ORIGINAL: warspite1
Still working through the same book.... The Olympics kind of took up my reading time recently. Anyway, the point of posting was to ask a question.
I have got up to the chapter on Greece / Yugoslavia / Crete. Re the latter, one thing that Beevor makes absolutely crystal clear is that the loss of Crete was the fault of General Freyberg V.C. I read a book on the fall of Crete about 20 years ago, and I do not recall anyone being singled out for blame (although it was a long time ago now). Specifically Beevor says:
- the troop deployments were wrong (particularly given the Allies had the benefit of Ultra)
- Freyburg new the attack date - but did not share with the commanders of the troops guarding the three key landing areas.
- Freyburg ignored opinion that a seaborne landing was impossible and so kept reserves back to counter a "non existent threat"
- he believed the battle won after the first landings were repulsed - despite the fighting at Maleme having not gone well for the small Kiwi unit stationed there.
Does anyone have any info/thoughts on this episode?
Michael Tamelander writes about this in his book about Malta and the Mediterranean war. His conclusion is that no blame for the loss of Crete falls on General Freyberg V.C.
Specifically about the points you mention he writes:
- Freyberg was not informed about Ultra. He received the information but was told it arrived from an agent in Berlin.
- The information that Freyberg received (from Ultra) told that the Germans
would invade from the sea with tanks. He had recieved no informations that the invasion would depend on the success of the air landing. Therefore the sea landing threat was a reality that Freyberg had to consider.
- Finds no real fault with the deployment. It was as good as it could get with the few resources available.
- Freyberg had ordered his units to counter attack
if the airfield fell into enemy hands or key positions needed to defend the airfield. Due to lacking communications Freyberg did
not have a clear picture of the Maleme situation. The commander of the 5th New Zeeland brigade feared new air landings in his rear and was reluctant to commit his reserve. Therefore he withdraw from several key positions in the belief that he was out numbered.
He also writes:
+ Two days before the invasion the remaining English fighters were ordered to evacuate Crete.
+ Freyberg had been ordered to leave the landing strips at the airfields in good condition. Even though the Germans would attack
before any English aircrafts (fighters) were available for Crete.
+ Crete had a severe shortage of communications equipment. For example: Freyberg's own staff and communications equipment had been directed to Alexandria.
+ Severe shortage of machine guns and mortars.
+ Some of the units available to Freyberg could be considered militia units or Ad Hoc units with limited value compared to their size. Some units lost most of their equipment in Greece.
+ The terrain made fast redeployments impossible and that was not helped by the lack of communications. Therefore many positions were in fact isolated.
+ After the battle commenced Freyberg needed supply but few supplies reached Crete. The 23rd he reported to Egypt that the ammunition situation was critical but recived the reply from Wavell that it was impossible to send any transport ships to Crete.
+ The first critical day of the air landings the fault was rather with the local commanders and not with Freyberg.
General E.C. Weston had been examining the possibility to defend Crete. April the 15th he sent his report and his conclussion was that it would be close to impossible to defend Crete without at least some fighter protection. Turns out he was more or less right.
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