AGS alternate/historical opening (or not using the Lvov gambit)

[Balou]

Question to the History-experts: was a Lvov pocket feasible in June 41? If yes, why not accept any attempts to "(re)create" it? If no, something's over-optimistic with WitE rules.

[loki100]

ORIGINAL: Balou

Question to the History-experts: was a Lvov pocket feasible in June 41? If yes, why not accept any attempts to "(re)create" it? If no, something's over-optimistic with WitE rules.

The problem is it only works as an experienced axis player knows precisely where the Soviet units are (ok pre-invasion German intelligence on the border armies was good - but not that good) and that they cannot move. Ok the Soviet response in the opening week ranged from incompetent to disastrous but Kirponos did a good job organsing SW Front and managed the first Soviet counterblow by about 26 June.

All it takes is a few inconvenient ZoCs, units in the wrong positions and it falls apart. It also seems to rely on moving AGC units to AGS. Now that may have been what the Germans should have done but its not what their invasion plan was based on.

As to the new invention of sending Panzers through Rumania to destroy S Front - well that is, to me, pure abuse of the rules. S Front is locked as Rumania did not enter the war on 22 June (1 July?) to stop a run away, some players are now committing Panzers from other AG groups via Rumania in a period when technically Rumania was still neutral.

[Balou]

Thanks for giving some historical background. Whether or not it was the german invasion plan, and whatever the soviet response may have been, there is still my question: would Lvov have been feasible IRL with AGS alone ?

BTW:
In WitE a "small" & rock solid pocket via Tarnopol isn't much of a problem - precisely for reasons you mentioned (known enemy positions, zocs, etc). And one doesn't need AGC.

[Klydon]

ORIGINAL: Balou

Thanks for giving some historical background. Whether or not it was the german invasion plan, and whatever the soviet response may have been, there is still my question: would Lvov have been feasible IRL with AGS alone ?

BTW:
In WitE a "small" & rock solid pocket via Tarnopol isn't much of a problem - precisely for reasons you mentioned (known enemy positions, zocs, etc). And one doesn't need AGC.

Could AGS historically have made a drive to the Rumanian border like they can now in WITE? No.

Could AGS with help from AGC have made a drive to the Rumanian border? Different question and one that is open to a lot of different opinion. Some will say not possible at all while others will say it was possible.

There are some issues however. First, WITE can't correctly do the weather like what happen in the real campaign. I have read in numerous places where PG1 was held by ground conditions as a result of storms and a lot of rain off and on. It didn't compare to the muddy season, but it slowed progress down and was a factor.

Another issue is unlike the AGN and AGC battle plans, where most players follow the plans the Germans had in mind for the campaign, there is a tremendous divergence from that in the south. Originally, PG1 and 6th army were supposed to head for the Kiev area and then along the west side of the river to the SE and eventually do a double envelopment with 17th army. Most do not follow this plan at all and instead make the drive to the Romanian border for the most part to trap as many Russian troops as possible.

Interestingly enough, one of the earlier plans was to have a panzer corps stationed in Rumania that would spearhead a offensive drive out of Rumania to meet PG1 along the river for a massive double envelopment. (I have a alternative scenario buried someplace for that). Just before the Balkans campaign, Hitler changed his mind on this point as he thought the Dniestr and some other rivers would be too big of an obstacle. (Turns out that wasn't true).

[loki100]

ORIGINAL: Balou

Thanks for giving some historical background. Whether or not it was the german invasion plan, and whatever the soviet response may have been, there is still my question: would Lvov have been feasible IRL with AGS alone ?

As Klydon says, if the entire German OOB is reworked it all enters the realm of opinion and creative writing.

The key is the German mindset, again as Klydon says, their plan was a direct drive to Kiev (the better roads and rail lines run that way, not down to the south so logistically its the easy option). Given the circumstances, Kirponos did a master class of aggressive defense, pulling back, using the rivers mixed with bruising counterstrokes.

AGS turned its Panzers south when it was clear that a direct drive on Kiev was not feasible, they then opened the gap between the less competently led S Front and SW Front and hooked back up the Dniepr, unhinging SW Front's defense of Kiev.

So I'd say (entering the world of creative fiction) that no it was not feasible either due to the troops available or their conceptualisation of the campaign aims.

[Balou]

Well then lets hope the devs share your opinion (WitE 2.0)...

[timmyab]

With the benefit of hindsight it seems that the German plan in the South was a mistake.The original double envelopment plan would probably have worked in my opinion.

Here's a passage from "THE GERMAN CAMPAIGN IN RUSSIA PLANNING AND OPERATIONS (1940-1942)"

Changes in plan (March-April 1941)
Army Group South
On 18 March Hitler decided that Sixth Army was to carry out the main thrust of Army Group South. The plan for a Twelfth Army advance from Moldavia toward the northeast was abandoned. The German and Romanian units assembling along the Pruth were to tie down the opposing forces and pursue them only in the event that they should withdraw. This change in plan had to be made because Hitler contended that the Dnestr was a formidable obstacle that could not be surmounted by a frontal attack without considerable delay. According to the new plan the powerful left of Army Group South was to punch its way to the Kiev area and approach the Dnestr line from the rear. The forces assembled in Moldavia would have to be sufficiently strong to prevent a Russian penetration into Romania, but this danger did not seem acute since Brauchitsch had expressed the opinion that the Russians would not attack Romania unless they were attacked from Romanian territory. According to Hitler, Hungary was to take no part in Operation BARBAROSSA, and Slovakia was to assist only in the concentration and supply of German troops.The Yugoslav coup d'etat on 26 March induced Hitler to expand the operations in the Balkans by attacking Yugoslavia in addition to Greece. The greater scope of the campaign in the Balkans necessitated that an army headquarters assume control of the occupied territories after the end of hostilities. Twelfth Army, which was in charge of the operations against Greece, was selected for this role, and Eleventh Army was designated as substitute headquarters for the forces assembled in Moldavia.On 30 March 1941 the army group and army commanders reported to Hitler. During this conference the mission of Eleventh Army was discussed, and Hitler ordered the army forces divided into three separate groups, capable of backing up the Romanian divisions in case of need. Since Eleventh Army had thus been given a defensive mission, the motorized forces originally earmarked for that area were transferred to First Panzer Group. The encirclement of the Russian forces in the western Ukraine was to be effected by a single envelopment from the north, during which the armored forces were to thrust to the Dnepr at and south of Kiev, bear southeastward, and follow the bend of the river to its mouth, thus preventing the Russian forces in the western Ukraine from withdrawing across the river.As a result of the foregoing changes, Directive No. 21 had mean while been amended as follows:
Section II, paragraph 3: In conjunction with the German troops assembled on Romanian territory, Romanian troops will tie down the enemy forces opposite their borders and will also lend assistance in maintaining the lines of communications.
Section III, A., paragraph 6: The army group committed south of the Pripyat Marshes will concentrate its main-effort forces in and to the south of the Lublin area for an attack in the general direction of Kiev. From there strong armored forces will thrust deep into enemy territory and envelop the Russian forces by following the course of the lower Dnepr.
The mixed German-Romanian force in the south will have two missions:1. To secure Romania as a base and thus guarantee the continuity of operations in the southern part of the theater; and2. To tie down the opposing enemy forces during the advance of the army group's north wing. In accordance with developments in the situation, the mixed force—supported by Air Force contingents—will launch a pursuit to prevent the Soviets from making an organized withdrawal across the Dnepr.The corresponding changes were also incorporated into the Army's operation order. [See map 5.~] Army Group South was no longer to concentrate its strength on both its wings; instead, it was to strengthen its left so that mobile forces could pace the drive on Kiev, where they were to bear southeastward and destroy—or at least cut off—all enemy forces still in the western Ukraine.The missions of the individual armies were changed as follows:Eleventh Army was to protect Romania against an invasion by Russian troops, tie down the forces opposite the Romanian border by tricking the enemy into believing that major forces were being assembled, and eventually launch a pursuit to prevent the Russians from making an organized withdrawal.Seventeenth Army was to jab with its powerful left, push back the enemy southeastward, and pursue him via Vinnitsa and Berdichev.First Panzer Group was to thrust via Berdichev and Zhitomir toward the Dnepr River at Kiev, and then immediately continue its southeastward drive in order to block the Russian routes of withdrawal.Sixth Army was to screen the north flank of the army group along the Pripyat Marshes and follow First Panzer Group closely up to Zhitomir. Upon receiving specific orders from army group, Sixth Army was to shift strong forces southeastward along the west bank of the Dnepr and join First Panzer Group in the destruction of the Russian forces fighting in the western Ukraine.The difficulties of such an operation, hinging on a single envelopment, were fully realized by the Army High Command. Its success depended essentially upon whether the Russian leaders would react swiftly to the situation. If they recognized the danger in time, major Russian forces would probably get across the Dnepr River—or at least those opposite the Romanian border. The outcome of the offensive in the south therefore seemed doubtful from the outset.

[swkuh]

Thanks to several members for the analysis. Compliments.

Seems the Lvov pocket is a little much for what was possible or expected in history. How to prevent it is an interesting problem for developers doing v2.0.

One issue might be the ability of armored corps now going beyond historical possibilities. Could be reined in a bit. Believe German equipment was not up to what the game allows. Breakdowns, supply difficulties, Soviet resistance, etc. could be increased. Of course, the balance factors might do most of this, but vanilla settings should reflect historical reality.

[Klydon]

As I have pointed out in the past, you do have to be careful when looking at distance, etc. A German drive to the Rumanian border is actually a shorter distance over easier terrain compared to what PG2 and PG3 did in the center to get to the Minsk area and close the trap on the Western Front.

[Michael T]

As I have pointed out in the past, you do have to be careful when looking at distance, etc. A German drive to the Rumanian border is actually a shorter distance over easier terrain compared to what PG2 and PG3 did in the center to get to the Minsk area and close the trap on the Western Front.

Never mind all that, it did not happen historically, therefore it is impossible [8|]

[mmarquo]

The other possibility is to allow the pocket, but to increase the staying power of encircled units. Not withstanding the revised air supply rules, surrounded units rout and dissolve too easy; still impossible for a resistant Stalingrad, Demyansk or other type of pocket. If the Axis surrounds 1,000,000 men in the south, it should take a fairly long time to round them up....

My 2 cents.

Marquo

[Redmarkus5]

I think that the root of the problem is the a-historical ability of SHC to withdraw units over vast distances from turn 1. This is why the GHC player feels obliged to form the pocket.

Soviet 'Shock' needs to be better modeled in the game, along with the German's blitzkrieg advantage.

[Michael T]

I think that the root of the problem is the a-historical ability of SHC to withdraw units over vast distances from turn 1. This is why the GHC player feels obliged to form the pocket.

and turn 2, 3 , 4 etc etc

[hugh04]

There are a bunch of problems, but one big one is how easy it is to flip control of a hex and how hard it is for the soviet to move. If there was another designation say called "contested hex" that allowed for movement and supply to be traced combined with true flipping of control only on those hexes that a side had an uncontested zoc at the end of the turn only, you would see some big changes.

vandev

[Redmarkus5]

ORIGINAL: vandev

There are a bunch of problems, but one big one is how easy it is to flip control of a hex and how hard it is for the soviet to move. If there was another designation say called "contested hex" that allowed for movement and supply to be traced combined with true flipping of control only on those hexes that a side had an uncontested zoc at the end of the turn only, you would see some big changes.

vandev

Yes, I agree, but that should be true for all turns up to 1945.

There is also a need for some extra shock effects in the early turns. I recall many East Front games that modeled this quite well in the past - it's not a new idea, as you know of course.

The whole Lvov discussion would vanish if Soviet movement was somewhat realistic. And I'm a SHC 'fan boy' as they call it!

[Redmarkus5]

ORIGINAL: Marquo

The other possibility is to allow the pocket, but to increase the staying power of encircled units. Not withstanding the revised air supply rules, surrounded units rout and dissolve too easy; still impossible for a resistant Stalingrad, Demyansk or other type of pocket. If the Axis surrounds 1,000,000 men in the south, it should take a fairly long time to round them up....

My 2 cents.

Marquo

Yes, +1 on that as well

[janh]

I think no one can truly and entirely rule out the possibility that the Germans may have pulled off something like the small, the medium or the biggest "turn 1 Lvovs", or the latest "Sapper/MichaelT" "delayed southern mega pockets" if they had committed significant extra forces from other AGs.

Thus it should be a possibility. I must admit I like the latest one Michael showed against Kamil more than the "straight-forward" turn 1 Lvovs since there are at least 2 or 3 turns for the Russian to react. Whatever that helps with poor MP and on, but it at least looks like a battle and not one side just napping until all's over. Possibly this is even more hurtful for the Soviets in the long run, though. The only catch I don't understand, or better cannot logically justify, is sending troops thru Romania and launching them while the Axis ally is still formally neutral -- this kind of is breaking the basic scenario design, and logically requires also removing the 1st turn surprise penalties for the Soviet southern fronts correspondingly to make any sense.

What I dislike about the "1st turn Lvov's" is the probability with which they succeed (it is basically a given if Axis wants to do it). That is in stark contrast to what I would expect it to have looked liked even if the Germans had send 1-3 more Panzerkorps south given the southern Soviet Armies rapid and powerful responses and the head-aches and heavy losses it caused the Axis. Even reinforced, the PzKps bullying to make the Lvov would have faced serious resistance, severe counterattacks, and suffered some sizable losses before succeeding. The later would probably have been doable "rather well and quickly" within the 0.5-1 week (turns) with at least 2 extra Panzerkorps, yet harder/slower or even uncertain with <= 1 extra Corps. It is this resistance and the fight the southern Front showed from the outset even within the first days, certainly much quicker than they ever could have been pocketed like the worse performing sleepers in the northern areas, that is entirely missing.

The whole thing is too simple, too certain, and --most importantly-- too cheap and lacking pretty much any battling compared to the huge impact it has on the balance of the first year or two. Hopefully for WitE 2.0 the devs will tackle any of the measures that could influence this, from ZOC differentiations, a fine-grain mud/weather model, more detailed surprise rules, more resilient pockets, a tiny randomization of starting locations, reaction moves... whatever it takes. Nonetheless, a a certain but small probability should remain to try a Lvov gambit, win big time or loose big time -- get it all, or see the majority of the Panzer get bogged down fighting south while AGC gets stuck north lacking it's armor...

[timmyab]

ORIGINAL: janh
The only catch I don't understand, or better cannot logically justify, is sending troops thru Romania and launching them while the Axis ally is still formally neutral

The mobile units that are sent South can't enter Romanian or Hungarian territory on turn one, they have to wait entrained on the Hungarin border.

[OddBall2]

While one can see the case against the Romanian gambit needing to be nerfed for political reasons. I question the Lvov pocket debate. I have read nearly all the AAR's. It seems that it really has no long term effect on the game. Everybody seems to get "X" distance to the east in the south. Even the AAR's with the Axis reaching Don/Donets line in 41 still have to retreat in the winter. The Germans cannot win on all three fronts at the same time. If the Axis focus on the south then Leningrad and Moscow survive. Having the Germans 500 miles east of the north and central fronts just means having to retreat to shorten the line in 42/43. Maybe in the hands of some of the top players they can push east enough to turn the tide. but it seems to me that once your pass the Donbas cities you are just flaying around on the steppe with nothing to aim for. Has anyone ever seen an Axis player take Baku?

[carlkay58]

Not against a human. Several have (including me) vs the AI at various levels.