+1 crsutton!ORIGINAL: crsutton
ORIGINAL: obvert
ORIGINAL: crsutton
It is also my experience that Allied ships start to gain a distinct advantage in surface combat after 1944. I think this is due to working torpedoes, better ships with better guns, faster rate of fire, better radar, and the jump in crew quality for any ship arriving after 1944.
I am perfectly comfortable engaging the Japanese with Fletcher class DDs when the moonlight is low and modern CLs and CAs when the moonlight is decent.
It's true, but should it be? As evidenced by some things that have happened to my IJN ships lately, I'm not really sure what to do or what force composition might be best. Should Flectchers alone be able to stave off and even get the better of IJN CAs and BBs with decent DD escort? Seems odd considering the number of guns and level of armor those ships have. But it is surely what I'm seeing.
In 44 the IJN can't compete on level terms or even with a supposed advantage. All through the game we've had surface battles, and I've never seen stuff like what has been happening lately. Its like a switch flipped in 44 and nothing works suddenly. I must be going through all of the 5 steps of the Kübler-Ross model of grief that the Japanese surely had to face themselves, little by little through the years. I'm not nearly at acceptance, but I've definitely moved past anger and I'm now into the bargaining stage, heading toward depression.
No, I really think it is as it should be and not out of historical proportion. Japanese ships were so totally outclassed by the newer Allied ships in 1944. I don't recall them pulling off many successful surface actions after 1943. Two things really changed for the Allies over this period. Much more effective radar and fire control systems. This changed the nature of night actions totally.
At the battle of Surigao the West Virginia started tracking the Yamashiro at close to 35,000 yards, fired her first salvo using modern gunnery radar, at 20,000 yards in pitch black conditions and hit her with the very first salvo. This sort of shooting would have been unheard in 1942 by either side and it was still not possible by any Japanese ship in 1944. We are talking almost "11.5 miles." Perfect daytime visability from the deck of a BB was rarely more than 14 miles..
Not only did they get that radar and fire control that could use it, they were trained to use it to advantage in night actions. This was not the case in 1942 when Admirals wasted their radar advantage by not making the radar equipped ships their flagship, not puttting those ships near the front of their column and not opening fire until they had visual ID of the enemy. See the battles of Cape Esperance [CL Helena had to open fire without orders to show where the enemy was] and Guadalcanal I [ Adm. Scott did not give orders to fire when reports started coming in because he didn't trust the radar, or wasn't sure where all the allied ships were. He also placed brand-new DD Fletcher at the rear of the line].
Contrast that with Empress Augusta Bay in 1943 wherein the four Cleveland CLs opened fire on radar ranges and bearings and got a first salvo hit on a CL [Sendai?] Or Cape St. George where US DDs made a torpedo attack by radar before the Japanese even knew they were there. Or the sinking of CA Haguro when the six British DDs set up a torpedo attack from six points of the compass using radar to track Haguro and their own units.
