Civil War 150th

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

Early in the morning, 11,000 Northern cavalry and supporting units splashed across two fords to engage the Southern troopers gathered at Brandy Station. They achieved a double surprise: first, a brigade under John Buford overran the pickets guarding one ford and forced a number of Rebel horsemen to ride bareback, having no time to saddle their mounts. Worse, another wing under David Greg, found a completely unguarded road and reached Fleetwood Hill, which had been the location of "Jeb" Stuart's headquarters the evening before.

But the Southerners rallied, and soon the Northerners found there were considerably more of them than they had planned for (about 9,500). This made it the largest primarily cavalry battle of the war, though both sides had some infantry and artillery as well. Charges and counter-charges swept across the Fleetwood Hill, until finally the Confederates established themselves to stay. With both his wings blocked, the Union commander ordered a general withdrawal.

Union losses were 69 killed 352 wounded 486 missing/captured, for a total of 907. Confederate losses were about 520 all told. By any cold, concrete measure, Brandy Station was a Confederate victory. The Southerners had been left in possession of the field, and they had inflicted more casualties than they had received. But the battle had intangible effects which would be surprisingly far-reaching. First, the large Rebel force there proved to the Union commanders that Lee's army was definitely on the move. Even more important, the morale of the Union troopers received a boost that would turn out to be permanent:

[font="Times New Roman"][The battle] made the Federal cavalry. Up to that time confessedly inferior to the Southern horsemen, they gained on this day that confidence in themselves and in their commanders which enabled them to contest so fiercely the subsequent battle-fields of June, July, and October.
[center] -- Stuart's adjutant Henry B. McClellan[/center][/font]

And, the myth of "Jeb" Stuart's invincibility was gone on the Confederate side as well. He had been surprised, and that wasn't supposed to happen -- he was supposed to be the one doing the surprising. Some stinging criticism, from the influential Richmond Enquirer and other sources, was leveled at him. Stuart began looking for a way to restore his dimmed glory. This would have its consequences.

Map by Hal Jespersen, www.cwmaps.com

[Capt. Harlock]

East of Vicksburg, early June 1863:

Confederate Secretary of War Seddon had asked Joe Johnston if he advised taking more troops from the Army of Tennessee.

[font="Times New Roman"] I replied on the 10th: “I have not at my disposal half the number of troops necessary. It is for the Government to determine what department, if any, can furnish the reenforcements required.” The Secretary’s dispatch, in cipher, could be only partially deciphered. On the 12th, something more being understood, the answer was continued: “To take from Bragg a force that would make this army fit to oppose Grant’s, would involve yielding Tennessee. It is for the Government to decide between this State and Tennessee.”
[...]
I cannot advise as to the points from which troops can best be taken, having no means of knowing. Nor is it for me to judge which it is best to hold, Mississippi or Tennessee —- that is for the Government to determine. Without some great blunder of the enemy, we cannot hold both.

Joseph E. Johnston, Narrative of Military Operations during the Civil War [/font]

Note that Johnston had originally been assigned as department commander for the vast area between the Allegheny Mountains and the Mississippi. As such he would have had the authority to take whatever troops he saw fit from Braxton Bragg's Army of Tennessee. But Johnston had a horror of trespassing on a fellow general's command, which was fair since he violently objected to any trespass on his own authority. Also, he wanted to pass the responsibility for the looming disaster up the chain of command. He did not want to be known either as the man who lost Tennessee, or the man who lost Vicksburg.

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

A second raid to bring the war home to the Northerners got underway. This one was considerably smaller than Lee's campaign, however, consisting of 2,460 Rebel cavalry with just four pieces of artillery, led by famed raider John Hunt Morgan. They jumped of from Sparta, Tennessee, intending to go to Kentucky and cause disruption in the rear of the Union Army of the Cumberland, which was facing the Army of Tennessee.

As it happened, they would go all the way to Indiana and then Ohio, possibly the farthest northward penetration by regular Confederate troops.

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

Lee's Army of Northern Virginia had successfully passed around to the west of Hooker's Army of the Potomac. The Rebels now moved into the Shenandoah Valley. Hooker had suspected something like this, and proposed to march on Richmond, which was now largely uncovered. However, so was Washington. Lincoln telegraphed to Hooker that his primary objective was the Confederate army, not the Confederate capital. Hooker reluctantly set his troops marching northward.

In the meantime, Lee's left wing under Richard Ewell approached the outskirts of Winchester, the key town of the middle Shenandoah Valley. It had been occupied (with an iron hand) for several months by a 6,000-man division under Major General Robert Milroy. But the location was not difficult to surround, and so General-in--Chief Halleck had sent a man to order Milroy to evacuate his force to Harpers Ferry. Milroy, however, had set up strong fortifications around the town, and was able to convince the intermediary to let him try to hold the place.

Skirmishing and artillery engagements began around noon. The Confederates had excellent knowledge of the area, because this was Stonewall Jackson's old stomping grounds, and they still had the maps drawn up by Jackson's cartographer. As the afternoon went by, the Southerners took position after position surrounding Winchester. By sundown they had seized the town of Martinsburg to the north, and cut the telegraph line, severing the Yankees' communication. A heavy rain came up, preventing the Northerners from observing that their escape route was being cut off.

Map by Hal Jespersen, www.cwmaps.com


At Port Hudson, Union commander Nathaniel Banks had the Confederate fortifications shelled for about an hour, interrupting the Rebels' lunchtime. He then sent a demand for surrender. Confederate commander Franklin Gardner sent back the reply: “My duty requires me to defend this position, and therefore I decline to surrender”.

Banks did not have an alternate plan ready. He ordered the artillery bombardment resumed, and decided on an infantry assault during the night. However, he did not give his three infantry leaders any detailed plan, simply telling them to attack at 1:00 a.m.

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

At Port Hudson, the Union first assault got underway at 3:30 a.m. Not only was it still dark, but there was fog. One by one, the uncoordinated advances were met with heavy Confederate fire, and were driven back. Nearly 1,800 Yankees were casualties, while the Rebels lost only 47. From then on, bombardment and siege were the order of the day, but the results were only slightly less lethal to the Northerners as disease swept through their camps.


Around Winchester in the Shenandoah Valley, much of the day was spent with the Confederates consolidating their positions and moving artillery into place. It was not until 6 p.m. that the main attack of the day got underway, taking advantage of the late daylight in mid-June. The Rebels rushed across 300 yards of open field and swept into one of the three main forts protecting the town. There was an intense but short hand-to-hand struggle, and then the Federals abandoned the fort, not having the time to spike their guns. It was not long before the cannons were turned against the Yankees.

Now the Southerners could command nearly the entire Union position with their artillery. The Northern commander summoned a council of war at 9 p.m., and realized that not only was he surrounded, he had only a division facing a corps. It was decided to evacuate during the night.

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

The Northern evacuation of Winchester went smoothly at first. Nearly all the wheeled vehicles were left behind, allowing the troops to pull out so quietly that the Confederates did not realize for hours that their foes were no longer in the town. The Yankees had also wisely chosen an alternate road than the main one going north.

But Southern commander Richard Ewell had maps of the area, and had noted the secondary escape route. He sent a force to cover a key bridge on this route, which arrived just before the advance column of Federals. Several attacks were made to try to take the bridge back, becoming more and more intense as more Union soldiers arrived. But more Confederate reinforcements arrived as well, and the bridge was held. At the height of the fighting, Northern commander Robert Milroy had his horse shot from under him, and his force became disorganized. Some surrendered outright, some fled in various directions, but either way most ended up prisoners. Milroy himself and about 1,200 men managed to escape, but Milroy did not maintain his freedom for long; he was placed under arrest for disobeying orders to abandon Winchester before the Confederates arrived. (He would eventually be exonerated because the orders had not been definite.)

A very happy Ewell reported back to Robert E. Lee. "The fruits of this victory were 23 pieces of artillery (nearly all rifled), 4,000 prisoners, 300 loaded wagons, more than 300 horses, and quite a large amount of commissary and quartermaster's stores." The butcher's bill for the Confederates had been just 47 killed, 219 wounded, and 3 missing. It was not the magnitude of the victory that Stonewall Jackson had won the year before at Harpers Ferry, but it was a very encouraging start to the campaign. Thus far Ewell seemed to be filling Jackson's shoes.

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

Joseph Johnston had wired to Richmond that he considered "saving Vicksburg hopeless". He got this reply:

[font="Times New Roman"]Confederate States of America,
War Department,
Richmond, June 16, 1863.

General J. E. Johnston:

Your telegram grieves and alarms me. Vicksburg must not be lost
without a desperate struggle. The interest and honor of the Confederacy
forbid it. I rely on you still to avert the loss. If better resources do not
offer, you must hazard attack. It may be made in concert with the garrison,
if practicable, but otherwise without, by day or night as you
think best.

(Signed,) JAMES A. SEDDON,

Secretary of War. [/font]



In Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, an advance troop of Confederate cavalry had ridden far ahead of the Army of Northern Virginia and occupied the town. It was for the second time; Stuart's troopers had raided the town the year before. The Southern horsemen proceeded to take almost everything in the way of supplies that the town afforded. For most items they paid in Confederate money, which was of course almost worthless to the Northerners. For three things they did not pay at all: what few horses they could find (most had been sent north on hearing the Rebels approach), whatever guns they could find, and all the blacks, whether runaway slaves or free. The Confederates had decided to apply the theory of "Contraband of War" to Union territory.

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

The CSS Atlanta was a casemate-type ironclad made by extensively rebuilding the blockade runner Fingal. Her engines were not quite up to the task of propelling the extra weight of guns and armor, and abortive attempts to attack the Union blockading squadron of the coast of Savannah, Georgia, had had to be called off. Now under a new commander named William A. Webb, the Atlanta set forth on a do-or-die sortie. Early in the morning, she hove into view of the two blockading monitors, USS Weehawken and USS Nahant.

Unfortunately for the Confederates, things went wrong shortly after Atlanta fired her first shot. She went aground on a sandbar, and found the tide was flowing against her attempts to get off. The USS Weehawken turned out to be a hybrid monitor, armed with one 11-inch and one 15-inch Dahlgren cannons. The shells from the 11-inch were serious enough, but the 15-inch was lethal, smashing through enough of Atlanta's armor to spray the interior with fragments. After fifteen minutes without being able to reply to any effect, Captain Webb realized that further fighting was only getting his crew decimated. The Atlanta was surrendered. The USS Nahant did not have time to get into firing position for a single shot (though she did share in the prize money).

The tide peaked an hour and a half later, allowing the Union vessels to pull the Atlanta off the sandbar. After some time under repair, Atlanta joined the Union navy, and served until the end of the war.

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

In the Union lines around Vicksburg, the ill feelings toward general John McClernand over the failed attacks of May 22 had never wholly gone away. But now they became more intense than ever, for a Northern newspaper arrived with a self-congratulatory order from McClernand's headquarters. It declared that his corps had done the majority of the fighting that day, and if only the two corps under William T. Sherman and James McPherson had made supporting attacks, that "would have probably insured success."

Since such attacks had in fact been made, and at a tragic cost in killed and wounded, the officers and men in those two corps were bitterly angry, and Sherman and McPherson had both complained to U. S. Grant in writing.

[font="Times New Roman"]This order had been sent North and published, and now papers containing it had reached our camps. The order had not been heard of by me, and certainly not by troops outside of McClernand's command until brought in this way. I at once wrote to McClernand, directing him to send me a copy of the order. He did so, and I at once relieved him from the command of the 13th army corps and ordered him back to Springfield, Illinois.

[center]--The Personal Memoirs of General U. S. Grant[/center]
[/font]

("At once" is one way of putting it; in fact, Grant wrote out the order and had it delivered in the middle of the night, waking McClernand up at 1:00 a.m. on this date.)

Grant had been looking for a way to rid himself of the ambitious McClernand for some time, but had nothing definite. Now he did: releasing any statement to the press without clearing it through superiors was a violation of both Grant's direct orders and War Department regulations. Grant would have been justified in dismissing McClernand from the army entirely, but McClernand's political connections (he was a personal acquaintance of Lincoln) would have made this unwise.

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

In Mississippi, Joseph Johnston regarded his instructions to attack Grant as little more than a prelude to the butchery of his command. He wired back to the Confederate War Department:

[font="Times New Roman"]Jackson, June 19, 1863.
Hon. J. A. Seddon:

Dispatch of the 16th received. I think that you do not appreciate
the difficulties in the course you direct, nor the probabilities or
consequence of failure. Grant's position, naturally very strong, is
entrenched and protected by powerful artillery, and the roads
obstructed. His reinforcements have been at least equal to my whole
force. The Big Black covers him from attack, and would cut off our
retreat if defeated. We cannot combine operations with General Pemberton,
from uncertain and slow communication. The defeat of this little
army would at once open Mississippi and Alabama to Grant. I will do
all I can, without hope of doing more than aid to extricate the garrison.

(Signed,) J. E. JOHNSTON. [/font]


In Virginia, George Stoneman had been replaced as the overall Union cavalry commander by Alfred Pleasonton. (For one thing, Stoneman had developed chronic hemorrhoids, exceedingly inconvenient for cavalry service.) But although the Northern horsemen were now generally equal to the Southerners, what was really needed was a complete breakthrough to find the main body of the Confederate army. And this was what "Jeb" Stuart and his men were still preventing. In the Battle of Middleburg which stretched over three days, the Rebel troopers kept the passes into the Shenandoah Valley blocked, allowing the Confederate infantry to march up the entire length of the valley while still keeping the Union high command guessing. A bonus was the capture of an entire regiment of Northern cavalry when it rode too far forward and found itself against a brigade of Southern cavalry, plus infantry support. When the clashes ended on today's date, both sides had been exhausted by fighting in unseasonal heat, but Pleasonton's men were as far from ever from their goal.

Abraham Lincoln and Joseph Hooker both were certain that something big was up, but until they knew just what, the Army of the Potomac had to keep Washington covered. They ordered Pleasonton to try again with a larger force.

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

West Virginia was formally admitted into the Union. The Confederate flag had been changed earlier in the year, and now it was the turn of the U. S. flag. (of course, the change was only to add a 35th star.)



In Pennsylvania, more and more Confederate troops began to appear. A call for militia was sent out, which drew little response except from the black community. The Governor tried to refuse these men, claiming that only the Federal government had been authorized to enlist colored troops.

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

At Upperville, Virginia, Alfred Pleasonton's cavalry again tried to break through "Jeb" Stuart's screen to get more information about what Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia were up to. Although the Yankees were now reinforced by a brigade of infantry, Stuart and his men took expert advantage of stone walls and other terrain features to make a slow fighting withdrawal. At Ashby's Gap they stopped and took up a strong defensive position. The Northerners captured a cannon, the first gun ever lost by Stuart's cavalry, but did not penetrate into the Shenandoah Valley. The exact plans of the Confederates were still a mystery.

But "Jeb" Stuart wasn't happy either. For nearly a week he had been fighting on the defensive, and it wasn't what cavalry was supposed to do. More, although he had accomplished his task of preventing the Yankees from finding out where the Confederate army was, the location of the Union army was now also uncertain. The bluecoats had moved away from Fredricksburg, heading north, but the all-important question was how far north. Stuart applied to Lee, requesting a more aggressive assignment (and one that gave him more of a chance to wipe out the sting of his surprise at Brandy Station).

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

Robert E. Lee issued new orders to "Jeb" Stuart and his cavalry. Lee's basic idea was for the Southern troopers to screen to the east of the main body of the Army of Northern Virginia. But he was accustomed to given his subordinates flexibility, to use their own judgement:

[font="Times New Roman"]HEADQUARTERS, June 22, 1863.

Maj. Gen. J. E. B. STUART,
Commanding Cavalry:

GENERAL: I have just received your note of 7.45 this morning to General Longstreet. I judge the efforts of the enemy yesterday were to arrest progress and ascertain our whereabouts. Perhaps he is satisfied. Do you know where he is and what he is doing? I fear he will steal a march on us, and get across the Potomac before we are aware. If you find that he is moving northward, and that two brigades can guard the Blue Ridge and take care of your rear, you can move with the other three into Maryland, and take position on General Ewell's right, place yourself in communication with him, guard his flank, keep him informed of the enemy's movements, and collect all the supplies you can for the use of the army. One column of General Ewell's army will probably move toward the Susquehanna by the Emmitsburg route; another by Chambersburg. Accounts from him last night state that there was no enemy west of Frederick. A cavalry force (about 100) guarded the Monocacy Bridge, which was barricaded. You will, of course, take charge of Jenkins' brigade, and give him necessary instructions. All supplies taken in Maryland must be by authorized staff officers for their respective departments--by no one else. They will be paid for, or receipts for the same given to the owners. I will send you a general order on this subject, which I wish you to see is strictly complied with.
I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. E. LEE,
General.
[/font]

The order was passed through James Longstreet's headquarters, who saw fit to give Stuart even more latitude:

[font="Times New Roman"]HEADQUARTERS,
Millwood, June 22, 1863- 7 p. m.

Maj. Gen. J. E. B. STUART,
Commanding Cavalry:

GENERAL: General Lee has inclosed to me this letter for you, to be forwarded to you, provided you can be spared from my front, and provided I think that you can move across the Potomac without disclosing our plans. He speaks of your leaving, via Hopewell Gap, and passing by the rear of the enemy. If you can get through by that route, I think that you will be less likely to indicate what our plans are than if you should cross by passing to our rear. I forward the letter of instructions with these suggestions.

Please advise me of the condition of affairs before you leave, and order General Hampton-whom I suppose you will leave here in command-to report to me at Millwood, either by letter or in person, as may be most agreeable to him.

Most respectfully,
JAMES LONGSTREET,
Lieutenant-General.
[/font]

Stuart had been hoping for a chance to ride completely around the Union army for a third time. Now, although it wasn't what either Lee or Longstreet really had in mind, the orders permitted it.

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

Up until this date, General William Rosecrans and the Army of the Cumberland had faced Braxton Bragg and the Army of Tennessee, neither moving except for cavalry raids. Now, after much haranguing from President Lincoln and General-in-Chief Halleck, the Northerners began what would be known as the Tullahoma campaign. Accompanied by one or two feints, a mounted brigade under Colonel John T. Wilder was sent forward. Wilder's men had been equipped with the new seven-shot Spencer repeating rifles (and they had been procured and paid for "creatively", due to shameful delays back in Washington).

[font="Times New Roman"]On the morning of June 24th, at 3 o'clock, we left camp 5 miles north of Murfreesboro, and started to the "front," in ad­vance of everything. As we passed through the camps in Murfreesboro, the rattle of drums, sounding of bugles, and clatter of wagons, told us plainly that the whole army was to follow in our wake, and we knew full well, from the direction we were taking, that a few hours march would bring the brigade to some of the strongholds of the enemy, so there was silence in the column as we moved along through the mud, and every ear was strained to catch the sound of the first gun of our advance guard that would tell us of the presence of the enemy.

Soon after daylight a heavy rain commenced falling which continued without interruption all day and night, and has con­tinued ever since, with only a few hours cessation at a time. About noon the first gun was fired, and then we pushed ahead rapidly, for we were nearing the formidable "Hoover's Gap," which it was supposed would cost a great many lives to pass through, and our brigade commander determined to surprise the enemy if possible, by a rapid march, and make a bold dash to pass through the "Gap" and hold it with our brigade alone until the rest of the army could get up. We soon came into the camp of a regiment of cavalry which was so much surprised by our sudden appearance that they scattered through the woods and over the hills in every direction, every fellow for himself, and all making the best time they could bareback, on foot and every other way, leaving all their tents, wagons, baggage, com­missary stores and indeed everything in our hands, but we didn't stop for anything, on we pushed, our boys, with their Spencer rifles, keeping up a continual popping in front. Soon we reached the celebrated "Gap" on the run.

... the enemy was surprised and flying before us, so we pushed onward until we passed entirely through the "Gap," when a puff of white smoke from a hill about half a mile in front of us, then a dull heavy roar, then the shrieking of a shell told us we could advance no further as we had reached their infantry and artillery force. But we had done enough, had advanced 6 miles further than ordered or expected possible, and had taken a point which it was expected would require a large part of the army to take; but the serious question with us now was: "Could we alone hold it in the presence of superior force?"

[...]

On us a terrific fire of shot and shell from five different points, and their masses of infantry, with flags flying, moved out of the woods on our right in splendid style; there were three or four times our number already in sight and still others came pouring out of the woods beyond. Our regiment lay on the hill side in mud and water, the rain pouring down in torrents, while each shell screamed so close to us as to make it seem that the next would tear us to pieces.

Presently the enemy got near enough to us to make a charge on our battery, and on they came; our men are on their feet in an instant and a terrible fire from the "Spencers" causes the advancing regiment to reel and its colors fall to the ground, but in an instant their colors are up again and on they come, think­ing to reach the battery before our guns can be reloaded, but they "reckoned without their host," they didn't know we had the "Spencers," and their charging yell was answered by an­other terrible volley, and another and another without cessation, until the poor regiment was literally cut to pieces, and but few men of that 20th Tennessee that attempted the charge will ever charge again. During all the rest of the fight at "Hoover's Gap" they never again attempted to take that battery...

... an incident occurred worthy of men­tion; for it shows the spirit of the men of this brigade. A corpo­ral of the [17th] Ind. was shot through the breast at the first fire; he had always said, as indeed all our men do, that the enemy should never get hold of his "Spencer" to use it; he hadn't strength to break it so he took out his knife, unscrewed a part of the lock plate and threw it away, rendering the gun en­tirely useless, he then fell back amid the storm of bullets, lay down and died.
--Col. James Connolly
[/font]

(Historical note: the real problem for the Confederates in trying to get the Spencers was the ammunition. Both sides used .58 caliber single-shot muskets, so ordinarily captured weapons could be loaded with standard-issue paper cartridges. But the Spencers used copper-cased cartridges, which the desperately copper-poor South could not manufacture in quantity.)

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

Probably the most amazing escape from slavery in recorded history happened on the outskirts of Vicksburg. The investment of the town had become a classic siege operation, including digging tunnels underneath the defensive ramparts and placing barrels of gunpowder to blast away the obstacles. The Confederates got wind of the operation and "counter-mined" or dug tunnels of their own, but much of the work was done by conscripted slaves. Partly as a result, they did not stop the Union sappers:

[font="Times New Roman"]On the 25th of June at three o'clock, all being ready, the mine was exploded. A heavy artillery fire all along the line had been ordered to open with the explosion. The effect was to blow the top of the hill off and make a crater where it stood. The breach was not sufficient to enable us to pass a column of attack through. In fact, the enemy having failed to reach our mine had thrown up a line farther back, where most of the men guarding that point were placed. There were a few men, however, left at the advance line, and others working in the countermine, which was still being pushed to find ours. All that were there were thrown into the air, some of them coming down on our side, still alive. I remember one colored man, who had been under ground at work when the explosion took place, who was thrown to our side. He was not much hurt, but terribly frightened. Some one asked him how high he had gone up. "Dun no, massa, but t'ink 'bout t'ree mile," was his reply.
[center]--The Personal Memoirs of General U. S. Grant[/center]
[/font]


In Virginia, an hour or two after midnight, "Jeb" Stuart and his troopers moved out. It is possible that Stuart had already made up his mind to ride completely around the Northern army, as he had done twice before and gained fame thereby. Whether or not he had so determined, the Army of the Potomac was about to become a moving target. That same day, Joe Hooker learned that Confederate infantry was in Maryland and moving into Pennsylvania, and he finally began to pursue Lee in earnest, his force heading north. By the time Stuart reached where he expected to find the Federals, they were gone.

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

The Army of Northern Virginia continued its progress north. As has generally been the case throughout history, newly raised militia proved no match for experienced soldiers. Confederates from Jubal Early's division brushed aside the Pennsylvania militia after a few skirmishes, and marched into a place called Gettysburg just north of the state border. Early announced a tribute, but few supplies were actually collected. The Rebels burned a bridge and some railroad cars, cut the telegraph wires, wrecked what rail lines they could, and camped for the night.


In New York City, Andrew H. Foote had been promoted to Rear Admiral, the highest rank then in the Union Navy. But his health had deteriorated, and he had given up his command of the fleet of river gunboats. After several months of what was essentially desk duty, he felt fit for active service again, and had been assigned to the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron, covering Virginia to Florida. But on this date he died suddenly, probably of kidney disease.

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

In spite of his nickname, "Fighting Joe" Hooker had turned out to be a general much like George McClellan: an excellent organizer, but hesitant on the battlefield. Now he showed another similarity; the fear that he was outnumbered. To bolster his strength for the looming showdown with Robert E. Lee and his army, Hooker wanted more troops. The best place to get them, he believed, was to take the 10,000-man garrison at Harpers Ferry. After all, over 12,000 men had proved insufficient to hold the place during the Antietam campaign.

But General-in-Chief Henry Halleck strongly disagreed. Difficult to defend it might be, but Harpers Ferry was a key junction and a place with strong emotional significance to both North and South. He flatly refused Hooker's request, even going so far as to tell the garrison commander to ignore Hooker's orders. The incensed Hooker telegraphed his resignation, hoping that Halleck would not dare to change commanders on the eve of battle. This was unwise, because Halleck and Lincoln were both unhappy with him. The resignation was immediately accepted.


In the morning, the Rebels under Jubal Early departed the town of Gettysburg. It did not seem to be a place worth holding, and the city of York, Pennsylvania offered a much better chance for gathering supplies.

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

In the early morning hours, a messenger came into the tent of V Corps commander George Gordon Meade and woke him up. Meade would later write to his wife that his first thought was that politics had caught up with him, and he was being arrested. To his astonishment he learned that he was now the commander of the Army of the Potomac. And it was clear that a major battle was only a matter of days away.



Just to the northwest of Washington D. C. , "Jeb" Stuart and his cavalry swooped in and captured a wagon train of 140 fully loaded wagons plus teams. This caused understandable alarm in the Northern capital, and Stuart is supposed to have told a prisoner that if his horses hadn't been fatigued "he would have marched down the 7th Street Road [and] took Abe & Cabinet prisoners." (Your humble amateur historian believes it had more to do with the fortifications around Washington.) The capture was all well and good, but the Southern troopers were supposed to have been in Hanover, Pennsylvania on this date, and loaded wagons would slow them down even more. Without those brigades of cavalry, Robert E. Lee and his army were largely blind as to where the Union army was. And on this date, that Union army was around Frederick, Maryland, and moving north at a good pace.

Map by Hal Jespersen, www.cwmaps.com

[nicwb]

Great thread as usual Capt Harlock.

I never knew that the Confederates had gone to Gettysburg some days earlier than the final clash.

As a matter of interest, what were the "politics" Meade was worried about? He must have been regarded as a solid commander to lead a Corps and be chosen to take charge of the Army of the Potomac.

[Capt. Harlock]

As a matter of interest, what were the "politics" Meade was worried about? He must have been regarded as a solid commander to lead a Corps and be chosen to take charge of the Army of the Potomac.

Some surprisingly incompetent men were promoted to corps or even army command during the Civil War, especially on the Northern side. Benjamin Butler, IMHO the worst of the Union generals, got his assignments because of his connections in the Massachusetts political scene. John McClernand we have also seen, and Grant finally was able to get rid of him not because of poor performance but because he had demonstrably violated War Department regulations. There was also Daniel Sickles, whom we will hear of during Gettysburg, whose political connections were powerful enough to make people pass over the fact that he had shot and killed the son of Francis Scott Key. Sickles claimed that Key had had an affair with his wife, and received the first successful verdict of "temporary insanity" in American legal history.

As for Meade himself, he had criticized Joseph Hooker both during and after Chancellorsville, and Hooker had not taken kindly to it. Although born to American parents, Meade's place of birth was actually in Spain, making his loyalty suspect to some people (though there were no solid grounds for this).