ORIGINAL: V I Lenin
ORIGINAL: Bullwinkle58
Interesting data: the bolded (-) factors seen above for Japan. Especially supply.
This was a good day at this base, but worse is coming. The Chinese supply situation here is beyond terrible and can't be fixed now. Que sera sera.
Absolutely not true!
This is a point that does not seem to register with anyone - supply draw inside bases does not work the same as supply draw outside bases. Your army at Tsuyung are limited to a max supply volume (as indicated by number on base screen) modified by supply weight in two very important ways.
Imagining that Tsuyung can draw 900 supplies per 'tick' (for sake of argument) and trying to draw supplies from Mandalay (you gave up Rangoon, yes?)
900 x 0.55 [spoilage for 3 hexes minor rail + 8 hexes minor road is 45%] = 495 - this is your actual 'per tick' supply received at the base, though 900 will be lost from Mandalay to do it.
Then, your weekly supply received will be either 495 x 2 or 495 x 4 (I cannot remember where the cutoff point is between the supply movement process running 2 or 4 times a week - I think it is over 70 = 4 and under 70 = 2, but not certain; I do remember than under 30 no supply flows at all - this means that if you lose Prome Tsuyung cannot draw from Akyab, Ramree, India etc - it has to draw from intermediate bases, all of which have limits and so are likely to cause big problems). So you are operating on max 1000t per week INSIDE TSUYUNG BASE.
OUTSIDE the base it is totally different IF you have supplies available to send out. LCUs do not have supply limits!, and they also go further to get their supplies - as long as spoilage would be less than 100% they will draw. This means that units not in a base
- Can draw more supplies (as much as they need, but do it less often at long range - often only 1 time per week)
- Can draw supplies from further
So, as long as you have supplies to send out, you can support units. There is danger here that if they are peacefully in a hex and enemy suddenly arrives and starts bombarding, it may take them 6 or 7 days to replenish their supply (so risk of running out - but only for first time, since after that they will up their demand to include resisting bombardment/counterfire) - but that can be mitigated easily with reserve forces.
From hex northwest of Tsuyung you can (just, just - 98% spoilage) draw from Imphal - but Japanese have already made it into jungle mountains, so damage is done; there is nothing useful at Tsuyung, so sensible thing to do is to retreat to hex northeast of Paoshan (66,44); from there units can if nothing else draw from Imphal at 'only' 88% spoilage and also from Silchar, which is very easy to supply due to the railway. In Burma, if you have units that do not need to be in bases, take them out and turn supply stockpiling on! In the countryside they can do their own supply and bases can build up to support aircraft, AA guns.
I hope that is making sense to you - ask if not! Using this you can support armies in Burma - it is very inefficient with very, very high supply wastage, but it can be done. Obviously closer you get to India = less wastage.
First, thank you for your input and work doing the math. I did not re-do it, but it looks at least directionaly correct, and is probably totally correct.
Second, you bring up issues which are always at work in Burma, one of the most, if not the actual most, complex sub-theaters on the map. Burma has it all--rivers, mountains, railroads, jungle, big ports, unbuilt infrastrucure, critical dot bases. And six months in Burma can make a lot of difference in the option list available to each side. Then there's the monsoon.
Your point about LCUs being able to re-supply outside bases more effectively is well-known by veteran players, and seems counter-intuitive to some, but it's there and it's how things work. That said, it's only a worthwhile move if it fits into the rest of the tactical and strategic plan. In this case in this game it is not the best move at Tsuyung. One might think so given what I have revealed here, so let me expand.
1) The macro-strategy for Burma rests on the December decision to abandon China in order to shorten supply lines in order to re-build Chinese LCUs in order to allow some of them to help defend Burma and others to relieve garrison units of the Indian army for comabt in Burma and Indo-China. Secondarily, the movement out of China is designed to not throw away VPs on indefensible Chinese territory, but to fight when odds are favorable in the west, and to maximize VP hauls in part by using the 2:1 VPs-per-device-lost rule when Japan fights China. Thirdly, the Chinese evacuation is designed to buy time for the Allies to develp Burma's infrastructure and supply state, particularly in advance of the first, 1942 monsoon season.
2) To accomplish #1, a majority of Chinese LCUs have moved to the Mandalay group and are in those bases rather than the countryside in order to maximize replacement draws. Replacements are off for China everywhere else except for a select few LCUs at Chungking. To accomplish the draws in the Mandalay group supply is being force-fed into Chittagong from multiple sources. Thousands of points per week are landing. This is being pulled into the interior in bi-and tri-weekly draws. It is going to the Mandalay group as well as the coastal bases of Cox's B. and Akyab where significant combat power is being accumulatred for future operations south. On a daily basis Mandalay, which is also building its own Forts and AF and has supply spinners increased, is using every spare supply point which flows to it. So much so that Schwebo, just north, has not managed to go above 20 supply itself, despite needing to build infrastructure.
3) Imphal and the other bases to the north are contributing a bit. Imphal hovers near 6000 supply as it is also building infrastructure. Ledo is at about 21,000 and needs it as it will shortly begin much more intense air transport operations. In short, Burma does not have a lot of supply to send east and still accomplish its core strategies. It is March 1942 after all. I am facing Burma's issues far earlier than many Allied players do because of my China evacuaiton, which is "odd." But Burma itself must come first if the China evacuation is to mean anything.
4) Looking east, Lashio is set to draw to about 15,000, but has not gone over 11,000 due to Fort and AF building. Lashio has a very large garrison. Your points about external supply might have salience here; I will look at moving some LCUs out onto the road to the west to perhaps draw a bit from the Mandalay group. Mountains on all non-road hexes at Lashio (and Paoshan and Tsuyung for that matter) make moving LCUs to non-road hexes to try to draw supply infeasible. The time needed to move into and then out of mountains is extreme and does not allow tactical response to passing Japanese forces. Moving into the mountains can have longer term strategic benefits if the difficulty of movement is turned onto the Japanese and these "hovering" units in the mountains are used as a check on the passing Japanese lest they come down to sever supply lines after the Japanese pass by. But in short, at Lashio, no supply can be spared for the other two bases yet. It is the last bastion before Japan breaks free into Burma and needs to be the strongest base east of Mandalay.
5) Paoshan runs at 40 supply every day and has not varied in weeks. (See #4) Forts there are critically low at 1 + 57%. Supply which flows in above the 40 is enough for some daily build, however, as well as a bit of internal LCU supply build. Forts will not begin on 3 without more base supply though. By then Ledo may be able to help. Here too I will look at the utility of moving an LCU or two onto the road, but as you note distance=spoilage is extreme by the time you get to Paoshan so there might not be much gain when compared to the fatigue of moving and the loss of the integrated engineers in the corps formations, engineers building the forts needed so badly.
6) Which brings us to Tsuyung. You argue this base should be abandoned now with the defenders moving closer to Paoshan. I don't plan to do that, for the following reasons:
A) The base already has Forts 2 as well as an AF 2 I don't want Japan to have tomorrow. When supply is short Forts are your friend.
B) This base is a true speed-bump. Its function is to slow and bleed. To buy time for Paoshan and Lashio to build. On the bleed front, again, Japan has to kill two Chinese devices to every one of its own I have to kill in order to stay even. This was part of the reason I attacked the tanks last turn. Once the whole stack arrives it will attack. It may pause to recon and rest. (I know from combat results that at least some units in the stack are low on supply, and he is now drawing supply up a narrow, single corridor through mountians.) When it attacks it should take out the Forts, take the base, and cause the defenders to retreat. The retreat will give the Chinese a "free" jump into the next hex unless he has some attackers set to Reserve-Pursuit. If I were to order the attackers to walk out now they would be in motion when attacked, or, best case, on the road when he took the base without fatigue or disruption, and then caught them on the road in Move mode with his tanks and without any forts at all. I'd rather fight from cover if the fight is inevitable.
C) TO the NE I have two large, converging stacks on the yellow road through the mountains. Half of it has Local Forts 3. It includes the Red Army national HQ under Mao. It will stay in place to see if his Tsuyung stack continues west for Paoshan. If it does my stack will come into Tsuyung's hex and attack in an attempt to cut supply. If he splits his stack to come NW to address it, the Chinese will fall back, all the way to Chungling if necessary. Once he takes Tsuyung, which he will, his problems are just beginning, not ending. All of this will take time to sort as the monsoon season approaches and I build my air force and troop strength in Burma as well as move new transports into Ledo.
Long, but I hope this better outlines what I'm trying to do in that piece of the map.
