Edit: a US Inf div got roughly 1100 squads/devices in total so saying one has lost 4000 squads/devices fighting for one base when he has WON the battle in the end means like he has burnt nearly the equivalent of four full US Inf divisions DESTROYED - on the offense. Sorry, no.
I did not take the Moose's post that lliterally and it made me think of equivalent. Let us say I land on a strongly held position and I loose a CA, 2 CL's a few DD's .. how many devices is that worth? So there is some combination of devices, naval, platforms, aircraft that are expended on both sides to defend/ attack a position.
The nuances are meaningless in the "normal" course of things. If AV or SCLS does not happen .. then the Allies have enough stuff in 44 that even when cornered into the exterme edges of the map like Greyjoy .. major operations to have a come back and win are very likely ... But if one is seeking Auto-victory then I believe the Moose was stating [at least I inturpretted] that this whole package must be considered because the IJ must not only take bases and keep the allies building certain proftiable bases but must be fully aware of the total costs of operations from early 42 to the turn expected AV in January 43. So the Allies need to be very aware in their offensive operations as they might donate to the top number of the fraction in offense [devices, naval platforms, and airplanes] while not gaining enough of the bottom number ... 4X gives a steep curve for the II for sure but ...
BTW) Stacking limitations might make destroying 4 full US divisions on the offense might be unlikely, but a little look at my late great AAR and I destoyed 4 full IJ divisions [5th, 55th, 19th 33rd and Imperial Guards Division along with the supporting cast] in Burma in a
counterattack by surrounding them and pinning the LYB's and eventually killing these divisions between Rangoon and the edge of the world. Making the total grab for the Allies a decisive victory. I had close to 3-1 points and an Allied AV by 1944. So in your example the IJ "won" in taking the Irrawaddy valley early in 42 at value 'X'. They never lost 4000 devices in any one victory. But the
total costs when it was over in late '42 was far more than 4000 devices .. enough if we continued that an Allied victory in 1944 was more than likely ...so the relavancy of the argument I think is not looking at one combat report but the entire picture over a specfic time period ..in particular one has to assess costs at strategic points in time .. 4:1 3:1 2:1 .
PJ is balancing this act right now IMHO ..
Just my .02 ....
"What gets us into trouble is not what we don't know. It's what we know for sure that just ain't so"
