Night bombing unreality?

[castor troy]

ORIGINAL: morejeffs

ORIGINAL: PaxMondo



But, 4E's at night are not effected by anything that the IJ player can do. The only losses/issues are those that the allied player controls. So once the 4E's are bombing at night at 6000 ft, well the fun rapidly leaves the game.

If I remember correctly that was pretty much reality once LeMay figured out how to do firebombing...Seems kind of strange to complain about the US actually ability to virtually destroy any Japanese city.

also got a picture of a night bombed airfield that looks like this? Best would be a picture with bombers at 100ft bombing at night hitting that said airfield...

oh, there might not exist such a photo

[LargeSlowTarget]

A RAF Bomber Command report on night bombing accuracy in 1941 showed that less than 33% of their bombs were hitting within five miles of their targets - at that time they were theoretically aiming for key military and industrial targets. This inaccuracy of night bombing was one of the factors that lead Bomber-Harris to adopt the "area bombing" and "dehousing" strategy. Even after the introduction of navigational aids like GEE in 1942, less than 30% of the bombers dropped their loads within the target area - defined as 3 miles(!) around the aiming point. After the introduction of OBOE in mid-43 accuracy increased to 50-60% and by the end of the war with H2S radar, pathfinders and much experience night bombing accuracy reached 90% of bombs dropped within 3 miles of the aiming point.

I suck in math but a 3 mile radius should cover around 28 square miles. London Heathrow airport covers less than 5 square miles and the average WW2 airfield even less, so I would say an airfield is indeed a small target for WWII night bombing.

[obvert]

ORIGINAL: LargeSlowTarget

A RAF Bomber Command report on night bombing accuracy in 1941 showed that less than 33% of their bombs were hitting within five miles of their targets - at that time they were theoretically aiming for key military and industrial targets. This inaccuracy of night bombing was one of the factors that lead Bomber-Harris to adopt the "area bombing" and "dehousing" strategy. Even after the introduction of navigational aids like GEE in 1942, less than 30% of the bombers dropped their loads within the target area - defined as 3 miles(!) around the aiming point. After the introduction of OBOE in mid-43 accuracy increased to 50-60% and by the end of the war with H2S radar, pathfinders and much experience night bombing accuracy reached 90% of bombs dropped within 3 miles of the aiming point.

I suck in math but a 3 mile radius should cover around 28 square miles. London Heathrow airport covers less than 5 square miles and the average WW2 airfield even less, so I would say an airfield is indeed a small target for WWII night bombing.

Especially when you consider a 'size 9 field' is really meant to represent several fields spread over a hex-sized area, not Heathrow.

[Bullwinkle58]

ORIGINAL: PaxMondo

There are quite a few AAR's running and at least the ones I am following have all started with or added restrictions to night bombing on 4E's. That to me is the relevant reality.... doesn't that suggest something?

My game with 1EyedJacks has no HRs, so it therefore has none on night bombing. I have probably done as much might bombing as anyone currently playing the game. It has uses, it is not over-powered. It presents options tot he Allied player, but also the Japanese should he wish to use it. It also has defenses.

I looked at ten consecutive days in my game, March 1942. In eight of them I had night bombing raids which either strayed or returned to base without bombing. This represents 20-100% of night attacks on those days. Each raid that turned back consumed supplies the same as if it had dropped bombs. Since these raids flew from either Chinese of Burmese bases the use of supply is a non-trivial consideration. Additionally, in the cases where my opponent has instituted night CAP it has been successful in turning back or disrupting raids on multiple occasions. He may not know that, but I see it. I do not report on these in my AAR for obvious reasons. That non-NFs, without radar and in some cases radios, can find and intercept bombers at all is not realistic. But it's the game and it's the way it is. That Japan usually does not choose to night-CAP important bases is a choice of asset usage. I'm sure Mike would prefer I send my 3- or 5-bomber packets against his 40 Oscars in broad daylight.

Japanese players who wish to ban night bombing and thus funnel Allied players into the Sword of Infinite Airplanes owned by Japan in the game should be truthful that this is what they're about. Those that further neuter Allied options by banning strat bombing here, there or everywhere are even worse. Those that claim that imposing restrictions in the game such that Japan does not need to CAP Palembang, the biggest strategic jewel on the map, so they can then use those hundreds of fighters in Australia or India--and do so under cover of claiming "realism"--are the worst of all.

[Bullwinkle58]

ORIGINAL: obvert

Night bombing of Manpower should be allowed as is in the late game to give the Allies what they used in the war. It's powerful, as it should be, but not overwhelmingly so, and ops losses can still be high.

Night bombing on any target requiring accuracy should probably be HRed as the game version is much too accurate. There are NO instances I've been able to find of sustained campaigns against airfields or pinpoint defenses during the war that resulted in the kind of devastation possible in game. If night bombing en masse could have been used effectively in the war, why was it not used except against the equivalent of 'Manpower?'

There wasn't sustained night bombing. Allied air leaders weren't stupid. Night bombing is hard and dangerous. But there were cases where it was used to gain an initial advantage, and then once air superiority was achieved the job was finished by day. You don't see this is the game as much because the Japanese have infinite planes, they fly on rice balls and not avgas, and in real life the replacement fairy didn't come every seven days with a bag of new planes.

One example where night bombing accomplished what I say above was the Wewak campaign in the August 1943 period. Wikipedia gives a nice summary, but I was able to find a thesis written from good secondary sources as well as unpublished primary sources (mostly WWII unit diaries as well as HQ reports; it's all in the Biblio.) This thesis was written in 1992 by a serving USAF major as a student at the Air University, Maxwell AFB. It's easy reading and well-written. IT covers the Wewak and associated base campaign as well as the Battle of the Bismarck Sea as case studies in the development and employment of air power as a detached action from land warfare as well as the development of local doctrine to deal with emerging realities in the theater. In particular it covers the development of parafrag tactics as well as local modification to 2E forward-firing strafing weapons. The thesis can be found at:

http://aupress.au.af.mil/digital/pdf/pa ... _force.pdf

A small selection of quotes:

"Developing the Tactics for Airfield Destruction

By the summer of 1943, Whitehead and his crews were demonstrating proficiency in attacking airfields. Having gained experience by striking bases in the Lae-Salamaua area and along the southern coast of New Britain they were developing a proven technique for success. Using the weapons acquired in the Papuan Campaign, their plan relied on light and medium bombers to reap the majority of destruction. The technique was broken down into four distinct phases:

1. Intelligence plots the movement of enemy aircraft in order that the attack may be timed for the movement when the heaviest concentration of planes can be hit.

2. Heavy bombers then deliver the initial blow from medium or high altitudes to soften up and tire out the opposition before the medium bombers can attack.

3. Medium bombers (B-25s sometimes aided by A-20s) follow the heavy bombers with a low altitude attack in which the entire airdrome area is strafed and clusters of parachute fragmentation bombs are dropped. To accomplish maximum results from the strafing attacks, the B-25’s were modified to carry eight forward firing .50-caliber machine guns.

4. Assessment of results is the fourth and final phase of these coordinated missions. On the basis of careful study both of strike and reconnaissance photos, the number of enemy planes destroyed is carefully tabulated. Once intelligence provided a suitable target, crews noted fuel and supply depots along with the location of enemy radar sites, AAA positions and ground spotters. Courses of attack were planned to avoid known threats while ensuring destruction of both aircraft and facilities.131 The timing between the high altitude heavy and low altitude medium bombers was the key. To confuse the enemy, the Fifth Air Force had devised two methods. The heavy bombers frequently attack during the night preceding a minimum altitude daylight mission. Such attacks often soften up enemy opposition by tiring out the antiaircraft gunners and by keeping the pilots awake during the night. 132 The second option was for heavy bombers to precede the medium bombers by two or three minutes. This type of attack forces the [Japanese] hand--if he puts his fighters in the air, he risks destruction of them by our fighter escort and if he leaves them on the ground, combined bombing and strafing will destroy them there.”133"

"The Plan is Executed

With the target date to attack Wewak set for August 17th, efforts were further accelerated to supply the airfield at Tsili Tsili. On August 15th, its location was finally discovered and attacked by 20-30 Japanese fighters and 12 bombers. Fifth Air Force fighters rose to meet them and shot down all the enemy bombers but not before one crashed into the recently constructed chapel killing the chaplain and several men. At the time of the attack, twelve Allied transports were in the landing pattern and Japanese Oscar fighters shot down two. On August 16th, 95 Allied transports loaded with 13 55-gallon drums of gasoline each arrived making the airdrome ready to support the next day’s effort. Once again Japanese fighters attacked while the transports were arriving but this time no damage was suffered.135 33

For the first strike, Whitehead chose to use heavy bombers at night hoping to catch the Japanese unprepared. Between 2100 and midnight on the 16th, 50 heavy bombers took off from airfields in the Port Moresby area for the three hour flight to the Wewak complex. A total of 48 aircraft reached the four airfields at But, Boram, Dagua, and Wewak and dropped a combination of incendiary, parafrag and demolition bombs.136

On August 17th, between the hours 0600 and 0630, 63 B-25s took off from Port Moresby and Dobodura. Due to a combination of bad weather and the inability of ten of the aircraft to release their 300-gallon turret tanks (a mandatory abort item by direction of Whitehead), only 32 aircraft reached the target.137 The B-25s met light resistance indicating that the heavy bombers had achieved their objective of paralyzing the enemy.

Arriving at the target at 0900 the B-25s commenced their attacks. The results were no less than spectacular. Three B-25s from the 405th Bombardment Squadron reached Dagua and initiated their runs from 30-50 feet. The pilot report stated:

40-50 Dinahs, type 100 Helens and type 97 Sallys inadequately dispersed in twos and threes in clearing along Southeast side of runway were bombed and straffed...Of these enemy planes 8 were reported definitely destroyed and 20 probably destroyed.138
The 3rd Bomb Group’s three squadrons also struck gold. The 90th Bomb Squadron claimed 15 aircraft destroyed at Wewak; the 8th claimed 40-60 destroyed at Boram; and the 13th claimed an additional 10 to 20 at Boram.139 The extremely high tally at Boram was due to a combination of superb airmanship and once again, inadequate dispersion by the Japanese. An entry in the 3rd Bomb Group Combat Log summarized the attack and showed the degree of complete surprise achieved: Boram, the principle target, was the first to be hit. The formation of 8th and 13th Squadron ships, led by Colonel Donald P. Hall, came around the ridge onto the target and took the Nips completely by surprise. Over 100 Japanese aircraft were lined up wing tip to wing tip; trucks were moving and personnel were busily at work. Col. Hall made the first pass from 100 feet and his initial burst exploded a Betty bomber. Our planes which followed bombed and strafed aircraft at the strip. When they turned for another pass the parked planes resembled a powder train as fire and smoke swiftly moved down the line. Crews of numerous ships observed frag bombs exploding in and around parked aircraft. They also saw an ammunition dump explode and two fuel dumps catch fire. The field was left in shambles; pieces of aircraft scattered allover the area."140

So, here we see night bombing used as a preface to a more comprehensive daylight campaign. The main objective of the night attack was to shock the Japanese, destroy a significant portion of his aircraft, and set fuel dumps ablaze. This was accomplished. Note that some of the night attackers did not achieve the target; this is in line with what we see in the game under the betas. Did the entire four-day campaign take place at night? No. Only the first night. Why? Because after the first night the Allies judged the Japanese sufficiently attrited that the risk-reward ratio favored day attacks to finish the job. But also note that Japan could not and did not get reinforcements into the theater during the campaign. And this campaign was decisive in taking that portion of NG.

"When questioned after the war, Major General Tanikawa of the Fourth Air Army confirmed the scale of devastation delivered to the Japanese air capability in New Guinea on the first two days of the attack:

'We lost 100 planes including light bombers, fighters and reconnaissance planes. It was a decisive Allied victory. We were planning to retain the balance of power and were making plans to bomb Port Moresby and other areas. A few days before our projected plan was to [materialize], we were bombed at Wewak and our air power was severely crippled. Consequently our air power was rapidly diminishing and was unable to aid our ground forces effectively which, in the end, constituted one of our chief reasons for losing the war.'152

For MacArthur and the men of the SWPA the real payoff of the raid carne two weeks later during the beginning of offensive operations along the Huon Peninsula. Confident the Fifth Air Force had achieved air superiority, “a much bolder plan could be ventured.”153 At sunrise on September 4th, the Australian 9th Division landed 20 miles east of Lae. Japanese aircraft launched from Rabaul could offer only light resistance and were met by Allied fighters. Complete command of the air allowed MacArthur to drop a parachute regiment to seize the airstrip at Nadzab located 20 miles northwest of Lae. The next day the Australian 7th Division was airlifted into the captured airstrip. On September 16th, Allied forces entered Lae and captured it unopposed.154 By mid-October the Huon Peninsula was secured."

[Bullwinkle58]

ORIGINAL: LargeSlowTarget

A RAF Bomber Command report on night bombing accuracy in 1941 showed that less than 33% of their bombs were hitting within five miles of their targets - at that time they were theoretically aiming for key military and industrial targets. This inaccuracy of night bombing was one of the factors that lead Bomber-Harris to adopt the "area bombing" and "dehousing" strategy. Even after the introduction of navigational aids like GEE in 1942, less than 30% of the bombers dropped their loads within the target area - defined as 3 miles(!) around the aiming point. After the introduction of OBOE in mid-43 accuracy increased to 50-60% and by the end of the war with H2S radar, pathfinders and much experience night bombing accuracy reached 90% of bombs dropped within 3 miles of the aiming point.

I suck in math but a 3 mile radius should cover around 28 square miles. London Heathrow airport covers less than 5 square miles and the average WW2 airfield even less, so I would say an airfield is indeed a small target for WWII night bombing.

However, the difference between discerning a single industrial target in the Essen metroplex, at night, from miles up, and seeing an air base hacked from unbroken jungle at 5000 feet, should be apparent.

[Chickenboy]

Obvert,

You're arguing with those that will never be convinced. They've read papers.

[Chickenboy]

Some CGI eye candy and an interview with an AVG pilot. 
 
Interesting review of how he was able to intercept a nighttime IJAAF bombing run, in spite of not having equipment nor training for the effort.  Sounds pretty effective for spot CAP.:
 
This is from the "Dogfights" series.  The video segment here is part 3 of 5.  Worth a look.
 
http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=33c_1189615532

[Bullwinkle58]

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

Obvert,

You're arguing with those that will never be convinced. They've read papers.

When you can't beat the argument, attack the paper. Pretty sad behavior from a doctorate holder.

Since I'm sure you didn't look at the paper, here's the unpublished sources. IOW, those you can't get at the public library or your local B&N.

Happy to help light up your life, Chicken.

" Unpublished Sources

“Allied Air Forces Southwest Pacific Area, Summary of Operations, January-June 1943.” Maxwell AFB, Alabama: USAF/HRA, n.d. 706.3083.
“Biographical Sketch of General George C. Kenney,” Maxwell AFB, Alabama: USAF/HRA, n.d. K239.293 Kenney.
Crabb, J.V., Brigadier General, USA. “Fifth Air Force Air War Against Japan, September 1942-August 1946,” Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Air University Library (AUL), February 4. 1946, 940.544973 F469 V.1.
“Destruction of Enemy Planes at Wewak.” Headquarters, Fifth Air Force Historical Record, Maxwell AFB, Alabama: USAF/HRA, September 10, 1943. 730.168".
“Ennis Whitehead Collection.” Letters to General George Kenney, Maxwell AFB, Alabama: USAF/HRA, August 16-21, 1943. 168.6008-3.
“V Bomber Command Office of A-2, Tactical Reports of Attacks on Bismarck Sea Convoy, March 2, 3, 4, 1943.” Maxwell AFB, Alabama: USAF/HRA, n.d. 732.306-2.
Goldstein, Donald M. “Ennis C. Whitehead, Aerospace Pioneer,” Ph.D. diss., University of Denver, 1970.
Hasdorff, James C. “USAF Historical Interview #806: General George C. Kenney.” Maxwell AFB, Alabama: USAF/HRA, April 20, 1974. K239.0512-806.
Headquarters, Advance Echelon Fifth Air Force. “Report on Destruction of Japanese Convoy in Bismarck Sea, March 1 to 5, 1943 (Inclusive)." Maxwell AFB, Alabama: USAF/HRA, April 6, 1943. 730.306-1A.
Headquarters, Fifth Air Force Historical Record. “Destruction of Enemy Planes at Wewak.” Maxwell AFB, Alabama: USAF/HRA, September 10, 1943.730.168.
Headquarters, USAAF. “Report of the Commanding General of the United States Army Air Force to the Secretary of War.” Maxwell. AFB, Alabama: AUL, January 4, 1944. 940.544973 Un3r V.1.
“Resume of General Arnold’s Talk.” Maxwell AFB, Alabama: USAF/HRA, May 5, 1941. 145.83-108.
________. “Second Report of the Commanding General of the Army Air Force to the Secretary of War.” Maxwell AFB, Alabama: AUL, February 27, 1945. 940.544973 Un3r V.2.
47
“History, 3rd Bombardment Group, 1 July 1919 - 31 March 1944.” Maxwell AFB, Alabama: USAF/HRA. GP-3-HI (Bomb).
“History of the 22d Bombardment Group (Light), 1 February 1940 to 31 January 1944.” Maxwell AFB, Alabama: USAF/HRA. GP-22-HI (Bomb).
“History, 38th Bombardment Group (M), 20 November 1940-March 1944.” Maxwell AFB, Alabama: USAF/HRA. GP-38-HI (Bomb).
“History of the 71st Bomb Squadron, September 1942-September 1946.” Maxwell AFB, Alabama: USAF/HRA. SQ-71-HI (Bomb).
“Letter From Headquarters Advanced Echelon, Fifth Air Force to All Air Force Units, New Guinea.” Maxwell AFB, Alabama: USAF/HRA, March 5, 1943. 730.2981.
“Light Bombardment Aviation.” Air Corps Tactical School Textbook. Maxwell Field, Alabama. Maxwell AFB, Alabama: USAF/HRA, January 15, 1940. 248.101-11A.
“Memorandum for Chief of Air Staff, and Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence, Subject--Evidence Regarding the Size of the Lae Convoy.” Maxwell AFB, Alabama: USAF/HRA, September 14, 1943. 142.021-8.
“Memorandum for Lt. General George C. Kenney, Subject: Proposed Release of Revised Information re Bismarck Sea Action.” Maxwell AFB, Alabama: USAF/HRA, August 12, 1943. 142.16-15.
“90th Bombardment Squadron World War II Combat Log.” Maxwell AFB, Alabama: USAF/HRA, May 1944. SQ-Bomb-90-HI (Bomb).
“Personal Letter from General George Kenney to General H. Arnold--Operations.” Maxwell AFB, Alabama: USAF/HRA, November 6, 1943. 706.311.
“Report on the Battle of the Bismarck Sea.” Prepared by Staff Members from the Thirteenth Air Force. Maxwell AFB, Alabama: USAF/HRA, September 24, 1945. 142.16-15 Pt.2.
“Report on the Battle of the Bismarck Sea, Japanese Interrogations.” Maxwell AFB, Alabama: USAF/HRA, September 24, 1945. 730.306-1D.
Smith, T.R., Project Engineer. “Report No. SM10908 on History of Light Bomber Series Airplanes.” Office of the Historian, Douglas Aircraft Company, Long Beach, California, December 4, 1944.
Stanley, Marvin, Colonel, USAF. “Historical Documentation, General George C. Kenney,” (Oral Interview). Maxwell AFB, Alabama: USAF/HRA, July 1975. K239.0512-747.
Taylor, Joe G. “Close Air Support in the War Against Japan.” USAF Historical Study #86. USAF Historical Division, Research Studies Institute, AU. Maxwell AFB, Alabama: USAF/HRA, 1955. 101-86.
48
USAAF, Historical Division, Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence. “Episodes in the History of the Army Air Forces: The Bismarck Sea Action, March 1-4, 1943.” Maxwell AFB, Alabama: USAF/HRA, September 1, 1943. 105.1-8.
USAAF APGC, Proof Department, Bombing Section. “Final Report on Minimum Altitude Attack of Water-Borne Surface Vessels with Aircraft Bombs.” Eglin AFB, Florida: USAF Devlopment Test Center History Office, December 7, 1942. Serial No. 1-42- 12.
“Special Fuze Testing Phase-Low Altitude Attacks of Water Borne Surface Vessels with Aircraft Bombs.” Eglin AFB, Florida: USAF Development Test Center History Office, October 31, 1942. Serial No. 1-42-12.
USAAF APGC, Historical Branch, AC/S-2. “History of Air Proving Ground Command: Personal Narratives, 1941-1946.” Maxwell AFB, Alabama: USAF/HRA, n.d. 240.04-5.
US Pacific Fleet, South Pacific Force, Intelligence Division. “Report on Destruction of the Lae Convoy, Mar 1-12, by the Fifth U.S. Army Air Forces and the Ninth Operational Group R.A.A.F.” Maxwell AFB, Alabama: USAF/HRA, n.d. 730.306-1C.
Watson, Richard L. Jr., Major, AAF. “Air Action in the Papuan Campaign, 21 July 1942 to 23 January 1943.” AAF Historical Study No. 17. Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence, Historical Division, AAF. Maxwell AFB, Alabama: USAF/HRA, August 1944. 101-17.
“The Fifth Air Force in the Huon Peninsula Campaign, January to October 1943.” AAF Reference History #13. AAF Historical Office, Headquarters, AAF. Maxwell AFB, Alabama: USAF/HRA, January 1946. 101-13.
Westenhoff, Charles M., Major, USAF, “Master of the Operational Art: General Kenney’s Early Campaigns,” 1991."

[LargeSlowTarget]

ORIGINAL: Bullwinkle58

However, the difference between discerning a single industrial target in the Essen metroplex, at night, from miles up, and seeing an air base hacked from unbroken jungle at 5000 feet, should be apparent.

The "single industrial target" usually was a factory complex of several square kilometers. The Krupp factory in Essen for example covered more than 5 square kilometers, about a third of the city. Pacific airfields were seldom "hacked from unbroken jungle" - they were usually built in natural clearings were Kunai grass indicated firm ground (e.g. Dobadura), or at relatively clear ground of plantations (e.g. Munda) or even along the beach (e.g. Torokina fighter strip). Plus maps of Europe were fairly accurate while maps of the Pacific islands were not, and there was no GEE or OBOE in the Pacific. So I remain sceptical that finding a Pacific jungle airstrip was easier than finding a sprawling industrial target in Europe.

But this is not really the problem - some pilots did manage to find their targets at night and other didn't and this is covered in the game - stray bombers, aborts etc. And I don't think JFBs want to ban night bombing. It is about the perceived über-availability of night bombers and über-effectiveness of night-bombing ports and airfields - for both sides. Remember, this thread started with a "complaint" about the results of Japanese night bombing.

Yes, night bombing of airfields *considerably smaller than entire European big cities or even factory complexes* did happen and may have had devastating effects (the paper quoted above only says the 4Es dropped stuff, but nothing about their results). But such attacks weren't the norm. As has been said here, night bombing was hard and dangerous and required a lot of training and there was no sustained night bombing campaign against airfields. If night flying, navigation and bombing had been relatively "easy", accurate, effective and free of hazards, it would have become standard doctrine - instead of night area bombing or "precision" daylight bombing.

But in the game one can switch his entire bomber force to night airbase bombing - as if this had been standard operation procedure - and can get questionable results like 49 bombs dropped for 42 hits, 4 planes destroyed and 76 damaged (see first post) using only a small part of available forces. Imagine the results with more planes and the payloads carried by 4Es...

So it is about limiting night bombing quantity and quality regarding relatively small targets (compared to entire cities) - not to ban it. Me think a "night capable" switch triggered by a a certain exp and training level would help a lot.

[MDDgames]

If it was easy to target airfields and ports at night in the WWII era, why wouldnt the allies have done it? Instead they firebombed cities at night and used pin-point attacks during the day. Maybe for a reason?

Simplest house rule on night attacks is one that fits into actual doctrine: night attacks can be directed at manpower targets only (i.e. city attacks). These attacks will sometimes drift and hit other targets (factories, airfields, ect) and they will start fires.

Just like they historically did.

If you want to target an airfield or port, then there again, let history be your guide. Limit to ONE squadron. Pretty simple. And night attacks at 100' against land targets? Please... The game engine isnt set up to handle the ops losses you would incur from such tactics.

[Bullwinkle58]

ORIGINAL: LargeSlowTarget

ORIGINAL: Bullwinkle58

However, the difference between discerning a single industrial target in the Essen metroplex, at night, from miles up, and seeing an air base hacked from unbroken jungle at 5000 feet, should be apparent.

The "single industrial target" usually was a factory complex of several square kilometers. The Krupp factory in Essen for example covered more than 5 square kilometers, about a third of the city. Pacific airfields were seldom "hacked from unbroken jungle" - they were usually built in natural clearings were Kunai grass indicated firm ground (e.g. Dobadura), or at relatively clear ground of plantations (e.g. Munda) or even along the beach (e.g. Torokina fighter strip). Plus maps of Europe were fairly accurate while maps of the Pacific islands were not, and there was no GEE or OBOE in the Pacific. So I remain sceptical that finding a Pacific jungle airstrip was easier than finding a sprawling industrial target in Europe.

But this is not really the problem - some pilots did manage to find their targets at night and other didn't and this is covered in the game - stray bombers, aborts etc. And I don't think JFBs want to ban night bombing. It is about the perceived über-availability of night bombers and über-effectiveness of night-bombing ports and airfields - for both sides. Remember, this thread started with a "complaint" about the results of Japanese night bombing.

Yes, night bombing of airfields *considerably smaller than entire European big cities or even factory complexes* did happen and may have had devastating effects (the paper quoted above only says the 4Es dropped stuff, but nothing about their results). But such attacks weren't the norm. As has been said here, night bombing was hard and dangerous and required a lot of training and there was no sustained night bombing campaign against airfields. If night flying, navigation and bombing had been relatively "easy", accurate, effective and free of hazards, it would have become standard doctrine - instead of night area bombing or "precision" daylight bombing.

But in the game one can switch his entire bomber force to night airbase bombing - as if this had been standard operation procedure - and can get questionable results like 49 bombs dropped for 42 hits, 4 planes destroyed and 76 damaged (see first post) using only a small part of available forces. Imagine the results with more planes and the payloads carried by 4Es...

So it is about limiting night bombing quantity and quality regarding relatively small targets (compared to entire cities) - not to ban it. Me think a "night capable" switch triggered by a a certain exp and training level would help a lot.

I've just spent an hour looking at ETO aerial photo recon archives. The Krupp complex was atypical in the extreme. Factories in industrial Europe were in urban areas, and surrounded by miles of housing and non-industrial buildings. Even in daylight recon photos the factories do not stand out except where there are large smoke stacks.

In the PTO the difference, even by starlight or moonlight (There is some moonlight about 3/4 of the time) between organic matter and man-made is striking. Many air bases were taken out of jungle or canopy; Wewak is an example. Numerous photos of the AF exist online. Many others were built quite close to ports so fuel and ordnance coming by ship could be easily transported to storage. The difference between water and shoreline is also easily discernible from the air, certainly at 5000-6000 feet. IPs were chosen from daylight photo recon, which was extensive on the US side by 1943. Those photos also exist on-line. By 1944 in the invasion of Saipan photo recon was so good that 3D models were made of the island to aid planners in precisely locating enemy prepared defenses.

Regardless of this, look at the game. Re-look at the OP's results. Extremely minimal. Note also that despite previous night's bombing, NO CAP is put up. A couple of fighters are lost; the rest are damaged and will be repaired. Of course there is no record of ops losses on the Japanese side. It's very likely this series of attacks were a wash.

Night bombing is a tool. It is not, as JFBs keep claiming, "uber" anything. IF players play the betas, with coordination penalties and turn-backs, they will find that night bombing works just OK. It has advantages in spreading the defender's CAP effort, and negatives in refused missions, strays, and ops losses. It doesn't need HRs to control; it's self-controlling. If an opponent uses it the majority of the time just shift the majority of your CAP effort to night and wait for the downsides of it to eat away at the attackers in pilots, airframes, and supply usage for no return. Every action in the game model has a reaction. Night bombing is to some extent a logical action for the Allies when they face overwhelming numbers of daytime CAP fighters, especially early. But it isn't a magic bullet.

I personally think that night AF bombing is a dumb use of very limited multi-engine assets for the Allies in 1942. I think night strat bombing makes a lot more sense. But when night AF bombing is done I have found the results unremarkable and certainly a trade-off, not a pure win. The OP's results reflect this too. If he defends Chungking with those good fighters sitting on the ground he'll find his losses are further reduced.

[Cavalry Corp]

In the game - I notice that any bombers opposed by fighters at night tend to miss regardless of no losses

[Bullwinkle58]

ORIGINAL: cavalry

In the game - I notice that any bombers opposed by fighters at night tend to miss regardless of no losses

If not 100% the rate is a lot higher.

[1EyedJacks]

ORIGINAL: MDDgames

If it was easy to target airfields and ports at night in the WWII era, why wouldnt the allies have done it? Instead they firebombed cities at night and used pin-point attacks during the day. Maybe for a reason?

Simplest house rule on night attacks is one that fits into actual doctrine: night attacks can be directed at manpower targets only (i.e. city attacks). These attacks will sometimes drift and hit other targets (factories, airfields, ect) and they will start fires.

Just like they historically did.

If you want to target an airfield or port, then there again, let history be your guide. Limit to ONE squadron. Pretty simple. And night attacks at 100' against land targets? Please... The game engine isnt set up to handle the ops losses you would incur from such tactics.

I'm in Las Vegas this week at a convention. So far I'm a tad behind in the win/loss column but I still have a few days left to break the bank... <grin>

I think a lot of folks talk about historical usage when playing this game but forget that the big breakthroughs in combat came from a leader that bucked the norms of warfare.

In my Game VS Steve I do not want to be limited to recreating the same war nor do I wish to be limited to the same tactics.

Think of how the first use of artillery changed the norms of warfare. Think of how cavalry impacted ground combat.
Remember how ground forces used to march about in blocks of three or four rows stacked together on an open battlefield devoid of cover? Repeating rifles, machine guns, and opponents that refused to fight in stacks but instead used natural or man-made cover changed the tactics of infantry.
Think of the Blitzkrieg as another example. Armies had gotten used to trench warfare and fortifications and then someone came up with the idea to spearhead a breakthrough with armor to ravage the REMFs.
I think that night bombing by allies in the war against Japan wasn't used much because there was no leader willing to push that concept. I think that as pilots learned to fly nighttime missions and learned to navigate at night they would get better.

There are two things I think are wrong with the bombing model:
1. That the infrastructure damage done to a base is permanent and can't be repaired. I think that if I have the HI and wish to repair factories, etc. then I should be able to do so.

2. The defensive strength of 4E bombers in their combat ability against Japanese fighters when they are not flying in large groups is wrong in my opinion. The defensive strength in 4E bombers came from their numbers - when they were flying in small groups or alone they were prey. I also think that odds should play a stronger role in 4E losses - and by that what I mean is if 4E are flying un-escorted and are forced to tangle with Japanese fighters at 3:1 odds or greater then there should be a lot more 4E that are lost in the encounter.

[zuluhour]

I don't know if the Devs had something in mind but I thought the factories were rebuilt in remote locations under mountains or camouflaged in the country side. Thus the city raids while effecting the shipyards to an extent, aircraft and weapon production remained on going if not increasing. I have not had the pleasure of strategic bombing yet in the game, does all production cease with city losses??

This is most likely a stupid question but here it goes anyway. Has anyone completely leveled the home islands yet? Is that even possible given the time frame? Which leads me to the biggest question, has anyone won a auto victory or major victory as Japan playing till the clock runs out?

Sorry for the babble, but back to the point, #1 from Oneeyed, I would think aircraft factories and LI should be able to be rebuilt and relocated so as to be un targetable after a period of time following an elimination of such or some kind of "trigger".

1 cent

[jetjockey]

"So, here we see night bombing used as a preface to a more comprehensive daylight campaign. The main objective of the night attack was to shock the Japanese, destroy a significant portion of his aircraft, and set fuel dumps ablaze. This was accomplished. Note that some of the night attackers did not achieve the target; this is in line with what we see in the game under the betas. Did the entire four-day campaign take place at night? No. Only the first night. Why? Because after the first night the Allies judged the Japanese sufficiently attrited that the risk-reward ratio favored day attacks to finish the job. But also note that Japan could not and did not get reinforcements into the theater during the campaign. And this campaign was decisive in taking that portion of NG."

Dude, are we really reading the same text here? The damage listed was attributed to the B-25s attacking at tree-top level, at 0900. The B-24s, attacking at night, were credited with disturbing the Japanese pilot's sleep cycle and tiring out the gunners; significant to this raid, but otherwise not impressive. If you are looking for an example of accurate night-time bombing, this isn't it.

Also, earlier it was mentioned that JFB's are shooting down more Allied bombers than was historically accurate. Check out this link:

http://www.usaaf.net/digest/t101.htm

The 20th lost just over 500 B-29s during the last half of 1944 and 1945. These losses were so bad that they were used as partial justification for the invasion of Okinawa; to serve as an emergency airfield for damaged B-29s unable to make the long flight back to their bases and as a base for fighters to escort the bombers that were being ripped to shreds. I will hazard a guess that if we were actually seeing these kind of Allied loses, not a few AFBs would be bytching.

[Bullwinkle58]

ORIGINAL: jetjockey

"So, here we see night bombing used as a preface to a more comprehensive daylight campaign. The main objective of the night attack was to shock the Japanese, destroy a significant portion of his aircraft, and set fuel dumps ablaze. This was accomplished. Note that some of the night attackers did not achieve the target; this is in line with what we see in the game under the betas. Did the entire four-day campaign take place at night? No. Only the first night. Why? Because after the first night the Allies judged the Japanese sufficiently attrited that the risk-reward ratio favored day attacks to finish the job. But also note that Japan could not and did not get reinforcements into the theater during the campaign. And this campaign was decisive in taking that portion of NG."

Dude, are we really reading the same text here? The damage listed was attributed to the B-25s attacking at tree-top level, at 0900. The B-24s, attacking at night, were credited with disturbing the Japanese pilot's sleep cycle and tiring out the gunners; significant to this raid, but otherwise not impressive. If you are looking for an example of accurate night-time bombing, this isn't it.

Dude, backatcha. If you read the paper, congratulations.

The night raid did more than keep the gunners awake, but the paper does not give a full BDA. Why? Perhaps it's in the source docs, but I also suspect one was never done since the 0900 raid made it impossible to separate damage from each. (For some reason there don't appear to be any photos from the night raid. Imagine.) Clearly the first raid found the AF, clearly they bombed it. I suspect, but the paper does not say, that raid was heavy on incendiaries as the 0900 raid found a mess and hitting avgas was a normal Allied objective in this era elsewhere. IT was harder to transport in than replacement planes which could fly.

In the case of low- or medium-altitude 4Es, finding the AF and dropping full loads, given how over-stacked it was (documented), they were plenty accurate. Further, given that they (documented) took off in full dark and transited the same way, this pretty large raid shows the frequent JFB claim that AFs could not be found at night to be untrue. A 3-hour transit from the other side of a large mountain range? Pretty impressive.

Edit: Here are the relevant paragraphs from the paper:

"For the first strike, Whitehead chose to use heavy bombers at night hoping to catch the Japanese unprepared. Between 2100 and midnight on the 16th, 50 heavy bombers took off from airfields in the Port Moresby area for the three hour flight to the Wewak complex. A total of 48 aircraft reached the four airfields at But, Boram, Dagua, and Wewak and dropped a combination of incendiary, parafrag and demolition bombs.136
On August 17th, between the hours 0600 and 0630, 63 B-25s took off from Port Moresby and Dobodura. Due to a combination of bad weather and the inability of ten of the aircraft to release their 300-gallon turret tanks (a mandatory abort item by direction of Whitehead), only 32 aircraft reached the target.137 The B-25s met light resistance indicating that the heavy bombers had achieved their objective of paralyzing the enemy."

[Bullwinkle58]

ORIGINAL: 1EyedJacks

ORIGINAL: MDDgames

If it was easy to target airfields and ports at night in the WWII era, why wouldnt the allies have done it? Instead they firebombed cities at night and used pin-point attacks during the day. Maybe for a reason?

Simplest house rule on night attacks is one that fits into actual doctrine: night attacks can be directed at manpower targets only (i.e. city attacks). These attacks will sometimes drift and hit other targets (factories, airfields, ect) and they will start fires.

Just like they historically did.

If you want to target an airfield or port, then there again, let history be your guide. Limit to ONE squadron. Pretty simple. And night attacks at 100' against land targets? Please... The game engine isnt set up to handle the ops losses you would incur from such tactics.

I'm in Las Vegas this week at a convention. So far I'm a tad behind in the win/loss column but I still have a few days left to break the bank... <grin>

I think a lot of folks talk about historical usage when playing this game but forget that the big breakthroughs in combat came from a leader that bucked the norms of warfare.

In my Game VS Steve I do not want to be limited to recreating the same war nor do I wish to be limited to the same tactics.

Think of how the first use of artillery changed the norms of warfare. Think of how cavalry impacted ground combat.
Remember how ground forces used to march about in blocks of three or four rows stacked together on an open battlefield devoid of cover? Repeating rifles, machine guns, and opponents that refused to fight in stacks but instead used natural or man-made cover changed the tactics of infantry.
Think of the Blitzkrieg as another example. Armies had gotten used to trench warfare and fortifications and then someone came up with the idea to spearhead a breakthrough with armor to ravage the REMFs.
I think that night bombing by allies in the war against Japan wasn't used much because there was no leader willing to push that concept. I think that as pilots learned to fly nighttime missions and learned to navigate at night they would get better.

There are two things I think are wrong with the bombing model:
1. That the infrastructure damage done to a base is permanent and can't be repaired. I think that if I have the HI and wish to repair factories, etc. then I should be able to do so.

2. The defensive strength of 4E bombers in their combat ability against Japanese fighters when they are not flying in large groups is wrong in my opinion. The defensive strength in 4E bombers came from their numbers - when they were flying in small groups or alone they were prey. I also think that odds should play a stronger role in 4E losses - and by that what I mean is if 4E are flying un-escorted and are forced to tangle with Japanese fighters at 3:1 odds or greater then there should be a lot more 4E that are lost in the encounter.

Good to see you're alive. Hit any buffets yet? [:)]

Stop splitting tens!!!!! [:'(]

I feel like Abbot and Costello talking about night bombing in our game; Oscar's on first. But you do bring up a couple of changes I'd agree would help. The permanent destroy rule if firebombed might make sense in 1945 (no time), but perhaps a double (2000 supply/point) charge to repair burned versus just collapsed industry would be a compromise. In case you haven't noticed I have been doing less Manpower bombing since it was suggested to me I should consider if I ever will need the supply those cities generate, once the Good Guys retake them. I don't get VPs for them anyway, so . . . It's another balancing factor in strat bombing. What's good in 1942 might hamstring the Allies in 1944-45 if local supply is missing.

[obvert]

ORIGINAL: Bullwinkle58

ORIGINAL: jetjockey

"So, here we see night bombing used as a preface to a more comprehensive daylight campaign. The main objective of the night attack was to shock the Japanese, destroy a significant portion of his aircraft, and set fuel dumps ablaze. This was accomplished. Note that some of the night attackers did not achieve the target; this is in line with what we see in the game under the betas. Did the entire four-day campaign take place at night? No. Only the first night. Why? Because after the first night the Allies judged the Japanese sufficiently attrited that the risk-reward ratio favored day attacks to finish the job. But also note that Japan could not and did not get reinforcements into the theater during the campaign. And this campaign was decisive in taking that portion of NG."

Dude, are we really reading the same text here? The damage listed was attributed to the B-25s attacking at tree-top level, at 0900. The B-24s, attacking at night, were credited with disturbing the Japanese pilot's sleep cycle and tiring out the gunners; significant to this raid, but otherwise not impressive. If you are looking for an example of accurate night-time bombing, this isn't it.

Dude, backatcha. If you read the paper, congratulations.

The night raid did more than keep the gunners awake, but the paper does not give a full BDA. Why? Perhaps it's in the source docs, but I also suspect one was never done since the 0900 raid made it impossible to separate damage from each. (For some reason there don't appear to be any photos from the night raid. Imagine.) Clearly the first raid found the AF, clearly they bombed it. I suspect, but the paper does not say, that raid was heavy on incendiaries as the 0900 raid found a mess and hitting avgas was a normal Allied objective in this era elsewhere. IT was harder to transport in than replacement planes which could fly.

In the case of low- or medium-altitude 4Es, finding the AF and dropping full loads, given how over-stacked it was (documented), they were plenty accurate. Further, given that they (documented) took off in full dark and transited the same way, this pretty large raid shows the frequent JFB claim that AFs could not be found at night to be untrue. A 3-hour transit from the other side of a large mountain range? Pretty impressive.

Edit: Here are the relevant paragraphs from the paper:

"For the first strike, Whitehead chose to use heavy bombers at night hoping to catch the Japanese unprepared. Between 2100 and midnight on the 16th, 50 heavy bombers took off from airfields in the Port Moresby area for the three hour flight to the Wewak complex. A total of 48 aircraft reached the four airfields at But, Boram, Dagua, and Wewak and dropped a combination of incendiary, parafrag and demolition bombs.136
On August 17th, between the hours 0600 and 0630, 63 B-25s took off from Port Moresby and Dobodura. Due to a combination of bad weather and the inability of ten of the aircraft to release their 300-gallon turret tanks (a mandatory abort item by direction of Whitehead), only 32 aircraft reached the target.137 The B-25s met light resistance indicating that the heavy bombers had achieved their objective of paralyzing the enemy."

Great find Bull. Thanks. [:)]

This adds to my growing feeling that the kind of raids possible in the game simply didn't happen in the war, and the type of destruction was not pinpoint but a scattered injury to a larger base structure.

This makes the rule we adopted in my game with Torsten look pretty good. An HR for 50 bombers per target per turn for anything other than manpower when bombing at night.

Night bombing can thus still be used to 'soften' a target, as in it's historical use shown here, but won't take out that target completely without the follow-on accuracy of daylight raids.