A midwar Japanese AAR (no USS Henrico)

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Chickenboy
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RE: A midwar Japanese AAR (no USS Henrico)

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September 6, 1943 (ex-China):

Singapore: KB and support arrives, refuels and replenishes air sorties. A sizeable AO TF is refueling at Soerbaja and will accompany KB towards Davao as an interim base location.

DEI: Timor: An IJN TF runs into trouble during a resupply run to Dili. 16 B-25s, based out of Darwin, attack the convoy, crippling an xAK and damaging an APD. The damage would have been worse, but for 8 A6M3a fighters covering the resupply. They extract a measure of vengeance, downing 9 B-25s in return.

Boela: Naval bombardment during the night by CA Salt Lake City and Cl Helena causes moderate airfield damage. Follow-up bombing raids by 24 B-24D1s cause further damage. Tomorrow N1K1-J George LRCAP will cover Boela to see if I can catch some unescorted bombers.

P/NG: Heavy Allied bombers pummel Aitape on the Northern coast of P/NG. All told, some 130 4e bombers take part in raids throughout the day on Aitape [X(]. IJNAF A6M3a and Tojo IIa aircraft do a reasonable job in holding the line, but are overwhelmed. 6 zeroes and 2 Tojos are lost. If there's a bright spot, it's that 6 P-47D2s were downed during the course of these raids. [8D]

South of New Britain, DD Aaron Ward is attacked by LowNav specialist Helen IIa aircraft based out of Shortlands. Unfortunately, Aaron Ward had fighter cover, whilest the Helens were unescorted. Only one Helen makes an attack against the destroyer, and it misses. I lose 7 planes and their crews.

Allied air losses today: 23
Japanese: 26

HI: 1.91 MM
Fuel: 1.882 MM
Oil: 1.298 MM
Res: 17.67 MM
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RE: A midwar Japanese AAR (no USS Henrico)

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Posting a 'top pilots' screenshot in another thread has reminded me that I'm due to update this AAR.

I have not received a turn from my opponent (USS Henrico) in over two months time. He has not responded to several emails asking after his health or his 'status' vis a vis the game. I recently sent him a (final) email informing him that this match was finished. Should he return, I'd be happy to review the game in detail with him, but this game was over.

Too bad, really-I was enjoying the match and thought I'd be able to get a game into 1944 and work on the final defenses of the Empire of Japan.

Way back when, we wrote up our opinions of the match and shared them with one another after the first 6 months of the war. I'll dig those up and post them for those Allied and Japan players that want to see a review from our POV of the early war.

My only standing PBEM now is against AW1Steve. It's scenario 2 in the early war-late January. I don't think Steve has updated his AAR in some time, but he has one on page 3 or 4 of the AAR board.

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RE: A midwar Japanese AAR (no USS Henrico)

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Here was my writeup in June 1942 about the early war...this may be a useful read for new players. Note: this was done some 2.5 years ago, so some of the 'patch' or other gameplay issues may no longer be relevant.

Looking back…the IJN perspective June 1942 (a theatre view):

Japan Home Islands:

A hungry beast needing constant feeding: Much of the effort for the Empire has been focused on immediate resource importation, with later added oil and fuel imports rising in importance. Shipping not used for amphibious assault is, by default, fed into the convoy system. Initially, this effort required in excess of half available transport, predominantly for resource convoys. As subsequent oil and fuel-rich lands were conquered, xAKs, TKs and AOs were recruited for transportation of needed oil and fuel. Until these lands fell, these ships were underutilized, but now are fully employed in transport of these precious commodities.

The interval between patch I and patch II was awful. In excess of 1,000,000 resources simply vanished from the map through ‘leakage’. This put the home islands in an unpleasant pinch. The home islands had only a few months of resource surplus with which to feed a rapidly growing manufacturing base. Disappearance of the surplus in the face of economic expansion required a redoubling of resource imports. Only now is the resource surplus building again. It is significantly lower than it could be and significantly lower than it probably ought to be.

I tried to use WiTP tracker to assist with economic management of the Empire. Alas, I was never able to make this program work with my system. Thus, my economic (mis)management of the Empire will be reduced to two tenets moving forward: 1. Conservative expansion of key weapon / engine / aircraft platforms and 2. Get as much as you can in as fast as you can-hoping for a friendly ‘fudge factor’.

Movement of resources, fuel and oil is not exactly as advertised on the map. I had originally envisioned the need for periodic resource trips to occupied lands to shepherd goods back to the mainland. This may not be necessary. For example, oil and fuel ‘leaks’ from Rangoon back to Bangkok, Saigon and CRB. Hong Kong, Canton and Shanghai resources flow to the largest port on the Asian mainland-Port Arthur. Under patches I and II, the island of Kyushu did not communicate with Honshu and the port of Shimonoseki acted as an unsharing sink. These issues were resolved after months of gameplay with the advent of patch III. This permitted Kyushu ports to be more effective recipients of convoys from the SRA that would have otherwise necessitated transshipment to Kobe, Osaka or Hiroshima on Honshu.

Supply and factory management: Initial production of critical engines and airframes was entirely unsatisfactory. Many factories were spewing out antiquated airframes and a polyglot of different and redundant engine types. The B5N2 Kate factory in Nagasaki was turned ‘off’ for production. Just what were the previous stewards of the economy thinking?
Home island supply was initially ample, permitting expansion of factories. However, because of the mechanisms for factory repair, hex supply needed to be carefully titrated to effect. Many cities went wanting for supply until the right combination of arrow ‘pull’ demands for supply could be determined. This slowed factory repair.
The forums had useful general thoughts regarding production of armaments, vehicles, aircraft and airframes. Many of the redundant factory types were switched to more useful engines or aircraft. In hindsight, perhaps I could have waited a bit longer to modernize production on some types of aircraft airframes, as I had (and still do) large pools of these older engine types that could have been used to my benefit. It would have been nice if the game engine scavenged some value from these pools rather than just having them sit.
Otherwise, the home islands only required minor changes to prepare for the conflict. Some repair yards were insufficient and these were expanded modestly. Same with vehicle and armament pools.

Manchuria and China:

The most capable heavy artillery units, engineer units and superfluous base units were immediately identified and ‘bought out’ of Manchuria. I estimate that I spent 2,000-3,000 PPs changing the HQ of these units. Prior to patch III, heavy artillery was a butcher. These units were employed very successfully in the initial reduction of the Lochang-Nanyang-Chengchow salient. Many of the heavy artillery from the Hong Kong siege were also useful in reducing Bataan and Clark Field in the Phillipine islands. Ditto for those heavy artillery units used in the siege of Singapore. Patch III changed all that and, in one stroke, rendered these units near useless. In hindsight, the PPs would have been more useful buying out frontline infantry divisions / regiments out of Manchuria.
Other than being a repository of surplus units, Manchuria was quickly identified as the training ground for at least half of the IJAAF fighter and bomber pilots. Rosters and training orders for these units were maxed out with an eye towards long-term training programs. The Home Islands harbor the balance of these training units. Here, antiquated aircraft flourish in their training role.

China has been a ‘softer theatre’ than expected. My initial goals in conquering China were quickly seized, permitting a grander strategy than I had initially held. Chinese infantry are rabble by themselves. When behind fortifications, defensive terrain or in the presence of good leaders (rare), they become much more formidable. The Chinese should seek to abandon those less defensive terrain features, lest they be encircled and annihilated. I did not anticipate the need to ship copious supply to the Chinese theatre from the home islands to support IJA offensives, but this is necessary for any prolonged offensive.
Control of the air in China has been interesting. If I wished, with maximum effort, I could overwhelm all of the gaijin airforce elements in China, due to the polyglot use of antiquated airframes handed down these second tier forces. However, a maximum effort in China would limit my available airforces in other parts of the expanding Empire. A compromise needs to be made then. This compromise involves keeping limited air superiority but waiving the possibility of air supremacy in the Chinese theatre. This will allow the Chinese airforce to live on and fester, but at least at this point, it must be so. One more thing about Chinese air forces-the region has a dearth of satisfactory base forces. These must be secured in order to support reasonable numbers of fighting aircraft.
Long term goals in China are a question now. I decry the ‘take it because you can and it’s there’ philosophy of so many JFBs. Without long-term strategic benefit, I just don’t see the value of plunging the IJA in a schwerpunkt towards Sian or Chungking. Cities with large amounts of light or heavy industry are tempting targets, however. There is also merit to clearing the main rail line running through Changsa.

Several dot hexes have tremendous resource production-a very laudable goal for capture. One, just South of Changsa, was liberated by IJ forces and reoccupied by Chinese rabble after the IJ forces moved off the hex. The resources were entirely intact when captured by the Japanese. Fortunately, the Chinese never attacked the vacant base hex to claim it for their own-they just sat there. Had they attacked and changed hex ownership, the resources may have been damaged, requiring significant supply to repair.

Phillipines and DEI:

I hate dogface submarines. When properly employed, the Allied submarines can be a significant blow to efforts to import the lifeblood (read: stolen stuff) of the Empire of Japan. It was with this in mind that I decided to erase the East Asian USN fleet at Manila on turn one. The initial attack and follow up went well, in terms of exterminating shipping at Manila and Hong Kong. SCTFs adroitly picked off commercial shipping evacuating HK and worked their way through the 3 RN DDs that scurried from this port. BB Fuso ate a vengeful torpedo from one of the DDs and required about 3 weeks of yard time to repair the damage. Fuso’s 40cm guns made a mess of the DD in turn.

Apart from submarine mining the approaches to Manila, I wanted to treat the Bataan guns with a certain measure of respect. Accordingly, I ordered my surface ships to stand off at least two hexes with a maximum ‘react’ setting of one hex. No sense being drawn into the shore batteries while chasing some rabble shipping.

Anticipating the flight of most shipping from the Phillipines towards Soerbaja, KB was tasked with sweeping the Celebes sea clear of enemy shipping and striking the port of Soerbaja. Prominent in the minds of the Imperial high command, however, was the fact that the BB Prince of Wales, BC Repulse, CA Houston and CL Boise (and other Dutch and British cruisers) were unaccounted for. These ships could make a powerful surface force to be reckoned with. While KB did have an escorting SCTF with BB presence, it was uncertain if this would be sufficient to deal with an aggressive early allied attempted intercept of KB. Such an outcome, if successfully performed by the allies, would have been disastrous for the Japanese hopes. With this in mind, KB’s approach to the Soerbaja was somewhat cautious. A days’ worth of strikes netted a body of escort types of craft in Soerbaja, but apparently missed a large cruiser force that had departed the day prior. Mores the pity.
Mini-KB was active in the area as well, sinking stray Allied shipping. The small size of the Imperial CVLs was an important limitation to their usefulness here. They quickly ran out of torpedo stores and were reliant on less effective bombs for naval targets.

Furthermore, their fuel stores (‘short legs’) necessitated their withdrawal rather early from the combat in order to refuel (and rearm). Alas, their departure seems to have minimized any ‘hammer / anvil’ possibilities for cooperation with KB.
However, attacking Soerbaja early in the war served to send a message: Clear out now as quickly as you can lest you be destroyed. The Allies seem to have taken this to heart and quickly removed all manner of shipping (save some annoying submarines) from the theatre. This wholesale egress did facilitate subsequent invasion of Java, as Japanese surface combatants could not possibly have covered all necessary landing forces employed in the liberation of the island.

The invasion of Sumatra was focused on early liberation of Palembang and its intact capture. Heaven was smiling on her sons with providence-the vital production center was captured entirely intact. Thank goodness for the inefficient Dutch engineers and random luck! A crippling of Palembang production would have set back the Imperial Japanese war effort in the Dutch East Indies by 4-6 months or more. Balikpapan was captured with about 50% damage to production facilities as was Miri. Oil centers here were repaired to maximum. Tarakan was mostly intact at capture.

The invasion and liberation of Java went well. After capture of S. Sumatra and Billiton, fighters were based there to provide LRCAP coverage of some ersatz xAKL invasion fleets. As expected, Dutch bombers sortied to attack these fleets, resulting in the downing of many dutch planes. Combined with regular fighter sweeps, these preliminary steps were useful in reducing numbers of capable Dutch combatants in the air capable of resisting the main invasion.

HIJM naval warfare experts debated about the best place to land on Java. Tjitilap was an early favorite because it was being used for resupply and extrication of Allied forces on Java. Japanese planners exchanged heated discussions about sending landing forces around the Northern tip of Sumatra and then South to surprise Tjitilap from the IO side. However, this port was too isolated from fighter cover and subject to possible interdiction by surface forces in the area. A port on the Northeast coast near Batavia was less defended, under air cover and nearer erstwhile invasion transports. It was selected for invasion. Land opposition was quickly rolled in Java, resulting in a sizeable bag of prisoners both in Batavia as well as Soerbaja. Japanese land forces were ordered to bypass areas of considerable resistance with a goal of cutting off retreat on the island back to Batavia or Soerbaja. This was paramount. Once retreat was disallowed, the island’s defenders were split into several pockets that could be reduced in a comparatively short period of time.
The IJ timeline for liberation of the DEI was a bit behind desired. Timor, for example, was not liberated until mid-late April 1942. All in all, however, HIJM was satisfied with the successes realized and pleased at the comparative minimal cost to His Majesty’s surface fleet and / or land units.

The Phillipine struggle:

After landing in the usual places on Luzon and driving forces back to the Manila / Clark Field / Bataan triangle, heavy artillery forces were brought in from the siege of Hong Kong as well as Manchuria to affect the siege. For the Manchurian artillery, political points were paid with the anticipation that the artillery would be better able to liquidate pockets of resistance and cause significant casualties. 24cm howitzers and larger caliber mortars were preferentially selected for this purpose, as they were not being currently utilized in the Manchurian standoff.

Bombardment results were excellent at Clark and Manila, less so at Bataan. Eventually, supplies for the Yankees at Bataan drew short and they were liquidated. Fatigue and disruption for Japanese forces were at the breaking point, so it was fortunate that the Yankees surrendered when they did, lest the siege be protracted while IJA units shuttled back to Clark and Manila for rest.

Elsewhere in the Phillipines, resistance was about as expected. Some islands (e.g. Panay (Iliolio)) were not able to be ‘addressed’ with available land forces, so they were left to wither until they can be brought into the fold at a later time.

Supply issues for these bypassed land units must be acute in June 1942. They certainly aren’t being helped at all by regular bombing from IJAAF units currently stationed at Clark / Manila or Mindanao. The bombing will continue until spare IJA units can be found to liquidate the remaining pockets of resistance.

Malaya and Burma:

IJA land forces, buttressed by additional heavy artillery from mainland Asia swept quickly down the Malaysian peninsula. At least half of these land forces were offloaded at Bangkok and railed South towards combat. The other half arrived by amphibious delivery on ports in the Gulf of Thailand.

Several pockets of Allied infantry were cordoned off and liquidated during the move towards Singapore. Movement of IJA forces was helped significantly by IJAAF ground bombing support. Concentrated Lilly and Sally (with occasional Nell and Betty participants) bombing of retreating ground forces created large numbers of Allied casualties and hindered rapid movement of same towards more defensible lines. On several occasions, Japanese armored or infantry forces ‘caught up’ to these fleeing units and punished them further. Singapore was invested in late January and liberated within the same month. Again, Japanese artillery was helpful in promoting casualties during the siege. The timing of Patch III (which ‘nerfed’ artillery) thankfully followed after Singapore’s demise had been assured.

The loyal subjects of Thailand gladly offered five divisions of the RTA for use in vanquishing his majesty’s enemies. BANZAI! Eh? What’s that? You want to only stay in Thailand? And you’re at <50% effective strength? And you need to be withdrawn in a couple of years? And you are of a restricted HQ designation that cannot be ‘bought’ with PPs? Gee-thanks arot. Can you AT LEAST break open the gates into Burma for us? Gee-thanks arot.

The RTA divisions were a big disappointment in terms of their capabilities, both due to structural deficiencies as well as necessary House Rules for their deployment. A happy medium was derived by which they would break open the gates to Burma for the exploitation of the REAL Japanese combat forces as a follow-on eschelon.

Early on, it was determined that Pegu was being reinforced by the Allies. Rather than shock attack across the river to entrenched forces, both RTA divisions as well as regular IJA forces forded the river North and enveloped Pegu to the South. During this movement through rough terrain, forces were air supplied by available transport aircraft. Once Pegu fell, this interim supply system was no longer required. After the inevitable fall of Rangoon, RTA divisions were redeployed to defensive positions in the co-East Asia Prosperity Sphere. RTA divisions were kept within 4 hexes of Thailand at all times, but had their transient uses.

Things went swimmingly in Burma for the victories armies of his Imperial Majesty. Oppressed by the jack boot of the Empire of Britain for so many years, Burmese forces were unfit for a stand up fight against even light Japanese forces. Those that resisted were summarily destroyed or sent packing across the malarial hinterland towards India. Many units were liquidated in their entirety, while some that fled will be able to rebuild in puppet India in time.

I was surprised how much ‘mileage’ I was getting out of a comparatively small invasion force. When it became clear that I could take all of upper and lower Burma with what had previously been considered a local ‘clearing force’, I did so. The theatre is unstable, however, and will need reinforcement to be capable of defense against a strengthened British / India assault.

Ceylon / Indian Ocean:

Invasion plans for Ceylon will not be discussed at this point due to a need for operational security.

The IJ approach to Ceylon to this point has been to interdict any British shipping plying the sea lanes between Ceylon and Java (early) or Aden-Karachi-Bombay-Ceylon (more recently). Mostly, this has taken the form of a minimally successful submarine campaign on the (mostly) Western Indian Ocean side of the subcontinent and around Ceylon. Some submarine mining has been conducted, to indeterminate success.

Shortly after the fall of Singapore, a rearmed and refueled KB stood out from the Malaysian peninsula towards Ceylon. Its goal was to attack shipping in Ceylon. In excess of 100 ships had been spotted by submarine-launched Glen aircraft at port in Colombo. These consisted of all manner juicy targets with minimal fighter CAP. Too good an opportunity to let slip. KB’s silent approach was apparently a surprise and the denizens of Colombo were treated to large port raids on two consecutive days. Both days saw maddening hyperfocused and exclusionary targeting of the BB Royal Sovereign, sparing the more valuable support and transport ships present. Limited shipping claims at Trincomalee were at least a consolation prize. On day two, eventually the RAF scrambled some well rested Hurricanes for CAP duty. These exacted a toll-particularly on an unescorted (doh!) Kate group. As it was clear that a third day’s strikes would only bang further on an already crippled BB, KB was withdrawn.

Other port raids in and around Darwin and Perth were also conducted. Perth was scouted by Glen subs, as was Colombo, prior to the raid. Again 100+ ships were reported in harbor, including a variety of juicy support types. KB was spotted the day before the port raid as it destroyed a small AM TF at sea. Thereafter, KB was forced to decide whether Allied combatants would make a break for it and run (thereby necessitating a ‘naval strike’-ready group) or take shelter in the port facilities (thereby necessitating a ‘port strike’ package). As was the case so often for the IJ forces in WWII, half measures were called for and produced half-results. On day one, few Allied naval forces sortied, so those naval-strike designated aircraft were left sitting on the deck of their carriers. Port strike aircraft were reasonably successful in hitting ships in harbor on days one and two. On day two, the same conundrum was somewhat assuaged by the finding of a surface combat TF in the port hex at Perth. An overkill strike sank a CL, damaged another and caused damage to smaller vessels. Allied heavy bombers on naval attack made their presence known on day two, encouraging withdrawal of KB. As KB egressed, in excess of 100 bombers were noted on the runways at Perth. Fending off waves of inaccurate lumbering Allied heavy bombers took a toll on KB fighter strength, with some carrier wings being below 50% operational effectiveness after day two. It was time for withdrawal….but…

Mischievous IJ planners expected that a multiple day Perth strike would assuage any raw nerves on Ceylon. After all, if KB is striking Perth, it must then go to a large port, refuel, rearm and sail anew in order to threaten another port, mustn’t it? A mid-IO refueling AO TF refilled KBs tanks and allowed a ‘left hook’ approach from Diego Garcia towards Ceylon. Either the KB would find some transiting TF from South Africa bound towards Ceylon (ideal!) or other convoy transiting Karachi-Ceylon (good!) or hit any nearby shipping around Ceylon (OK, I guess). With the latest experiences about alerted Colombo Hurricanes and the depleted status of the KB fighter wings, it was determined that now scarce sorties would be reserved towards striking shipping at sea. This rather than another port strike which would further damage the BB Royal Sovereign / HMS Bomb Sponge. Results were disappointing-a few AMs were dispatched, but apparently a juicy transport TF had just been missed.

Oh yeah-the Pacific:

Early on, the IJ looked at the Pacific as largely a holding area. Selected bases would be taken by force relatively early in the conflict, others reinforced, but most of the force disposition available to the IJN was deployed in the DEI. There was little initial interest or support for large island assaults with an eye towards wiping out possible base forces or interdicting the LOS from CONUS.

An exception to this was the mini-KB supported early assault on PM. The need for speed on this operation was important to prevent forceful reinforcement from Australia. As such, an entire division and base support units assaulted the port in late December / Early January. Subsequent air assault by heavy bombers from the Australian mainland were annoying in their ability to damage A6M2 aircraft and take tremendous punishment without going down. Eventually, Japanese air combat units from other nearby bases had to fly LRCAP in support of PM due to the damage the PM Zero unit had sustained. With the very high production numbers of the A6M airframe, we were willing to trade a B17 op loss for an A6M op loss indefinitely. Apparently this exchange rate was displeasing to the Allies and they eventually stopped these raids.

The carrier battle of the New Hebrides:

In WiTP classic, (as Allies), I regularly reinforced Noumea early. It was generally one of the first bases I reinforced. Expecting this same behavior, Noumea was kept under submarine watch since early in the war. The lack of any activity made the IJ high command question their judgement NOT to invade Noumea early in the campaign, like they did Port Moresby. While this debate was going on, an Allied reinforcement convoy appeared in early-mid May.

Mini-KB, operating in theatre at the time, was tasked with attempting an intercept. Transit took too long and mini-KB instead opted for a port attack. The attack was modestly successful, sinking a couple of auxiliary ships as a consolation.

Mini-KB fell back to rearm and refuel. Then it sallied forth again after another transport group was identified heading towards Noumea. This time, the tact was to sail around from the East side of Luganville and the Santa Cruz islands (and avoid detection from Noumea-based aircraft) and hook westwards in time to cut off the transport TF when it returned to port either at New Zealand or Fiji.

Because of the paucity of torpedoes on mini-KB, and the fact that the targeted transport TF was merely xAKLs, orders were given to switch Kates to bombs. It was assumed by high command that 800kg bombs could be used by the Kates for striking naval targets. This capacity was demonstrated numerous times in various port strikes with the regular KB. Apparently, the (late) quartermaster did not wish to contradict his superior officer and did not tell anyone that mini-KB Kates do not use 800kg bombs, but rather the more mundane 250kg bombs.

As mini-KB approached the point of its Western turn, scout planes reported a surprise to the South. Numerous American aircraft carriers. Numbers of planes identified on the TF by scout planes suggested that at least 4 fleet carriers were present a mere 3 hexes from the Japanese TF’s position. A smaller CV TF was identified 5-6 hexes south.
A good-sized IJ naval strike hit the “Yorktown” and “Saratoga” with numerous 250kg bombs. Yorktown was reported with a fuel explosion and also took a supplementary torpedo to add to its woes. At the end of the action phase, both ships were aflame, with heavy damage, heavy fires and heavy smoke obscuring the ships. Yorktown is on the ‘ships sunk’ list, but FOW has been pervasive on that accursed list.

A breath of relief was uttered on the Japanese ships. There was not Allied reprisal yet. Whew! What a relief! Oh, wait-what’s that in the air? Oh…crap. Better get the Emperor’s painting shrink-wrapped for the transfer to another ship.

The allied strike fell heavily on two CVLs and two CVEs, leaving XXXXXXX aflame and XXXXX sinking. Fortunately, it only lightly hit XXXXXXX. The mother-XXXXXXX piece of XXXXXXX fighter aircraft on CAP intercepted jack XXXXXXX.

Because of the close proximity, a strong surface force centered around BB Mutsu was dispatched during the night to attempt a carrier surface intercept and buy time for the damaged CVs to withdraw North. During the combat replay of the night naval movement phase, the Allied carrier TFs danced around avoiding combat with the IJN SCTF. Undoubtedly, this disrupted their planned movement, whichever direction that may have been.

BB Mutsu and company performed admirably, putting a 40cm shell into CL St. Louis, a 63 cm Long Lance torpedo into CA Astoria and numerous large caliber shell hits into CA Minneapolis. All three are on the ships sunk list. CL St. Louis is likely hurt, but I cannot believe that one shell hit (granted, a big ‘un) put her under. Minneapolis sank during the combat turn, CA Astoria was torpedoed twice by a prowling RO boat in the next day phase-sinking her. CL Kiso was treated rudely during this exchange. She fought unsuccessfully to reach port. To Japanese surprise, the Mutsu SCTF was able to flee the scene the next day without expected air attack.

Submarine activity in the Pacific has been subdued and, to date, a disappointment. Part of this is likely the realization that Allied supply TFs have been routed near the South Pole, including Tahiti and New Zealand. This makes supply interdiction for the short-legged RO and other boats problematic. The IJN hope that, when given a more finite stretch of sea to ‘work’ with high-traffic sea lanes, more proficiency results. In the interim, the ships will continue to gain skill through at-sea training. As an ominous portent, allied ASW has dramatically increased its effectiveness in the 45 days, making it seem as though the ‘golden age’ of the IJN submarine has passed before it had a chance to truly materialize.
Elsewhere in the Pacific, defensive forces have been distributed to key bases. Digging in has commenced in earnest in anticipation of allied counterstrokes.

Secret programs have also ensured a war-winning supply of uber-weapons, including balloon bombs and more entirely useless midget subs than you can shake a seaweed rope at. Scientists have debated whether to introduce anime or manga comics onto the unsuspecting public. Although Japanese military scientists are without compunction, the emperor has asked that they stay their hand with release of these offensive materials on the American public until after the war.

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RE: A midwar Japanese AAR (no USS Henrico)

Post by Chickenboy »

My opponent posted his review of the war to that June 1942 time frame as well:

Allied Operational Summary of Operations, 12/41-5/42

The Pacific War started at Manila on December 7th with a sudden and deliberate attack by naval and air forces of the Empire of Japan. By Theatre:

Northern Pacific
No significant operations to date.

West Coast
Japanese submarines operated off the Coast in the first month of the war. No sightings have been reported since. In case the subs return, an air base has been established in the Channel Islands west of Los Angeles to increase the coverage of ASW aircraft, including blimps.

Pearl Harbor/Cen Pacific

The (intact) battle fleet remained at Pearl during the first month, owing to a lack of fleet train resources and limited sources of fuel west of Pearl. War Plan Orange, the plan to relieve the Phillipines, was deemed too risky given Japanese carrier success at Manila. First priority, after ensuring the safety of Pearl, was given to establish a secure LOC to OZ and NZ through the South Pacific.

When the expected Japanese moves against Guam and Wake proved slower than expected, a CV sortie was made to Wake to pick up the Marine Wildcat squadron there, but abandoned when the Marines were unable to transfer to the American carrier. No other attempts were made to relieve Guam and Wake other than submarine supply.

Since the capture of Guam and Wake, the only known major enemy action in the area was a mini-KB sortie in the Christmas Island area that turned south to Pago Pago, presumably due to lack of targets at Xmas Isle.

Enemy subs are present around Pearl and have accounted for a couple of AM ships that were hunting them.

South Pacific

The American priority has been to establish the LOC to OZ/NZ. Various islands have been built up with ground forces and air units. None of these are capable of holding off a division size assault supported by Japanese carriers. However, several of these would now require a division size assault with carrier support to succeed, which was hardly the case in early 1942.

For the most part, Allied operations have been quite fortunate to avoid Japanese raiders in the area. An AO at Tahiti was sunk by AMCs early, but a transport convoy carrying Marines 80 miles south of that action avoided being intercepted. Most Allied convoys have used heavier escorts in the area since that action, so the Japanese raid can be viewed as successful in terms of tying down escorts. Also, a troop transport got torpedoed by a sub, but was able to make harbor in NZ. Other Japanese subs have been sighted around Suva, Pago Pago, and Tahiti (one sub practically docked there), but haven’t caused too much trouble yet.

SW Pacific (including New Caledonia)

The Japanese moved against and captured Rabaul quickly, and then shortly thereafter Tulagi. There was a follow up move against Port Moresby, supported by the Mini-KB that the Americans were unable to impact. This was a well-timed move by the Japanese, because the NE OZ airbases were due to come available for level bombers shortly, and a B-26 group was due to arrive as well (albeit one that had no naval bombing training). A USN sub got a shot at a CV, but it failed to detonate. There were two USN carriers at Sydney when the attack was taking place, but it was deemed to risky for them to intervene alone, and there were limited surface forces available, largely due to a lack of fuel in Oz in general. It was decided soon afterwards to send the other two carriers in the Pacific to check any further Japanese moves south against eastern Oz or NZ.

Noumea was not reinforced, except for an Aussie battalion, in the first months of the war, because it was unclear of Allied ability to hold it. Once the KB was sighted off Ceylon for its second raid on the place, the decision was made to build up Noumea with a regiment and base force from NZ. The transports required to carry this out were in OZ, and their movements to NZ apparently made the Japanese believe that the move to Noumea was happening right away. Hence a mini-KB raid on Noumea followed, which sank an AVD and damaged the facilities, but failed to hit anything vital.

The four USN carriers under Spruance and Halsey sailed from Sydney to meet the mini-KB, but the Japanese were gone by the time the USN arrived, so Spruance/Halsey were ordered to remain south of Noumea to cover the transport of ground units from NZ to Noumea. Also the Hornet TF approached from the east after a run from Pearl and joined Spruance after refueling. Eventually the Mini-KB did return, a day after the USN had been ordered to port to avoid wasting fuel, and Spruance/Halsey/Mitscher quickly turned around to meet them. It was the Allied expectation that the Japanese were aware of the presence of Allied covering assets in the area and were only trying to draw the USN units into visual range and/or a submarine trap, not attempt a major battle. Instead the first carrier action of the war took place, the Battle of New Hebrides. The results of that battle were CENSORED.

Australia

The initial focus in OZ was to build up the bases and forces in the areas most threatened. The buildup in the NE was too late to prevent any serious intervention in the fall of Port Moresby. Allied B-17s did raid PM after the fall for awhile, until it was decided that trading four engine planes for Zeroes wasn’t working at that stage of the war.

Darwin was used as a submarine base early in the war. This ended when a KB raid sunk all the ships in the harbor, including the supporting AS. Since then, the Allies have not built up northern coastline facilities because of their vulnerability to enemy attack. Supplies can be moved to the Darwin area (because the game started under Patch 1) by pulling supplies into Alice Springs, then Tennant Creek, then Katherine in succession. Moving ground forces into or out of the northern area is difficult because they have to be marched from the Alice Springs railhead northward. Future Allied plans are CENSORED.

Perth has been used a receiving base for Capetown shipments, although not exclusively. It was the subject of a KB raid shortly after the fall of Java, which damaged a large number of ships and sank several, including a Dutch cruiser. This is viewed on the Allied side as the most productive Japanese raid of the war so far, after Manila. Fortunately a Capetown convoy had just departed when the raid happened, and avoided the KB. Also the Houston/Boise/Marblehead TF, which had based in Perth for the previous couple of months, had recently left for Melbourne to be upgraded in a larger port. An aviation support unit (90 AV) had just landed and railroaded back to Perth, which allowed the Allies to double their AV at the base during the battle. The Allies flew in a B-17 group, a B-26 group and other bomber units, which discouraged the Japanese from following up the initial carnage.

Phillipines

The situation here was totally hopeless from the outset after the KB raided Manila on 12/7. Surviving ships split up and tried to escape to Oz, but only a handful made it. The handful of subs that survived tried to interdict the Japanese transport fleet, but were hunted by ASW TFs and achieved little, aside from a couple of sinkings near Wake. The merchant ships at Hong Kong also got blown away trying to run, although one destroyer did damage a BB with a torpedo.

The USAAF was overwhelmed quickly and resorted to hit and run strafing operations by fighters until they were withdrawn. The Japanese did let up on the airfields after the first day so the B-17s were withdrawn to Oz, followed by the PBYs. No ground units were withdrawn.

The US army withdrew in fairly good order to Bataan and were hammered by artillery. The Japanese did launch several deliberate attacks, but the defense was maintained until the supplies ran out. Bataan fell shortly thereafter. On a couple of other islands several isolated units are stilling holding out and apparently being used for Japanese LBA target practice.

Malaya

Task Force Z fled to Ceylon at the start of the war, as Admiral Phillips thought better of tangling with enemy LBA.

The British army did little right here, as units were cut off or retreated into a trap instead of southwards to Singapore. British defensive positions were best described as speed bumps. The RAF Buffaloes provided target practice for the Japanese fighters and the RAF bombers were unable to do anything useful.

The British were able to withdraw some fragments of key units by PBYs before the fall of Singapore, but basically it was a very poor show by the Empire and their commander.

DEI

The basic surprise here was that the fall took as long as it did, because there were no outside ground units sent here. The KB showed up within ten days to hit Soerajaba, causing the ABDA naval forces to flee the area via the strait next to Batavia. Had the mini-KB been waiting near Batavia, it would have been a slaughter. The ABDA forces did return in part to Java later, but found no targets in range that seemed worth the risk of engaging, and eventually returned to Perth.

The Japanese completed the full conquest of Borneo, Sumatra and Java. The Japanese effectively trapped the Dutch airforce into attacking decoy empty transports, which was an effective slaughter and saved Japanese troops and ships from attack. Allied command committed no outside assets to the theater, other than surviving British air from Malaya and a pair of US P-40 squadrons, and was surprised that resistance lasted as long as it did,

Burma/NE India

The Allies committed very few additional ground units to Burma, viewing it as a long cause, and a probable trap for units trying to defend Rangoon. The Burmese units were viewed as expendable, since their reinforcements run out. This played out pretty much as expected, although Allied command expected more pursuit of their retreating ground forces. The Japanese forces committed to the invasion appeared light, but quite sufficient for the task.

This front, along with China, has seen substantial air activity, which is like to continue. So far, the Japanese have made no apparent land moves towards India: their attention appears to focused on China, which the Allies are trying to airlift supplies to.

Ceylon

Ceylon has been the target of two KB raids. The first had some fortunate timing from the Allied side: Somerville’s carrier TF, including the POW and Repulse, was returning from an escort mission and was two days out when a Japanese recon plane was sighted over Colombo: Somerville’s TF was ordered to take a circuitous route and hence stayed out of recon range during the raid.

As a result the primary target was the Royal Sovereign, which got bombed repeatedly for two days, but remained afloat. Several other smaller ships were hit, including a KV-escorts are almost as big as capital ship in the IO in early 42. However, on day 2 two Hurricane squadrons cost the KB some planes and Nagumo decided that was enough.

The second raid did catch Somerville’s ships in Colombo harbor, but attacks on the ASW ships patrolling warned the British to put the RAF on full alert, send the FAA ashore, and fly level bombers over from India for a full counterattack. Instead the Japanese withdrew before the port was actually attacked. Allied command believes that the Japanese may have thought that a high level of air combat along the India/Burma frontier had led to Ceylon having weaker fighter defenses than proved to be the case: hence the withdrawal after the RN declined to sortie.

China

China is the worst front of the war at present. Most of the forward Chinese cities on 12/7 have fallen and the Japanese have successfully run down most of the units behind their lines. The city of Changsha is under seige and its future is in doubt. The AVG has fought hard with limited supplies of aircraft (albeit less limited than if PH had been attacked and more P40-Es had been required there), but has been more of nuisance than a hindrance to enemy operations so far. There is an airlift from India going on, but poor Allied generalship is viewed as the main issue.

This theater remains under review.

Submarine Operations

Allied submarine operations in the Far East were negatively impacted by the loss of subs at Manila on 12/7. However, it is believed that a majority of these subs, being older, would have been required to withdraw from active duty within the next three years.

The loss of these subs, however, did mean that they were unable to participate in the defense of the Phillipines. Surviving subs, along with subs based at PH and WC, have been tasked with attacking the Japanese merchant fleet and assisting combat operations with scouting. New Gato class subs are arriving regularly: these are expected to be better able to take damage than Dutch/British subs, which have had some operational losses. Reported issues with torpedoes have been referred to Washington.

Mahattan Project
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