*********** from the peanut gallery - No CR or PJH please.

[witpqs]

ORIGINAL: Alfred

As it is, Singapore was a huge Allied POW camp contributing absolutely nothing to the prosecution of the Allied war effort; all achieved without a single Japanese prison guard.

Right! What was the purpose of sending only two divisions? They got mauled for nothing. Could they and the forces with them hold back a breakout from Singapore? I don't know what is there with them, or the full roster of what hunkered down in Singapore.

[Alfred]

ORIGINAL: witpqs

ORIGINAL: Alfred

As it is, Singapore was a huge Allied POW camp contributing absolutely nothing to the prosecution of the Allied war effort; all achieved without a single Japanese prison guard.

Right! What was the purpose of sending only two divisions? They got mauled for nothing. Could they and the forces with them hold back a breakout from Singapore? I don't know what is there with them, or the full roster of what hunkered down in Singapore.

I can only assume that more divisions ae following because 2 only should not suffice to capture Singapore. Better though would have been to send none across. Now, in the unlikely event that the Allied garrison could force the two intruders to retreat back across the causeway, the odds of a successful Allied crossing are considerably improved.

Alfred

[witpqs]

ORIGINAL: Alfred

ORIGINAL: witpqs

ORIGINAL: Alfred

As it is, Singapore was a huge Allied POW camp contributing absolutely nothing to the prosecution of the Allied war effort; all achieved without a single Japanese prison guard.

Right! What was the purpose of sending only two divisions? They got mauled for nothing. Could they and the forces with them hold back a breakout from Singapore? I don't know what is there with them, or the full roster of what hunkered down in Singapore.

I can only assume that more divisions ae following because 2 only should not suffice to capture Singapore. Better though would have been to send none across. Now, in the unlikely event that the Allied garrison could force the two intruders to retreat back across the causeway, the odds of a successful Allied crossing are considerably improved.

Alfred

Complete agreement - send none across unless there are enough crossing to do the job.

I gained the impression from PJH's post that only the HQ stayed across the river in Singapore, and that the two divisions fell back across the river during the failed crossing. I have seen units do that when REALLY smashed on a river crossing. If so, they must be in horrendous shape. I would only rely on whatever units are in hex with them.

[Alfred]

witpqs,

I'm not reading the Japanese AAR and I don't recall Canoerebel mentioning the enemy had auto withdrawn. That being so, together with the HQ being the only unit in "reserve", now would be the perfect opportunity for the Singapore garrison to breakout, if it had been readied to do so. For Japanese units do not easily retreat and if they auto withdrew it means they were really very badly defeated with large numbers of disabled squads at least to be expected.

Alfred

[Cribtop]

In his AAR, PJH stated he messed up the orders because he was in a hurry to get the turn out. I don't think the two divisional crossing was intentional. That said, it would be a boon to CR if he's ready to take advantage.

[Bullwinkle58]

ORIGINAL: Alfred

ORIGINAL: JeffK

While I dont understand the emphasis on Socotra and havent used the extended map since it came out I really doubt the sense of a massive Singapore gambit.

The troops there are not the best and they will face a shock attack crossing the straights.

And where do they go? A long winding road up the Malay Peninsula and even further to Bankok before you would make PJH worry.

The comments about KB off the West Coast are interesting, I thought the numbers were light and I queried if it might be mini KB.

You are correct about CR's fixations, but they have borne fruit in his past games, maybe they provide determination and maybe become a self fulfilling truth if hid opponent reacts.

I would like to see CR try some odd tactics, what will unsettle PJH. (Land on Hokkaido?? Maybe a bit early) It would have to be against a target PJH cant ignore. (If you were going to land supply at Singapore, why not try for Palembang??)

A Singapore breakout, which should have been prepared for from the moment it became obvious Japan was not targetting its capture as a high priority, has many advantages.

1. The Allied troops are already in situ. They are not in situ at Palembang.

2. Those troops are of a much higher overall quality than the Allied Burma Army. The Australian troops are good, the two Indian divisions, once assembled, only need rest time to recover morale and do some training. They have had that opportunity. Very importantly there are several artillery and AA units present which means they can operate without air support to a much greater degree than can any other British/Commonwealt assembled force at this time of the war. Also do not underestimate the value of all those support squads in the numerous HQs.

3. The breakout would be largely hitting thin air. However so much time has elapsed that Japan has been given time to bring in sufficient new divisions to now allow, and only now, the actual investment of Singapore.

4. The key bases in Malaya which Japan is utilising to support its naval operations in the Bay of Bengal lie on good communication lines. Against limited combat opposition the Allied forces would advance quite rapidly. The advance does not have to reach Rangoon or Bangkok to sever Japan's currently isolated from each other forces in Assam and lower Burma. PH would have to scramble forces from somewhere to cover his LOCs. Personally I doubt he has any strategic reserve at the moment, thus some operation would have to be stripped of forces to meet the threat. As it is, Singapore was a huge Allied POW camp contributing absolutely nothing to the prosecution of the Allied war effort; all achieved without a single Japanese prison guard.

5. Moving to Palembang is not so good because:

(a) fresh forces from somewhere would be necessary (unlike Singapore where they already exist in situ)
(b) no significant overland bases are threatened which is the complete opposite situation regarding Singapore
(c) thus only air operations out of Palembang would be dangerous. The airfield is too small for efficient 4E use, unlike Singapore
(d) Palembang's port is far smaller than Singapore's and that has serious ramifications in terms of unloading speed and attendant ship losses (not to mention the then necessary ship repair and reloading facilities). Plus access to it is limited which restricts the basing of heavy naval assets out of Palembang
(e) the Singapore breakout creates a reasonably secure Allied SLOC to Singapore. Recapture of Palembang itself does not create a similarly secure SLOC

Alfred

Good to see you here Alfred.

The comments on Palembang speak for themselves. Bad choice versus Singers.

On the troop levels, if a big ram is engineered to reach Singers it could be expanded a bit and some of the Allied forces currently being wasted in Oz, Ceylon, and Scoodra could be on xAPs and into Singers to beef up the break-through thrust. Supply is paramount, but extra AV is available, and in Malaysia could do some good VP-wise versus sitting in the aforementioned backwaters.

The northern goals as you say need not be Bangkok or Rangoon. A thrust to the height of Alor Star and Georgetown would take away some very large air bases, secure the western side and make Pt. Blair less vulnerable, remove air patrols to the west as well, and present opportunity for a turn east to take Kota Bharu. Siginificant additional supply capturing ought to be possible, as well as a push-back on a VP-ratio which is not running in the Allies' favor at the moment.

Possibly of the greatest import, such a move would make PH react for a change instead of CR dancing to the Japanese tune. And for relatively little additional risk.

The trap CR has fallen into is to assume that Singers must fall; the only question is when. PH's choice of strategic target priority has presented CR an opportunity to hold Singers for the duration, an event which places severe limitis on Japan's options in the sub-theater in 1943-44--shipyard-wise, strait transit-wise, and resource flow-wise. An Allied Singers makes Palembang and Medan untenable as longer-range 4Es come on line, as well as represent a VP-hedge fund and springboard to support re-taking Indo-China in the out years.

[JocMeister]

I think CR is finally starting to realise what a mess China is for the Allies. "Where I was guardedly optimistic two weeks ago, I'm now guardedly pessimistic"

If CR superstack of 300k gets mauled I think there is a good chance he will loose China in 42.

[witpqs]

Moose,

How would those forces actually get to Singapore at this time? They would all wind up on a diving expedition.

[Walloc]

Poor CR, that last combat report in PJHs thread....

Rasmus

[Justus2]

I have a question, regarding CRs recent posts on using PPs for transferring units from Manchuria. I didn't want to bring it up in the AAR, as I haven't played PBEM so I don't really know how this would be taken. I know it is frequently listed as a House Rule in other PBEM/AARs, but this game they specifically did not, to me that would imply they accepted taht PP would not have to be paid? Conversely, did CR pay PP to move US forces into Canada? That seems to me to be a similar situation, right? I am not trying to blame either side, just wondering if I am understanding the issue.

[Dan Nichols]

CR explicitly stated on page one of his AAR that there were NO house rules. To me that would mean PJH can march troops out of Manchucko or Korea as he wishes.

[Walloc]

ORIGINAL: Dan Nichols

CR explicitly stated on page one of his AAR that there were NO house rules. To me that would mean PJH can march troops out of Manchucko or Korea as he wishes.

CR quote from his AAR

That's me, your friendly neighborhood editor.

By the way, 116th IJA Div. showed up in far west China. (That's one of the good Kwantung units NYGiants mentioned yesterday). I've emailed Steve to ask him if he's paying to transfer units. I certainly hope he is. If he isn't we seem to be playing with different notions of propriety and frankly discussing what's pushing the envelope.

Kind regards,

Rasmus

Edit: Guess name change didnt work.... fail me!

[Justus2]

shows up right on the main page, but didnt change the title on the AAR sub-page. Maybe only thread starter can change it?

[Walloc]

Yeah PMed CR to tell Jeffk, presumable he is only one that can change it.

[Dan Nichols]

ORIGINAL: Walloc

ORIGINAL: Dan Nichols

CR explicitly stated on page one of his AAR that there were NO house rules. To me that would mean PJH can march troops out of Manchucko or Korea as he wishes.

CR quote from his AAR

That's me, your friendly neighborhood editor.

By the way, 116th IJA Div. showed up in far west China. (That's one of the good Kwantung units NYGiants mentioned yesterday). I've emailed Steve to ask him if he's paying to transfer units. I certainly hope he is. If he isn't we seem to be playing with different notions of propriety and frankly discussing what's pushing the envelope.

Kind regards,

Rasmus

Edit: Guess name change didnt work.... fail me!

From page 1 of the same AAR:
Thanks for the input and suggestions, gents. A few comments in reply:

1. I'm trying to find a happy medium in which an enhanced Japan can fight on more even terms more deeply into the games. So if the R&D allows PH to produce better aircraft in 1943 and 1944, that's okay. On the flip side, I was a little worried about 1942, when Japanese airpower under PDU On can be a killer and yet PDU Off seems to swing things the other way. There doesn't seem to be a happy medium, so I'm hoping better Allied torps will even things out a bit.

2. I think this will be a tough game. PH has the experience and level of aggression that should make 1942 a rip-roarer.

3. While PH (and Nemo) enjoy the mind games, I don't. I generally avoid commentary for that reason, because I don't like giving away intel, and because I strive to avoid comments that can seem boastful (even an innocent comment coming after a big victory can strike an opponent the wrong way). So, my way of playing the mental aspect of the game is to ignore it.

4. We have no house rules. Were I playing Nemo, and were Nemo strident in the "no house rules" proclamation, the first thing I would do is empty out both Manila and Pearl Harbor. But in many games that just won't sit right even in a "no holds bar" atmosphere. So I won't do anything radical on the opening day of the war.

[Walloc]

Dont disagree on that Dan, but its non the less not the perception of CR, judging from his comments. That was what i was trying to point out.

ORIGINAL: Dan Nichols

4. We have no house rules. Were I playing Nemo, and were Nemo strident in the "no house rules" proclamation, the first thing I would do is empty out both Manila and Pearl Harbor. But in many games that just won't sit right even in a "no holds bar" atmosphere. So I won't do anything radical on the opening day of the war.

Reading the rest of the paragraph prolly suggests more than what u have highlighted. So while he says no HR, in fact he suggests unwritten rules to be followed. This is by the nature of it problematic.

Kind regards,

Rasmus

[Dan Nichols]

I understand what you are saying, it seems that CR is not sure what he agreed to. If there are no house rules, then there are no house rules.

[Walloc]

I edited my previous post to fully explain my point if u would reread, thx.

Rasmus

[Capt. Harlock]

Reading the rest of the paragraph prolly suggests more than what u have highlighted. So while he says no HR, in fact he suggests unwritten rules to be followed.

Yes -- but he only said he wouldn't do anything radical on the opening day of the war. Subsequent turns are something else again.

[Walloc]

ORIGINAL: Capt. Harlock

Reading the rest of the paragraph prolly suggests more than what u have highlighted. So while he says no HR, in fact he suggests unwritten rules to be followed.

Yes -- but he only said he wouldn't do anything radical on the opening day of the war. Subsequent turns are something else again.

Yet they have discussed validity of actions ever since. Use of para for shock attack, no para frag intel gathering, issue of map edge/ off map ports fleeing. So both have engaged in the question of what is "kosher" or not. Obvious since both have posed questions in their AARs to what others think.
Im not argueing if u dont read it very stricktly that the have a no HR game. Just saying at leased CR hasnt thot that to be quite the case and IMO nor have PJH. Tho its clear that they have differed on what is what. Or there would never been any question to ask others in their AARs on to what they think are kosher. Nor had there been any discussions between the 2 of them regarding this. We know this has happened. Its a questions of shades of grey.

Kind regards,

Rasmus