ORIGINAL: jetjockey
Again, I go back to the text that YOU provide. It gives no indication that the night raid did ANY damage at Wewak. Standard BDA would have at least made an attempt to quantify the effectiveness of the night raid. Instead we are told that the B-24s accomplished their mission which was to "soften up enemy opposition by tiring out the antiaircraft gunners and by keeping the pilots awake during the night." Any other interpretation of this document is pure conjecture.
You may be able to find a document that supports your position, but this isn't it.
I bolded the portion of the document that says what I said. But your challenging tone got my back up a bit, so I dusted off that undergrad history degree and did some digging. What I found may be of interest to the grogs here. And yeah, original source documents DO support what Major Gann said in his thesis in 1992. So come with me . . .
I re-posted the portion of the thesis which said, but didn't prove, that the night attack by the heavies disrupted the airfield to an extent that opposition against the 0900 medium-bomber and fighter attack was significantly suppressed. Did Major Gann accurately summarize his source? Yes, he did. How do we know? He footnoted it. So let's go look at the note.
"For the first strike, Whitehead chose to use heavy bombers at night hoping to catch the Japanese unprepared. Between 2100 and midnight on the 16th, 50 heavy bombers took off from airfields in the Port Moresby area for the three hour flight to the Wewak complex. A total of 48 aircraft reached the four airfields at But, Boram, Dagua, and Wewak and dropped a combination of incendiary, parafrag and demolition bombs.136"
Note 136 reads: "136 Watson, Huon Campaign, 196-197. See also Kenney Reports, 276; and “How the Fifth Air Force Destroys Jap Planes on the Ground, 5."
OK, from this Notes format convention we need to look north for the first time this source was cited. And who the heck is this guy Watson? And we find "129 Richard L. Watson, Jr., Major, USA, “The Fifth Air Force in the Huon Peninsula Campaign, January to October 1943,” AAF Reference History #13, AAF Historical Office, Headquarters, AAF, (Maxwell AFB, Alabama: USAF/HRA, January 1946)"
Huh. So, Watson was a serving officer, and he wrote an official history of the campaign, and he did it in 1946 while it was fresh. But any swivel-servant could write such a thing using the New York Times as source, from his cozy office in D.C. Who was Major Watson, really?
Google provides. Insert the title of this work and behold! The entire piece is on-line.
The original, typed by hand and stamped with security classification is here:
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/AAFHS/AAFHS-113.pdf
But a much easier to read, edited version is here.
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/IV/
This is Volume IV of the massive, official, history of the Army Air Corps in WWII. Volume I is at
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/I/
"IN March 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt wrote to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget ordering each war agency to prepare "an accurate and objective account" of that agency's war experience. Soon after, the Army Air Forces began hiring professional historians so that its history could, in the words of Brigadier General Laurence Kuter, "be recorded while it is hot and that personnel be selected and an agency set up for a clear historian's job without axe to grind or defense to prepare." An Historical Division was established in Headquarters Army Air Forces under Air Intelligence, in September 1942, and the modern Air Force historical program began.
With the end of the war, Headquarters approved a plan for writing and publishing a seven-volume history. In December 1945, Lieutenant General Ira C. Eaker, Deputy Commander of Army Air Forces, asked the Chancellor of the University of Chicago to "assume the responsibility for the publication" of the history, stressing that it must "meet the highest academic standards." Lieutenant Colonel Wesley Frank Craven of New York University and Major James Lea Cate of the University of Chicago, both of whom had been assigned to the historical program, were selected to be editors of the volumes. Between 1948 and 1958 seven were published. With publication of the last, the editors wrote that the Air Force had "fulfilled in letter and spirit" the promise of access to documents and complete freedom of historical interpretation. Like all history, The Army Air Forces in World War II reflects the era when it was conceived, researched, and written. The strategic bombing campaigns received the primary emphasis, not only because of a widely-shared belief in bombardment's contribution
--iii--
to victory, but also because of its importance in establishing the United States Air Force as a military service independent of the Army."
In Volume I, and later in Volume IV, we see that Major Watson was indeed a real professor of history at Duke University (a very fine school.) He was part of the very large effort, ordered by the President of the United States in early 1942, to fully document the coming war. This mammoth effort was not completed until the late-1950s. But during the war Major Watson, who headed up the southwest Pacific region's efforts, worked for three years documenting, observing, writing. With full access to the players and the documents, including classified ones. This is all detailed in Volume I. It's fascinating stuff.
"But the authors, like most members of the wartime Army, were civilians in uniform rather than professional soldiers. In all cases the period of academic training and practice exceeded in length that of military indoctrination and service; the authors were citizens and taxpayers before, and after, their tour of military duty, and they have felt called on to write no official apologia. Service loyalties they undoubtedly carried with them in returning to their academic posts, but not to the degree that their critical faculties have been submerged. They have written as present scholars rather than as former Air Corps officers.
Of the individual contributors to this volume, the following biographical facts are pertinent. Maj. James L. Cate, as a member of the staff of the Historical Office, devoted his attention chiefly to the problems of strategic bombardment and after June 1944 served as historical officer of the Twentieth Air Force. miss Kathleen Williams' research and writing, done under the immediate direction of the chief of the Operational History Branch, ranged over varied fields of AAF organization and operation according to the immediate need of the moment.
Maj. Richard L. Watson for three years carried the main responsibility in the office for the Southwest Pacific; Maj. Kramer J. Rohfleisch held a similar responsibility for the remainder of the Pacific; and Maj. Herbert Weaver bore the responsibility for the China-Burma-India theater. Capt. William A. Goss served as historian with the Fourth Air Force and was subsequently brought into AAF Headquarters for study of continental air defenses. Lt. Arthur B. Ferguson divided his attention between antisubmarine operations and the Combined Bomber Offensive. Capt. John D. Carter served first as historian of the South Atlantic Wing, Air Transport Command, and after that at Headquarters, ATC. Capt. Alfred Goldberg, after working on the histories of the VIII Air Force Service Command and Air Service Command, USSTAF, was assigned to Headquarters, USSTAF."
So, what does Volume IV say about the raid in question? Well, if one reads that section it is immediately apparent that Major Gann did accurately summarize it in his thesis. His goal was argumentative, not merely descriptive as Major Watson's was, so Gann did not reproduce Watson's complete comments. But they are accurate. The first raid by heavy bombers was successful and important to the campaign over the succeeding days. A BDA WAS performed before the 0900 raid came in. How detailed Watson does not say; he does say there was no time to return film to Pt. Moresby, develop it, and disseminate to briefers before the 0900 raid took off about 0600. But there was a BDA.
This is the relevant portion of the document:
"Aerial photographs on 30 July had shown only nineteen light bombers on the airfield at But. Improvements on the drome, however, seemed to indicate its future use by heavy aircraft. Four days later, there were twenty fighters and several light and medium bombers at Wewak, eighteen light bombers and five fighters at But, and a total of fifty-six aircraft at Dagua. The build-up continued until on 13 August eight medium bombers, thirty-one light bombers, and sixty-nine f thirty-four light bombers, and twenty-three fighters at But and Dagua.62 General Whitehead now had at his disposal two heavy groups with sixty-four bombers in commission and two medium groups with fifty-eight B-25's having a fuel capacity equal to the round trip from Port Moresby.63 And on the afternoon of 16 August, final plans were made for the most decisive series of air strikes carried out by the Fifth Air Force since the Bismarck Sea action.
Eight squadrons of heavies would open the assault with night attacks on the four Wewak airdromes. After this preliminary softening, five squadrons of B-25 strafers, covered by a strong fighter escort, would follow at minimum altitude to bomb and strafe every plane still on the ground.64.
Between 2100 and midnight of 16 August, twelve B-17's and thirty-eight B-24's took off from Port Moresby. The weather was generally good, and all aircraft reached the target except for two B-24's which turned back because of mechanical difficulties. Shortly after midnight, the first heavy bombers crossed the target and from then until after 0300 the bombers divided their attention among the four Wewak dromes. Incendiaries carried by the leading planes were supposed to light the targets, but the timing was off and the incendiaries and frag clusters fell together. Searchlights proved annoying, antiaircraft fire was intense, and several night fighters attempted interception, but only three aircraft were lost and none apparently to the enemy fighters.65 Results are difficult to determine. Photographs of Wewak, Boram, and Dagua, taken early on the following morning and prior to the subsequent attacks, showed "at least 18 unserviceable" aircraft out of some 204 counted. It was certain only that the heavies had accomplished their primary mission--to keep the Japanese aircraft grounded for the next attack.
Even while the pictures were being shot, three squadrons of B-25'S made ready for the take-off at Dobodura and two more squadrons at Port Moresby. The Moresby-based planes, undertaking in their 500-mile flight to Wewak the deepest penetration by medium bombers into enemy-held New Guinea yet made, had trouble. Of the twenty-six B-25's taking off, only three reached the target. These three performed magnificently in their attack on Dagua. They scattered 105 x 23-pound parafrags which smashed at least seventeen aircraft on the ground, fired more than 5,000 rounds, and shot down one of fifteen intercepting Oscars, but the failure of the other planes to get through allowed But to go scot-free. Twenty-nine of the strafers from Dobodura (thirty-seven had taken off), however, dropped 786 parafrags and claimed 786 hits on Boram and Wewak. At Wewak, the 90th Squadron rather conservatively claimed about fifteen aircraft destroyed or damaged. The 8th Squadron announced that at Boram at least fifteen of forty to sixty aircraft had been totally destroyed and twenty-five to thirty left burning. The 13th Squadron, which had joined the 8th in the attack on Boram, reported that of seventy to eighty aircraft on the runway, "all [were] believed destroyed or severely damaged."66.
Except for one fighter attack, which the B-25's themselves broke up, Japanese resistance was limited to fairly heavy antiaircraft fire. The heavy bombers which had preceded the mediums undoubtedly should be credited in part, but the Fifth Air Force had also sent with the mediums fighter escort on a scale theretofore unknown in the Southwest Pacific. All six P-38 squadrons participated; on the early morning of 17 August, 99 of the 127 fighters actually in commission took off from Dobodura and Moresby to form the escort. Of these planes, fourteen turned back because of mechanical difficulties. The remainder, with the comforting knowledge of adequate refueling facilities at Tsili Tsili, completed what to them was an uneventful flight with "nil" interceptions.67"
What was Major Watson's source for the account of the first attack? Notes 64 and 65.
Note 64: "64. Account of Mission 228-G on 16 Aug. 1943,63d, 64th, 6ph, and 403d Bomb."
Note 65: "65. Ibid.; Form 34, 15-21 Aug. 1943, 63d, 64th, 6ph, 403d, 319th, 320th, 321st, and 400th Sqs."
What is a "Form 34"?
"At the center of the new Management Control stood the two offices of Organizational Planning and of Statistical Control. The former studied administrative procedures and prepared flow charts of AAF activity with a view to recommending necessary reforms or reorganizations; it also coordinated all administrative publications. Statistical Control undertook to consolidate and systematize all statistical reporting so as to provide for staff purposes information that was not only full but which facilitated comparative studies. For this last purpose, it was necessary that the data be based upon a uniform system of reporting. The methods employed are perhaps best suggested by the newly developed AAF Form 127, which became the basic report for statistical information on personnel. Required at regular intervals from all AAF units, this form reported all personnel both by military specialty and unit assignment. Prepared in multiple copies for transmission through channels, the report gave some assurance that all echelons of command would base their studies on the same statistics. By providing comparable data for every unit of the AAF, Form 127 greatly facilitated the preparation
--37--
of over-all analyses. Similarly, the daily inventory of aircraft (AAF Form 120) was used as a source of information for determining advance requirements as well as the most effective distribution of equipment on hand.
During the latter half of the war Statistical Control undertook through AAF Form 34--a report listing for each mission such items as the number of planes employed, the flying time, the bomb tonnage dropped, the total of ammunition and fuel consumed, and the losses sustained or inflicted--to replace fragmentary and uneven reports from combat theaters with uniform world-wide operational statistics. A special dividend for historians came at the end of hostilities in the Army Air Forces Statistical Digest, a publication of December 1945 which summarized in as accurate and complete a form as can be hoped for the statistical record of the war years.18"
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/VI/AAF-VI-2.html
Referring again to the above quoted material, we see that:
1) The first raid by the heavies succeeded in its main objective
2) Night fighters were aloft (JFBs take note)
3) There was night AA fire and it was significant
4) Incendiaries were dropped
5) "At least" 18 planes were knocked out on the ground. Whatever their number, in combination with fires and disruption to ground personnel, enemy opposition to the 0900 raid was low. Had the heavies not attacked at night, and the second raid had instead found a pristine set of four air bases, the results of the 0900 raids might have been very different.
I trust that this analysis satisfies you and any others here suspicious of Major Gann's academic efforts in 1992.
