we (the western allies) would have found ouselves in an unenviable situation indeed.
What would that extremely intense Normandy battle have been like with twice as many Germans and uncertain control of the air?
Anyway we discuss this with a hindsight that was not available to the participants. They had to play to their percieved strengths
and against what they saw as the enemies weakness. Stalin had some idea of what he wanted europe to look like when the war
was over. Churchill appeared to sense some of this and tried to do some maneuvering. Most americans seemd to think they
were going to lick the Nazis and go home. It was a whole lot more complicated than that.
And here we are today.
cheers

On the merits of the Italian Campaign, you will have to convince me.

As to where we are today, well, the Soviet Union collapsed under its own weight two decades ago while Germany and Japan are generally pacifist and two the America's best trading partners. China and India, both under foreign rule during WW2, are independent and rapidly growing in prosperity. Australia and New Zealand, who on a per capita basis contributed mightly to the Allied victory, are economically strong. Seemed to turn out all right, although Britain may be viewed as an exception. It entered the war as a great power and ended the war much diminished.

All this is, however, a long way from the topic of warfare between IJA and Red Army in 1945, for which I apologize.

Mike

Its hard to convince anyone on the merits of the Italian campaign , including my rational self. As a Hungarian though, I think from the Balkans to the Baltic shores everyone understands Churchill's motive (we did have 50 years of Soviet rule afterwards). Lying to FDR about it by calling it Europe's soft underbelly is a bit over the top though. FDR's naivety about Uncle Joe is another thing. But militarily the only exit from Italy towards Eastern Europe was Trieste/Fiume (the only two Adriatic cities with decent size harbors and the infrastructure linked to the hinterland of Central Eastern Europe) and beyond. A generation of Italian man died near and in the Isonzo valley trying to get just that couple of miles to Trieste, and to have to slog through all the way from the south,is pretty much impossible. On the other side, Marseille and Toulon were great objectives as harbors, just not as useful in late 44.