Babes Updates Refineries and Supply

[Symon]

First off, all the numbers are from Goralski and Freeburg, “Oil and War”, and US Bureau of Mines, “20th Century Petroleum Statistics”. Note crude oil comes out to an average of around 7.14 barrels per Tonne (US barrels, metric ton) when you take into account the specific gravity range of SRA crudes.

Japanese refinery capacity was ~ 41,000,000 bbls per year in 1942

SRA – Balikpapan, Pladjoe, Soengei-Gerong, Tjepoe, Pangkalan-Brandan, Wonokromo, Kapoean, Lutong, et al; Total refinery throughput capacity, in 1941 was 7, 246,000 metric tons, i.e., 51,735,440 bbl. I have specific values for the Sumatra, Balikpapan, Brunei refineries, that total 43,600,000, so I only have to do allocations of 8,135,440 to the outliers. Not bad.

The following table is the average yearly crude production, in barrels per day, for Japan, Brunei, Burma and the DEI.

1941 / 5,455 / 18,005 / 21,266 / 147,134
1942 / 4,658 / 8,219 / 6,850 / 65,753
1943 / 4,836 / 12,329 / 2,740 / 132,312
1944 / 4,484 / 16,393 / 2,049 / 60,820
1945 / 4,260 / 5,753 / 1,986 / 20,822

Note Japan's domestic output had been above 7,000 barrels per day in 1939 and 1940. Also note the 1945 figures are for the year, so they are not a useful guide to the production to August 1945.

Also note that the Japanese did not bother much with the Burma fields, those being further away and more vulnerable. At best they supplied the local forces.

Japan's oil sources by year, 1) Crude oil imports, 2) refined imports, 3) domestic production, 4) Synthetics and substitutes, 5) totals, in average barrels per day

1938 / 50,422 / 38,477 / 6,753 / 912 / 96,564
1939 / 51,625 / 32,378 / 6,389 / 2,011 / 92,403
1940 / 60,411 / 41,398 / 5,652 / 3,984 / 111,445
1941 / 8,576 / 14,361 / 5,318 / 5,159 / 33,416
1942 / 22,318 / 6,515 / 4,630 / 7,345 / 40,808
1943 / 26,981 / 12,745 / 4,970 / 5,551 / 50,247
1944 / 4,496 / 9,334 / 4,342 / 5,693 / 23,865
1945 (Jan to Jun) / 0 / 0 / 4,432 / 4,874 / 9,306

As to damage of the oil facilities, there was minor damage at Palembang, more at Balikpapan, Sorengai-Gerong took until January 1943 to resume production; Lutong in north Borneo over 2 years. Basically by mid 1943, roughly 70% of the pre-war output had been restored. But even the primary sources are not clear as to whether this refers to oil field production, refinery production, or some amalgam of the two.

[witpqs]

Nice info. What the heck was causing Japan's domestic oil production to fall before the war began outside of China?

[Symon]

So it's wierd. You get 41M (raw) refinery cap in Japan and 51M (raw) refinery cap in the DEI. That's not anything like the 1030 IJ/1910 DEI refinery ratio in game. Gonna have to do some fancy dancing.[8D]
<snip>
Well, that was a wierd double post. Forum seems to be a bit unstable these days.

[spence]

What the heck was causing Japan's domestic oil production to fall before the war began outside of China?

Perhaps the wells were running dry? (I don't know)

[PaxMondo]

I know parts of the answers, but not necessarily the whole. IJ domestic production suffered from two issues during the war.
1. These were old fields and well pressures were steadily declining. Secondary/Tertiary recovery tactics now in common use (water/steam injection/fraccing) were not known technologies at that time.
2. Two of the fields in the north were damaged by earthquakes during the war years.

[witpqs]

ORIGINAL: PaxMondo

I know parts of the answers, but not necessarily the whole. IJ domestic production suffered from two issues during the war.
1. These were old fields and well pressures were steadily declining. Secondary/Tertiary recovery tactics now in common use (water/steam injection/fraccing) were not known technologies at that time.
2. Two of the fields in the north were damaged by earthquakes during the war years.

Thanks. I figured anything could (and probably did!) happen during the war, but the decline prior to the war was a bit surprising as I thought they would drill any place in the home islands that they could.