von Klink stumbles into Russia (and gets frost bite)

[rmonical]

This short AAR captures the essence of my first FTF WITE game. It was as Axis against Toidi - a true gentleman. He mercifully suggested I surrender (and we switch sides) when I admitted I had long since given up any hope of anything other than a crushing defeat. We upgraded to 7.03 as soon as it came out. I have asked Toidi to upgrade to 7.06 and run turn 42 as I have many divisions with morale well below national morale and I want to report back on the effect of the change. Anyway, here goes.

I managed to misplace some very on-point emails from Toidi, I hope he still has them and adds the content to this AAR.


Admiral Canaris,
The purpose of this document is to document the various intelligence failures and unexplained phenomena leading to the recently concluded disaster in Russia. The campaign started well with complete strategic surprise and many Soviet units surrounded with hundreds of thousands of prisoners.

After the initial reverses along the border, however, the enemy retreated in good order and we were unable to encircle any significant forces. One of the key reasons for this is the remarkably resilient command and control demonstrated at all echelons of Soviet leadership. Indeed, the Soviet ability to respond to our attacks exceeded anything we experienced in the West. Within weeks of the initial assault, the enemy was organizing large scale counterattacks against our lead mobile elements. They frequently surrounded and routed them. Soviet logistics appeared to generally operate very well. The expected shortages and bottlenecks we anticipated as a result of the lack of experienced staff officers and organization of new headquarters did not appear. While the enemy made adjustments to accommodate for the lack of experienced senior officers, the overall Soviet command and control from late July through the end appeared to operate as well as ours. Indeed, in the logistics area, the enemy capabilities appeared to significantly exceed our own – even in stable areas of the front directly serviced by nearby rail lines. This is the status of the front in early October.

[rmonical]

While our panzers were routinely able to pierce the front and surround pockets of enemy troops, those pockets were invariable broken by the Soviet’s remarkably effective counterattacks. In particular, our strongly reinforced Army Group North did not seriously threaten Leningrad. By early October, the enemy had 5 million men under arms and many effective divisions. One example of their effectiveness was shown by this counterattack against a penetration NW of Moscow.

[rmonical]

While fiercely resisting in front of Leningrad the enemy gave way slowly around Smolensk and rapidly in the Ukraine. By the time we closed with the enemy near Stalino, they had established a position that was impenetrable to our poorly supplied and exhausted troops.

[rmonical]

As a result of the deteriorating supply situation and weather, we decided to halt major offensive operations, prepare for the Winter and resume the offensive campaign in 1942 after the huge territorial gains has been absorbed. Particularly strong defenses had were established in front of Leningrad as that area was well supplied and offensive operations wound down there in September after PG 4 was sent to AGC. The no-mans land in AGN was an area that whoever moved into was attacked and retreated.

[rmonical]

The winter campaign was of course dominated by THE ANOMALY and the massive Soviet counterattacks. We still have no explanation for THE ANOMALY. This is what we understand today.

Between November 28 and December 5, the Axis forces in the east suffered a sudden, unexpected and rapid decline in combat effectiveness. A number of explanations have been advanced for THE ANOMALY, but none of them stand-up under close examination.

One potential explanation for THE ANOMALY is that severe weather is responsible. While the Winter of 1941-42 was severe, this notion fails when one considers the fact that the effect was completely uniform across a front stretching over 900 miles and several climate zones. If THE ANOMALY were due to the weather, one would expect some differences in the nature of the impact between Riga and Oddessa. There was none.

Another potential explanation is that our troops simply did not know what to expect this far East in the winter. This notion fails when one realizes that many of our senior leaders operated over the same terrain impacted by the THE ANOMALY through the winter of 1917 and 1918. While the combat was much less intense in the prior conflict, we generally were familiar with the terrain and what to expect from the weather.

Another potential explanation is that the winter was so cold that our weapons simply did not work. While adjustments were required for the extreme conditions, they are not an explanation for the full impact of THE ANOMALY. Indeed, since our mountain troops using virtually the same weapons were not impacted by the THE ANOMALY, this notion fails as well.

Finally, logistics has been advanced as a cause of THE ANOMALY. This notion also fails because the impact of THE ANOMALY was uniform from the well rested, well dug in and well supplied troops in AGN to the overextended troops in front of Stalino.

Finally THE ANOMALY persisted throughout the winter ending with the onset of the Spring rains.

One other odd effect associated with THE ANOMALY is the remarkable mobility of the enemy troops in these severe weather conditions. There is no explanation for why an infantry or a cavalry unit can maneuver through hostile but undefended territory more effectively in blizzard conditions than in snow.

We have no idea what caused THE ANOMALY so we do not know if it would have re-occurred next Winter. We were wise to accept terms in the East and end that cursed campaign.

[rmonical]

The best example of the impact of THE ANOMALY is the ability of the enemy to dislodge the well supplied, well led, heavily reinforced and dug in divisions of AGN. In the initial weeks of THE ANOMALY, the best of our troops under the best possible conditions for defense were almost completely ineffective. They were even reinforced with our available mountain divisions.

[rmonical]

The situation for AGS rapidly became a disaster. Most of 17th Army was surrounded by those fast moving cavalry divisions and corps.

[rmonical]

Finally, the ultimate disaster, the effects of THE ANOMALY extended to our homeland training establishment. Rebuilt divisions simply would not train up to acceptable standards over a period of many weeks. So the Heer ended the winter with most of its divisions barely more effective than their enemy counterparts.

[rmonical]

By the end of THE ANOMALY , had added 9th Army and 2 Panzer Army to the defense of AGN with only limited success. We were able to hold Pskov.

[rmonical]

The disaster in AGS continued to the end. We were simply unable to run West fast enough to outpace the exceptionally mobile Soviet cavalry.

[Peltonx]

This is a joke right?

I know its not but what esle can anyone say other then "This is a joke right?"

[gids]

atm im playing a game as a soviet and im at turn 18 he already lost Wiking ,LaH ,a panzer division and some minor infantry divisions of the rumanians ,i cought him totally offguard on his flanks with the massive cavalrydivision surge you get in the south.....once surrounded he was lost and the winter has yet to come...

[bigbaba]

oh my...that can happen when one tries to hold everything in winter/blizzard as german.

[gids]

the blizzard hasnt started yet :p

[bigbaba]

omg, that isnt even blizzard yet.

that is something i wont do in our game for sure gids.

i will try to get as far as i can and then do it like in our last game.

[gids]

to the guys defense i have to say its his first game and he underestimated the russian side terribly,he didnt do the lyov pocket, he ignored riga ,didnt go for pockets in the start in almost any front,so i gave hime some advice and told him to read the forums (which i think he didnt do),and yes im pretty sure you dont do easy times on opponents