The Good The Bad & The Indifferent

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Canoerebel
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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent

Post by Canoerebel »

Gentlemen, the KB will approach theater from one of three doors. Which door will it be:

1. Door Number One: The Gulf of Siam? Nah. John's carriers have to be able to maneuver and close with the Allies. He won't chose this route.

2. Door Number Two: The Malacca Straits? Possibly, but the straits are choked with Allied subs (though John may not realize that as he's switched all his ASW patrols over to other missions). It's possible, but not likely. He'll want room to maneuver.

3. Door Number Three: The Indian Ocean? Yes, almost certainly. Plenty of sea room; ability to maneuver and close; ability to chase and maul if he's victorious.

So the Allies will post ships accordingly.
"Rats set fire to Mr. Cooper’s store in Fort Valley. No damage done." Columbus (Ga) Enquirer-Sun, October 2, 1880.
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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent

Post by JohnDillworth »

A cut and past from the Reluctant Admiral site:
The Reluctant Admiral is a Japanese 'what if' scenario based upon a greater contribution by Adm. Yamamoto Isoroku. The premise of the Mod is that Yamamoto exerted a much greater influence first on the Japan Naval Aircraft Industry, then as Deputy Navy Minister, and finally as Navy Minister itself. Yamamoto chooses, at great risk to his life, to forego command of the Combined Fleet and dedicate himself to preparing Japan for a war he didn't want. He adds two new slipways for Fleet construction to facilitate a different, final pre-war expansion of the Kaigun. New and expanded Naval Yards, Heavy Industry, and Armaments are added at tremendous cost for the Japanese economy as the Admiral attempts to prepare Japan for a possibly long war. In so choosing to do this Yamamoto then changes the 4th Circle Building plan replacing the 3rd and 4th Yamato-Class Battleships with three improved Shokaku-Class CVs and a pair of Kawachi-Class fast Battlecruisers, two Tone-Class CAs, an accelerated Agano-Class deployment, and additional destroyers. Quick, reasonably cheap carrier conversions are moved forward seeing all of the pre-war CVs/CVLs deploy by December 7th or at slightly earlier dates in 1942.

The Japan Naval Air Arm is changed so that everything is staked to the Zero Airframe with a specialization of the Zero into a Land-Based Interceptor as well as CV-Based Fighters. Research and production expansion is achieved by streamlining the air industry (cutting several models) while bringing forward second generation aircraft: Judy, Jill, etc… By great effort the IJNAF deploys nearly all new aircraft on December 7th.

RA 4.0 now brings his ‘vision’ to the IJN’s Land Component. He reorganizes the SNLF units into a Brigade-Sized offensive force and—knowing it will be a war of attrition—converts many Naval Guard into enhanced units with Coastal Defense artillery for a stronger defensive unit. Additional small units are added to the IJN’s Troops and support units better reflecting Yamamoto's foresight into base building, defense, and expansion needs.

The foresight of the Admiral paysoff during 1942 and early-1943 as new ships, aircraft, and ground units enter into the Japanese Order-of-Battle, however, the cost is steep. Though expanded and using modern aircraft many Japanese Naval Air units start with their experience lowered to reflect the dilution of the experienced pilots into new units. Supply and fuel reserves start at a much reduced state. The Japanese MUST take the DEI as fast as possible.

In a major change over the previous two versions of Reluctant Admiral, the 3.0 postulates more of Yamamoto’s influence upon the wartime Kaigun. First class destroyers are accelerated and emphasis is shifted to the AA Akizuki-Class at the expense of the more balanced Yugumo’s. Manpower is at a premium within the Fleet so Submarines, Escorts, and ASW forces all see a major retooling reflecting the Japanese quality over quantity belief. Yamamoto chooses the immediately useful projects, including 2nd-class destroyers, fast transports and coastal defense fleet, at the expense of large destroyers and subs offered by the stock, historical choice.

It should be noted that not all the changes are for the Japanese. The Allies see continued major changes in their starting locations, new air units, several ground units, a CLAA conversion for the Omaha-CL, a pair of additional CVLs, and options for nearly 10 CVEs. The added warships reflect a ‘stopgap’ counter to the increased Japanese strength found at war’s start.
Today I come bearing an olive branch in one hand, and the freedom fighter's gun in the other. Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand. I repeat, do not let the olive branch fall from my hand. - Yasser Arafat Speech to UN General Assembly
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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent

Post by Nemo121 »

CR,

As re: Malaysia... Well some of those bases are bound to be unoccupied if he really has been as negligent with his garrisoning as it seems. Take 2 British Catalina squadrons, divide them in 3 then recon 6 bases with them. Whichever bases are empty get an FT TF'ed assault unit or paratroopers the next day.

If he's even been a bit negligent this could give you 2 or 3 bridgeheads on the west coast of Malaysia at almost no cost... If you wait a week before making this move then all of this low-hanging fruit will be lost because yuo've got to figure the idea of using transport planes to fly elements of different combat units into each unoccupied base is gonna occur to him sooner or later, if it hasn't already.


gmoney,
Aye and that's when the true games begin. Have I uncovered the plan hiding behind the deception and that's all there is or is this plan the deception and the deception operation is the real plan... or are both deceptions and there's actually a third, even deeper plan which is what's really going to happen.

E.g. If CR was really sneaky what would happen now is that as John3rd panics in reaction to this invasion the forces off the coast of Oz would turn out to be a real invasion force and would, while he's distracted, move in and take what we were told were their targets.... or this would happen with an invasion somewhere else which was completely off the radar (CENPAC ). I do think that CR is making for Sumatra with awfully little in the way of ground forces and this makes me wonder just where his other ground forces are. I'd be following Sumatra with another operation timed to go in once KB hit the Sumatran region.. I guess we're going to see how sneakily and deeply CR thought about this.

For context, I'm within a week of this game date in my game and I have 3,000AV in Burma - all of which can be freely redeployed - and adding in Regts lost in the Kuriles which Dan still has available the US has about 10 divisions of infantry I can deploy wherever I wish while the Aussies and Kiwis have another 2 divisions worth.

So, all in all I have about 19 divisions with which I can go on the offensive. This operation accounts for, perhaps, 5 with another 7 or 8 tied down in northern Burma. Where's the other 6 to 7 divisions? By my count Dan could mount another operation, of this size, without carrier cover ( so long as he knows where KB is ) anywhere along the Japanese perimeter. When KB hits Sumatra it'll be accompanied by the IJNAF and IJAAF naval strike groups --- giving Dan the perfect opportunity to strike somewhere on the perimeter without his CVs. It is certainly what I would have planned to do and there ARE 6 divisions out there -- I think they're probably resting or garrisoning and not on amphibious TFs but the option was there.
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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent

Post by JohnDillworth »

3. Door Number Three: The Indian Ocean? Yes, almost certainly. Plenty of sea room; ability to maneuver and close; ability to chase and maul if he's victorious.

Yup, and the AO's come toddling after trying to keep up. They will have to go out in the open ocean to support the KB. Maybe he can keep these under LBA but he probably has to protect these at sea. Woe to he that does not
Today I come bearing an olive branch in one hand, and the freedom fighter's gun in the other. Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand. I repeat, do not let the olive branch fall from my hand. - Yasser Arafat Speech to UN General Assembly
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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent

Post by BBfanboy »

Nemo, while I have no doubt your assessment of the land forces available is good, I have no idea if the Allies in late 1942 have the sealift available to carry out a second major operation in a short time. Because the xAPs are not yet APAs, CR would have had to use shallow loading of each ship to ensure rapid unload of the amphib force. That should have used up almost all the xAPs and it will take a while to reassign them across the map. APDs and raiding forces are another matter, and could certainly grab some undefended dots that could then grow into festering sores for John III.

Agree on grabbing the weak or undefended bases in Malaya. Suddenly his plan to reinforce/counterattack in Sumatra is suborned to clearing his rail line in Malaya that keeps Singapore in business. His best LBA bases for assault on Sumatra will not operate long without plenty of supply of avgas and bombs. Even if the units in Malaya are later crushed, the time bought for Sumatra will be worth it.
No matter how bad a situation is, you can always make it worse. - Chris Hadfield : An Astronaut's Guide To Life On Earth
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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent

Post by Canoerebel »

ORIGINAL: Nemo121
... This operation accounts for, perhaps, 5 with another 7 or 8 tied down in northern Burma. Where's the other 6 to 7 divisions? ....

The math doesn't work, primarily because of political points.

The Allies have seven-plus western divisions in Sumatra - 18th UK, 27, 32 and 37 USA, 1st Marine, three Marine regiments, and four or five Army RCT.

There are four-plus western devisions in Burma - 2nd UK, 41st USA, two Australian.

There is one restricted US division at Los Angeles awaiting PP for purchasing (but priority is fairly low in comparison to needs and opportunities in Sumatra and Burma).

The Americans have the equivalent of 1.5 divisions in Oz (a mix of Marine and army) There is one RCT in New Zealand. There are lots of restricted Oz divisions, plus perhaps one divisions that isn't restricted.

I can buy out a sizeable army in Oz and move, but what's the higher priority - moving somewhere in CenPac or SoPac or using the PP to buy another Indian divisions to reinforce Sumatra or Burma? Probably the latter, though I haven't "pulled the trigger" yet.

Shipping was also entirely allocated to this mission. I could cobble together a modest amphibious Tf in Oz and a pretty decent one on West Coast. But the Oz force could carry at best one division. (Some of the Sumatra ships will be going back to Oz.

I do have future plans, but nothing simultaneous with this operation. The number of men, ships, fuel and such required to lift 7+ divisions (and many tank, enginneer, HQ, arty, AA units too) demands a huge % of the sea-lift power in November 1942.

Some players would have been able to manage something else - even something small in SoPac right now might be quite beneficial - but there's no way the Allies could at this point mount a two-division invasion. Not enough ships. Not enough PP.
"Rats set fire to Mr. Cooper’s store in Fort Valley. No damage done." Columbus (Ga) Enquirer-Sun, October 2, 1880.
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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent

Post by Canoerebel »

11/13/42

The Allies are moving forward; some promising things; some speed bumps; some opportunites; some risk; some damage; much fun.

Sumatra on the Ground: The Allies had hoped to take Langsa and Sibolga quick and easy, through an assist by bombardment TFs and carrier air, but neither worked. Both garrisons, though modest to weak, held. However, there's little doubt both of these key bases are ripe for the pucking. I think Sibolga (the second most important base in this operation) could fall in a few days. Langsa should fall as soon as 27th Div. can board ships and make the short journey (probably three or four days). More troubling is Padang. One of my RCT - properly in Combat Mode and loaded in an amphibiuos TF - is coming ashore in strat mode (the 2nd time for this bug) and is therefore unable to fight for days. I don't like the looks of things here and may abort the landings and move these troops (perhaps 100 AV still aboard ship) to Sibolga. 32nd Div. will begin coming ashore at Sabang tomorrow. While today wasn't great, I do feel encouraged that Sibolga and Langsa cannot stand against the Allies, and if Langsa falls, the Allies can then move on Medan in force.

Malaya on the Ground: Fast transport will carry Marine raiders (diverted from Sibolga a few days ago) to what seems to be unoccpied Phuket. Amphibous ships carrying about 20 AV of 18th UK Div. and a full US Army tank unit will land at Alor Star tomorrow. This won't work if there is a garrison there. LRCAP to be provided by a dozen P-39G from Sabang. A bunch of APDs reach Sabang tomorrow, so the Allies will have more capacity to probe and raid. Paratroops are still a couple of days out. I'm working the Malaya angle.

Sumatra in the Air: Nice progress on repairing Sabang airfield (which is at 3.49%). USN carrier air flew ground missions vs. Sibolga, but didn't do all that much damage. Japanese air - especially from bases on the southern tip, clobbered a handful of naked transports fiddling around Enganno and Padang. Also, Vals from Victoria Point (where SigInt says John is bringing an Air Flotilla unit) hit a few naked ships around Phuket.

Sumatra at Sea: A few turns back, John unleashed a bunch of SSX (I bet he had been gathering these to hit the fleet at Akyab). Today, they sank an AR and damaged an AE and something else. Another sub sank DD Buchanan. (The Allies haven't lost anything larger than these in this operation thus far.) The fast USN BBs bombarded both Langsa and Sibolga without impressive results. Lots of the Bay of Bengal fleet will be reaching Sabang in the next two days. Carrier TF sorties range from 71% to 82%. So, that enters into things now - can I afford to fly ground missions? Do I consider withdrawing carriers to Colombo before the KB shows up, relying on LBA and escort carriers to lend a hand with ground operations.

Indications: A picket xAK south of Java retired from air threat. Could be LBA from an island, but more likely enemy carriers. If so, the KB could be between Timor and Java now. If they don't have to refuel, perhaps three days from the Padang vicinity? This might be a good reason to indeed scrub Padang, begin consolidating the IO ships around Sibolga and Sabang, and decide whether the carriers can stay or whether now is the time to get them to Colombo to refuel. Any thoughts, gents?

Bay of Bengal: Mutsu is still a Port Blair. I want her if and when it makes sense to get her.

Burma: It does appear that John is making a general withdrawal in Burma. Allied troops in contested hexes will make probing attacks; those in unoccupied hexes (including some well-dug-in Indian brigades in the jungle) to move forward.

"Rats set fire to Mr. Cooper’s store in Fort Valley. No damage done." Columbus (Ga) Enquirer-Sun, October 2, 1880.
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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent

Post by Canoerebel »

P.S. Sabang now has 430 mines and two ACM. A big and loaded DM TF is awaiting - I'd like to mine some other ports, but first I need to take them (I don't want to mine enemy ports that I'm invading or raiding).
"Rats set fire to Mr. Cooper’s store in Fort Valley. No damage done." Columbus (Ga) Enquirer-Sun, October 2, 1880.
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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent

Post by Cap Mandrake »

Phuket is actually Thailand (Siam) but still a great base. [:)] Nice beaches too.

Fantastic to keep something this big under wraps!
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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent

Post by Canoerebel »

I'm open to comment and counsel, but my "working draft" for the major decisions:

1. Divert the Padang TFs to Sibolga ("strat mode" bug, operation miring down, transports getting hit by enemy LBA, KB could arrive in just a couple of days, meaning chances of success remote.

2. Keep the carriers on station despite roughly 70% to 80% sortie levels. Replenishing run to Colombo would take eight days. Better to keep the carriers in theater to handle the pending major move on Langsa and possible major moves on Malaya.

3. Keep the fast BBs on station. Main armament ammo still looks good for each of the three ships. Choose targets carefully going forward, but keep the ships here for basically the same reason as the carriers.
"Rats set fire to Mr. Cooper’s store in Fort Valley. No damage done." Columbus (Ga) Enquirer-Sun, October 2, 1880.
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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent

Post by Nemo121 »

Wow,its a bit weird you don't have the shipping. I am at the same gametime as you and a lot more xAPs etc were lost before I took over than you've lost and yet I recently shifted 150 unused transports from India and Oz to CONUSA. That has still left me with about 200 transports scattered between Oz and India for my forces there... and that's after more severe losses than you've taken.

I obviously have different tolerances for logistics shipping or amphibious loading - for something like this I'd be quite happy to put a US Tank Bn ( 6,000 or so points of loading on an xAK in a single xAK. If you want to combat load it across two that halves your sealift right there. It must be something along those lines.)
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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent

Post by Canoerebel »

The final tough decision:

1600 PP in the bank. A big (and decent) Indian div. at Chittagong (with plenty of transports there) costs 1550. Worthwhile to buy and move to Sumatra? Decision must be made fast in hopes of getting there ahead of KB (even now it's unlikely). Better to commit the division to Burma (I don't think so). Better not to spend PP right now, instead building the bank for eventual use in the Pacific (okay, that's legit, but isn't Sumatra an "everything now, now, now!" priority?). I'm leaning towards making the buy, but I'm interested in opinions.
"Rats set fire to Mr. Cooper’s store in Fort Valley. No damage done." Columbus (Ga) Enquirer-Sun, October 2, 1880.
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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent

Post by Canoerebel »

Right now, I might have 50 transports of all kinds in Oz, most of them at Townsville as part of the feint. At USA I have a decent number - probably 75 or more. Pearl Harbor has perhaps 15 to 20. India and Aden have 30 to 50. Capetown has alot of xAK, but no xAP. Hundreds of ships are involved in the sea lift to Sumatra - some still coming in, some now retiring towards Colombo, some on hold as I prepare to mount new moves on Sibolga, Langsa and Malaya/Thailand.
"Rats set fire to Mr. Cooper’s store in Fort Valley. No damage done." Columbus (Ga) Enquirer-Sun, October 2, 1880.
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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent

Post by Cap Mandrake »

ORIGINAL: Canoerebel

2. Keep the carriers on station despite roughly 70% to 80% sortie levels. Replenishing run to Colombo would take eight days. Better to keep the carriers in theater to handle the pending major move on Langsa and possible major moves on Malaya.


Does this mean 70-80% of sorties used or remaining? Also, there is the question of the F4F complements (airframes and fatigue). Seems like you need to get done as much as you can BEFORE the KB gets there. [:)] Stop all the ground attacks by the carrier bombers and grab what you can, then go back and replenish.
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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent

Post by JohnDillworth »

Dang. That AE & AR must hurt. Guess you have a couple of others but nothing in the zip code
Today I come bearing an olive branch in one hand, and the freedom fighter's gun in the other. Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand. I repeat, do not let the olive branch fall from my hand. - Yasser Arafat Speech to UN General Assembly
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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent

Post by Canoerebel »

The sortie levels are still between 70% and 82%. Aircraft airworthiness levels are good, plus there's a snazzy 36-plane F4F unit at Ramree Island ready to fly in as reinforcements. I LOVE Ramree Island!
"Rats set fire to Mr. Cooper’s store in Fort Valley. No damage done." Columbus (Ga) Enquirer-Sun, October 2, 1880.
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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent

Post by Canoerebel »

ORIGINAL: JohnDillworth
Dang. That AE & AR must hurt. Guess you have a couple of others but nothing in the zip code

Nah! I have three undamaged AE, one AKE and an AR at Sabang (joining the damaged AE and sunk AR).
"Rats set fire to Mr. Cooper’s store in Fort Valley. No damage done." Columbus (Ga) Enquirer-Sun, October 2, 1880.
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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent

Post by Cap Mandrake »

I'm confused. Did the good guys take Sabang yet? No airfields yet in Arried control on Sumatra?
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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent

Post by Galahad78 »

gmoney,
Aye and that's when the true games begin. Have I uncovered the plan hiding behind the deception and that's all there is or is this plan the deception and the deception operation is the real plan... or are both deceptions and there's actually a third, even deeper plan which is what's really going to happen.

Frank Herbert summarized it perfectly in Dune: "Feints inside feints inside feints..." (or something in that lines; read it many years ago in Spanish [:)])

It's been a real delight to read these last 5 pages and see the unveiling of the plan CR, good job!
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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent

Post by Canoerebel »

Yeah, Sabang fell on D+1, a very exciting moment in Allied war annals. Level three field currently has 96 fighters and an lightning recon squadron. PBYs are based in the Nicobars and Nias (an island south - true - of Sumatra). But I certainly am in big need of Sibolga and Langsa.

P.S. An Air HQ will begin landing tomorrow, so the Allies will have land-based torp capability also.
"Rats set fire to Mr. Cooper’s store in Fort Valley. No damage done." Columbus (Ga) Enquirer-Sun, October 2, 1880.
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