The Good The Bad & The Indifferent

[Bullwinkle58]

This is a portion of my WIndows desktop, with the shortcuts to launch AE and Tracker, plus the e-manuals. How do you make the game start?

If you're not using a shortcut you must be runig in native screen resolution, with the old font, without proper allowances for your CPU array, etc. IOW, AAARRRRRGGGHHHHH!!!! [:)]

[Canoerebel]

I've solved the problem. I have two kinds of files. All the "jsignt" files are blank, but something called "asignt" appears fine.

I apologize for testing your patience Bullwinkle. I hope you didn't pull any hairs out. But through your kind efforts to help, I finally stumbled across the information I need. (However, my brain blew seven fuses in the process, so I may need to a stiff glass of orange juice or two tonight.)

[Bullwinkle58]

ORIGINAL: Canoerebel

I've solved the problem. I have two kinds of files. All the "jsignt" files are blank, but something called "asignt" appears fine.

I apologize for testing your patience Bullwinkle. I hope you didn't pull any hairs out. But through your kind efforts to help, I finally stumbled across the information I need. (However, my brain blew seven fuses in the process, so I may need to a stiff glass of orange juice or two tonight.)

OK, this is funny. Sorry. [:'(]

"'A' is for Allies, children. The good guys. 'J' is for Japanese, kids, the bad guys. Write that with your crayons now, please."

[Canoerebel]

I start the game using a pull cord. This was one of the finest jury-rigging projects I've ever managed. I took an old one from my lawn mower, attached it to the hard drive using a hyperplex motor pinerplate flexbox, and can start it with one or two pulls at most.

[Bullwinkle58]

ORIGINAL: Canoerebel

I start the game using a pull cord. This was one of the finest jury-rigging projects I've ever managed. I took an old one from my lawn mower, attached it to the hard drive using a hyperplex motor pinerplate flexbox, and can start it with one or two pulls at most.

See, if you attached a chipmunk to the cord I'd be impressed . . .

[Canoerebel]

Maybe a hamster and its exercise wheel?

[Canoerebel]

Darn, I wish those "jsignt" files were full of info! Boy, howdy, I woulda stumbled across the motherlode!

[Bullwinkle58]

ORIGINAL: Canoerebel

Darn, I wish those "jsignt" files were full of info! Boy, howdy, I woulda stumbled across the motherlode!

Al they say is "Radio works. Radio works. Radio works."

[Bullwinkle58]

ORIGINAL: Bullwinkle58

ORIGINAL: Canoerebel

Darn, I wish those "jsignt" files were full of info! Boy, howdy, I woulda stumbled across the motherlode!

Al they say is "Radio works. Radio works. Radio works."

It is worth looking at the joperationsreport for the previous day. They do get some "national" intel which is good for the Allied player to know they know. Here's an example from my game:

OPERATIONAL REPORT FOR Apr 12, 42

Balboa expands port to size 4
Las Vegas expands airfield to size 8

We get similar info about the AF at Nagasaki or Shanghai, deep behind enemy lines..

[Lecivius]

Man...to funny! [:D]

[Bullwinkle58]

ORIGINAL: Lecivius

Man...to funny! [:D]

We're here all week, folks! Tip your veal!

[Canoerebel]

Thanks to good ol' Bullwinkle, I've now gone back through SigInt reports - make that "aSigInt" reports - for April 20 through July 22.

Over enough time, SigInt usually paints a pretty accurate picture of what's where. There's always the chance that major omissions may totally skew the picture. To come to the point: I don't see anything alarming. In fact, the overall feel is reinforcing of my previous analysis/guesses/hunches.

From east to west:

Umnak: Karafuta Mixed Bde. (6/7); Karafuto planning attack on Cold Bay (7/4); NE Area Fleet (6/20); NE Fleet prepping for Akutan (6/29); 53rd Const'n Bn. (7/10); 92nd B.F. (7/11 and 7/20)
Adak: 5/2nd China Assault Div. (4/28); 5th Field A.F. Const'n Bn. (5/18); 3rd Air Flotilla (5/9 and 6/6); 93rd B.F. (many reports)
Amchitka: 5th Nav. Const'n Bn. (6/5)
Shemya: 39th NJAAF A.F. (5/25)
Attu: 4/8th Field AF Const. Bn (many reports); 5th JAAF AF (4/29 and 7/19)

Wild Card: 7th Div. just invaded Akutan. Does it stay there or does John pull it back to garrison another base. I'll need to bomb or recon to develop info - when the time is right. If he pulls that unit back to Attu Island, the equation changes significantly.

[Schlemiel]

Quite a long string of posts. Your not so secret agenda of beating Greyjoy in the post count is in full effect. Perhaps we should start another random discussion now that aSigIntGate has died down a little How 'bout them angels?

[Crackaces]

ORIGINAL: Schlemiel

Quite a long string of posts. Your not so secret agenda of beating Greyjoy in the post count is in full effect. Perhaps we should start another random discussion now that aSigIntGate has died down a little How 'bout them angels?

Then there is the false intel of the post count in the thread suddenly jumping up ... sort of like "Heavy Radio Traffic in CR's AAR thread ..."[8D]

[Canoerebel]

That works too!

I just completed the 7/23 turn. I'll post an update later, but SigInt had a bit of Aleutians news (later I'll add this to the post above):

Umnak: 8th Field Const'n Bn.
Agattu: 2/5th AF Const'n Bn. on a maru inbound.

Agattu is one of the dot hexes (it's adjacent to Shemya and Attu) that I'm targeting. I "think" this shows that John is paying attention to the Aluetians, but not obsessed about it. IE, this smacks of "long-term" prep. Unless he does some big work in the next 40 days, I don't think garrisons are going to be a big obstacle. The key is the KB.

...and things are heating up very hot and very nice in the Bay of Bengal, meaning all conditions are ripe for John to commit the KB either there or Oz or somewhere in between. I think. I hope.

[Houtje]

Suppose that John comes to Bay of B. with the KB and lots of BB etc. He'd probably be able to gain supremacy there for a while and deny supply & reinf. TF to Ramree, right? If so, do you think will you be able to hold it if he comes for it, over land or sea?

[Cribtop]

Hilarious, CR. I always said my Dad was the least tech savvy person on Earth (although he is brilliant in non-tech areas). He once broke a VCR by stubbornly cramming the tape in backwards! He and my Mom once called to assert that "the Internet is gone!" They had accidentally deleted the shortcut to Safari.

After reading the previous SigInt posts, you might give dear old Dad a run for his money! [:D]

[Nemo121]

I'm catching up on this AAR ( not reading John 3rd's side ) and thought I would comment as I came across posts in January which were interesting. CR, if you don't want me to comment just let me know and I'll desist.

1. Deep battle was raised by Princeps and then Alfred commented as follows:

would quickly point out that the current KB operations off New Zealand is not a "deep battle" operation. From a strategic POV, he would not be complimentary of the overall Japanese play.

Precisely. Haring off into the deep in order to chase down some strategically meaningless frippery isn't deep battle, it is the worst sort of flash over substance, tactical showboating ever. John3rd doesn't do strategy and deep thought. His personality is the key to understanding his play as it dictates much of his play.

As to what he is emulating with some of these thrusts... It isn't so much Tukhachevsky at Frunze or even Budenny during the 1920 Polish campaign getting bogged down at Lviv while the strategically decisive battle was taken place at Warsaw... No he harkens back to a much earlier time. It reminds me very much of Rameses II at Kadesh. He is forward with the Amun division dreaming of glory and mentally composing the poem and bulletin which will proclaim his capture of Kadesh when he realises that the Hittites are across the hill. He calls for the Seth, Re and Ptah (sic?) divisions to come up but as they take their time he gloriously confronts the enemy himself ( as the Amun division crumbles ). At the end of the day he has a draw from the battle, a great narrative of how awesome and daring he was in charging the Hittite lines when he was abandoned by the Amun division and the Amun division is totally and utterly trashed.... and its destruction was utterly avoidable and unnecessary.

The aftermath is always much like Kadesh also. There is slaughter on the field, much is made of the clamour and flashing of sunlight off armour and weaponry but, at the end, whether one considers it a win, draw or a loss, there isn't the logistically realistic underpinning to make it stick and so, as with Rameses II he retreats back to Egypt, writes his poem and bulletin and posts them at his temples at Luxor, Karnak and Abydos ( and elsewhere but I can't remember their names right now - the temples, of course being analogues to the forum threads ) and relies on the grandeur of his monuments to bear testimony to the grandeur of his "victory".

I've outlined a little for those who may not be familiar with the Battle of Kadesh. Bottom line though, I've used this example before because there really are striking similarities between Rameses II's conduct of the battle of Kadesh ( and his strategic and operational failures ) and John3rd's conduct of this and other campaigns. What's also helpful is that he can be relied upon to make the same errors time and again since they come from his personality and not from an error in assessment of enemy intentions or capabilities. I'd strongly suggest a quick refresher with the battle of Kadesh since John3rd emulates Rameses II's handling of his forces at Kadesh time and time and time again. Budenny at Lviv is another good example but Kadesh is smaller, clearer and more easily digested since its scale is tactical and operational and not grand strategic like Lviv was.

Obviously this is just my opinion.


2. A rather interesting discussion of the applicability of Deep Battle to naval tactics -harking back to Drake but, rather surprisingly, without any mention of Mahan which is unusual given the subject matter and nationalities of most contributors.

Bullwinkle makes some interesting points re: the differences between land warfare and naval warfare and the lack of "terrain features" in naval warfare while Crackaces talks of the grand strategic level ( off-map resources, reinforcement schedules etc... what the Soviets of the time would have termed grand strategic or national policy level matters ).

Two quick points re: this interesting discussion:
a) If one views islands as fortified terrain and chains of islands which project combat power such that it interlinks with projected combat power from other islands as a front line then one can view the Pacific as a front line with secondary lines, tactical depth ( that range into no-man's land or behind your lines to which the enemy's tactical bombers can operate ), operational depth ( that range into which an operation can be mounted without transitioning into your strategic depth - usually into the 1st or 2nd line of defence and no farther ) and strategic depth ( everything else ).

Deep battle is concerned with engaging the enemy geographically and temporally throughout their entire depth ( tactical, operational and strategic ) using all modalities ( the presence of force, the absence of force, the confirmation and/or denial of intelligence and the creation of maskirovka ) to both misdirect and direct the enemy such that you can most efficiently break into their strategic depth, dislocating their tactical and operational defences and forcing a strategic redeployment of enemy forces along, ideally, the entire zone of contact between your forces and theirs.

In simple terms, if you can hold Guadalcanal and can take the Marianas without getting hung up around Rabaul and Truk then why not do so? You'll render Rabaul and Truk irrelevant ( so long as your logistics are defensible ).

The key though with Deep Battle is that it is about engaging ( through combat, misinformation, misdirection etc etc ) all layers of the enemy's dispositions in order to shape the battlefield as you wish it to be and then striking at something strategically vital which dislocates their tactical and operational defences entirely. Does that mean you skip the fight in the tactical or operational zone? No, it just means you don't allow yourself to get bogged down there - the Soviets did this through the use of echelons all the way up to Front and Strategic Direction level ( which could be responsible for releasing a Tank Army into NATO's operational depth in pursuance of a strategic objective ) while the US sought to do this with AirLand Battle ( the engagement of Soviet echelons through their tactical, operational and strategic depth through the use of ground combat units, helicopters, operational and strategic airstrikes, A-teams and stay-behinds lasing Copperheads onto any tank with a really large aerial --- this was the US version of deep battle ) and the teaching of auftragstaktiken and "manoeuvre warfare".

Obviously everyone can view it through whatever prism makes most sense to them but, for me, those 4 layers ( grand strategic/national policy level, strategic, operational and tactical ) as well as the Soviet emphasis on controlling both what is and isn't seen/done etc ( as opposed to the Western orthodoxy of just focussing on what isn't seen/done ) are sensible, clear and easy enough to create a rubric around.

When push comes to shove though ---- whatever works for you works for you. No one person has a monopoly on the "right way" to do anything ( in this game or in life ).


3. Crackaces:

Of course most of the time I am thinking of John's moves at the level WHAT IS HE THINKING !!!????!!!!

LOL! Also, ny59giants is correct in post 687. Strong traits, strong.

[Crackaces]

The nuances of this analogy are relavent and striking ... I would event wager the "historians " in this forum see this contest as a "draw" at this point. However, once the Burma campaign gets underway .. there will be no question where this campaign is headed ..

[Nemo121]

I'm only on page 11 of this AAR. Looking forward to what happens with Burma.

Prediction: Flash with no strategic significance countered by a slow but steady ( and effective ) buildup by the Allies which eschews the possibility of quick advances in favour of sure advances... all while John 3rd leads the Amun division into strategically irrelevant but flashy sideshows in other theatres. It makes for an exciting game but I feel a bit like Pierre Bosquet .