Sleepless on Samoa, the Sequel (wneumann vs Pillager) Allies only

[wneumann]

Summary of Operations 4/22/43

Formosa Straits: US patrol sub intercepts and torpedoes unescorted Jap xAK. SS Greenling automatically left its patrol area following the attack and now returning to base for replenishment. Another US fleet sub just entering the East China Sea (SS Balao) has been dispatched to take up SS Greenling’s previous patrol zone. AAR follows.

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Submarine attack near Taihoku at 89,62 (N of Taihoku)

Japanese Ships
xAK Somedono Maru, Torpedo hits 1, on fire, heavy damage (reported hull penetration from torpedo hit, not reported sunk)

Allied Ships
SS Greenling

xAK Somedono Maru is sighted by SS Greenling
SS Greenling launches 2 torpedoes

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North Pacific: US submarine base at Adak Is now open for business. Home ports for a number of US submarine TF’s now operating in patrol zones off the Japanese Home Islands have been reset from Pearl Harbor to Adak.

A similar measure is being done for US sub patrols operating in southern areas of the Pacific (mainly south of Truk near Suva and the Solomons) – home ports for these subs reset from Pearl Harbor to Auckland.

Intent of both the measures above is to push forward assigned home (replenishment & repair) bases for US patrol subs. In addition to the two measures above, Midway is now being prepped for use as a refueling base for US sub patrol TF’s.

A small US convoy (WA-22) arrived at Amchitka Is to begin development of this base for operational use. The convoy includes an AVD (which is remaining at Amchitka) to allow immediate deployment of PBY Catalina planes to Amchitka, also two xAKL unloading 3400 supply. Plans are underway to transfer various LCU to Amchitka to construct base facilities and other activities.


Hawaii: Main body of transport convoy WP-50A (28 ships) arrives in Pearl Harbor this game turn from San Francisco – the convoy minus one xAP heavily damaged from a ship collision occurring in the convoy on 4/19. Cargo arriving aboard the main body of WP-50A includes three LCU (146 USA Base Force, 12 USN Naval Construction Rgt, most of US 31 Infantry Rgt), 106K supply and 93K fuel. The heavily damaged xAP from the convoy is moving separately (at 4 kts speed) and still enroute to Pearl Harbor – cargo aboard this xAP includes elements of 31 Infantry Rgt (about 1/3 of its TOE strength) and 2100 supply. Estimated arrival of the heavily damaged xAP at Pearl Harbor is in 7-8 days, plans are for shipyard repair in Pearl Harbor after the ship is unloaded on arrival.

It should be noted (and omitted from my previous discussion on transport convoys) that my “standard” practice in loading LCU cargo for convoys requires dispersal of the LCU aboard at least 2-3 ships regardless of the LCU’s size. This practice ensures that (1) loss of any individual transport ship does not result in total elimination of an LCU, and (2) faster unloading of the entire LCU at the convoy’s destination.


Central Pacific: Sigint entry for 4/21 reports intercepted Jap radio transmissions from Maleolap. Detected status of Maleolap shows no visible Japanese forces or activity - current detected port size 1(1), airfield size 4(1).


Transport Convoy WP-49 Update (the epilogue): Main body of the convoy now enroute to its original destination (Auckland). Damaged LST-459 completed unloading in Tahiti and departing this game turn for Pearl Harbor.


South Pacific: US patrol sub S-35 remained in Luganville base hex, did not intercept Japanese ships leaving Luganville this game turn. No spotted Japanese ships remain in Luganville base. S-35 is now returning to base for replenishment before resuming its regular patrol activity.

Sigint entry for 4/21 reports heavy volume of intercepted Jap radio transmissions from Rabaul. Detected status of Rabaul shows (as expected) unidentified Jap aircraft based there, also ship(s) anchored in port.

Another Sigint entry for 4/21 reports intercepted Jap radio transmissions from Noumea. Detected status of Noumea shows unidentified Jap planes based there. Pillager had briefly operated G4M Betty bombers from Noumea some time ago, no report of any Jap air activity from Noumea since then (planes now detected in Noumea could be anything). Current airfield size at Noumea is 2(5), port size 5(4). No other visible Japanese forces or activity observed in Noumea.

Daily coastwatcher entries from 4/21 Operations report follow.

Coastwatcher Report: 3 ships in port at Buna
Coastwatcher Report: 3 ships in port at Lae
Coastwatcher Report: 1 ship in port at Madang
Coastwatcher Report: 5 ships in port at Milne Bay
Coastwatcher Report: xAK Akitsushima Maru reported in port at Rabaul
Coastwatcher Report: 1 ship in port at Woodlark Island
Coastwatcher Report: 6 ships in port at Noumea
Coastwatcher Report: 1 ship in port at Salamaua
Coastwatcher Report: xAK Zinzan Maru reported in port at Rabaul
Coastwatcher Report: 3 ships in port at Woodlark Island
Coastwatcher Report: 1 ship in port at Belep Islands
Coastwatcher sighting: 1 Japanese ship at 106,125 near Rabaul, Speed unknown
Coastwatcher sighting: 1 Japanese ship at 114,138 near Lunga, Speed unknown


DEI: US patrol sub reporting attack by Ki-21 Sally air patrol near Palembang (hex location 52, 91). No hits or damage.

I’ve omitted many Jap LBA air contacts and attacks on US patrol subs reported in various Combat Events and Operations report entries from my game turn posts as they haven’t been regarded individually as significant events. From combining all these incidents a possible item of interest is emerging – Pillager appears to have a significant part of his IJA 2E bomber force (outside of China) widely dispersed and flying air patrols against Allied subs. Locations where this activity has been observed (more or less continuously) include interior sea areas of the DEI, near Formosa, sea areas W and S of the Japanese Home Islands, Andaman Sea, sea areas near the Marianas. While this can’t be interpreted as Pillager taking IJA bomber forces out of use for supporting Japanese army ground operations, it can be concluded that a considerable period of preparation would be needed for Pillager to assemble IJA bomber forces in significant strength for ground support missions of Japanese land forces outside China.


Burma: Detected status of Jap base in Rangoon from British aerial recon – 9 Japanese ship anchored in port, 2 Jap TF in harbor, 107 aircraft (83 fighters, 24 bombers), 7 Jap LCU’s.

RAF and USAAF bombers hit Magwe oil production facilities in a series of small night bombing raids rather than the intended coordinated attack. Detected status of Magwe shows oil production facilities at 51(250) – little if any damage inflicted by this game turn’s bombing attacks. One USAAF B-24D Liberator destroyed by flak, one Ki-44 Tojo reported destroyed (operational loss). No Allied bombers remain damaged though several were damaged in the AAR below. Given the results (added damage to Magwe oil production), the bombing strikes appear to be less than a smashing success – however, they will be continued on at least an intermittent basis. Combat Events report entries and AAR’s follow.

7 x No.160 Sqn RAF Liberator II stray due to night
5 x No.215 Sqn RAF Wellington Ic stray due to night
4 x 7th BG/9th BS B-24D Liberator stray due to night
5 x 7th BG/492nd BS B-24D Liberator stray due to night
6 x 7th BG/493rd BS B-24D Liberator stray due to night
7 x No.215 Sqn RAF Wellington Ic stray due to night
5 x 7th BG/9th BS B-24D Liberator stray due to night
7 x 7th BG/492nd BS B-24D Liberator stray due to night

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Night Air attack on Magwe, at 57,47

Weather in hex: Overcast

Raid spotted at 40 NM, estimated altitude 12,000 feet.
Estimated time to target is 15 minutes

Japanese aircraft
Ki-44-IIa Tojo x 6

Allied aircraft
Liberator II x 9
Wellington Ic x 12

No Japanese losses

Allied aircraft losses
Liberator II: 1 damaged

Aircraft Attacking:
12 x Wellington Ic bombing from 10000 feet
City Attack: 8 x 500 lb GP Bomb
9 x Liberator II bombing from 10000 feet
City Attack: 8 x 500 lb GP Bomb

CAP engaged:
47th I.F.Chutai with Ki-44-IIa Tojo (1 airborne, 3 on standby, 2 scrambling)
1 plane(s) intercepting now.
Group patrol altitude is 15000 , scrambling fighters to 15000.
Time for all group planes to reach interception is 48 minutes

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Night Air attack on Magwe, at 57,47

Weather in hex: Overcast

Raid spotted at 33 NM, estimated altitude 13,000 feet.
Estimated time to target is 11 minutes

Japanese aircraft
Ki-44-IIa Tojo x 3

Allied aircraft
Liberator II x 7

No Japanese losses
No Allied losses

Aircraft Attacking:
7 x Liberator II bombing from 10000 feet
City Attack: 8 x 500 lb GP Bomb

CAP engaged:
47th I.F.Chutai with Ki-44-IIa Tojo (3 airborne, 0 on standby, 0 scrambling)
3 plane(s) intercepting now.
Group patrol altitude is 15000
Raid is overhead

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Night Air attack on Magwe, at 57,47

Weather in hex: Overcast

Raid spotted at 45 NM, estimated altitude 16,000 feet.
Estimated time to target is 15 minutes

Japanese aircraft
Ki-44-IIa Tojo x 2

Allied aircraft
B-24D Liberator x 4

No Japanese losses

Allied aircraft losses
B-24D Liberator: 1 damaged

Aircraft Attacking:
4 x B-24D Liberator bombing from 10000 feet
City Attack: 10 x 500 lb GP Bomb

CAP engaged:
47th I.F.Chutai with Ki-44-IIa Tojo (2 airborne, 0 on standby, 0 scrambling)
2 plane(s) intercepting now.
Group patrol altitude is 15000
Raid is overhead

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Night Air attack on Magwe, at 57,47

Weather in hex: Overcast

Raid spotted at 34 NM, estimated altitude 13,000 feet.
Estimated time to target is 11 minutes

Japanese aircraft
Ki-44-IIa Tojo x 1

Allied aircraft
B-24D Liberator x 5

No Japanese losses

Allied aircraft losses
B-24D Liberator: 1 destroyed by flak

Aircraft Attacking:
4 x B-24D Liberator bombing from 10000 feet
City Attack: 10 x 500 lb GP Bomb

CAP engaged:
47th I.F.Chutai with Ki-44-IIa Tojo (1 airborne, 0 on standby, 0 scrambling)
1 plane(s) intercepting now.
Group patrol altitude is 15000
Raid is overhead

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Night Air attack on Magwe, at 57,47

Weather in hex: Overcast

Allied aircraft
B-24D Liberator x 6

No Allied losses

Aircraft Attacking:
6 x B-24D Liberator bombing from 10000 feet
City Attack: 10 x 500 lb GP Bomb

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Night Air attack on Magwe, at 57,47

Weather in hex: Overcast

Allied aircraft
Wellington Ic x 7

No Allied losses

Aircraft Attacking:
7 x Wellington Ic bombing from 10000 feet
City Attack: 8 x 500 lb GP Bomb

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Night Air attack on Magwe, at 57,47

Weather in hex: Overcast

Allied aircraft
B-24D Liberator x 7

No Allied losses

Aircraft Attacking:
7 x B-24D Liberator bombing from 10000 feet
City Attack: 10 x 500 lb GP Bomb

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China: Japanese launch deliberate ground assault on Chungking. This game turn’s ground attack completely eliminates all built-up Chinese fortifications in Chungking – it’s now likely the days of Chinese resistance in Chungking are numbered. AAR follows.

** below indicates Japanese LCU reinforcements arriving this game turn. (no new arrivals)

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Ground combat at Chungking (76,45)

Japanese Deliberate attack

Attacking force 260554 troops, 2603 guns, 1536 vehicles, Assault Value = 9904
Defending force 493643 troops, 2342 guns, 0 vehicles, Assault Value = 13614
Japanese engineers reduce fortifications to 0
Japanese adjusted assault: 3703
Allied adjusted defense: 7175

Japanese assault odds: 1 to 2 (fort level 0)

Combat modifiers
Defender: terrain(+), leaders(+), experience(-), supply(-)
Attacker:

Japanese ground losses:
24985 casualties reported
Squads: 60 destroyed, 1989 disabled
Non Combat: 5 destroyed, 195 disabled
Engineers: 4 destroyed, 185 disabled
Guns lost 85 (1 destroyed, 84 disabled)
Vehicles lost 88 (1 destroyed, 87 disabled)

Allied ground losses:
41940 casualties reported
Squads: 384 destroyed, 2378 disabled
Non Combat: 641 destroyed, 1354 disabled
Engineers: 18 destroyed, 63 disabled
Guns lost 302 (39 destroyed, 263 disabled)
Units destroyed 9

Assaulting units:
41st Division
104th Division
15th Division
40th Division
23rd Ind.Mixed Brigade
9th Ind.Mixed Brigade
37th Division
1st Ind.Mixed Brigade
26th Division
110th Division
13th Division
3rd Tank Division
8th Armored Car Co
7th Ind.Mixed Brigade
59th Infantry Brigade
4th Ind.Mixed Brigade
22nd Division
35th Division
70th Division
36th Division
15th Tank Regiment
32nd Division
39th Division
17th Division
34th Division
58th Division
116th Division
6th Division
38th Division
13th Ind.Art.Mortar Battalion
2nd Ind. Mountain Gun Regiment
15th Ind.Medium Field Artillery Regiment
Tonei Hvy Gun Regiment
11th Ind.Art.Mortar Battalion
12th Army
1st Mortar Battalion
12th Ind.Art.Mortar Battalion
3rd Ind.Hvy.Art. Battalion
2nd Mortar Battalion
6th Medium Field Artillery Regiment
14th Medium Field Artillery Regiment
1st Army
10th Ind. Mountain Gun Regiment
21st Mortar Battalion
52nd Ind.Mtn.Gun Battalion
4th Ind. Mountain Gun Regiment
11th Army
51st Ind.Mtn.Gun Battalion
North China Area Army
23rd Army
2nd Ind.Hvy.Art. Battalion
1st Hvy.Artillery Regiment
20th Ind. Mtn Gun Battalion

Defending units:
70th Chinese Corps
53rd Chinese Corps
32nd Chinese Corps
1st Chinese Corps
91st Chinese Corps
52nd Chinese Corps
2nd Prov Chinese Corps
11th Chinese Corps
45th Chinese Corps
68th Chinese Corps
33rd Chinese Corps
27th Chinese Corps
37th Chinese Corps
15th Chinese Corps
90th Chinese Corps
49th Chinese Corps
56th Chinese Corps
26th Chinese Corps
3rd Chinese Corps
14th Chinese Corps
99th Chinese Corps
63rd Chinese Corps
72nd Chinese Corps
44th Chinese Corps
41st Chinese Corps
1st Chinese Cavalry Corps
96th Chinese Corps
31st Chinese Corps
85th Chinese Corps
60th Chinese Corps
2nd Chinese Corps
57th Chinese Corps
71st Chinese Corps
19th Chinese Corps
98th Chinese Corps
89th Chinese Corps
35th Chinese Corps
79th Chinese Corps
9th Prov Chinese Corps
46th Chinese Corps
5th New Chinese Corps
21st Chinese Corps
78th Chinese Corps
7th Chinese Corps
75th Chinese Corps
47th Chinese Corps
87th Chinese Corps
25th Chinese Corps
43rd Chinese Corps
67th Chinese Corps
30th Chinese Corps
59th Chinese Corps
86th Chinese Corps
9th Chinese Corps
50th Chinese Corps
97th Chinese Corps
115th Red Chinese Division
38th Chinese Corps
1st New Chinese Corps
8th Chinese Corps
62nd Chinese Corps
100th Chinese Corps
20th Chinese Corps
84th Chinese Corps
2nd Chinese Cavalry Corps
4th Chinese Cavalry Corps
10th Chinese Corps
29th Chinese Corps
39th Chinese Corps
5th Chinese Cavalry Corps
94th Chinese Corps
61st Chinese Corps
42nd Chinese Corps
55th Chinese Corps
18th Chinese Corps
92nd Chinese Corps
4th Chinese Corps
77th Chinese Corps
12th Chinese Corps
16th Chinese Corps
13th Chinese Corps
76th Chinese Corps
73rd Chinese Corps
74th Chinese Corps
93rd Chinese Corps
120th Red Chinese Division
81st Chinese Corps
3rd Prov Chinese Corps
22nd Chinese Corps
37th Group Army
7th New Chinese Corps
14th Construction Regiment
1st Chinese Base Force
5th War Area
32nd Group Army
China Command
1st War Area
22nd Group Army
8th Construction Regiment
3rd War Area
9th War Area
8th War Area
10th Construction Regiment
7th War Area
9th Group Army
16th Group Army
19th Group Army
3rd Chinese Cavalry Corps
31st Group Army
36th Group Army
13th Chinese Base Force
13th Construction Regiment
18th Artillery Regiment
25th Group Army
23rd Group Army
8th Group Army
7th Artillery Regiment
15th Chinese Base Force
14th Group Army
9th Chinese Base Force
10th Chinese Base Force
5th Group Army
15th Group Army
1st Group Army
Central Reserve
6th Construction Regiment
3rd Construction Regiment
65th Chinese Corps
2nd War Area
12th Construction Regiment
38th Group Army
4th War Area
2nd Chinese Base Force
6th Group Army
2nd Group Army
1st Construction Regiment
6th War Area
11th Construction Regiment
16th Construction Regiment
7th Group Army
83rd Chinese Corps
21st Group Army
13th Group Army
3rd Heavy Mortar Regiment
7th Chinese Base Force
36th Chinese Corps
35th Group Army
4th Chinese Base Force
12th Group Army
18th Chinese Base Force
69th Chinese Corps
24th Group Army
CAF HQ
27th Group Army
33rd Group Army
Jingcha War Area
17th Construction Regiment
41st AA Regiment
6th Chinese Base Force
20th Artillery Regiment
11th Group Army
Red Chinese Army
11th Chinese Base Force
20th Group Army
3rd Group Army
20th Chinese Base Force
17th Chinese Base Force
18th Group Army
26th Group Army
39th Group Army
49th AA Regiment

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[wneumann]

Summary of Operations 4/23/43

Japanese Home Islands: US patrol sub reports contact with small Jap transport TF. AAR follows.

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ASW attack near Chichi-jima at 115,72 (NE of Chichi jima)

Japanese Ships
xAK Matsue Maru
E Fuyo

Allied Ships
SS Blackfish

SS Blackfish is sighted by escort
E Fuyo fails to find sub, continues to search...
Escort abandons search for sub

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Central Pacific: Sigint entry for 4/22 reports intercepted Jap radio transmissions from Ponape. Detected status of Ponape shows no visible Japanese forces or activity - current detected port size 1(1), airfield size 2(3). Only one identified Jap LCU known to be located on Ponape from available intelligence data – this unit a static LCU (Ponape Naval Fort). Ponape has been a rather quiet location, possibly additional unseen Jap LCU or other activity there.

Heavy volume of intercepted Jap radio transmissions from Truk reported in another 4/22 Sigint entry. Detected status of Truk shows the expected Jap aircraft based there and ship(s) in port. No other visible Japanese forces or activity.


South Pacific: A 4/22 Sigint entry reports elements of Jap 10th Infantry Division are now located at Lunga. This information provides some confirmation to an earlier report that Pillager may have been moving a detachment of 10 Division to Lunga. What’s interesting is it does not appear Pillager broke down 10th Division into A/B/C sub-units to do this.

Daily coastwatcher entries from 4/22 Operations report follow.

Coastwatcher Report: 1 ship in port at Lae
Coastwatcher Report: 4 ships in port at Milne Bay
Coastwatcher Report: 1 ship in port at Port Moresby
Coastwatcher Report: harbor at Rabaul is reported empty
Coastwatcher Report: 5 ships in port at Noumea
Coastwatcher Report: 3 ships in port at Lunga
Coastwatcher Report: 1 ship in port at Ndeni
Coastwatcher Report: 1 ship in port at Madang
Coastwatcher Report: 1 ship in port at Tanna
Coastwatcher Report: 1 ship in port at Hoorn Islands
Coastwatcher sighting: 2 Japanese ships at 114,138 near Lunga, Speed unknown


SW Pacific: Sigint entry for 4/22 reporting intercepted radio transmissions from an unidentified Jap submarine at hex location 100, 139 south of Milne Bay. No available information on the sub’s movement, though it’s likely the sub is intended for patrol off the Australian east coast. Activity of this Jap sub should represent little problem as it will probably see and find nothing – and in any event the sub will be attacked if it approaches close enough to an Allied base with ASW resources to go after it.


Burma: Detected status of Jap base in Rangoon from British aerial recon – 9 Japanese ships anchored in port, 2 Jap TF in harbor, 107 aircraft (85 fighters, 22 bombers), 7 Jap LCU’s.


Aden: Four Dutch AF patrol squadrons have fully completed pilot training and now transferred to US Pacific Ocean Areas command. This group of Dutch squadrons will be employed in the Pacific theatres to reinforce Allied air naval search/ASW forces.


China: No reported ground combat at Chungking this game turn.

[wneumann]

Summary of Operations 4/24/43

Very quiet day at the office, lots of things quietly plodding along behind the scenes...

South Pacific: Daily coastwatcher entries from 4/23 Operations report follow.

Coastwatcher Report: 4 ships in port at Lunga
Coastwatcher Report: 3 ships in port at Lae
Coastwatcher Report: 3 ships in port at Milne Bay
Coastwatcher Report: 3 ships reported in port at Rabaul
Coastwatcher Report: 1 ship in port at Efate
Coastwatcher Report: 1 ship in port at Hoorn Islands
Coastwatcher sighting: 1 Japanese ship at 114,138 near Lunga, Speed unknown
Coastwatcher Report: 4 ships in port at Lunga
Coastwatcher Report: 3 ships in port at Lae
Coastwatcher Report: 5 ships in port at Milne Bay
Coastwatcher Report: xAP Brazil Maru reported in port at Rabaul
Coastwatcher Report: 1 ship in port at Luganville
Coastwatcher sighting: 1 Japanese ship at 114,138 near Lunga, Speed unknown


Burma: Detected status of Jap base in Rangoon from British aerial recon – 9 Japanese ships anchored in port, 1 Jap TF in harbor (-1 from last report), 109 aircraft (81 fighters, 28 bombers), 7 Jap LCU’s.


China: No reported ground combat at Chungking this game turn.

[wneumann]

Summary of Operations 4/25/43

Central Pacific: Sigint entry for 4/24 reports heavy volume of intercepted Jap radio transmissions from Kwajalein. Detected status of Kwajalein shows the expected Jap planes base there, also ship(s) in port – no other visible Japanese forces or activity observed.

A second 4/24 Sigint entry reports intercepted Jap radio transmissions from Majuro. Detected status of Majuro shows no visible Japanese forces or activity.


South Pacific: Daily coastwatcher entries from 4/24 Operations report follow.

Coastwatcher Report: 3 ships in port at Lunga
Coastwatcher Report: 1 ship in port at Thousand Ships Bay
Coastwatcher Report: 1 ship in port at Tulagi
Coastwatcher Report: 1 ship in port at Buna
Coastwatcher Report: 2 ships reported in port at Rabaul
Coastwatcher sighting: 1 Japanese ship at 114,138 near Lunga, Speed unknown
Coastwatcher Report: 3 ships in port at Tulagi
Coastwatcher Report: 1 ship in port at Buna
Coastwatcher Report: 3 ships in port at Lae
Coastwatcher Report: 4 ships reported in port at Rabaul
Coastwatcher Report: 1 ship in port at Woodlark Island
Coastwatcher Report: 1 ship in port at Belep Islands
Coastwatcher Report: 4 ships in port at Luganville
Coastwatcher sighting: 2 Japanese ships at 114,138 near Lunga, Speed unknown


DEI: US patrol sub in action against Jap surface ASW near Palembang. AAR follows.

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ASW attack near Muntok at 49,89 (NW of Palembang)

Japanese Ships
SC Ch 12
SC CHa-18

Allied Ships
SS Perch, hits 3 (system damage 12, float 6, returning to Australia for repair)

SS Perch is sighted by escort
Perch bottoming out ....
SC CHa-18 attacking submerged sub ....
Escort abandons search for sub

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Andaman Sea: Dutch patrol sub reporting contact with Jap surface ASW. AAR follows.

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ASW attack near Victoria Point at 48,65 (W of Victoria Point)

Japanese Ships
DD Mutsuki
E Hachijo
DD Isonami

Allied Ships
SS KXVIII

SS KXVIII is located by DD Mutsuki
KXVIII diving deep ....
DD Mutsuki fails to find sub, continues to search...
DD Isonami fails to find sub and abandons search
DD Mutsuki fails to find sub, continues to search...
Escort abandons search for sub

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Burma: Detected status of Jap base in Rangoon from British aerial recon – 9 Japanese ships anchored in port, 1 Jap TF in harbor (-1 from last report), 122 aircraft (91 fighters, 31 bombers), 7 Jap LCU’s.


China: No reported ground combat at Chungking this game turn.

[wneumann]

Summary of Operations 4/26/43

Formosa Straits: US patrol sub in action against Jap surface ASW. AAR follows.

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Sub attack near Taihoku at 87,62 (adjacent hex NW of Taihoku)

Japanese Ships
PB Chohakusan Maru, Torpedo hits 1, on fire, heavy damage (sunk)
PB Rokko Maru #2

Allied Ships
SS Balao

SS Balao launches 2 torpedoes at PB Chohakusan Maru
Balao diving deep ....
PB Rokko Maru #2 fails to find sub, continues to search...
Escort abandons search for sub

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Central Pacific: Sigint entry for 4/25 reports intercepted Jap radio transmissions from Gardner Is. Detected status of Gardner Is shows no visible Japanese forces or activity.


South Pacific: Unidentified Jap submarine spotted by naval air search off Suva.

Daily coastwatcher entries from 4/25 Operations report follow.

Coastwatcher Report: 3 ships in port at Shortlands
Coastwatcher Report: 1 ship in port at Madang
Coastwatcher Report: 1 ship in port at Salamaua
Coastwatcher Report: xAK Yamafuku Maru reported in port at Rabaul
Coastwatcher Report: 1 ship in port at Luganville
Coastwatcher sighting: 1 Japanese ship at 106,125 near Rabaul, Speed unknown
Coastwatcher Report: 4 ships in port at Lunga
Coastwatcher Report: 1 ship in port at Tulagi
Coastwatcher Report: 1 ship in port at Buna
Coastwatcher Report: 1 ship in port at Hansa Bay
Coastwatcher Report: 5 ships in port at Milne Bay
Coastwatcher Report: xAK Ryuko Maru reported in port at Rabaul
Coastwatcher sighting: 1 Japanese ship at 114,138 near Lunga, Speed unknown


Andaman Sea: Several Allied patrol subs reporting contacts with Jap air patrols; planes include K-21 Sally, Ki-30 Ann, Ki-49 Helen. Jap air activity in the Andaman Sea has been ongoing for the last several game turns. No hits or damage reported.


Burma: Detected status of Jap base in Rangoon from British aerial recon – 9 Japanese ships anchored in port, no Jap TF in harbor (-1 from last report), 113 aircraft (85 fighters, 28 bombers), 7 Jap LCU’s.


China: Japanese ground bombardment attack on Chungking. AAR follows.

** below indicates Japanese LCU reinforcements arriving this game turn. (no new arrivals)

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Ground combat at Chungking (76,45)

Japanese Bombardment attack

Attacking force 276959 troops, 2799 guns, 1456 vehicles, Assault Value = 9221
Defending force 469229 troops, 2256 guns, 0 vehicles, Assault Value = 11869

Japanese ground losses:
12 casualties reported
Squads: 0 destroyed, 0 disabled
Non Combat: 0 destroyed, 0 disabled
Engineers: 0 destroyed, 1 disabled

Allied ground losses:
819 casualties reported
Squads: 24 destroyed, 73 disabled
Non Combat: 1 destroyed, 8 disabled
Engineers: 3 destroyed, 0 disabled
Guns lost 4 (1 destroyed, 3 disabled)

Assaulting units:
9th Ind.Mixed Brigade
39th Division
116th Division
1st Ind.Mixed Brigade
4th Ind.Mixed Brigade
13th Division
8th Armored Car Co
7th Ind.Mixed Brigade
110th Division
6th Division
59th Infantry Brigade
26th Division
58th Division
40th Division
37th Division
15th Division
32nd Division
22nd Division
17th Division
34th Division
15th Tank Regiment
41st Division
3rd Tank Division
104th Division
36th Division
23rd Ind.Mixed Brigade
35th Division
70th Division
38th Division
Tonei Hvy Gun Regiment
12th Army
2nd Ind. Mountain Gun Regiment
14th Medium Field Artillery Regiment
6th Medium Field Artillery Regiment
13th Ind.Art.Mortar Battalion
15th Ind.Medium Field Artillery Regiment
11th Army
12th Ind.Art.Mortar Battalion
10th Ind. Mountain Gun Regiment
1st Hvy.Artillery Regiment
11th Ind.Art.Mortar Battalion
2nd Ind.Hvy.Art. Battalion
2nd Mortar Battalion
21st Mortar Battalion
23rd Army
4th Ind. Mountain Gun Regiment
3rd Ind.Hvy.Art. Battalion
1st Mortar Battalion
52nd Ind.Mtn.Gun Battalion
North China Area Army
51st Ind.Mtn.Gun Battalion
1st Army
20th Ind. Mtn Gun Battalion

Defending units:
100th Chinese Corps
87th Chinese Corps
21st Chinese Corps
32nd Chinese Corps
3rd Chinese Corps
55th Chinese Corps
11th Chinese Corps
92nd Chinese Corps
18th Chinese Corps
71st Chinese Corps
43rd Chinese Corps
49th Chinese Corps
45th Chinese Corps
29th Chinese Corps
38th Chinese Corps
97th Chinese Corps
52nd Chinese Corps
85th Chinese Corps
1st New Chinese Corps
99th Chinese Corps
61st Chinese Corps
42nd Chinese Corps
91st Chinese Corps
84th Chinese Corps
23rd Chinese Corps
26th Chinese Corps
63rd Chinese Corps
98th Chinese Corps
12th Chinese Corps
46th Chinese Corps
67th Chinese Corps
31st Chinese Corps
27th Chinese Corps
8th Chinese Corps
10th Chinese Corps
35th Chinese Corps
56th Chinese Corps
9th Prov Chinese Corps
13th Chinese Corps
90th Chinese Corps
37th Chinese Corps
62nd Chinese Corps
36th Chinese Corps
2nd Chinese Corps
4th Chinese Corps
7th Chinese Corps
16th Chinese Corps
19th Chinese Corps
59th Chinese Corps
74th Chinese Corps
5th New Chinese Corps
14th Chinese Corps
4th Chinese Cavalry Corps
76th Chinese Corps
41st Chinese Corps
30th Chinese Corps
2nd Chinese Cavalry Corps
1st Chinese Cavalry Corps
2nd Prov Chinese Corps
73rd Chinese Corps
72nd Chinese Corps
20th Chinese Corps
78th Chinese Corps
68th Chinese Corps
25th Chinese Corps
47th Chinese Corps
120th Red Chinese Division
77th Chinese Corps
53rd Chinese Corps
57th Chinese Corps
9th Chinese Corps
89th Chinese Corps
60th Chinese Corps
5th Chinese Cavalry Corps
79th Chinese Corps
96th Chinese Corps
86th Chinese Corps
44th Chinese Corps
50th Chinese Corps
94th Chinese Corps
1st Chinese Corps
33rd Chinese Corps
81st Chinese Corps
75th Chinese Corps
93rd Chinese Corps
3rd Prov Chinese Corps
18th Chinese Base Force
7th New Chinese Corps
3rd Construction Regiment
115th Red Chinese Division
22nd Chinese Corps
39th Chinese Corps
1st War Area
20th Chinese Base Force
6th War Area
China Command
8th War Area
32nd Group Army
3rd Chinese Cavalry Corps
14th Construction Regiment
12th Group Army
7th Chinese Base Force
13th Chinese Base Force
16th Construction Regiment
11th Chinese Base Force
17th Construction Regiment
15th Chinese Base Force
37th Group Army
6th Chinese Base Force
33rd Group Army
15th Chinese Corps
CAF HQ
25th Group Army
Central Reserve
12th Construction Regiment
4th War Area
7th Artillery Regiment
65th Chinese Corps
Jingcha War Area
27th Group Army
20th Artillery Regiment
17th Chinese Base Force
13th Construction Regiment
4th Chinese Base Force
31st Group Army
24th Group Army
11th Construction Regiment
5th Group Army
7th War Area
41st AA Regiment
18th Group Army
21st Group Army
19th Group Army
3rd Heavy Mortar Regiment
14th Group Army
20th Group Army
1st Chinese Base Force
Red Chinese Army
15th Group Army
6th Group Army
18th Artillery Regiment
9th Group Army
1st Group Army
6th Construction Regiment
3rd Group Army
5th War Area
35th Group Army
2nd War Area
13th Group Army
2nd Group Army
9th War Area
8th Construction Regiment
2nd Chinese Base Force
9th Chinese Base Force
22nd Group Army
36th Group Army
26th Group Army
3rd War Area
10th Chinese Base Force
38th Group Army
10th Construction Regiment
23rd Group Army
49th AA Regiment

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[wneumann]

Summary of Operations 4/27/43

Central Pacific: Sigint entry for 4/26 reports intercepted Jap radio transmissions from Funafuti. Detected status of Funafuti shows unidentified Jap aircraft based there, no other visible Japanese forces or activity.


South Pacific: Daily coastwatcher entries from 4/26 Operations report follow.

Coastwatcher Report: 4 ships in port at Lunga
Coastwatcher Report: 4 ships in port at Shortlands
Coastwatcher Report: 1 ship in port at Buna
Coastwatcher Report: 3 ships in port at Lae
Coastwatcher Report: 5 ships in port at Milne Bay
Coastwatcher Report: 1 ship in port at Woodlark Island
Coastwatcher Report: 6 ships in port at Noumea
Coastwatcher sighting: 1 Japanese ship at 106,125 near Rabaul, Speed unknown
Coastwatcher sighting: 1 Japanese ship at 114,138 near Lunga, Speed unknown
Coastwatcher Report: 1 ship in port at Lunga
Coastwatcher Report: 3 ships in port at Shortlands
Coastwatcher Report: 1 ship in port at Thousand Ships Bay
Coastwatcher Report: 1 ship in port at Lae
Coastwatcher Report: 1 ship in port at Woodlark Island
Coastwatcher Report: 1 ship in port at Efate
Coastwatcher sighting: 2 Japanese ships at 106,125 near Rabaul, Speed unknown
Coastwatcher sighting: 1 Japanese ship at 114,138 near Lunga, Speed unknown


Andaman Sea: US patrol sub in contact with Jap transport TF off Phuket. AAR follows.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ASW attack near Phuket at 47,69 (adjacent hex SW of Phuket)

Japanese Ships
PB Rikusen Maru
PB Kyo Maru #5
AK Teiyo Maru
AK Tatutaki Maru
AK Tamagawa Maru
AK Sinko Maru
xAK Hukuzyu Maru
xAK Hokutai Maru
PB Yachiyo Maru
PB Tama Maru #3
PB Shintohoku Maru

Allied Ships
SS Peto

SS Peto is sighted by escort
PB Yachiyo Maru fails to find sub, continues to search...
PB Tama Maru #3 fails to find sub and abandons search
PB Shintohoku Maru fails to find sub and abandons search
Escort abandons search for sub

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


Burma: Detected status of Jap base in Rangoon from British aerial recon – 9 Japanese ships anchored in port, 1 Jap TF in harbor (+1 from last report), 101 aircraft (74 fighters, 27 bombers), 7 Jap LCU’s.


Indian Ocean: Unidentified Jap submarine detected off Male island (Maldives). It’s possible Pillager has this sub out on a recon mission to detect Allied activity at island bases in the Indian Ocean – if so, a visit from this sub can be expected at Addu and Diego Garcia. The Jap sub otherwise presents no problem to Allied ship movements in this area of the Indian Ocean.


China: Japanese continue ground bombardment attack on Chungking. Latest AAR follows.

** below indicates Japanese LCU reinforcements arriving this game turn. (no new arrivals)

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ground combat at Chungking (76,45)

Japanese Bombardment attack

Attacking force 279228 troops, 2799 guns, 1457 vehicles, Assault Value = 9461
Defending force 469756 troops, 2247 guns, 0 vehicles, Assault Value = 11927

Allied ground losses:
425 casualties reported
Squads: 14 destroyed, 30 disabled
Non Combat: 1 destroyed, 3 disabled
Engineers: 0 destroyed, 1 disabled
Guns lost 5 (1 destroyed, 4 disabled)

Assaulting units:
37th Division
8th Armored Car Co
7th Ind.Mixed Brigade
15th Tank Regiment
1st Ind.Mixed Brigade
116th Division
26th Division
59th Infantry Brigade
104th Division
35th Division
22nd Division
41st Division
6th Division
32nd Division
58th Division
4th Ind.Mixed Brigade
17th Division
15th Division
34th Division
39th Division
110th Division
13th Division
9th Ind.Mixed Brigade
70th Division
23rd Ind.Mixed Brigade
36th Division
3rd Tank Division
40th Division
38th Division
6th Medium Field Artillery Regiment
4th Ind. Mountain Gun Regiment
52nd Ind.Mtn.Gun Battalion
1st Hvy.Artillery Regiment
10th Ind. Mountain Gun Regiment
51st Ind.Mtn.Gun Battalion
15th Ind.Medium Field Artillery Regiment
2nd Ind. Mountain Gun Regiment
12th Army
12th Ind.Art.Mortar Battalion
2nd Mortar Battalion
Tonei Hvy Gun Regiment
13th Ind.Art.Mortar Battalion
3rd Ind.Hvy.Art. Battalion
23rd Army
11th Ind.Art.Mortar Battalion
1st Mortar Battalion
1st Army
14th Medium Field Artillery Regiment
2nd Ind.Hvy.Art. Battalion
11th Army
North China Area Army
21st Mortar Battalion
20th Ind. Mtn Gun Battalion

Defending units:
7th Chinese Corps
74th Chinese Corps
75th Chinese Corps
59th Chinese Corps
4th Chinese Corps
2nd Chinese Cavalry Corps
96th Chinese Corps
3rd Chinese Corps
99th Chinese Corps
93rd Chinese Corps
19th Chinese Corps
53rd Chinese Corps
13th Chinese Corps
78th Chinese Corps
36th Chinese Corps
49th Chinese Corps
26th Chinese Corps
23rd Chinese Corps
62nd Chinese Corps
45th Chinese Corps
30th Chinese Corps
63rd Chinese Corps
12th Chinese Corps
1st Chinese Corps
21st Chinese Corps
44th Chinese Corps
57th Chinese Corps
16th Chinese Corps
4th Chinese Cavalry Corps
20th Chinese Corps
14th Chinese Corps
27th Chinese Corps
85th Chinese Corps
2nd Prov Chinese Corps
10th Chinese Corps
46th Chinese Corps
86th Chinese Corps
67th Chinese Corps
33rd Chinese Corps
98th Chinese Corps
35th Chinese Corps
68th Chinese Corps
97th Chinese Corps
81st Chinese Corps
71st Chinese Corps
84th Chinese Corps
50th Chinese Corps
25th Chinese Corps
76th Chinese Corps
18th Chinese Corps
52nd Chinese Corps
29th Chinese Corps
9th Prov Chinese Corps
9th Chinese Corps
100th Chinese Corps
56th Chinese Corps
5th New Chinese Corps
72nd Chinese Corps
77th Chinese Corps
37th Chinese Corps
90th Chinese Corps
89th Chinese Corps
47th Chinese Corps
79th Chinese Corps
5th Chinese Cavalry Corps
94th Chinese Corps
87th Chinese Corps
41st Chinese Corps
8th Chinese Corps
60th Chinese Corps
92nd Chinese Corps
91st Chinese Corps
1st Chinese Cavalry Corps
32nd Chinese Corps
11th Chinese Corps
61st Chinese Corps
31st Chinese Corps
2nd Chinese Corps
120th Red Chinese Division
73rd Chinese Corps
43rd Chinese Corps
55th Chinese Corps
42nd Chinese Corps
3rd Prov Chinese Corps
38th Chinese Corps
1st New Chinese Corps
2nd Construction Regiment
5th War Area
37th Group Army
17th Construction Regiment
15th Chinese Corps
31st Group Army
3rd Chinese Cavalry Corps
8th War Area
33rd Group Army
7th New Chinese Corps
26th Group Army
CAF HQ
China Command
7th War Area
14th Construction Regiment
12th Group Army
1st Group Army
21st Group Army
6th War Area
8th Construction Regiment
11th Chinese Base Force
38th Group Army
2nd Group Army
6th Chinese Base Force
6th Group Army
27th Group Army
16th Construction Regiment
65th Chinese Corps
Jingcha War Area
19th Group Army
18th Group Army
3rd War Area
3rd Group Army
15th Group Army
17th Chinese Base Force
9th Chinese Base Force
24th Group Army
1st Chinese Base Force
115th Red Chinese Division
18th Artillery Regiment
35th Group Army
10th Construction Regiment
20th Chinese Base Force
22nd Chinese Corps
15th Chinese Base Force
4th Chinese Base Force
4th War Area
18th Chinese Base Force
22nd Group Army
9th War Area
9th Group Army
10th Chinese Base Force
6th Construction Regiment
13th Construction Regiment
Red Chinese Army
20th Group Army
11th Construction Regiment
7th Chinese Base Force
13th Group Army
Central Reserve
41st AA Regiment
12th Construction Regiment
14th Group Army
2nd Chinese Base Force
5th Group Army
39th Chinese Corps
13th Chinese Base Force
1st War Area
3rd Construction Regiment
2nd War Area
20th Artillery Regiment
25th Group Army
23rd Group Army
36th Group Army
32nd Group Army
7th Artillery Regiment
3rd Heavy Mortar Regiment
49th AA Regiment

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[wneumann]

Summary of Operations 4/28/43

Hawaii: Damaged xAP detached from transport convoy WP-50A after ship collision on 4/19 arrives this game turn in Pearl Harbor with its cargo (elements of US 31 Infantry Rgt plus 2100 supply) intact. The xAP is now unloading and will remain at Pearl Harbor for shipyard repair.


South Pacific: Daily coastwatcher entries from 4/27 Operations report follow.

Coastwatcher Report: 4 ships in port at Lunga
Coastwatcher Report: 1 ship in port at Shortlands
Coastwatcher Report: 1 ship in port at Port Moresby
Coastwatcher Report: 1 ship in port at Gasmata
Coastwatcher Report: harbor at Rabaul is reported empty
Coastwatcher sighting: 1 Japanese ship at 114,138 near Lunga, Speed unknown
Coastwatcher Report: 3 ships in port at Lae
Coastwatcher Report: 3 ships in port at Milne Bay
Coastwatcher Report: harbor at Rabaul is reported empty
Coastwatcher Report: 1 ship in port at Kavieng
Coastwatcher Report: 1 ship in port at Manus
Coastwatcher Report: 1 ship in port at Efate
Coastwatcher Report: 4 ships in port at Luganville


Australia: Transport convoy MX-15 (14 tankers) arrives from Middle East via Capetown with 116K fuel cargo.


Andaman Sea: US patrol sub off Phuket remains in contact with the Jap transport TF it spotted last game turn, also in action with a separate Jap surface ASW TF. SS Peto followed the Jap transport TF moving northward toward Rangoon since last game turn. AAR’s follow.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ASW attack near Phuket at 47,67 (NW of Phuket)

Japanese Ships
PB Rikusen Maru
PB Kyo Maru #5
AK Teiyo Maru
AK Tatutaki Maru
AK Tamagawa Maru
AK Sinko Maru
xAK Hukuzyu Maru
xAK Hokutai Maru
PB Yachiyo Maru
PB Tama Maru #3
PB Shintohoku Maru

Allied Ships
SS Peto

SS Peto is sighted by escort
Peto diving deep ....
PB Yachiyo Maru fails to find sub, continues to search...
PB Tama Maru #3 fails to find sub and abandons search
PB Shintohoku Maru fails to find sub and abandons search
Escort abandons search for sub

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ASW attack near Phuket at 47,67

Japanese Ships
DD Mutsuki
E Hachijo
DD Isonami

Allied Ships
SS Peto

SS Peto launches 2 torpedoes at DD Mutsuki
DD Mutsuki fails to find sub and abandons search
DD Isonami attacking submerged sub ....
Escort abandons search for sub

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


Burma: Detected status of Jap base in Rangoon from British aerial recon – 9 Japanese ships anchored in port, 1 Jap TF in harbor, 99 aircraft (80 fighters, 19 bombers), 7 Jap LCU’s.


China: Japanese ground bombardment attack on Chungking continues. AAR follows.

** below indicates Japanese LCU reinforcements arriving this game turn. (no new arrivals)

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ground combat at Chungking (76,45)

Japanese Bombardment attack

Attacking force 281148 troops, 2799 guns, 1457 vehicles, Assault Value = 9652
Defending force 470728 troops, 2243 guns, 0 vehicles, Assault Value = 12003

Allied ground losses:
355 casualties reported
Squads: 2 destroyed, 22 disabled
Non Combat: 1 destroyed, 12 disabled
Engineers: 0 destroyed, 0 disabled

Assaulting units:
36th Division
59th Infantry Brigade
110th Division
15th Tank Regiment
39th Division
9th Ind.Mixed Brigade
4th Ind.Mixed Brigade
35th Division
58th Division
1st Ind.Mixed Brigade
41st Division
116th Division
26th Division
6th Division
8th Armored Car Co
3rd Tank Division
7th Ind.Mixed Brigade
32nd Division
22nd Division
37th Division
17th Division
104th Division
70th Division
15th Division
40th Division
34th Division
13th Division
23rd Ind.Mixed Brigade
38th Division
11th Army
51st Ind.Mtn.Gun Battalion
2nd Ind. Mountain Gun Regiment
2nd Mortar Battalion
4th Ind. Mountain Gun Regiment
11th Ind.Art.Mortar Battalion
2nd Ind.Hvy.Art. Battalion
1st Hvy.Artillery Regiment
12th Ind.Art.Mortar Battalion
12th Army
21st Mortar Battalion
Tonei Hvy Gun Regiment
23rd Army
13th Ind.Art.Mortar Battalion
52nd Ind.Mtn.Gun Battalion
1st Mortar Battalion
1st Army
3rd Ind.Hvy.Art. Battalion
15th Ind.Medium Field Artillery Regiment
6th Medium Field Artillery Regiment
14th Medium Field Artillery Regiment
North China Area Army
10th Ind. Mountain Gun Regiment
20th Ind. Mtn Gun Battalion

Defending units:
81st Chinese Corps
3rd Chinese Corps
120th Red Chinese Division
8th Chinese Corps
35th Chinese Corps
4th Chinese Corps
32nd Chinese Corps
23rd Chinese Corps
27th Chinese Corps
59th Chinese Corps
11th Chinese Corps
5th New Chinese Corps
78th Chinese Corps
56th Chinese Corps
45th Chinese Corps
90th Chinese Corps
2nd Chinese Corps
68th Chinese Corps
75th Chinese Corps
85th Chinese Corps
2nd Prov Chinese Corps
93rd Chinese Corps
86th Chinese Corps
20th Chinese Corps
53rd Chinese Corps
92nd Chinese Corps
79th Chinese Corps
55th Chinese Corps
49th Chinese Corps
18th Chinese Corps
37th Chinese Corps
7th Chinese Corps
77th Chinese Corps
71st Chinese Corps
1st Chinese Corps
1st New Chinese Corps
44th Chinese Corps
5th Chinese Cavalry Corps
43rd Chinese Corps
57th Chinese Corps
100th Chinese Corps
47th Chinese Corps
36th Chinese Corps
21st Chinese Corps
2nd Chinese Cavalry Corps
61st Chinese Corps
10th Chinese Corps
4th Chinese Cavalry Corps
46th Chinese Corps
98th Chinese Corps
42nd Chinese Corps
29th Chinese Corps
26th Chinese Corps
50th Chinese Corps
87th Chinese Corps
52nd Chinese Corps
9th Prov Chinese Corps
60th Chinese Corps
67th Chinese Corps
25th Chinese Corps
3rd Prov Chinese Corps
96th Chinese Corps
19th Chinese Corps
14th Chinese Corps
63rd Chinese Corps
12th Chinese Corps
97th Chinese Corps
13th Chinese Corps
33rd Chinese Corps
99th Chinese Corps
72nd Chinese Corps
41st Chinese Corps
74th Chinese Corps
91st Chinese Corps
76th Chinese Corps
38th Chinese Corps
16th Chinese Corps
30th Chinese Corps
31st Chinese Corps
94th Chinese Corps
73rd Chinese Corps
89th Chinese Corps
1st Chinese Cavalry Corps
84th Chinese Corps
62nd Chinese Corps
9th Chinese Corps
2nd Construction Regiment
32nd Group Army
15th Chinese Base Force
6th Chinese Base Force
33rd Group Army
37th Group Army
9th Group Army
18th Artillery Regiment
13th Group Army
4th Chinese Base Force
27th Group Army
41st AA Regiment
2nd Chinese Base Force
17th Construction Regiment
7th Chinese Base Force
1st War Area
8th Construction Regiment
38th Group Army
26th Group Army
31st Group Army
12th Group Army
18th Group Army
8th War Area
18th Chinese Base Force
19th Group Army
14th Construction Regiment
2nd Group Army
10th Construction Regiment
14th Group Army
7th New Chinese Corps
20th Group Army
9th War Area
2nd War Area
65th Chinese Corps
20th Artillery Regiment
Red Chinese Army
3rd Chinese Cavalry Corps
China Command
10th Chinese Base Force
6th Construction Regiment
11th Construction Regiment
3rd Construction Regiment
13th Construction Regiment
20th Chinese Base Force
4th War Area
22nd Group Army
35th Group Army
4th Heavy Mortar Regiment
5th Group Army
6th War Area
36th Group Army
11th Chinese Base Force
CAF HQ
39th Chinese Corps
9th Chinese Base Force
Central Reserve
1st Group Army
3rd Group Army
7th War Area
6th Group Army
24th Group Army
12th Construction Regiment
13th Chinese Base Force
3rd Heavy Mortar Regiment
15th Group Army
15th Chinese Corps
3rd War Area
4th Group Army
Jingcha War Area
17th Chinese Base Force
21st Group Army
16th Construction Regiment
5th War Area
7th Artillery Regiment
115th Red Chinese Division
25th Group Army
22nd Chinese Corps
1st Chinese Base Force
23rd Group Army
49th AA Regiment

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[wneumann]

The Big Picture #16 – Allied Buildup and Offensive Preparations (Overview)

This post is first in a series describing the current state of Allied buildup and preparations for offensive operations along with plans and projections being looked at. This post will examine matters from a overall view, later posts in the series examine specific theatres.

When does the Allied offensive begin? Current projection is mid to late-1943, exact timing determined by progress with various items and requirements described in later sections of this post.


China as a consideration: What is starting to become an important consideration in timing Allied offensive operations is the situation in China. With the fall of Chungking, Pillager will acquire a substantial pool of available Japanese combat LCU. Many if not most of these Japanese LCU will likely have high experience levels from their combat in China and expected to considerably reinforce Jap ground defenses wherever Pillager chooses to employ them – this a certainty once these units are no longer needed in China. This is more a matter of when, not if. In terms of time, there is a limited “window of best opportunity” where conditions will be most favorable for launching an Allied offensive. This “window of opportunity” disappears once the battle for Chungking ends, the Jap LCU’s involved at Chungking are fully recovered from combat operations in China, and Pillager re-deploys the newly available LCU’s from China to other theatre(s) where he intends to use them.

Steps and requirements for launching Allied offensive operations: The following is a basic outline of steps and requirements – those already or mostly completed, now underway, and yet to be done. Each of these are covered in more detail below and will also be covered in later discussions of specific theatres.

• Complete port and airfield construction activity at bases from which Allied offensive operations will be launched and/or supported.
• Complete deployment and arrival of LCU and air units to forward theatre areas from the mainland US.
• Continue expansion of supply and fuel stockpiles within each forward theatre, particularly stockpiles reserved for support of Allied offensive operations.
• Complete LCU preparations for specific objectives as objectives are identified and forces being used to attack each objective are determined.
• Complete deployment and arrival of specialized and general-purpose transport ships for amphibious landing ops into forward theatre areas where amphibious assaults are being planned.
• Complete deployment and arrival into forward theatre areas of auxiliary, mine warfare and surface ASW ships needed to directly support amphibious assaults and their follow-up.
• Deploy naval forces (carrier, surface combat, bombardment) into forward theatre areas.


Base Construction activities (ports and airfields): As of 4/43, construction to expand port and airfield facilities is now largely completed at forward bases from which Allied amphibious and other offensive operations are expected to be launched and/or supported. Construction at these bases was done to expand port and/or airfield facilities to their maximum allowable sizes. Construction activity in forward theatres continues to build additional port and airfield facilities beyond what had been initially required.

Deployment and arrival of LCU and air units from the mainland US into forward theatres: At this time, most LCU and air forces starting the game or entering as reinforcements in the mainland US have already shipped out of the US and now in forward theatre areas. This activity has been ongoing since 12/41. LCU’s and air units have been dispatched continuously and as quickly as possible from the US – this either done immediately or as soon as (1) the LCU or air unit is at full TOE strength, (2) an LCU with sub-units have all sub-units on map and combined to form the parent unit, (3) a command transfer done to reassign LCU or air units when necessary, and (4) the specific theatre where an LCU or air unit is intended to be used has been identified.

Additional LCU and air units continue to depart the mainland US as they enter the game and are fully prepared for deployment.

As of 4/43, most Allied ground and air forces expected to be used in offensive operations are currently located within the forward theatres where they are anticipated to operate.


Buildup and expansion of supply and fuel stockpiles within forward theatres: The emphasis here is on stockpiles reserved for support of Allied offensive operations, these stockpiles in addition to minimum supply and fuel required to maintain rear-area bases and activities. This activity has also been ongoing since 12/41 and is basically completed. As there’s never too much supply or fuel, movement of additional supply and fuel stocks into forward theatres continues.


LCU preparations for specific objectives: This step started at the beginning of 1943 gradually setting individual LCU to begin preparations for specific objectives as (1) the objectives were identified, and (2) what LCU were needed for attack on a given objective. This is a continuing process with more LCU to be prepped as objectives and requirements for different objectives are identified.


Transfer of transport and auxiliary ships to forward theatre areas: Ships covered under this step include transports (AP and AK, APA and AKA, APD), landing craft (LST, LCI) and landing ships, mine warfare ships (minesweepers and layers), auxiliaries and tenders, small craft and ships required or expected to be required to be used directly in an amphibious assault or in support after an amphibious landing. This activity is being done with particular emphasis to both South and SW Pacific theatres.

Transfers of these ships to forward theatres has been done almost entirely through the transport convoy system - ships assigned to convoys leaving the mainland US, detached from the convoy on arrival at its destination, then placed in reserve at a rear-area base within the forward theatre where they were dispatched. Transfers was begun after the start of 1943 and are ongoing. Current level of completion is about 50%. It should also be noted there’s a number of ship upgrades and conversions of AK and AP ships to amphibious types (APA, AKA, LSI) – plans are to take advantage of these upgrades and conversions as they become available.


Accumulation of other ship types usable in amphibious support operations: This process started in early 1943 in the South and SW Pacific theatres. Ship types in this category are intended mainly for use to support amphibious landings after the initial assault – these ships including many xAKL, small xAP, and smaller short-range xAK not suitable for use in the convoy system. Where these ships are potentially useful is their relatively small size and cargo capacity allows easy and quicker unloading of cargoes in small ports, especially useful for quick turn-around at bases subject to Japanese naval or air attack.


Deployment and arrival of naval forces in forward theatres: This is the final step of preparation and projected to be done at the last possible moment, mainly to eliminate any possibility of advance warning to my Japanese opponent. Naval forces included in this step are carriers, bombardment and surface combat TF’s.


What theatre(s) are the most likely Allied paths of advance? At this time, all Pacific theatres are in the “mix” with one or more possible objectives in each theatre planned or under preparation. The approach being taken in selection and timing of objectives is taking the best possible opportunity, regardless of theatre, following the path (or paths) of least resistance.

My current ranking of theatres (best to worst) follows.

• South and SW Pacific (these two being about equal)
• Central Pacific
• North Pacific
• Eastern DEI
• Burma and Southeast Asia
• Central and Western DEI

South and SW Pacific theatres occupy the #1 and #1a spots due to current level of preparations as well as having the largest number of possible points of attack.

Central Pacific theatre is also considered quite favorable, though activity in this theatre is more likely to supplement what is underway in the South and SW Pacific.

While the North Pacific is limited in available objectives, it does have value in providing some diversion. No plans for large-scale offensive operations from the North Pacific theatre are currently under consideration but could be possible if future developments or opportunities justify them.

A direct Allied advance against Burma, Southeast Asia or the DEI is viewed as considerably more problematical. Known intelligence data has established and largely verified that Pillager has considerably reinforced Japanese defensives against an Allied ground or amphibious assault in each of these theatres – especially (and already) true at key locations in the DEI. Likely or possible Japanese reinforcements to these areas from a collapse of China would easily add to the difficulty in these three theatres – possibly more so than in the Pacific areas. A secondary objective of the recent US carrier operation against Palembang was encouraging Pillager to put even more emphasis on defending the DEI (rather than elsewhere).


Allied paths of advance: Each of the main Pacific theatres (Central, South, Southwest) has at least one primary objective with active preparation for that objective now underway. Smaller targets in each theatre area are also being looked at as secondary objectives that may be done in addition to a primary objective or as an alternate to the primary objective if an attack on the primary objective proves to be infeasible.

My preferred approach to Allied strategic plans for the next few months of 1943 is launching offensives in at least two of the three main Pacific theatres – these attacks not necessary simultaneous, but with the intent of having offensive actions in each Pacific theatre complementing efforts underway elsewhere. I’d like to have Pillager watching several directions at once, not allowing concentration of Japanese strategic reserves (particularly KB and IJN surface naval forces) against any one Allied path of advance – this (of course) done without the Allies seriously dispersing their forces.

The best possibility of launching multiple coordinated Allied attacks exists between South and Southwest Pacific theatres – this combination of theatres allows the easiest shifting of resources and attack forces back and forth. Allied offensive operations from South and Southwest Pacific can also be mutually supporting. Central Pacific theatre is a little more distant (in terms of mutually supporting) but does allow a good avenue for diversionary attack(s) on the Japanese outer perimeter which can be converted to a main path of advance under favorable conditions in the Central Pacific or if the strategic situation elsewhere makes this necessary. My overall approach is not being overly “fixed” on specific objectives (though to a point this is necessary for preparation purposes) but looking for and taking the best available path(s) of least Japanese resistance.



The Role of Intelligence: Over time, accumulating and recording identifying locations and dates of Jap LCU from Sigint entries and AAR’s has provided a fairly detailed listing of virtually the entire Japanese LCU order of battle. The idea behind accumulating LCU deployments being that placement and distribution of an opponent’s LCU is a useful indicator of said opponent’s overall strategy (either offensive or defensive). At this point, it’s possible to point to almost any Japanese-controlled base on the game map and identify the specific Jap LCU probably located in the base and how long (or recently) each one has been there.

The process of updating Jap LCU information each game turn also provides some insight into Pillager’s movements of Japanese LCU – particularly useful in spotting transfers of Jap units from Manchuria/Korea to other theatres. Tracking information on Jap LCU over time provides specific identities of Jap LCU Pillager has moved or is moving, their destination and previous location. Known movements of Jap LCU can also provide information identifying larger scale trends in the "big picture".

Combining Jap LCU information with other information including detected port/airfield sizes and ship movements, it has been possible to compile a reasonably comprehensive view of what’s inside the Japanese empire from available intelligence data. Jap combat LCU concentrations indicate bases and areas where Pillager is likely or probably intending to defend and relative importance of the location to Japanese strategy.

Locations and distribution of Jap construction and base force LCU indicating where Pillager is engaged in building airfields, ports and fortifications – detected statuses of these bases also providing what is being built and level of completion. Base force and HQ LCU locations along with detected port/airfield sizes indicating where Pillager has established Japanese air and naval bases, including an estimate of each base’s relative size, importance and possible role(s). It’s not only where Pillager has his Japanese planes and ships, it’s also the bases where he can put them.

My estimate is this accumulation of data is probably 80-90% accurate (to the degree it's complete) given FOW and how “dated” some items of information are. It doesn’t tell everything, it’s not totally accurate, but it does tell much if not most of the story. Having tracked and updated this data since 12/41 has given me some sense of how good (or not so good) a specific piece of information is. I do expect some surprises, but not many of them. The main thing in interpreting and evaluating intelligence data is not going too far beyond what is definitely known or easily proven from the available information.


Bottlenecks: AGC (amphibious command ships) and Amphibious Force HQ not yet available. Scheduled date of the first AGC ship arrival is 9/43, arrival of the first Amphibious Force HQ in 7/43.

Availability or unavailability of AGC and Amphibious Force HQ will have a considerable role in whether or not some Allied offensive operations are launched at a given time, especially against Japanese objectives known to be defended. Without AGC and Amphibious Force HQ, selection of objectives and assaults on these objectives will need to be done with a considerable degree of discretion. If it appears likely that successful assault on an objective will require an AGC and Amphibious Force HQ and none is available, a delay of the assault may likely be needed until AGC and Amphibious Force HQ enter the game and reach the front lines. Evaluation of this will be done on a case-by-case basis.


The “to do” list & expected events in the near future: A number of tasks remain to be done, plus several events unfolding in the near future for the Allied side will have some amount of influence in Allies strategic offensive plans now unfolding.

• Complete movement and concentration of amphibious transport ships (AP, APA, AKA, LST, LCI, LSI, APD types) into forward theatres. This is the biggest single step underway at this time and now partially completed. The first contingents of these ships have already reached forward theatre areas (mainly South Pacific) and “parked” in reserve as they arrive. Additional amphibious ships of these types are being attached in departing transport convoys as they form and leave the mainland US – several convoys now in transit to the South/SW Pacific include contingents of amphibious transport ships.

• Movement of US ground and air units from the mainland US continue as new LCU and air squadrons enter the game as reinforcements and the new units become ready to deploy from the mainland US. A number of US air squadrons now operating as pilot training units in the mainland US are also planned to convert to front-line combat squadrons and transfer to forward theatres. The conversion process from “training” to “combat” mode for these air squadrons includes two steps – (1) plane upgrade to first-line type, and (2) mass swapping of fully-trained pilots into the squadrons replacing any untrained or partially trained pilots.

• Arrival of CV Essex within the next month. More carriers!

• Fighter plane upgrade (F4F Wildcat to F6F Hellcat) in the US main carrier force. This has not started yet for VF squadrons aboard the six US fleet CV’s now in the game. F6F-3 aircraft started production this month (4/43) – 103 planes currently in the replacement pool, sufficient as of now to equip VF squadrons aboard two carriers with adequate planes in the pool to cover operational/combat losses. VF squadrons on all six US fleet carriers are expected to complete aircraft upgrade to F6F Hellcats by early 6/43.


• Creation of a US escort carrier force. This action is something I did in my earlier PBEM vs Pillager in CHS and it appears to have value in AE as well. Primary function of US escort carrier TF(s) will be providing dedicated fighter CAP directly over transport and amphibious TF engaged in landing operations or follow-up transport ops delivering reinforcements and supply into a beachhead – CVE performing this function allows the main fleet carrier force to freely pursue other missions.

Eight US CVE (excluding Long Island) are currently in the game, all located on the US West Coast with all CVE air groups on dedicated pilot training. Dive and torpedo bombing squadrons entering the game aboard CVE have been put ashore and likely to continue operating as land-based pilot training squadrons. This action allows one fighter squadron carried aboard each CVE with 24-28 F4F Wildcats.

Organization of CVE operating in this role (as currently projected) is likely in 2-3 CVE air combat TF with destroyer escort, fighter planes aboard the CVE almost exclusively flying CAP missions. This mode of organization may change if other alternatives are identified.


• Transport ship upgrades and conversions to amphibious-capable ship types. Several of these are currently or soon to be available – notably a conversion of British Pacific L Cargo class xAK (3900 cargo capacity) to xAP (1000 troop & 1200 cargo), and a 6/43 ship upgrade of US C2 Arcturus class AK (6200 cargo capacity) to AKA (also 6200 cargo).

I had mentioned the British Pacific L Cargo xAK conversion in an earlier post – an initial group of five ships now converting in shipyard at Aden, additional ships may or may not be planned. xAK to xAP ship conversions are being limited to a scale where the number of ships converted from xAK does not significantly impact the number of transport ships or cargo capacity available for use in the long-range transport convoy system.

My policy is taking advantage of available transport ship upgrades or conversions to more amphibious-capable types and configurations as much as possible without causing a serious impact on other Allied sea transport operations. The more amphibious-capable ships available the better.


• Movement of Allied (combat) naval forces including carrier, bombardment, surface combat TF into front-line theatre areas is being deferred to the final step of preparation for any given amphibious assault operation(s) they are intended to support. This is not so much a matter of security precautions rather than an established practice of keeping major Allied carrier and surface naval forces invisible until the last possible moment before they are intended to strike.

• Operation of the long-range transport convoy system (particularly “WP” and “EX” convoys) is intended to continue without reduction or interruption once Allied strategic offensive operations begin. It should be noted a policy is in place where individual transport ships are being assigned to either the long-range transport convoy system, or used within a front-line theatre areas for short-range transport missions or in an amphibious assault – except for emergency or priority missions, individual transport ships will not be moved back and forth between long-range transport convoys and direct support of offensive operations in front-line theatres. Until and unless there’s a real and proven need to break this rule, it stands.

[wneumann]

Summary of Operations 4/29/43

Central Pacific: Sigint entries for 4/28 report intercepted Jap radio transmissions from Mili (southern Marshalls) and Funafuti (Ellice islands). Detected status of Mili shows no visible Japanese forces or activity, status at Funafuti shows unidentified Jap LCU(s). Known Jap LCU at Funafuti from available intelligence data includes three units (3 Garrison Unit, 3 Naval Construction Bn, 3 JNAF AF Co). Another 4/28 Sigint entry verifies 3 Naval Construction Bn is still at Funafuti. No other visible items of interest at either Mili or Funafuti.


South Pacific: A Sigint entry for 4/28 reports sea movement of additional elements of Jap 10th Infantry Division is underway from Noumea to Lunga.

Daily coastwatcher entries from 4/28 Operations report follow.

Coastwatcher Report: 4 ships in port at Milne Bay
Coastwatcher Report: 1 ship in port at Manus
Coastwatcher Report: 6 ships in port at Noumea
Coastwatcher Report: 1 ship in port at Tanna
Coastwatcher sighting: 2 Japanese ships at 115,160 near Noumea, Speed unknown
Coastwatcher sighting: 1 Japanese ship at 114,138 near Lunga, Speed unknown
Coastwatcher Report: 1 ship in port at Ndeni
Coastwatcher Report: 1 ship in port at Buna
Coastwatcher Report: 3 ships in port at Lae
Coastwatcher Report: 3 ships in port at Milne Bay
Coastwatcher Report: xAK Nihonka Maru reported in port at Rabaul
Coastwatcher Report: 6 ships in port at Noumea
Coastwatcher Report: 1 ship in port at Efate
Coastwatcher sighting: 3 Japanese ships at 115,160 near Noumea, Speed unknown


DEI: US patrol sub in eastern Java Sea reports contact with small Jap transport. SS Perch is returning to Australia for repair after being damaged in action with Jap surface ASW on 4/25. AAR follows.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Submarine attack near Makassar at 63,107 (SW of Macassar)

Japanese Ships
xAKL Haguro Maru

Allied Ships
SS Perch

xAKL Haguro Maru is sighted by SS Perch
Captain of SS Perch elects not to launch torpedoes at this target

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sigint entry for 4/28 reports intercepted radio transmissions from one or more unidentified Jap TF(s) in the eastern Indian Ocean near Christmas Is (IO) at hex location 46, 105 south of Tjilatjap. No information available on number of Jap TF, composition or movement.


Burma: Detected status of Jap base in Rangoon from British aerial recon – 9 Japanese ships anchored in port, 1 Jap TF in harbor, 103 aircraft (80 fighters, 23 bombers), 7 Jap LCU’s.

Sigint entries for 4/28 reporting intercepted Jap radio transmissions from Moulmein and Bassein in southern Burma - unidentified Jap aircraft detected and visible in both bases. No other visible Japanese forces or activity observed in either location.


China: Japanese deliberate ground attack on Chungking. AAR follows.

** below indicates Japanese LCU reinforcements arriving this game turn. (no new arrivals)

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Ground combat at Chungking (76,45)

Japanese Deliberate attack

Attacking force 229075 troops, 2352 guns, 1466 vehicles, Assault Value = 9795
Defending force 471561 troops, 2241 guns, 0 vehicles, Assault Value = 12065
Japanese adjusted assault: 5308
Allied adjusted defense: 5491
Japanese assault odds: 1 to 2 (fort level 0)

Combat modifiers
Defender: terrain(+), leaders(+), experience(-), supply(-)
Attacker:

Japanese ground losses:
8879 casualties reported
Squads: 50 destroyed, 2018 disabled
Non Combat: 2 destroyed, 216 disabled
Engineers: 8 destroyed, 164 disabled
Guns lost 132 (1 destroyed, 131 disabled)
Vehicles lost 93 (23 destroyed, 70 disabled)

Allied ground losses:
38761 casualties reported
Squads: 352 destroyed, 1638 disabled
Non Combat: 701 destroyed, 1370 disabled
Engineers: 14 destroyed, 28 disabled
Guns lost 225 (75 destroyed, 150 disabled)
Units destroyed 10

Assaulting units:
35th Division
1st Ind.Mixed Brigade
110th Division
17th Division
9th Ind.Mixed Brigade
104th Division
7th Ind.Mixed Brigade
59th Infantry Brigade
4th Ind.Mixed Brigade
15th Division
8th Armored Car Co
37th Division
15th Tank Regiment
36th Division
32nd Division
40th Division
6th Division
26th Division
3rd Tank Division
22nd Division
34th Division
116th Division
23rd Ind.Mixed Brigade
70th Division
41st Division
39th Division
58th Division
13th Division
38th Division
6th Medium Field Artillery Regiment
12th Army
13th Ind.Art.Mortar Battalion
15th Ind.Medium Field Artillery Regiment
Tonei Hvy Gun Regiment
3rd Ind.Hvy.Art. Battalion
12th Ind.Art.Mortar Battalion
1st Army
23rd Army
11th Ind.Art.Mortar Battalion
4th Ind. Mountain Gun Regiment
52nd Ind.Mtn.Gun Battalion
10th Ind. Mountain Gun Regiment
North China Area Army
2nd Ind.Hvy.Art. Battalion
2nd Ind. Mountain Gun Regiment
21st Mortar Battalion
51st Ind.Mtn.Gun Battalion
1st Mortar Battalion
1st Hvy.Artillery Regiment
2nd Mortar Battalion
14th Medium Field Artillery Regiment
11th Army
20th Ind. Mtn Gun Battalion

Defending units:
11th Chinese Corps
8th Chinese Corps
62nd Chinese Corps
9th Prov Chinese Corps
5th New Chinese Corps
4th Chinese Cavalry Corps
86th Chinese Corps
14th Chinese Corps
99th Chinese Corps
81st Chinese Corps
38th Chinese Corps
18th Chinese Corps
1st Chinese Cavalry Corps
1st New Chinese Corps
27th Chinese Corps
57th Chinese Corps
74th Chinese Corps
35th Chinese Corps
85th Chinese Corps
75th Chinese Corps
96th Chinese Corps
60th Chinese Corps
98th Chinese Corps
3rd Chinese Corps
16th Chinese Corps
9th Chinese Corps
2nd Chinese Cavalry Corps
50th Chinese Corps
61st Chinese Corps
89th Chinese Corps
33rd Chinese Corps
68th Chinese Corps
10th Chinese Corps
45th Chinese Corps
97th Chinese Corps
47th Chinese Corps
78th Chinese Corps
25th Chinese Corps
23rd Chinese Corps
59th Chinese Corps
87th Chinese Corps
3rd Prov Chinese Corps
49th Chinese Corps
1st Chinese Corps
42nd Chinese Corps
55th Chinese Corps
36th Chinese Corps
93rd Chinese Corps
43rd Chinese Corps
100th Chinese Corps
79th Chinese Corps
53rd Chinese Corps
56th Chinese Corps
77th Chinese Corps
29th Chinese Corps
73rd Chinese Corps
4th Chinese Corps
21st Chinese Corps
13th Chinese Corps
7th Chinese Corps
31st Chinese Corps
32nd Chinese Corps
46th Chinese Corps
94th Chinese Corps
72nd Chinese Corps
92nd Chinese Corps
41st Chinese Corps
91st Chinese Corps
2nd Prov Chinese Corps
30th Chinese Corps
90th Chinese Corps
44th Chinese Corps
19th Chinese Corps
5th Chinese Cavalry Corps
71st Chinese Corps
52nd Chinese Corps
120th Red Chinese Division
26th Chinese Corps
76th Chinese Corps
63rd Chinese Corps
2nd Chinese Corps
20th Chinese Corps
84th Chinese Corps
12th Chinese Corps
67th Chinese Corps
37th Chinese Corps
2nd Construction Regiment
9th Chinese Base Force
1st Chinese Base Force
1st War Area
7th Artillery Regiment
37th Group Army
15th Chinese Base Force
8th Construction Regiment
32nd Group Army
1st Group Army
3rd War Area
22nd Chinese Corps
39th Chinese Corps
6th Chinese Base Force
8th War Area
115th Red Chinese Division
38th Group Army
3rd Group Army
6th War Area
2nd Group Army
31st Group Army
26th Group Army
65th Chinese Corps
17th Construction Regiment
13th Chinese Base Force
15th Group Army
20th Group Army
5th Group Army
41st AA Regiment
15th Chinese Corps
21st Group Army
9th War Area
9th Group Army
6th Group Army
33rd Group Army
20th Artillery Regiment
2nd Chinese Base Force
16th Construction Regiment
35th Group Army
12th Group Army
14th Group Army
4th Group Army
3rd Construction Regiment
18th Chinese Base Force
14th Construction Regiment
Jingcha War Area
36th Group Army
4th Chinese Base Force
20th Chinese Base Force
Lusu War Area
13th Construction Regiment
25th Group Army
7th New Chinese Corps
22nd Group Army
3rd Chinese Cavalry Corps
10th Chinese Base Force
2nd War Area
18th Artillery Regiment
12th Construction Regiment
11th Chinese Base Force
7th Chinese Base Force
11th Construction Regiment
CAF HQ
4th War Area
Central Reserve
24th Group Army
3rd Heavy Mortar Regiment
23rd Group Army
13th Group Army
27th Group Army
6th Construction Regiment
7th War Area
Red Chinese Army
4th Heavy Mortar Regiment
18th Group Army
10th Construction Regiment
19th Group Army
49th AA Regiment
17th Chinese Base Force
China Command
5th War Area
56th AT Gun Regiment

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[wneumann]

The Big Picture #17 – Allied Buildup and Offensive Preparations (South Pacific theatre)

This post covers Allied buildup activities and offensive preparations specific to the South Pacific theatre through the end of 4/43.

Principal bases in the South Pacific theatre area: Auckland is the central base for operations in the South Pacific theatre area. Major secondary operating bases established in the South Pacific area include Fiji (both Suva and Nadi bases), Pago Pago, Tongatapu (naval base for light surface ASW & minesweepers covering Suva) and Tahiti. Port and airfield facilities at all these bases are fully expanded to maximum sizes.


Supply & Fuel Operational Stockpiles: The following quantities are on-hand amounts currently stored at central location(s) in the South Pacific theatre area and considered available for use in supporting planned or projected offensive operations in/from this theatre. The quantities below exclude amounts of supply and fuel on-hand at outlying bases, also any estimated amounts required to maintain rear-area bases and operations in the South Pacific area plus maintaining LCU and aircraft in NZ restricted command forces.

• Supply – 2.0 million
• Fuel – 970K

Build-up of these reserves was done mainly through shipments arriving from the mainland US via “WP” convoys from the West Coast – this activity intended to continue. Most LCU and air unit arrivals in the South Pacific also come via this convoy route.

Light industry production in New Zealand is active and producing supply points using domestic resource production along with small quantities of resource points occasionally transported from Suva to Auckland. All heavy industry facilities in New Zealand are currently inactive.


HQ Units in theatre: HQ’s operating in the South Pacific area follow.

• Naval HQ (1) – South Pacific theatre
• Air HQ (6) - 13th USAAF, XIII US Fighter Cmd, XIII US Bomber Cmd, USN AirSoPac, US Marine AirFMPac, 1 Group RNZAF (NZ unrestricted command)
• Ground HQ (3) – US I Amphibious Corps, US XIV Corps, 3rd NZ Division HQ
• Other HQ (1) – New Zealand Command (restricted command)


Combat Ground forces in theatre: The LCU listed below include Allied ground combat forces now in the South Pacific theatre area, excluding New Zealand LCU under restricted command. The majority of these units are currently located in New Zealand, Fiji or Samoa, plus a small garrison at Tahiti.

• Divisional combat units (Infantry) – four US Army infantry divisions, two US Marine divisions.
• Brigade/Regiment combat units (Infantry) – three NZ Infantry Brigades (unrestricted command), 112 US Cavalry Rgt, two US Infantry Rgts
• Battalion combat units (Infantry) – Samoa Marine Bn (US), 4 US Marine Raider Bn, two US Army bns, two Australian bns (unrestricted command), Samoa Detachment and 1 Fiji Commando Bn (both NZ unrestricted command)
• Airborne units – three US Marine Parachute Bns
• Combat Engineer units – 131 US Combat Engineer Rgt, 110 US Combat Engineer Bn
• Tank/Motorized units - three US Tank Bns, 3 NZ Armored Sqn (unrestricted command), two NZ light Motorized Rgts (unrestricted command)
• Artillery units – 33 NZ Medium Artillery Rgt (unrestricted command), eight US Field Artillery Bns


Support and Base Force LCU in theatre: Allied units listed below are now in the South Pacific theatre area, excluding New Zealand LCU under restricted command. Most of these units currently located in New Zealand, Fiji or Samoa, plus the garrison at Tahiti.

• Naval base units – five USN Base Force LCU, F Det USN Port Svc
• Air base units – four USAAF Base Force LCU, one US Aviation Base Force LCU, two US Marine Air Base Force LCU, two NZ Air Base Force LCU (unrestricted command)
• Other base units – five USA Base Force LCU
• Anti-aircraft units – five US AA Rgts, one US AA Bn
• Coast Artillery units – seven US Marine Def Bns
• Construction Engineer units – five US Army EAB, two US Marine EAB, three US Naval Construction Rgts, sixteen USN Seabee Bns, two NZ Pioneer Coys (unrestricted command)


Allied LBA Air forces currently in theatre: Most air squadrons listed below include forces based in New Zealand plus those in the Suva/Samoa area.

• Fighter (USAAF) – 5 squadrons, 125 planes total. 3 squadrons with P-40K, one P-38F, one P-38G.
• Fighter (USN, US Marine) – 5 squadrons, 90 planes total. Three squadrons with F4U-1 Corsair, two F4F. Priority for plane upgrades from F4F Wildcat to F4U Corsairs being given to VMF fighter squadrons in the South Pacific.
• Fighter (NZ, all restricted command) – 3 squadrons, 36 planes total. All three NZ fighter squadrons equipped with Kittyhawk variants.

• Dive Bombers (US Marine) – 7 squadrons, 126 planes total. All squadrons equipped with SBD-3 Dauntless.
• 2E Bombers (USAAF) – none currently in theatre.
• 2E Bombers (NZ restricted command) – 6 squadrons, 72 planes total. 5 squadrons with Hudson III(LR), one Vincent I. Four of the 6 squadrons (all Hudson III) trained specifically for both regular and low-level naval attack. One Hudson III squadron employed on naval search missions from Suva, the Vincent I squadron for dedicated pilot training. My intent is using NZ 2E bombers primarily for naval attack.
• Torpedo (NZ restricted command) – 1 squadron, 12 planes. This squadron operating Vildebeest IV, has a 5/15/43 scheduled withdrawal date.

• 4E Bombers (USAAF) – 2 squadrons, 28 planes total. One squadron with B-17E, one LB-30.

Plans currently in place have Central and South Pacific theatres using a common pool of USAAF 4E bombers that will move between the two theatres. Intent of this plan is to form and operate a single concentrated force of 4E bombers that will operate as “flying artillery” in support of offensive operations in either theatre. Movement of 4E bombers between Central and South Pacific will be done using base-to-base transfer by air. Pago Pago airfield (Samoa) is fully expanded to size 7 with sufficient supply and aviation support in place as a transit point to support air transfer missions between Pearl Harbor and Suva. Additional 4E bomber squadrons in SW Pacific theatre can be drawn into this pool as needed or desired.

• Patrol (USN) – 4 squadrons, 45 planes total. All squadrons with PBY Catalina variants. One squadron based at Tahiti.
• Patrol (Australian) – 1 squadron, 4 planes. This squadron with Catalina I.
• Patrol (NZ, unrestricted command) – 1 squadron, 1 plane. This squadron has one S19 Singapore floatplane and currently a training squadron. Plans are to upgrade the squadron to 12 PBY-5 Catalina (NZ) when these planes become available in sufficient quantity to do the upgrade – production of (NZ) PBY-5 just started in 4/43. After upgrade, the NZ squadron will operate on front-line naval search missions.

• Recon (USAAF) – 2 squadrons, 24 planes total. One squadron with F-4 Lightning, one with F-5A Lightning.

• Air Transport (USAAF & US Marines) – 3 squadrons, 37 planes total. 2 squadrons with R4D-1, one C-47.


Aviation support elements currently available in theatre:

• Base Force LCU (US & NZ non-restricted command) – 1384 squads
• Base Force LCU (NZ restricted command) – 229 squads
• Seaplane tenders – 8 total air support capacity


Allied Naval forces currently in theatre: At this time, no major Allied surface naval or carrier forces are operating in the South Pacific theatre area. Overall strategic plans do not have major Allied carrier or surface naval forces permanently operating in the South Pacific or any other theatre command – these forces are intended to move from one area to another according to operational or strategic needs at a given time and will only appear in the forward zone of a theatre area at the “last moment” before launching of a major operation.

Ships in naval forces currently located in the South Pacific theatre and assigned to operations there include (1) surface ASW and minesweeping forces covering New Zealand and Suva, and (2) S-class submarines operating in patrol areas to the N, NW and W of Suva.

From early 1942, all US S-class subs and short-range Dutch submarines have been assigned to patrol operations near Suva, also in northern areas of the Coral Sea near Rabaul and the Solomons. This action was done to take best advantage of the limited range of these subs, also the fact torpedo armament on these subs were the best available through all of 1942. In 1943, patrol operations of some US fleet submarines are starting to be based at Auckland (rather than Pearl Harbor) – this being done for US fleet subs in patrol operations south of Truk to take advantage of Auckland’s closer location to the assigned patrol areas of these subs. At this time only a small number of US fleet subs are based at Auckland, plans are underway to increase the number of subs at Auckland.

The following are numbers of various light naval forces currently located within the South Pacific theatre area mainly on surface ASW and mine warfare operations. If necessary, this force can be reinforced with additional ships from the SW Pacific theatre area (Australia).

• Light Cruisers (CL) – 1 Omaha Class
• Destroyers (DD) – 5 (all Wickes & Clemson classes)
• Light surface ASW ships (SC, PC) – 25 (most operating near Suva or Auckland)
• US S-class submarines – 15
• US Fleet submarines – 4 (plus 6 additional subs now enroute from Pearl Harbor)
• Destroyer Minesweepers (DMS) – 2
• Minesweepers (AM, YMS) – 15 (both US and NZ ships)
• Coastal Minesweepers (AMc) – 7 (all NZ)
• Minefield Tenders (ACM) – 4
• Minelayers (CM) – 2 (both US)
• PT Boats – 3


Transport, Amphibious & Naval Auxiliary ships in theatre: Ships included in this category are reserved for use within the theatre area and perform one or more of the operational function(s) below.

(1) Short-range sea transport between bases within the theatre area.
(2) Auxiliary ships for replenishment and support purposes.
(3) Ships being accumulated in reserve for use in planned and projected amphibious operations.

Ships listed below are now located at bases in the South Pacific theatre area – these ships part of a common pool with SW Pacific theatre available for operational use in either (SW or South Pacific) theatre.

• Transport (xAKL, various nationalities) – 29
• Transport (small xAK) – 6
• Submarine Transport (SST) – 3
• Small AO – 5 (four Dutch, one Australian)
• LST – 17
• Destroyer Transports (APD) – 1

• Tenders (AG) – 4
• Seaplane Tender (AVD, AVP) – 2 (one Dutch, one US)


Naval support currently available in theatre: The following are numbers of available naval support squads on TOE strength in Base Force LCU located in the South Pacific area.

• Base Force LCU (US. NZ, Free French non-restricted command) – 560 squads
• Base Force LCU (NZ restricted command) – 40 squads

One repair shipyard at Auckland (size 15) is located in the South Pacific command area. This shipyard mainly used for repair of minor damage for submarines, small surface ASW and transport ships based in the South Pacific theatre area. Auckland shipyard is occasionally used for upgrades and major repairs, though in most cases (for security reasons) these ships are transferred to shipyards in Australia (Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane) to undergo major repairs or ship upgrades. My practice has been limiting use of Auckland shipyard to simple, quick repair activity or emergencies – this to prevent the possibility of ships being caught in shipyard during a Japanese attack (main concern here being a KB sortie).

[CaptBeefheart]

wneumann: This is a very detailed AAR which is quite helpful in dispensing information to newbies and even in providing new ideas to experienced players. Very much appreciated.

One question I have is: Why do you send air and ground units from the East Coast to Cape Town (and then Oz) by convoy? Is the move quicker that way than a strat move between bases? Apologies if you covered this earlier.

Cheers,
CC

[wneumann]

CC,

Why do you send air and ground units from the East Coast to Cape Town (and then Oz) by convoy? Is the move quicker that way than a strat move between bases?

Short answer to the second question is the off-map route is probably longer in time, total off and on-map movement time for a typical "EX" convoy being about 45-50 days one-way. Most of this transit time is off-map movement.


I’ve employed the Eastern US to Australia via Capetown route since 12/41 – all “EX” convoys arriving in Australia operate along this route. This particular convoy route has been used for all cargo (LCU, air units, supply, fuel) being transported to SW Pacific theatre from the mainland US. I didn’t have any one particular reason for establishing and using this convoy route. What follows is the combination of factors and the process I used to develop the system of transport convoys in place between the Eastern US and Australia via Capetown.

1) AE game map geography – Two features from the geography immediately stuck out when first examining the AE game map: (1) availability of off-map sea movement routes and (2) the Eastern US base. The next step was answering the question “What can they be used for?”


2) Off map sea movement routes – The first and most important advantage of off-map sea routes is immunity of Allied ships moving across them from Japanese detection or attack. Allied transport convoys using off-map sea routes can be organized, scheduled and dispatched with complete disregard to what my Japanese opponent is doing or attempting to do on-map, this true at least during intervals when these convoys are moving off-map. Another feature of the Eastern US to Capetown "leg" of this route is that ships travelling between these two off-map bases do not consume fuel - however, ships in TF moving between Eastern US and Capetown must refuel to at least the Minimal Refuel level required to cover the distance between Eastern US and Capetown even though the ships do not actually use the fuel in transit.

No question that movement of transport convoys using off-map sea routes from the mainland US to Australia (via Capetown) is longer at least in time if not also distance. However, for most cargoes travelling from the US to Australia in 1941-42, I viewed that how long it took for these cargoes to arrive in Australia mattered less than simply getting them there. Within the early war time frame, the advantage of increased security in using off-map sea transport to get LCU, air units and other cargo to Australia greatly outweighed the longer movement distance and time to get those cargoes to Australia using the off-map route. If the LCU or air unit you’re shipping to Australia from the mainland US for SW Pacific probably isn’t going to be used before the Allied offensive in 1943 (or so), it probably doesn’t matter how quickly the LCU or air unit arrives in Australia. Haste is especially wasteful when that haste is unnecessary.


3) Eastern US base is a feature of AE game map geography with a number of features difficult for an Allied player to ignore – including size 10 port and airfield facilities, the largest shipyard (size 300), large stockpiles of fuel and supply points.

Eastern US is currently the designated departure point for nearly all cargo to SW Pacific theatre from the mainland US. Individual LCU and air units assigned to SW Pacific are moved to the Eastern US for departure – this action sorts them out from LCU and air units assigned to other theatres and also from restricted command units remaining in the mainland US. Just makes tracking easier. Much of the supply and fuel stockpile in the Eastern US is also shipped to SW Pacific theatre along with the departing LCU and air units. This also provides a use (in Australia for SW Pacific theatre) of supply and fuel points stockpiled at the Eastern US base.


4) During 12/41 and early 1942, it quickly became apparent I had a considerable local surplus of long-range, large capacity Allied transport ships (xAK, xAP and TK) available in Australia, India and the Middle East, these ships with little or nothing to do where they were currently located.

Transport ships from this surplus group were collected at Capetown and dispatched from there to the Eastern US for use in the Allied transport convoy system I was organizing. These ships included about 60-70% of the British transport ship fleet starting the game in India and the Middle East, plus nearly all larger transports successfully evacuated from the DEI, Malaya and the Philippines. These ships plus additional US transport ships arriving later as reinforcements in the Eastern US now form the “EX” convoys operating between the Eastern US and Australia. It just happened that sending these transports off-map to the Eastern US was more feasible than sending them across the Pacific to the US West Coast – this movement path later becoming the route for “EX” convoys.


5) Melbourne is being used as the destination port for “EX” transport convoys from Eastern US to Australia. The on-map entry point used by the AI for sea movement from Capetown to Melbourne plus the route of approach from the entry point to Melbourne is virtually inaccessible to either Japanese detection or interdiction.


One final note I will make on using this route. “EX” transport convoys have proved highly successful for the Allied buildup of SW Pacific theatre in Australia. However, once the Allied strategic offensive from SW Pacific (and other theatres) begins, other (more direct) sea transport routes will be needed as the Allied advance moves farther north from Australia and closer to the Japanese homeland - probable end result is that the off-map route now used by “EX” convoys will become obsolete and eventually discontinued.

I should also add... the off-map route via Capetown from Panama was also used by the US Main Carrier force in transit to and from the Palembang raid.

[wneumann]

Summary of Operations 4/30/43

Formosa Straits: US patrol sub intercepts a very large Jap TK in the northern exit of the straits between Formosa and mainland China. AAR follows.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sub attack near Taihoku at 87,61 (NW of Taihoku)

Japanese Ships
TK Koho Maru
PB Toko Maru #4

Allied Ships
SS Balao

SS Balao launches 2 torpedoes at TK Koho Maru
Balao diving deep ....
PB Toko Maru #4 fails to find sub, continues to search...
Escort abandons search for sub

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


Central Pacific: Sigint entries for 4/29 report intercepted Jap radio transmissions from Kwajalein and Roi-Namur. Unidentified Jap aircraft are visible at both Kwajalein and Roi-Namur, also both bases have ship(s) in port. No other visible Japanese forces or activity observed at either Kwajalein or Roi-Namur.

Intercepted Jap radio transmissions at Tarawa were reported in another Sigint entry for 4/29. Detected status of Tarawa shows no visible Japanese forces or activity.


South Pacific: US patrol sub intercepts possible Jap fast transport TF in a night action between the eastern Solomons and Ndeni. AAR follows.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ASW attack near Kirakira at 117,140 (adjacent hex E of Kirakira)

Japanese Ships
APD Nadakaze
APD Fuji
APD Shimakaze
APD Tade
APD Hagi

Allied Ships
SS Guardfish

SS Guardfish launches 2 torpedoes at APD Nadakaze
Guardfish diving deep ....
APD Tade fails to find sub and abandons search
APD Hagi attacking submerged sub ....
Escort abandons search for sub

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Daily coastwatcher entries from 4/29 Operations report follow.

Coastwatcher Report: 3 ships in port at Tulagi
Coastwatcher Report: 3 ships in port at Lae
Coastwatcher Report: 1 ship in port at Manus
Coastwatcher Report: 3 ships in port at Luganville
Coastwatcher sighting: 1 Japanese ship at 115,160 near Noumea, Speed unknown
Coastwatcher sighting: 1 Japanese ship at 106,125 near Rabaul, Speed unknown
Coastwatcher sighting: 1 Japanese ship at 114,138 near Lunga, Speed unknown
Coastwatcher Report: 1 ship in port at Thousand Ships Bay
Coastwatcher Report: 1 ship in port at Buna
Coastwatcher Report: 3 ships in port at Lae
Coastwatcher Report: 1 ship in port at Belep Islands
Coastwatcher Report: 4 ships in port at Luganville
Coastwatcher Report: 1 ship in port at Tanna
Coastwatcher sighting: 2 Japanese ships at 114,138 near Lunga, Speed unknown


Andaman Sea: Dutch patrol sub in action with Jap transport convoy off Rangoon, also attacked and damaged by Ki-49 Helen air patrol (system damage 17, float 12, engine 7). O21 now returning to base at 16 kts for repair. AAR follows.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ASW attack near Rangoon at 53,56 (S of Rangoon)

Japanese Ships
PB Kyo Maru #5
PB Fukeui Maru #7
AK Teiyo Maru
AK Tamagawa Maru
AK Sinko Maru
xAK Kosin Maru
xAK Hokutai Maru
PB Yachiyo Maru
PB Tama Maru #3
PB Shintohoku Maru

Allied Ships
SS O21

SS O21 is sighted by escort
O21 diving deep ....
PB Yachiyo Maru fails to find sub, continues to search...
PB Tama Maru #3 fails to find sub, continues to search...
PB Shintohoku Maru fails to find sub, continues to search...
Escort abandons search for sub

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


Burma: Detected status of Jap base in Rangoon from British aerial recon – 9 Japanese ships anchored in port, no Jap TF in harbor (-1 from last report), 105 aircraft (79 fighters, 29 bombers), 7 Jap LCU’s.

One really, really uncoordinated air strike… RAF and USAAF launch night bombing raid against Magwe oil production. No Japanese aircraft destroyed. Total Allied air losses include two B-25C (one due to flak, one ops), one RAF Hudson IIIa (ops loss). Detected status at Magwe shows oil production at 52(169) – these raids accomplished little or no damage. 110 Japanese aircraft (106 fighters) also detected at Magwe. Combat events entries and AAR’s follow.

5 x No.146 Sqn RAF Wellington Ic stray due to night
7 x No.160 Sqn RAF Liberator II stray due to night
4 x No.215 Sqn RAF Wellington Ic stray due to night
4 x No.353 Sqn RAF Hudson IIIa stray due to night
4 x 7th BG/9th BS B-24D Liberator stray due to night
7 x 341st BG/11th BS B-25C Mitchell stray due to night
5 x 341st BG/22nd BS B-25C Mitchell stray due to night
5 x 341st BG/490th BS B-25C Mitchell stray due to night
6 x 7th BG/492nd BS B-24D Liberator stray due to night
5 x 7th BG/493rd BS B-24D Liberator stray due to night
7 x No.146 Sqn RAF Wellington Ic stray due to night
4 x 341st BG/11th BS B-25C Mitchell stray due to night
7 x 341st BG/490th BS B-25C Mitchell stray due to night
7 x 7th BG/493rd BS B-24D Liberator stray due to night

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Night Air attack on Magwe, at 57,47

Weather in hex: Moderate rain

Raid spotted at 38 NM, estimated altitude 9,000 feet.
Estimated time to target is 14 minutes

Japanese aircraft
Ki-44-IIa Tojo x 6

Allied aircraft
Hudson IIIa x 5
Liberator II x 8
Wellington Ic x 5

No Japanese losses
No Allied losses

Aircraft Attacking:
8 x Liberator II bombing from 7000 feet
City Attack: 8 x 500 lb GP Bomb
5 x Wellington Ic bombing from 7000 feet
City Attack: 8 x 500 lb GP Bomb
5 x Hudson IIIa bombing from 1000 feet
City Attack: 2 x 250 lb GP Bomb

CAP engaged:
47th I.F.Chutai with Ki-44-IIa Tojo (1 airborne, 3 on standby, 2 scrambling)
1 plane(s) intercepting now.
Group patrol altitude is 15000 , scrambling fighters to 15000.
Time for all group planes to reach interception is 44 minutes

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Night Air attack on Magwe, at 57,47

Weather in hex: Moderate rain

Raid spotted at 7 NM, estimated altitude 10,000 feet.
Estimated time to target is 2 minutes

Japanese aircraft
Ki-44-IIa Tojo x 6

Allied aircraft
B-24D Liberator x 5

No Japanese losses

Allied aircraft losses
B-24D Liberator: 2 damaged

Aircraft Attacking:
5 x B-24D Liberator bombing from 8000 feet
City Attack: 10 x 500 lb GP Bomb

CAP engaged:
47th I.F.Chutai with Ki-44-IIa Tojo (4 airborne, 0 on standby, 2 scrambling)
4 plane(s) intercepting now.
Group patrol altitude is 15000 , scrambling fighters to 15000.
Time for all group planes to reach interception is 34 minutes

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Night Air attack on Magwe, at 57,47

Weather in hex: Moderate rain

Raid spotted at 37 NM, estimated altitude 9,000 feet.
Estimated time to target is 10 minutes

Japanese aircraft
Ki-44-IIa Tojo x 5

Allied aircraft
B-25C Mitchell x 5

No Japanese losses

Allied aircraft losses
B-25C Mitchell: 1 damaged

Aircraft Attacking:
5 x B-25C Mitchell bombing from 1000 feet
City Attack: 3 x 500 lb GP Bomb

CAP engaged:
47th I.F.Chutai with Ki-44-IIa Tojo (5 airborne, 0 on standby, 0 scrambling)
5 plane(s) intercepting now.
Group patrol altitude is 15000
Raid is overhead

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Night Air attack on Magwe, at 57,47

Weather in hex: Moderate rain

Raid spotted at 39 NM, estimated altitude 8,000 feet.
Estimated time to target is 11 minutes

Japanese aircraft
Ki-44-IIa Tojo x 5

Allied aircraft
B-25C Mitchell x 7

No Japanese losses

Allied aircraft losses
B-25C Mitchell: 2 damaged

Aircraft Attacking:
7 x B-25C Mitchell bombing from 1000 feet
City Attack: 3 x 500 lb GP Bomb

CAP engaged: (same as previous strike)

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Night Air attack on Magwe, at 57,47

Weather in hex: Moderate rain

Raid spotted at 38 NM, estimated altitude 10,000 feet.
Estimated time to target is 11 minutes

Japanese aircraft
Ki-44-IIa Tojo x 5

Allied aircraft
B-25C Mitchell x 12

No Japanese losses

Allied aircraft losses
B-25C Mitchell: 1 damaged

Aircraft Attacking:
12 x B-25C Mitchell bombing from 1000 feet
City Attack: 3 x 500 lb GP Bomb

CAP engaged: (same as previous strike)

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Night Air attack on Magwe, at 57,47

Weather in hex: Moderate rain

Raid spotted at 12 NM, estimated altitude 11,000 feet.
Estimated time to target is 4 minutes

Japanese aircraft
Ki-44-IIa Tojo x 5

Allied aircraft
Wellington Ic x 5

No Japanese losses
No Allied losses

Aircraft Attacking:
5 x Wellington Ic bombing from 7000 feet
City Attack: 8 x 500 lb GP Bomb

CAP engaged: (same as previous strike)

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Night Air attack on Magwe, at 57,47

Weather in hex: Moderate rain

Raid spotted at 24 NM, estimated altitude 13,000 feet.
Estimated time to target is 8 minutes

Japanese aircraft
Ki-44-IIa Tojo x 5

Allied aircraft
Liberator II x 7

No Japanese losses
No Allied losses

Aircraft Attacking:
7 x Liberator II bombing from 7000 feet
City Attack: 8 x 500 lb GP Bomb

CAP engaged: (same as previous strike)

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Night Air attack on Magwe, at 57,47

Weather in hex: Moderate rain

Raid spotted at 11 NM, estimated altitude 10,000 feet.
Estimated time to target is 4 minutes

Japanese aircraft
Ki-44-IIa Tojo x 5

Allied aircraft
Wellington Ic x 4

No Japanese losses
No Allied losses

Aircraft Attacking:
4 x Wellington Ic bombing from 7000 feet
City Attack: 8 x 500 lb GP Bomb

CAP engaged: (same as previous strike)

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Night Air attack on Magwe, at 57,47

Weather in hex: Moderate rain

Raid spotted at 49 NM, estimated altitude 8,000 feet.
Estimated time to target is 16 minutes

Japanese aircraft
Ki-44-IIa Tojo x 5

Allied aircraft
Hudson IIIa x 4

No Japanese losses

Allied aircraft losses
Hudson IIIa: 2 damaged

Aircraft Attacking:
4 x Hudson IIIa bombing from 1000 feet
City Attack: 2 x 250 lb GP Bomb

CAP engaged: (same as previous strike)

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Night Air attack on Magwe, at 57,47

Weather in hex: Moderate rain

Raid spotted at 23 NM, estimated altitude 10,000 feet.
Estimated time to target is 6 minutes

Japanese aircraft
Ki-44-IIa Tojo x 5

Allied aircraft
B-25C Mitchell x 7

No Japanese losses
No Allied losses

Aircraft Attacking:
7 x B-25C Mitchell bombing from 1000 feet
City Attack: 3 x 500 lb GP Bomb

CAP engaged: (same as previous strike)

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Night Air attack on Magwe, at 57,47

Weather in hex: Moderate rain

Raid spotted at 49 NM, estimated altitude 11,000 feet.
Estimated time to target is 14 minutes

Japanese aircraft
Ki-44-IIa Tojo x 5

Allied aircraft
B-25C Mitchell x 5

No Japanese losses
No Allied losses

Aircraft Attacking:
5 x B-25C Mitchell bombing from 1000 feet
City Attack: 3 x 500 lb GP Bomb

CAP engaged: (same as previous strike)

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Night Air attack on Magwe, at 57,47

Weather in hex: Moderate rain

Raid spotted at 47 NM, estimated altitude 10,000 feet.
Estimated time to target is 16 minutes

Japanese aircraft
Ki-44-IIa Tojo x 5

Allied aircraft
B-24D Liberator x 6

No Japanese losses
No Allied losses

Aircraft Attacking:
6 x B-24D Liberator bombing from 7000 feet
City Attack: 10 x 500 lb GP Bomb

CAP engaged: (same as previous strike)

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Night Air attack on Magwe, at 57,47

Weather in hex: Moderate rain

Raid spotted at 11 NM, estimated altitude 12,000 feet.
Estimated time to target is 3 minutes

Japanese aircraft
Ki-44-IIa Tojo x 5

Allied aircraft
B-24D Liberator x 5

No Japanese losses
No Allied losses

Aircraft Attacking:
5 x B-24D Liberator bombing from 7000 feet
City Attack: 10 x 500 lb GP Bomb

CAP engaged: (same as previous strike)

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Night Air attack on Magwe, at 57,47

Weather in hex: Moderate rain

Raid spotted at 32 NM, estimated altitude 9,000 feet.
Estimated time to target is 12 minutes

Japanese aircraft
Ki-44-IIa Tojo x 4

Allied aircraft
Wellington Ic x 7

No Japanese losses
No Allied losses

Aircraft Attacking:
7 x Wellington Ic bombing from 7000 feet
City Attack: 8 x 500 lb GP Bomb

CAP engaged:
47th I.F.Chutai with Ki-44-IIa Tojo (4 airborne, 0 on standby, 0 scrambling)
4 plane(s) intercepting now.
Group patrol altitude is 15000
Raid is overhead

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Night Air attack on Magwe, at 57,47

Weather in hex: Moderate rain

Raid spotted at 21 NM, estimated altitude 10,000 feet.
Estimated time to target is 6 minutes

Japanese aircraft
Ki-44-IIa Tojo x 4

Allied aircraft
B-25C Mitchell x 4

No Japanese losses
No Allied losses

Aircraft Attacking:
4 x B-25C Mitchell bombing from 1000 feet
City Attack: 3 x 500 lb GP Bomb

CAP engaged: (same as previous strike)

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Night Air attack on Magwe, at 57,47

Weather in hex: Moderate rain

Raid spotted at 13 NM, estimated altitude 13,000 feet.
Estimated time to target is 3 minutes

Japanese aircraft
Ki-44-IIa Tojo x 4

Allied aircraft
B-25C Mitchell x 7

No Japanese losses

Allied aircraft losses
B-25C Mitchell: 1 destroyed by flak

Aircraft Attacking:
6 x B-25C Mitchell bombing from 1000 feet
City Attack: 3 x 500 lb GP Bomb

CAP engaged: (same as previous air strike)

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Night Air attack on Magwe, at 57,47

Weather in hex: Moderate rain

Raid spotted at 25 NM, estimated altitude 12,000 feet.
Estimated time to target is 8 minutes

Japanese aircraft
Ki-44-IIa Tojo x 4

Allied aircraft
B-24D Liberator x 7

No Japanese losses
No Allied losses

Aircraft Attacking:
7 x B-24D Liberator bombing from 7000 feet
City Attack: 10 x 500 lb GP Bomb

CAP engaged: (same as previous air strike)

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


China: No reported ground combat at Chungking.

[wneumann]

The Big Picture #18 – Allied Buildup and Offensive Preparations (SW Pacific theatre)

This post covers Allied buildup activities and offensive preparations specific to the SW Pacific theatre through the end of 4/43.

Principal bases in the SW Pacific theatre area: Sydney is the central base for operations in the SW Pacific theatre area. Major secondary operating bases established in the SW Pacific area include Brisbane (naval base for submarines) and Melbourne (primary arrival port for “EX” transport convoys from the Eastern US). Geographic area currently in the SW Pacific command area includes the eastern half of Australia. Allied forces and activities in interior areas, western and NW Australia not included in the SW Pacific theatre.

Construction and build-up of a complex of bases in NE Australia (Townsville, Charters Towers, Cairns, Cooktown, Portland Roads) to launch/support planned operations against the New Guinea area is now completed or in the final stages. Port and airfield facilities at the bases above are fully expanded to maximum sizes. Particular emphasis has been maximizing airfield expansion at these bases to support large-scale Allied air operations over eastern New Guinea.

Less emphasis has been placed on bases in Western and NW Australia. Perth is capable of supporting smaller-scale operations. To date, no development of base facilities at Darwin has been done – mainly due to general difficulties with supply in NW Australia, also the intent of not offering a base in this region with significant port/airfield sizes in reach of possible Japanese attack and capture.


Supply & Fuel Operational Stockpiles: The following quantities are on-hand amounts currently stored at central location(s) in the SW Pacific theatre area and considered available for use in supporting planned or projected offensive operations in/from this theatre. The quantities below exclude amounts of supply and fuel on-hand at smaller bases in Australia, also any estimated amounts required to maintain rear-area bases and operations in the SW Pacific area plus maintaining LCU and aircraft in Australian restricted command forces.

• Supply – 3.75 million
• Fuel – 735K

Build-up of reserves was done through shipments arriving from the Eastern US aboard “EX” convoys – this activity intended to continue. Nearly all LCU and air unit arrivals for SW Pacific theatre also come via this convoy route. A small number of LCU and air units assigned to South Pacific theatre also arrive in Australia via the “EX” convoys, these LCU and air squadrons moving on to the South Pacific via local sea transport between Australia and New Zealand.

Light industry production in Australia is active and producing supply points using domestic resource production on the Australia mainland along with resource points transported to mainland Australia from Tasmania (Hobart). Small quantities of oil have been shipped to Australia allowing the small refinery in Sydney to occasionally produce fuel. All heavy industry facilities in Australia are currently inactive.


HQ Units in theatre: HQ’s currently operating in the SW Pacific area as follows.

• Southwest Pacific theatre HQ
• Naval HQ (1) – Asiatic Fleet
• Air HQ (3) - 5th USAAF, II US Fighter Cmd, V US Bomber Cmd, 9 Group RAAF (unrestricted command)
• Ground HQ (2) – I US Corps, I Australian Corps. HQ US Sixth Army is currently enroute to Australia.
• Other HQ (6, all restricted command) – Australia Command (theatre), 1st & 2nd Australian Army (ground), RAAF command (air), II & III Australian Corps (ground)


Combat Ground forces in theatre: The LCU listed below include US forces and non-restricted Allied ground forces now in the SW Pacific theatre area. Australian combat LCU under restricted command are excluded. Units listed below are located entirely in mainland Australia.

US combat ground forces.

• Divisional combat units (Infantry) – three Army infantry divisions, one Marine division
• Brigade/Regiment combat units (Infantry) – 158 Infantry Rgt
• Battalion combat units (Infantry) – 1/102 Infantry Bn, two Marine Raider bns
• Airborne units – 503 Parachute Rgt
• Combat Engineer units – 102 Combat Engineer Rgt, 2/151 Combat Engineer Bn
• Tank/Motorized units – seven Tank bns
• Artillery units – four FA rgts, four FA bns

Australian combat ground forces in unrestricted command. These units are directly attached to SW Pacific command HQ or or indirectly attached to SW Pacific through I Australian Corps. One additional Australian division (6th) is now attached to SW Pacific theatre command and currently in defensive garrison at Colombo – plans for 6 Division include transfer to Australia for active operations in SW Pacific once it can be relieved of current duties at Colombo.

• Divisional combat units (Infantry) – four infantry divisions (2nd, 7th, 8th, 9th)
• Battalion combat units (Infantry) – two infantry bns, one MG bn
• Company size combat units (Infantry) – ten Independent Cos
• Airborne units – 1 Para Bn
• Combat Engineer units – 2/3 AIF Pioneer Bn
• Tank/Motorized units – 4 Armored Brigade, four armored rgts, one armored car bn
• Artillery units – seven FA rgts, one antitank rgt

A small contingent of Dutch combat forces evacuated from the DEI in early 1942 are also attached to SW Pacific command.

• Battalion combat units (Infantry) – two (Marinier Bn, Dili Detachment)
• Tank/Motorized units – Lijfwacht Cavalry Sqn (light recon)


Support and Base Force LCU in theatre: Allied units listed below are now in the SW Pacific theatre area and available for offensive operations. Excluded from list are restricted command Australian LCU at bases in western, interior areas and NW Australia. All units below are now located in mainland Australia.

US and Australian unrestricted command.

• Naval base units – one USN Base Force LCU, three RAN Base Force LCU
• Air base units – four USAAF Base Force LCU, five US Aviation Base Force LCU, eleven Australian Air Base LCU (various), Rabaul Det Base Force (Australian), one Dutch Air Base Force LCU
• Other base units – eight USA Base Force LCU
• Anti-aircraft units – five US AA rgts, four Australian AA rgts, two US AA bns, two Dutch AA bns
• Coast Artillery units – three US Marine Def Bns, three Coast Artillery rgts (US Army)
• Construction Engineer units – five US Army Construction rgts, two US Army EAB, one US Naval Construction rgt, ten USN Seabee bns, two Australian construction engineer LCU (various)

Australian restricted command support and base force LCU at bases in eastern and SE Australia. These LCU are included here as they’re currently positioned to support SW Pacific operations launched or staged from bases in eastern and SE Australia.

• Naval base units – six RAN Base Force LCU
• Air base units – fifteen Air Base LCU (various)
• Other base units – Brisbane Base Force
• Anti-aircraft units – six AA rgts
• Coast Artillery units – four coast artillery LCU (various), five static fort LCU
• Construction Engineer units – three LCU (various), plus one combat engineer bn


Allied LBA Air forces currently in theatre: All air squadrons listed below are based in mainland Australia.

US and unrestricted Australian air squadrons.

• Fighter (USAAF) – 9 squadrons, 225 planes total. Four squadrons with P-40K, one P-40E, three with P-39D, two with P-38G.

• Dive Bombers (USAAF) – 2 squadrons, 32 planes total. Both squadrons with A-24, trained for high and low level naval attack. Plans are to eventually convert both squadrons to 2E bomber.
• Dive Bombers (US Marine) – 1 squadron, 18 planes total. Equipped with SBD-1 (upgrade planned), trained for both ground and naval attack.
• 2E Bombers (USAAF) – 7 squadrons, 112 planes total. three squadrons with B-25C, three with B-26, one A-20A-1. All B-25C squadrons trained for ground attack, all A-20A and B-26 squadrons trained for high and low level naval attack. Three additional USAAF 2E bomber squadrons (48 B-25C total) now in Eastern US scheduled to depart for SW Pacific.

• 4E Bombers (USAAF) – 10 squadrons, 156 planes total. Four squadrons with B-17E, six with B-24D. Four additional USAAF 4E bomber squadrons (48 B-24D total) now in Eastern US scheduled to depart for SW Pacific.

• Patrol (USN) – 2 squadrons, 21 planes total. One with PBY Catalina variants, one training squadron (18 O2U-3 Kingfisher).
• Patrol (Australian) – 1 squadron, 5 planes. This squadron with Catalina I.
• Recon (USAAF) – none currently operating in theatre.

• Air Transport (USAAF and US Marine) – 8 squadrons, 104 planes total. Seven with C-47, one R4D-1.


Restricted command Australian AF squadrons. Most Australian AF squadrons in restricted command are currently operating as dedicated training squadrons. Plans include future transfer of at least some transferrable Australian squadrons out of restricted command to front-line service under SW Pacific command.

• Fighter – 14 squadrons, 214 planes total. Six squadrons with Spitfire Vc, three with Kittyhawk variants, three Beaufighter Ic, two P-39D.

• 1E Level Bombers – 5 squadrons, 54 planes total. All equipped with Wirraway planes.
• 2E Level Bombers (Australian) – 12 squadrons, 174 planes total. Six squadrons with Hudson III(LR), three with Anson I, two Beaufort V, one Mitchell II.
• 2E Torpedo Bombers (Australian) – 2 squadrons, 24 planes total. Both squadrons Beaufort VIII.
• 2E Bombers (Dutch under RAAF command) – 1 squadron, 18 B25-C Mitchell. Trained for both ground and naval (high & low level) attack.

• Patrol – 5 squadrons, 16 planes total. One with Catalina I, two Walrus II, one Seagull V, one S23 Empire.
• Recon – 1 squadron, 6 planes total. Currently with B-339-23PR (recon variant of Buffalo fighter), upgrade planned when improved recon planes are available.
• Transport – 3 squadrons, 24 planes total. Two squadrons with DH-84 Dragon, one DC-2.


Aviation support elements currently available in theatre:

• Base Force LCU (US & Dutch, Australian non-restricted command) – 1835 squads
• Base Force LCU (Australian restricted command) – 681 squads. Squads in this total include elements in Australian restricted command support and base force LCU currently located at bases in eastern and SE Australia.
• Seaplane tenders – 104 total air support capacity


Allied Naval forces currently in theatre: At this time, no major Allied surface naval or carrier forces are operating in the SW Pacific theatre area. Overall strategic plans do not have major Allied carrier or surface naval forces permanently operating in the SW Pacific or any other theatre command – these forces are intended to move from one area to another according to operational or strategic needs at a given time and will only appear in the forward zone of a theatre area at the “last moment” before launching of a major operation.

Ships in naval forces currently assigned within the SW Pacific theatre include (1) surface ASW and minesweeping forces covering the E and SE coast of mainland Australia, and (2) a small number of Dutch and US fleet submarines operating on patrol in the Coral Sea and surrounding sea areas near Rabaul and the Solomons.

The following are numbers of various light naval forces currently located within the SW Pacific theatre area mainly on surface ASW and mine warfare operations. If necessary, this force can be reinforced with additional ships from South Pacific theatre. Light naval ships in the SW Pacific include Dutch naval forces evacuated from the DEI in early 1942.

• Light Cruiser (CL) – 6 (includes US Omaha Class, Australian, Dutch)
• Destroyers (DD) – 12 (includes US Wickes & Clemson classes, Australian, Dutch)
• Light surface ASW ships (SC, PC, PG, ML) – 14 (includes US , Australian, Dutch & British)
• Submarines – 8 (includes US fleet & Dutch subs)
• Destroyer Minesweepers (DMS) –
• Minesweepers (AM, YMS) – 54 (includes US, Australian & Dutch)
• Coastal Minesweepers (AMc) – 32 (includes Australian & Dutch)
• Minelayers (CM) – 4 (includes US, Australian & Dutch)
• Coastal Minelayers (CMc) – 1 (Dutch)
• Destroyer Minelayers (DM) – 7
• PT Boats – 7 (includes US & Dutch)


Transport, Amphibious & Naval Auxiliary ships in theatre: Ships included in this category are reserved for use within the theatre area and perform one or more of the operational function(s) below.

(1) Short-range sea transport between bases within the theatre area.
(2) Auxiliary ships for replenishment and support purposes.
(3) Ships being accumulated in reserve for use in planned and projected amphibious operations.

Ships listed below are now located at bases in the SW Pacific theatre area – these ships part of a common pool with South Pacific theatre available for operational use in either (SW or South Pacific) theatre. The forces below include many Dutch auxiliary ships evacuated to Australia from the DEI in early 1942.

• Transport (xAKL, various nationalities) – 26
• Transport (small xAK) – 6
• Transport (small xAP, various nationalities) - 37
• Small AO – 1 (Dutch)
• Small TK – 4 (Dutch)
• Amphibious Landing Ship (LSI) – 1 (Australian)

• CVE Long Island
• Repair Ships (AR) – 3 (US & Dutch)
• Tenders – 2 AG (Dutch), 2 AE (US)
• Destroyer Tender (AD) - 2
• Submarine Tender (AS) - 7 (includes US & Dutch)
• PT Tender (AGP) – 3 (Dutch)
• Seaplane Tender (AV, AVD, AVP) – 13 (US & Dutch)


Naval support currently available in theatre: The following are numbers of available naval support squads on TOE strength in Base Force LCU located in the SW Pacific area.

• Base Force LCU (US. Australian non-restricted command) – 210 squads
• Base Force LCU (Australian restricted command) – 70 squads

Three repair shipyards are located in the SW Pacific command area – Sydney (size 30), Melbourne and Brisbane (both the latter size 10). Sydney shipyard handles some repair and ship upgrade functions for South Pacific theatre.

These shipyards plus repair ships (AR) based in SW Pacific adequately handle repair of damage for submarines, small surface ASW and transport ships in South and SW Pacific theatres. Ship upgrade activity for most Allied ships assigned to South and SW Pacific commands is handled in Sydney and Melbourne. Sydney and Melbourne shipyards also used for repair of damage on ships assigned to South and SW Pacific – in the case of South Pacific, ships that cannot be quickly repaired or upgraded in Auckland are dispatched to Australia to undergo necessary shipyard repair and upgrade. The shipyard at Brisbane is used almost entirely for upgrade and repair of submarines, occasionally handles overflow from Sydney and Melbourne shipyards as needed.

[wneumann]

Summary of Operations 5/01/43

5/43 Ship Upgrades: This month’s upgrade is rather small - mainly US Clemson & Wickes class DD (4-stackers).

I did not convert any US Clemson or Wickes class DD from their initial DD configuration, my original plan was not converting any of these DD until such time as I determined exactly what I wanted to convert them to. In the meantime, I had been applying ship upgrades for these two classes as they became available. At this point in the game (5/43), I was beginning to consider plans for converting these DD to either APD or DMS.

While looking at displays for individual Clemson/Wickes DD’s, I noticed the options for converting these ships to other configurations (APD, DM, DMS) had disappeared from the Ship Displays. I did some research using archived save files from previous game turns to determine when the conversion options disappeared and perhaps why they did.

I found type conversion options to APD, DM, DMS on Clemson/Wickes DD were no longer available after these ships completed upgrade to “LR Class” in 1942 – the “LR” upgrade for Clemson occurring in 4/42, the “LR” upgrade for Wickes in 5/42. What appeared to happen is that the “LR” ship upgrade for these two DD classes removes type conversions to APD, DM and DMS from the upgrade paths – once an individual Clemson or Wickes class DD is past the 1942 “LR” upgrade, you have committed this ship for use as a DD or DE.

My experience brings perhaps a word of caution… You can leave Clemson and Wickes class DD’s unconverted but turn off ship upgrade on individual ships after the 2/42 upgrade if you intend to convert these at any later time from DD to an APD, DM, DMS, etc. It appears Clemson and Wickes DD can go through the 2/42 upgrade without losing the ability to convert to another ship type – after that, all bets are off.

Note: There is a rather useful thread in the War Room forums on this subject (USN 4 Stacker Conversions). I also posted the information above in that thread.


Central Pacific: Intercepted Jap radio transmissions from Tabiteuea reported in two 4/30 Sigint entries. Detected status of Tabiteuea shows unidentified Jap aircraft based there, also ship(s) in port. No other visible Japanese forces or activity.

Sigint entry for 4/30 reports intercepted Jap radio transmissions from Baker Is. Detected status of Baker Is shows unidentified Jap planes based there, no other visible Japanese forces or activity.


South Pacific: Movement of Jap 10th Infantry Division elements via sea transport from Noumea to Lunga continues – this activity reported in Sigint entries for 4/29 and 4/30. No visible Japanese transport ships detected in either Lunga or Noumea.

Daily coastwatcher entries from 4/30 Operations report follow.

Coastwatcher Report: 1 ship in port at Gasmata
Coastwatcher Report: 3 ships in port at Woodlark Island
Coastwatcher Report: 1 ship in port at Belep Islands
Coastwatcher Report: 5 ships in port at Noumea **
Coastwatcher Report: 3 ships in port at Luganville
Coastwatcher sighting: 1 Japanese ship at 120,150 near Luganville, Speed 8, Moving Southeast
Coastwatcher Report: 1 ship in port at Ndeni
Coastwatcher Report: 1 ship in port at Lae
Coastwatcher Report: xAK Nichiren Maru reported in port at Rabaul
Coastwatcher Report: 1 ship in port at Koumac
Coastwatcher Report: 6 ships in port at Noumea **
Coastwatcher Report: 1 ship in port at Luganville
Coastwatcher sighting: 1 Japanese ship at 114,138 near Lunga, Speed unknown

** possibly loading elements of Jap 10 Division.


Andaman Sea: Pillager has significant Jap surface and air ASW forces committed against Allied patrol sub activity in the sea movement route between Rangoon and Singapore. The fact he has done so possibly reflects the relative importance of this sea route in the Japanese war effort.

Dutch sub K-XVIII hit and damaged in attack by Ki-49 Helen air patrol. SS K-XVIII (system damage 37, float 14) returning to base at 15 kts speed for repair.


US patrol sub engages Jap surface ASW and damaged after receiving a considerable “bombardment”. SS Peto is now returning to base for repair at 13 kts speed. AAR follows.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ASW attack near Phuket at 48,70 (adjacent hex SW of Phuket)

Japanese Ships
DD Mutsuki
E Hachijo
DD Isonami

Allied Ships
SS Peto, hits 5 (system damage 13, float 13, engine 1)

SS Peto launches 2 torpedoes at DD Mutsuki
DD Mutsuki attacking submerged sub ....
DD Isonami attacking submerged sub ....
DD Mutsuki attacking submerged sub ....
DD Mutsuki is out of ASW ammo
Escort abandons search for sub

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


Burma: Detected status of Jap base in Rangoon from British aerial recon – 9 Japanese ships anchored in port, 1 Jap TF in harbor (+1 from last report), 91 aircraft (69 fighters, 22 bombers), 7 Jap LCU’s.


China: No reported ground combat at Chungking.

[wneumann]

The Big Picture #19 – Allied Buildup and Offensive Preparations (Central Pacific theatre)

This post covers Allied buildup activities and offensive preparations specific to the Central Pacific theatre as of the end of 4/43.

Principal bases in the Central Pacific theatre area: Pearl Harbor (and Hawaii in general) is the primary staging and operations base for the Central Pacific theatre area. Midway is currently under development as a forward submarine refueling base. The remainder of the Central Pacific theatre area (Line Islands) is mostly inactive, small bases at Palmyra and Christmas Is supporting naval air search.

Of the three main Pacific theatres (along with South & SW Pacific), the Central Pacific is the more difficult theatre for launching a strategic Allied offensive – this due mainly to the wide approaches of open sea area east of the Marshall and Gilbert islands. Central Pacific does have value as a point of attack, particularly in support of Allied offensive actions to the south. A later, “second strike” offensive in the Central Pacific can be effective after earlier Allied attacks draw Pillager’s attention into the southern Pacific areas.


Supply & Fuel Operational Stockpiles: The following quantities are current on-hand amounts centrally stored in the Central Pacific theatre area and considered available for use in supporting planned or projected offensive operations in/from this theatre. The quantities below exclude amounts of supply and fuel on-hand at outlying bases and also required quantities for operation of bases in Hawaii (including Pearl Harbor).

• Supply – 1.4 million
• Fuel – 1.1 million

Build-up of these reserves is done entirely through shipments arriving from the mainland US via “WP” convoys from the West Coast – this activity intended to continue. LCU and air unit arrivals in the Central Pacific also come via this convoy route.

Light industry production at Pearl Harbor is active and producing additional supply points using resource production on Oahu, along with small quantities of resource points transported from Hilo. Occasional transport ships moving from Alaska to Hawaii are also loaded with resource point cargo from Alaskan bases including Anchorage and Juneau – this practice just to fill available empty cargo space when applicable.


HQ Units in theatre: HQ operating in the Central Pacific area as follows.

• Naval HQ (1) – Pacific Ocean Areas HQ
• Air HQ (5) - 7th USAAF, VII US Fighter Cmd, VII US Bomber Cmd, USN AirCenPac, US Forwd AirCenPac
• Ground HQ – none at this time.
• Other HQ (1) – Hawaiian Dept HQ (restricted command)


Combat Ground forces in theatre: LCU listed below include US unrestricted command ground forces now in the Central Pacific theatre area. Most of these LCU are currently located in Hawaii (Pearl Harbor or the “big island”), plus garrisons at Midway, Johnston, Palmyra and Christmas Is. A small number of LCU in Hawaii are in restricted command under Hawaiian Dept, some of these could be transferred to front-line command if needed (though I do not anticipate this being necessary).

• Divisional combat units (Infantry) – three US Army infantry divisions. No US Marine divisions currently located in Central Pacific though later divisions (5th, 6th) could be sent here. 4th Marine Division is expected to be formed on the US West Coast from its three regiments by mid to late 5/42, no definite plans at this time as to what theatre this division will be employed.
• Brigade/Regiment combat units (Infantry) – two Army Infantry rgts (31 & 53). 31 US Infantry Rgt LCU reformed after its earlier elimination in the Philippines, then assigned to Central Pacific command area.
• Battalion combat units (Infantry) – no unrestricted command. Three restricted command infantry battalions (1/298, 2/298 & 3/298 Infantry) are in Hawaii under Hawaiian Dept command, these LCU could be transferred if an infantry unit of this size is needed.
• Airborne units – none at this time.
• Combat Engineer units – 34 US Combat Engineer Rgt
• Tank/Motorized units - five US Tank Bns
• Artillery units – one US Field Artillery Bn


Support and Base Force LCU in theatre: Allied units listed below are now in the Central Pacific theatre area. Most of these units currently located in Hawaii, a small number in garrisons at Midway, Johnston and the Line Islands.

• Naval base units – three USN Base Force LCU, two Det USN Port Svc
• Air base units – three USAAF Base Force LCU, one US Aviation Base Force LCU
• Other base units – two USA Base Force LCU, Pearl Harbor Base Force LCU (contains both air and naval support elements)
• Anti-aircraft units – six US AA Rgts, US AA Bn
• Coast Artillery units – six US Marine Def Bns, one US Army coast artillery bn
• Construction Engineer units – five US Naval Construction Rgts, eight USN Seabee Bns


Allied LBA Air forces currently in theatre: Except for naval search (PBY Catalina) squadrons operating from Midway and the Line Islands, all other Central Pacific air squadrons based in Hawaii.

• Fighter (USAAF) – 11 squadrons, 262 planes total. 7 squadrons with P-40K, one P-40E, two P-38F, one P-39D.
• Fighter (US Marine) – 2 squadrons, 36 planes total. Both squadrons equipped with F2A-3 Buffalo and operating as dedicated pilot training squadrons until their scheduled withdrawal dates (12/43 and 1/44). Both squadrons also re-enter the game in early 1944 as reinforcements, at that time they will be converted to front-line combat squadrons. This is normal practive I've followed with many air squadrons having withdrawal dates.

• Dive Bombers (USN and Marine) – none currently in theatre. Two USN VS squadrons are based at Pearl Harbor, these now operating as dive bomber pilot training squadrons with OS2U-3 Kingfisher floatplanes. Both squadrons upgrade to dive bombers and are planned to be used as front-line combat squadrons in this role.
• 2E Bombers (USAAF) – 5 squadrons, 72 planes total. Four squadrons with B-26 Marauder variants, one A-20. Three of the 5 squadrons trained for specialized ground attack, two for high & low level naval strikes.
• Torpedo – none currently in theatre.

• 4E Bombers (USAAF) – 6 squadrons, 72 planes total. Three squadrons with B-17E, one B-17F, two B-24D.

4E bombers currently in Central Pacific are included in a common pool of USAAF 4E bombers planned to move between the Central & South Pacific theatres. Intent of the plan is a single concentrated force of 4E bombers that will operate as “flying artillery” in support of offensive operations in either theatre. Movement of 4E bombers between Central and South Pacific will be done using base-to-base transfer by air. Pago Pago airfield (Samoa) is fully expanded to size 7 with sufficient supply and aviation support in place to support air transfer missions.

• Patrol (USN) – 7 squadrons, 60 planes total. One squadron with PB4Y-1 Liberators, all others with PBY Catalina variants. Squadrons based in Hawaii, Midway, Johnston and the Line Islands.
• Recon (USAAF) – one squadron with 12 F-4 Lightning.

• Air Transport (USAAF) – one squadron with 12 C-33.


Aviation support elements currently available in theatre:

• Base Force LCU – 422 squads


Allied Naval forces currently in theatre: At this time, no major Allied surface naval or carrier forces are permanently based in the Central Pacific theatre area. Overall strategic plans do not have major Allied carrier or surface naval forces permanently operating in any specific theatre command – these forces intended to move from one area to another according to operational or strategic needs at a given time and will only appear in the forward zone of a theatre area at the “last moment” before launching of a major operation.

Pearl Harbor is currently the principal base for US fleet subs operating in patrol areas throughout the Pacific north of the Solomons and except for US S-class subs in the sea areas around Suva and Pago Pago. A process has already started where US fleet subs are using “satellite” bases (already or soon to be in operation) at Auckland, Brisbane, Midway and Adak Is as forward refueling and replenishment sites. Some US fleet subs from Pearl Harbor are being rebased at Auckland for patrol operations in sea areas south of Truk. Pearl Harbor continues as the primary support base for US submarine operations north of Truk, the Western Pacific, and sea areas near the Japanese Home Islands. Overall intent of this process is pushing submarine operations forward and closer to active patrol areas to the greatest extent possible.

Currently, very few US ships are permanently based at Pearl Harbor. This measure was taken in 1/43 when US carrier forces departed for the Palembang raid – given where the carriers went and the fact they were off-map for a large part of this time, the entire Pacific Ocean area (all theatres) were completely open to the KB and Japanese surface naval forces with little or no effective US naval opposition. This was a known risk of the Palembang operation and removal of US ships from Pearl Harbor was one of the measures taken in response. Except for BB West Virginia repairing in shipyard from damage in the opening 12/7/41 attack (it couldn’t be moved anyway), Pillager would likely have found empty water in the port at Pearl Harbor if he had been tempted to strike – though plenty of fighter CAP and flak would be on-hand.

I’ve continued leaving Pearl Harbor empty of ships since the Palembang operation. While security of Pearl Harbor in itself is not a major factor, an empty base does keep the Japanese and Pillager guessing (where are the ships?).


Transport, Amphibious & Naval Auxiliary ships in theatre: Considering proximity of Central Pacific theatre to major base facilities at Pearl Harbor and on the US West Coast, current need and use for naval auxiliary ships in this theatre is limited. Auxiliary ships in “central reserve” on the US West Coast are drawn upon for the Central Pacific area as needed.

All sea transport requirements to bases in the Central Pacific area are being handled directly from the US West Coast, this done almost entirely with “WP” convoys or detachments from them. A number of small transports (xAKL) are also kept in US West Coast bases for this purpose and employed occasionally in small transport TF’s outside the convoy system.

Current priority for dispatching amphibious ships from the mainland US is mainly to South Pacific theatre – no amphibious ships at this time are going to the Central Pacific area.


Naval support currently available in theatre: The following are numbers of available naval support squads on TOE strength in Base Force LCU located in the Central Pacific area.

• Base Force LCU – 780 squads, mainly at Pearl Harbor.

Unlike other Pacific theatres, proximity of Central Pacific to the mainland US allows facilities on the US West Coast to be directly available for use by Central Pacific theatre. Note this fact being true for the present and near future, any significant westward advance by US forces in the Central Pacific alters the validity of this premise.

[wneumann]

Summary of Operations 5/02/43

Central Pacific: US patrol sub intercepts ASW escorts from a Jap TF. My estimate is the Jap DD are more likely attached escorts for other ships in this TF rather than operating independently as surface ASW. If this estimate is true, it’s now a question of what the DD are escorting (probably to or from Rabaul). AAR follows.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sub attack near Satawal at 106,112 (SW of Truk)

Japanese Ships
DD Michishio
DD Arashio

Allied Ships
SS Grayling

SS Grayling launches 4 torpedoes at DD Michishio
DD Arashio fails to find sub, continues to search...
Escort abandons search for sub

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Intercepted Jap radio transmissions from Maleolap and Wotje reported in 5/01 Sigint entries. No visible Japanese forces or activity detected in either location.

Sigint entry for 5/01 reports heavy volume of intercepted Jap radio transmissions from Truk. Detected status of Truk shows the expected Jap planes based there and ship(s) in port, no other visible Japanese forces or activity.


South Pacific: Transport convoy WP-49 (40 ships, excluding LST-459 damaged in ship collision) arrives this game turn in Auckland. Damaged LST-459 was detached from the convoy at Tahiti and now moving to Pearl Harbor for shipyard repair.

Cargo arriving aboard the convoy includes one LCU (226 USN Base Force), 139K supply and 1300 fuel. Many ships arriving in convoy WP-49 are being detached in Auckland and will remain in South Pacific theatre for use in future operations - including auxiliaries (1 AS, 1 AD, 1 AV, 1 AG), minesweepers (1 AM, 4 DMS) and amphibious transport (3 APA, 9 LST).

Daily coastwatcher entries from 5/01 Operations report follow.

Coastwatcher Report: 3 ships in port at Shortlands
Coastwatcher Report: 1 ship in port at Port Moresby
Coastwatcher Report: 1 ship in port at Gasmata
Coastwatcher Report: xAK Akitsushima Maru reported in port at Rabaul
Coastwatcher Report: 6 ships in port at Noumea
Coastwatcher sighting: 1 Japanese ship at 115,160 near Noumea, Speed unknown
Coastwatcher sighting: 1 Japanese ship at 120,150 near Luganville, Speed unknown
Coastwatcher sighting: 1 Japanese ship at 114,138 near Lunga, Speed unknown
Coastwatcher sighting: 1 Japanese ship at 106,125 near Rabaul, Speed 11, Moving Southeast
Coastwatcher Report: 4 ships in port at Lunga
Coastwatcher Report: 1 ship in port at Shortlands
Coastwatcher Report: 3 ships in port at Tulagi
Coastwatcher Report: 1 ship in port at Finschhafen
Coastwatcher Report: 3 ships in port at Lae
Coastwatcher Report: 1 ship in port at Madang
Coastwatcher sighting: 1 Japanese ship at 115,160 near Noumea, Speed unknown
Coastwatcher sighting: 1 Japanese ship at 120,150 near Luganville, Speed unknown
Coastwatcher sighting: 1 Japanese ship at 114,138 near Lunga, Speed unknown


Burma: Detected status of Jap base in Rangoon from British aerial recon – 9 Japanese ships anchored in port, 1 Jap TF in harbor, 90 aircraft (69 fighters, 21 bombers), 7 Jap LCU’s.


Colombo: Two US fleet subs arrive this game turn from Eastern US (via Capetown) to reinforce Allied submarine group operating in the Indian Ocean area (includes sub patrols operating in Andaman Sea).


China: No reported ground combat at Chungking.

[wneumann]

The Big Picture #20 – Allied Buildup and Preparations (North Pacific theatre)

This post covers Allied buildup activities and preparations specific to the North Pacific theatre as of the end of 4/43.

Principal bases in the North Pacific theatre area: Forward bases within the North Pacific area are entirely within Alaska and the Aleutian islands. Anchorage was initially the only fully operational base in the North Pacific – since then construction and development of additional bases has gradually moved westward across the Aleutians. Dutch Harbor (port) and Umnak Is (port and airfield) are the primary bases in the eastern Aleutians, Kodiak also fully expanded for use as a forward supply and fuel dump. Kodiak was originally developed for fuel and supply storage as no other forward bases with significant stockpile capacity existed in the North Pacific during early 1942 – with completion of base expansion at other locations, fuel and supply now stored at Kodiak will gradually move westward.

Expansion of airfield and (more notably) port facilities have been completed at Adak, this base now being opened to support US patrol sub operations near the Japanese Home Islands and adjacent northern sea areas of the Pacific. US forces are in the early stages of occupying Amchitka, construction to expand port and airfield facilities there is planned and expected to begin shortly. Plans are to eventually push westward to include Kiska and/or Attu islands.

Seattle was initially the primary rear support base in the mainland US for servicing operations in the North Pacific. Development and expansion of port and airfield facilities in Prince Rupert (Canada) began almost immediately in 12/41 for its future use as the primary departure point for shipping to bases in the North Pacific. Prince Rupert is well suited for this function as (1) it has large maximum port and airfield sizes, and (2) it has connection with a major railroad line to the mainland US via Vancouver. Expansion of Prince Rupert was fully complete in late 1942 and now has largely replaced Seattle as the main departure point to the North Pacific.

Of the four Pacific theatres (along with Central, South & SW Pacific), North Pacific has the fewest available good opportunities for a strategic Allied offensive. While Allied offensive opportunities in the North Pacific are limited compared to elsewhere, my view is to expand bases and infrastructure in the North Pacific for any possible use in launching or support of major Allied offensive operations. No plans are under active consideration in the North Pacific, all options are being kept open.


Supply & Fuel Operational Stockpiles: The following quantities are current on-hand amounts centrally stored in the Central Pacific theatre area and considered available for use in supporting planned or projected offensive operations in/from this theatre. The quantities below exclude amounts of supply and fuel on-hand at outlying bases and also required quantities for operation of bases in Hawaii (including Pearl Harbor).

• Supply – 260K
• Fuel – 230K

Build-up of these reserves is done mostly through shipments arriving from the mainland US and Prince Rupert via “WA” convoys. No light industry production exists in the North Pacific area. All fuel and supply to the North Pacific area is shipped from either Port Rupert or Seattle.


HQ Units in theatre: HQ operating in the North Pacific area as follows.

• Naval HQ (1) – North Pacific theatre HQ (now located at Dutch Harbor)
• Air HQ (3) - 11th USAAF, XI US Fighter Cmd, XI US Bomber Cmd
• Ground HQ – none at this time.
• Other HQ (1) – Alaska Defence Cmd HQ (restricted command)


Combat Ground forces in theatre: LCU listed below include US unrestricted command ground forces now in the North Pacific theatre area. All LCU are located in mainland Alaska or the Aleutian islands. A number of other of LCU in mainland Alaska (not listed below) are in restricted command and could be transferred to front-line command if needed – this not expected to be necessary.

• Divisional combat units (Infantry) – none at this time.
• Brigade/Regiment combat units (Infantry) –two Army Infantry rgts
• Battalion combat units (Infantry) – three Infantry bns
• Combat Engineer units – 1/151 Combat Engineer Bn
• Artillery units – one US Field Artillery Bn


Support and Base Force LCU in theatre: Allied units listed below are now in the North Pacific theatre area, all located in mainland Alaska and the Aleutian islands. Most units in mainland Alaska are restricted command and not moveable from the Alaska mainland – most restricted command LCU also at partial TOE strength.

• Naval base units – six USN Base Force LCU (3 unrestricted command, 3 restricted)
• Air base units – three USAAF Base Force LCU (1 unrestricted command, 2 restricted), one US Aviation Base Force LCU (unrestricted)
• Anti-aircraft units – six US AA Rgts (3 unrestricted command, 3 restricted)
• Coast Artillery units – three US Army coast artillery bns (all restricted command)
• Construction Engineer units – two Army EAB, three US Army Construction Rgts, three USN Seabee Bns. All construction LCU unrestricted command.


Allied LBA Air forces currently in theatre: Except for one naval search squadron operating in the Aleutians, all other North Pacific air squadrons based at Anchorage and under restricted command (11th USAAF). Except for the naval search squadron, all squadrons in the North Pacific are operating as dedicated pilot training units.

• Fighter (USAAF) – 2 squadrons, 50 planes total. One squadron with P-40E, one P-36A.
• 2E Bombers (USAAF) – 2 squadrons, 11 planes total. Both squadrons with B-18A, training squadrons for naval attack.
• Patrol (USN) – one squadron with 12 PBY-5 Catalina.
• Recon – none at this time
• Air Transport (USAAF) – one squadron with 13 C-47.


Aviation support elements currently available in theatre:

• Base Force LCU (unrestricted command) – 240 squads
• Base Force LCU (restricted command) – 321 squads
• Seaplane tenders – 6 total air support capacity


Allied Naval forces currently in theatre: At this time, no major Allied surface naval or carrier forces are permanently based in the North Pacific theatre area. Overall strategic plans do not have major Allied carrier or surface naval forces permanently operating in any specific theatre command – these forces intended to move from one area to another according to operational or strategic needs at a given time and will only appear in the forward zone of a theatre area at the “last moment” before launching of a major operation.

Adak Island has recently opened for use as a forward replenishment base for US fleet subs.

The following are numbers of various light naval forces attached to and located within the North Pacific theatre area for local surface ASW and mine warfare operations. This force does not include US and Canadian light naval forces based in Canada and US West Coast bases that occasionally appear in North Pacific waters. As needed, the light naval forces below are easily reinforced with additional ships drawn from US and Canadian West Coast bases.

• Light surface ASW ships (YP) – 5
• Minesweepers (YMS) – 4
• Coastal Minesweepers (AMc) – 1
• Minefield Tenders (ACM) – 1


Transport, Amphibious & Naval Auxiliary ships in theatre: Sea transport requirements to bases in the North Pacific area is being handled directly from Prince Rupert and the US West Coast.

Most transport shipping to and within the North Pacific theatre is done using “WA” convoys or detachments from them. While sea transport in the North Pacific area is included (organizationally) in the long-range transport convoy system, in practice most Allied transport ships allocated to “WA” convoys actually consist of local (in-theatre) transport ships drawn from a dedicated pool of ships based on the US/Canada West Coast reserved specifically for this purpose.

The following are transport and auxiliary ships currently in use for operations in the North Pacific. Auxiliary ships listed below are attached to North Pacific theatre, transport ships are assigned to pool bases on the US/Canada West Coast.

• Transport (xAKL, US & Canadian) – 7
• Transport (xAK) – 13 of various sizes
• Tankers (TK) – 2

• Submarine Tender (AS) – 1
• Seaplane Tender (AVD) – 1

No amphibious ships are currently in the North Pacific theatre area, nor are there plans to do so.


Naval support currently available in theatre: The following are numbers of available naval support squads on TOE strength in Base Force LCU located in the Central Pacific area.

• Base Force LCU (unrestricted command) – 470 squads
• Base Force LCU (restricted command) – 25 squads

Primary shipyard facility (size 10) for North Pacific theatre is at Prince Rupert, sufficient for the minor repair/ship upgrade activity normally encountered with this theatre. Additional shipyards at Vancouver, Victoria, Seattle and Tacoma are readily available if larger or additional shipyard capacity is needed.


North Pacific command LCU and air units in mainland US: A small number of LCU and air units assigned to North Pacific command start or enter the game (reinforcements) at locations in the mainland US. Most of these units have been kept on reserve in the mainland US as they are surplus forces not required in the North Pacific area to conduct activities occurring within the theatre – the forces already located in the North Pacific sufficient to carry out activities.

Up to this time, surplus North Pacific LCU and air units on reserve in the mainland US remain assigned to North Pacific command. Plans are not to change command assignment of these units provided there is no need for these units elsewhere. As many of these units have scheduled withdrawal dates, it is unlikely they will be transferred out of a North Pacific command and will probably remain in the mainland US until their withdrawal date.

North Pacific units now in the mainland US include the following.

• Ground units (all assigned to North Pacific HQ) – three Army Field Artillery bns, one Naval Construction rgt, one USN Base Force LCU.
• Air squadrons (all 11th USAAF command) – one bomber, one recon, one transport. All of these squadrons currently operating as dedicated pilot training units.

[wneumann]

Summary of Operations 5/03/43

Central Pacific: Sigint entry for 5/02 reports intercepted Jap radio transmissions from Majuro. Detected status of Majuro shows no visible Japanese forces or activity.


South Pacific: Daily coastwatcher entries from 5/02 Operations report follow.

Coastwatcher Report: 4 ships in port at Lunga
Coastwatcher Report: 3 ships in port at Shortlands
Coastwatcher Report: 1 ship in port at Gasmata
Coastwatcher Report: harbor at Rabaul is reported empty
Coastwatcher Report: 1 ship in port at Kavieng
Coastwatcher Report: 1 ship in port at Woodlark Island
Coastwatcher Report: 3 ships in port at Luganville
Coastwatcher sighting: 1 Japanese ship at 120,150 near Luganville, Speed unknown
Coastwatcher sighting: 1 Japanese ship at 114,138 near Lunga, Speed unknown
Coastwatcher Report: 4 ships in port at Lunga
Coastwatcher Report: 3 ships in port at Shortlands
Coastwatcher Report: 3 ships in port at Buna
Coastwatcher Report: 1 ship in port at Milne Bay
Coastwatcher Report: 1 ship in port at Salamaua
Coastwatcher Report: harbor at Rabaul is reported empty
Coastwatcher Report: 1 ship in port at Kavieng
Coastwatcher Report: 6 ships in port at Noumea
Coastwatcher Report: 4 ships in port at Luganville


Australia: Transport convoy EX-32 (29 ships) arrives this game turn from Eastern US via Capetown. Cargo arriving aboard the convoy includes two LCU (HQ US Sixth Army, 181 USAAF Base Force), 140K supply and 45K fuel. Four ships from the convoy (2 large LSI, 2 AMC) are being detached from the convoy in Australia and will remain in SW Pacific theatre for use in future operations. Plans under consideration have the two AMC employed in a “fast AP” role.

Two additional Australian units transferred from restricted command to SW Pacific theatre – 3 Australian Brigade and an RAAF recon squadron with 5 F-4 Lightning. 3 Brigade’s TOE had (automatically) upgraded and lost some elements in the conversion, making a transfer to SW Pacific possible at reduced PP cost before rebuilding 3 Brigade to full TOE strength from the replacement pools.

A second Australian brigade (12 Brigade at Hobart) underwent the same automatic TOE upgrade as 3 Brigade. Replacements for 12 Brigade have been turned off to temporarily “mothball” this LCU. Plans under consideration for 12 Brigade include a transfer to SW Pacific followed by rebuilding to full TOE strength as now being started with 3 Brigade. Transfer and rebuilding of 12 Brigade is a lower priority task in terms of both PP expenditure and use of replacement pool elements. A number of other Australian LCU (6th, 7th and 8th Australian Divisions plus 3 Brigade) are currently drawing replacement pool elements to rebuild to full TOE strength after upgrades – priority is being given for these units to fill out before starting work on 12 Brigade. Rebuilding of the Australian divisions is nearly complete and once completed should allow 12 Brigade to begin its process.


Andaman Sea: Damaged US patrol sub returning to base pursued and attacked by Jap surface ASW. A relatively small force of eight US and Allied subs is claiming its fair share of Pillager’s attention and the attention of significant Japanese air and surface ASW forces covering the shipping route between Rangoon and Singapore. No Allied subs in the Andaman Sea area have been sunk to date, but almost every Allied sub sent to patrol there has returned with significant damage from Japanese air or surface attack (keeping the Colombo and Calcutta shipyards busy). AAR follows.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ASW attack near Great Nicobar at 43,65 (adjacent hex N or Great Nicobar)

Japanese Ships
DD Mutsuki
E Saga

Allied Ships
SS Peto

SS Peto is located by DD Mutsuki
Peto diving deep ....
E Saga attacking submerged sub ....
Escort abandons search for sub

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


Burma: Detected status of Jap base in Rangoon from British aerial recon – 9 Japanese ships anchored in port, 1 Jap TF in harbor, 106 aircraft (80 fighters, 26 bombers), 7 Jap LCU’s.


China: No reported ground combat at Chungking.

[wneumann]

The Big Picture #21 – Allied Buildup and Preparations (Southeast Asia, India and Middle East)

This post covers Allied buildup activities and preparations specific to India and the Middle East, including the Indian Ocean region as of the end of 4/43.

Overview: In contrast to the level of activity for offensive operations in eastern Australia and throughout the Pacific theatres, Allied buildup and preparations in mainland Asia and Indian Ocean theatres remains largely oriented toward a general defensive strategy. This is the one Allied theatre area where events in China will have the greatest effect.


Effect of Final Collapse in China in Southeast Asia: India in particular is the Allies’ greatest concern relative to the final collapse of China. There’s little question Burma and Southeast Asia will eventually receive a significant share of Japanese ground forces currently engaged at Chungking. What cannot escape attention is many if not most of the Japanese LCU now engaged in China will likely have high combat experience levels accumulated from combat during the China campaign.

Current situation estimate has Chungking holding out through most or all of 5/43, probably not much longer beyond that.

While a Japanese invasion of India is far from impossible, my situation estimate does not consider a likely Japanese offensive into India after the fall of Chungking – not so much because a reinforced Japanese army in Burma/Southeast Asia couldn’t successfully attack India (it would actually have a good possibility of success), rather, a Japanese conquest and occupation of even part of India may have relatively little value in the big picture when all said and done. A Japanese invasion of India in 1943 could easily become a scenario where expanding Japanese conquests collide with the Law of Diminishing Returns. In 1941-42 invading India makes considerably more sense than an invasion launched in mid-1943. If my theory is correct, Pillager will also end up taking this view.

What I see the more likely scenario is Pillager reinforcing Burma and Southeast Asia to the extent where any significant Allied offensive action (before the last days in 1945) will be at minimum next to impossible if not totally so. Reinforcing Japanese forces in Burma and Southeast Asia with units freed up from the collapse in China would easily accomplish this with some left over to reinforce Jap defenses in the Pacific theatres.


Prognosis for general Allied offensive in Burma/Southeast Asia: Regardless of which of the two scenarios above turn out to be true, possibility of a successful Allied general offensive from India into Burma and Southeast Asia before the final days of the campaign in 1945 is very unlikely. Even without Japanese reinforcement of Southeast Asia with forces from China, an Allied offensive from India into Burma and Southeast Asia will be difficult without an inordinately large Allied buildup (probably at the expense of other theatres).

Quantity and offensive capability of currently existing Allied forces in India and the Middle East does not appear to match up well for launching a general offensive against the Japanese forces they will likely face in Burma and Southeast Asia. This becomes even more true with transfer of significant Japanese ground forces from China into Burma and Southeast Asia after a fall of Chungking.

Another factor from the collapse of China comes into play when the Allies do launch an offensive into Burma. For both the Allies and Japanese, China is the northern flank of anything that happens in Burma or Southeast Asia. Historically, this northern flank benefitted the Allies as southern China was Allied-controlled territory. Not so in this campaign… Japanese control of southern China gives Pillager a flanking position along the northern boundary of any Allied advance into Burma or beyond – elements of advancing Allied forces would have to be diverted from the main path of attack to secure its northern flank.


Near and intermediate-term assessment of Allied strategy: What may very well be the best short to intermediate-term Allied strategy in the Indian theatre is a buildup. Actions completed in the buildup process would be useful and relevant whether for defensive or offensive purposes. At minimum, an Allied buildup improves defensive positions in India if Pillager does opt for a Japanese attack.

A buildup of India also has the secondary effect of inducing Pillager to reinforce Burma and Southeast Asia with Japanese forces to at least match the Allied forces across from them. Even if Pillager doesn’t launch an offensive action toward India, he will still have to match the gradual increase in Allied strength in India from reinforcements entering the game (let alone any additional Allied forces I may or could send there) to (at least) hold Japanese-controlled territory in Burma and Southeast Asia and ensure the status quo. Japanese forces from China that Pillager sends into Burma and Southeast Asia is at least a temporary diversion away from the Pacific theatres.

A real Allied buildup in India (regardless of what it’s ultimately used for) is a necessity. Not only to stop Pillager if he “calls the bluff”, but also enough of a buildup for the Allies to actually launch an offensive in the event a promising opportunity to do this appears. The threat of a future Allied offensive from India must not only be credible but also have the ability to be carried out.

Overall Allied strategic plans for the India theatre (for at least until mid to late 1944) will likely be on the order of about 75% defensive, 25% offensive.


Principal Allied forward positions in India: As presently configured, forward positions currently held by Allied forces in India are primarily defensive in nature. Effective Allied defense in eastern India must account for both of two possibilities – (1) a Japanese ground offensive from Burma, and (2) a Japanese amphibious assault across the Bay of Bengal. To cover both possibilities, the Allied front line covering eastern India is represented by a line of forward positions extending from Ledo to Madras plus Colombo. Two guiding factors were considered.

• Available British and Indian ground forces (after satisfying required base garrisons at interior bases in India) are not sufficient in quantity to form an adequate continuous line covering the entire distance between Ledo and Madras plus Colombo.

• Geography. The geography of inland areas of NE India and the eastern coast of India along the Bay of Bengal generally favors the Allied defense – this rendering many locations less than suitable points of attack for Japanese forces advancing from Burma/Southeast Asia into India. An end effect of geography is allowing Allied defenses to concentrate at or near the most likely routes of Japanese attack.

For inland areas of NE India, the lack of any road/railroad connection across the border between Burma and India is a barrier representing a serious obstacle to an overland invasion from Burma. Even Japanese capture of forward bases inside of NE India does not completely remove this obstacle.

Japanese amphibious assault against coastal areas of India along the Bay of Bengal would require landing at a coastal base in India containing existing port facilities or a base where port facilities can be expanded for a beachhead. Except for Madras and the Calcutta area (Calcutta base & Diamond Harbor), only two other bases in eastern India along the Bay of Bengal coast contain port facilities usable to forming a Japanese beachhead. Note that Akyab, Cox Bazar and Chittagong are excluded for reasons to be covered later.

Following on the two points above, Allied ground forces in India have been deployed in a series of strongpoints, most of these strongpoints located at bases.

In coastal areas along the Bay of Bengal, Allied strongpoints are arranged as a sort of “Atlantic Wall” – fortified and garrisoned positions established at all bases along the coast with existing port facilities or where port facilities can be built. Several bases along this coast (i.e. Bezvada & Cuttack) have no buildable port capacity and considered the least favorable locations for a Japanese amphibious landing. The key to defenses in this area is to fortify and occupy in strength those base locations along this coast where a Japanese force can possibly land and then create a significant bridgehead through which a landing can be reinforced and supplied - a bridgehead of this type requiring a base with port facilities). Construction of fortifications in these strongpoints has been done to or near the maximum possible – this activity is a current priority for construction engineer LCU in mainland India. Port and airfield facilities in coastal bases were not expanded beyond their original sizes to minimize usefulness of coastal bases as a beachhead in the event Japanese forces launch a successful amphibious assault and capture them. Forward airbases covering the coastal area are all located inland.

Ceylon (Colombo and all bases) has also been garrisoned and fortified in a similar manner.

Looking at inland areas along the India-Burma border, it was concluded a forward defense along the boundary line had some difficulties and many locations along the boundary possible traps for large Allied ground forces sent in to defend them. Available numbers of Allied combat LCU are insufficient to form an effective continuous line in any strength along the boundary area, the inability to form a continuous line creating gaps allowing Japanese forces to infiltrate Allied-held strongpoints in the boundary area. Infiltration tactics being a known component of Pillager’s ground strategy repertoire. While terrain along the India-Burma boundary is favorable to a defender, it also creates a very unfavorable overland escape route for isolated ground forces.

Bases along the boundary area (including Imphal, Kohima, Ledo, Akyab, Cox Bazar and Chittagong) are minimally garrisoned, mostly to serve as early warning and also create the illusion of being held in strength. These bases are all considered death traps for any large Allied ground force sent in to defend them. For the most part, Japanese capture of these bases would yield minimal if any advantage. There is no useful line of supply traceable from most of these bases back into Burma. Ledo does have an airfield, but would require a Japanese airlift to move anything in. Chittagong would be marginally more useful to a Japanese offensive here, supply and reinforcements could be brought in by sea transport, this sea transport would also be subject to Allied air interdiction from Calcutta and surrounding air bases.

The planned main line of resistance (MLR) in northeast India is along the line from Dacca to Tezpur.

The main part of Allied ground forces in mainland India are stationed as a mobile reserve in groups at a series of bases covering the entire length of the forward Allied position between Madras and Tezpur.

• Groups of Allied (mobile reserve) ground forces are located at bases along major rail lines, allowing the use of strategic rail movement to dispatch and concentrate a ground force at any point along the forward position line.

• Each group of Allied ground forces is centered around a Ground HQ including the four Indian Corps HQ (III, IV, XV, XXIII) plus HQ 3rd Special Force Division.

My current policy on base construction activity in India is limited to building only fortifications in base locations along coastal areas on the Bay of Bengal and at most bases to the NE of Calcutta – no expansion of airfield or port sizes at these locations. The intent of the policy is denial of any useful port or airfield facilities in a base (beyond whatever is initially there) to Japanese forces in the event the base is captured Allied airfields have been constructed at bases located behind the main line of forward Allied positions (Madras to Tezpur) and a short distance inland from the eastern Indian coastline. This somewhat follows the formula applied in the Pacific theatres – first build a solid defensive position, the defensive position in turn used as the foundation to create the jumping off point for later offensive operations.


Supply & Fuel Operational Stockpiles: The following quantities are current reserve amounts centrally stored in mainland India and available for use in supporting either defensive or offensive Allied operations. Quantities below exclude amounts of supply and fuel on-hand at outlying bases in mainland India, also quantities on-hand at Colombo.

• Supply – 1.6 million
• Fuel – 250K

Build-up of supply reserves is done through shipments arriving from Capetown via “DC” convoys, fuel reserves in India transported from Abadan via local (in-theatre) shipping. Light industry and refinery production is active in mainland India, heavy industry production has been turned off.


Allied LCU strength in theatre: For the most part, Allied LCU’s now in India consist primarily of British and Indian LCU starting the game plus Allied reinforcements entering the game at Aden or mainland India since 12/41 (omitting detail of these forces). Other additional Allied ground force components are also present in India include.

• British forces evacuated from Burma during the Japanese capture in early 1942. These include mainly small infantry LCU and a sizeable contingent of base force units.

• British reinforcements intended for Malaya diverted to India including 18th Infantry Division.

• Free Chinese army in exile – 12 infantry LCU plus NCAC (army) HQ . These LCU have been rebuilding in India with replacement elements, some now at full TOE strength, nearly all the remainder now at 80-90% TOE. One side-benefit of holding out in Chungking has been the flow of Chinese replacement elements into the pools, these elements used entirely for rebuilding Chinese LCU now in India since available supply inside China became no longer sufficient for Chinese LCU within China to draw replacement elements . Chinese ground units now in India were remnants (<5% TOE strength) of transferrable command Chinese LCU evacuated by air to India via Ledo - I began doing this once it became apparent airlifting supply to China in adequate quantities was not going to be successful.

• A number of small British and Indian combat LCU eliminated in Malaya are gradually being purchased back into the game and rebuilt to full TOE strength – emphasis on LCU that are sub-units of 9th and 11th Indian Divisions. Plans are to revive 9 and 11 Indian Divisions as full divisional LCU at some point in the future.

• Australian 6th Infantry Division (AIF) was diverted to Colombo to augment the Allied ground force garrison on Ceylon. Current plans have 6 Australian Division eventually transferring to Australia to join SW Pacific theatre ground forces, the division is planned to remain at Colombo as long as it’s required there.

Most British and Indian combat LCU not employed as required garrisons at rear-area bases or rebuilding are now located in or near forward positions in Eastern India described earlier in this post.


Allied LBA Air forces currently in theatre: The majority of Allied air forces in mainland India and Ceylon include RAF squadrons starting or entering the game at Aden or in India, plus 10th USAAF units arriving in the game as reinforcements. Other Allied air contingents in the India and Middle East areas include the following.

• RAF squadrons evacuated from Burma and Malaya.

• Free Chinese AF in exile – a force of 14 transferrable air squadrons (six fighter, eight 2E bomber) were evacuated from China to India along with available pilots from other Chinese air units. Chinese AF squadrons in India are operating now under 10th USAAF command. Seven of the Chinese squadrons in India (four fighter, three bomber) are considered permanent front-line air units, the remaining squadrons have withdrawal dates and in use as pilot training squadrons. Training standard of Chinese AF pilots in India matches other Allied air forces (USAAF, RAF, etc). The front-line Chinese air squadrons in India are expected to provide a useful backup to RAF and 10th USAAF air units within the capability of the planes they are equipped with.

• A small number of Dutch patrol squadrons rebuilt from squadrons eliminated in the DEI and re-entering the game at Aden in late 1942 as reinforcements.


Allied Naval forces currently in theatre: The core of British naval forces in the theatre include the older BB (Royal Sovereign & Queen Elizabeth classes) and BC Repulse along with supporting CA, CL and DD. Only one British carrier (CVL Hermes) is currently in theatre. Under the present strategic situation, these naval forces have limited value beyond the role as a deterrent force-in-being.

With arrival of CV Victorious in Panama, a British surface force (BB Prince of Wales, 3 CA, 4 CL) was dispatched to the Pacific to operate in a carrier TF with CV Victorious during the time the carrier is in the game (scheduled withdrawal date 10/15/43). This group of British ships is operating as a carrier TF within the US main carrier force. Following CV Victorious’ scheduled withdrawal in 10/43, ships in the British surface force are planned to return to Australia and/or Southeast Asia.

A small Allied submarine force in the theatre includes seven subs (1 British, 2 Dutch, 4 US fleet subs). Two additional US fleet subs (entered as reinforcements in Eastern US) are enroute to the Indian Ocean via Capetown and arriving shortly. A KB carrier raid on Colombo in 6/42 took a heavy toll of the original group of British and Dutch submarines based in Colombo, most of them sunk in this raid. A small number of US fleet subs from the eastern US have or will be dispatched to rebuild and maintain an Allied submarine force in the Indian Ocean area. Main operating areas of this Allied sub force include the Andaman Sea plus patrols off sea passages that exit the DEI into the eastern Indian Ocean (i.e. Sunda Straits and similar passages leading southward from Java and Sumatra).

Numerous light British and Indian naval forces are based in mainland India – including surface ASW and mine warfare ships.

An Allied naval base at Diego Garcia is now fully operational. This base provided refueling to US carrier forces attacking Palembang. Colombo is operational only as a submarine base, no Allied surface or carrier naval forces are stationed there on a regular basis.


Transport, Amphibious & Naval Auxiliary ships in theatre: Part of the long-range convoy system is in use between Capetown, mainland India (Bombay), Colombo and Middle East bases (Aden & Abadan) – this involving “CD” convoys and detachments. Most transport convoy traffic in the Indian Ocean area runs along a three point route – transporting supply from Capetown to mainland India and Colombo, empty ships from mainland India and Colombo to Abadan, transporting fuel from Abadan to Capetown.

A separate group of small transports based at Aden and Abadan carry fuel cargo, LCU and air units between the Middle East and India.

Most larger British TK are operating in a small branch of the long-range convoy system (“MX” convoys) carrying fuel cargo from Abadan to Australia via Capetown. This became possible once it was established the available cargo capacity of small xAK was sufficient for transporting fuel from Abadan to mainland India and Ceylon. Heavy industry (HI) in mainland India was shut down to decrease fuel point requirements there.


Naval support currently available in theatre: The primary repair shipyard facility (size 80) for the Indian Ocean area is at Capetown. Shipyards at Colombo and Bombay are used mainly for minor quick repair/upgrade and emergency ship repair. Port and shipyard facilities at Calcutta are generally not in use due to their proximity to Japanese LBA, also the Bay of Bengal sea area is a cul-de-sac for Allied ships and easily a trap for ships entering or moving through this sea area.