NATO's limited airdefence

[Tazak]

Starting this thread to help understand why NATO seems to be very limited on air defence rather than derail the airpower and helicopter threads.

First we need to look at the mindset of not just the NATO planners but the political budget planners, something the Soviets seem not to have to worry about.

Do a google search for "US Air and Ground Conventional Forces for NATO: Air Defense " and you'll find a PDF document dated March 1978 aimed at the US Congress budget planners in which the authors discuss NATO airdefences and the 'pact' threat, and outlines a number of options the US forces want to increase AD in Germany.
Why is this document important...defence budgets were often reviewed every 5 years looking ahead over the next 10 years, this document outlines the US/nato air defence doctrine during the period of 1978 presumably to 1988 and what budget options should be for 1978-1983.

Some key quotes
"Over 1,500 of the Pact inventory in Central Europe are either multirole fighters capable of ground attack or aircraft specifically designed for this mission. The Soviet Union also has deployed around 300 Mi-24 Hind attack helicopters, which some see as a serious threat to NATO tank forces."
"Compared to ground-based systems, aircraft can hit more distant targets and can be massed against a given portion of the front more quickly. Nevertheless, it is important to examine in detail the threat posed by Pact aircraft to NATO units near the front, because the Army plans to make substantial investments in all-weather air defense systems that are earmarked to be used there"
"The Germans, for example, have almost 3,000 such guns, or roughly one gun for every 115 personnel in their army during peacetime. The United States has around 100 anti-aircraft guns in the Central Region, or only about one gun for every 2,000 U.S. Army troops stationed there" - taking about AAA
"There are significant differences between U.S. and allied AA guns currently deployed iri Europe, aside from the inadequate numbers of U.S. systems"
"Purchase of 1,000 Rhein- metall 20 mm. guns, and development/procurement of a clear-weather 35 mm. gun, for savings against the Defense Department program after 1983"

Overall it talks about the air threat being from strike aircraft and the limited numbers/versions of all weather aircraft available to the soviets at the time, there is very little mention of helicopters outside of the quote above. it's not hard to imagine that pressure from the Airforce as well as major defence contractors like Boeing etc pushing down the route of "airpower will keep the skies clear". Other NATO member states were pursuing their own routes of air defence like Britain where AAA was phased out in favour of Rapier SAM being the mainstay of ground based defence systems, backed up with blowpipe for more local AD but the primary method of keeping the skies clear of soviet aircraft was the RAF.
I don't think that NATO viewed the helicopter threat as serious until reports came out of Afghanistan about the soviet use of the Hind gunship.

During Afghanistan invasion/occupation the soviets changed tactics in regards to its helicopter usage from a massed of gunships approaching at 300feet in the open to using NAPE tactics after losses from AAA and later stinger missiles, but Afghanistan terrain in many respects give good fields of view from the mountain tops to enable an area defence by AAA and SAM while much of Western Germany presents a more undulating terrain with large wooded areas which lend themselves better for NAPE tactics.

An additional good read is Tactical Air Defence which the statement "Following ten years of fighting in Vietnam, U.S. Army ground forces became accustomed to operating in a total air-superiority environment. This factor had the effect of deferring R&D efforts in the AD area in favor of more pressing concerns raised by the Vietnam conflict. Although the Soviet air threat was not forgotten, the numerically large but comparatively unsophisticated Soviet Air Force—de-emphasized in Soviet tactical considerations in favor of armor and artillery firepower--was not viewed as a sufficient threat to require an extensive U. S. battlefield AD network." goes a long way in explaining the limited AD within NATO

[loki100]

Interesting.

Related, and this may just reflect the UK. There was a lot of pressure to ensure adequate air defense assets in the UK and given a limited pool, and limited budgets, this often came up against the UK's NATO commitment to W Germany. In effect, there was a tendency to rob peter to pay paul and use notionally NATO assets for UK home defense.

More to the point, I think there is a classic case of decision framing here (sorry this is my academic topic). In effect, NATO had to make 3 factors fit together and did so by ignoring the contradictions.

They had a large and every expensive airforce. They knew that in a conventional war (unless the myth of REFORGER really worked), then the WP had effective superiority on the ground. They didn't want to be seen as a purely nuclear alliance (ie first use the second the Soviets attacked) due to the level of anti-nuclear movements in all W Europe.

So it suited to pretend that the fixed wing airforce would solve the problem. And, as a consequence, you didn't need more ground ADA as your airforce had superiority (I think you are right there was an almost wilfull ignorance of the Hinds).

Its akin to German planning for Barbarossa. They knew how bad the Russian winter would have been (many had served in the East in 1914-18 or trained in the USSR in the Weimar years). They knew they couldn't ship the needed winter clothing and fuel and ammunition. So they decided they could win in the Summer-Autumn and made all their estimates of the size of the Soviet forces fit exactly that parameter - so the decision made sense, but only by ignoring any evidence that didn't fit.

[Tazak]

Next we need to look at both NATO & WP air operations. Below are to links, one looking at soviet air and antiair operations, the other a view from "A top airpower analyst looks back at the greatest air war that never was.".

Soviet Air and Antiair Operations
How the West Would Have Won

Both are worth reading and consider that given the offensive nature of both sides the losses sustained would make air operations costly on both sides.

looking at the Soviet Air and Antiair operations under the 'Implications for NATO' heading is the statement "Two areas could improve NATO's chances to survive a Soviet air operation––modernized and more numerous ground-based air defenses, plus a surface-to-surface missile capability to suppress Warsaw Pact airfields"

Reading the 'How the west would have won' article however the author makes reference to "NATO forces fielded thousands of short-range surface-to-air missile batteries and guns in the forward area with longer-ranged Patriot, Hawk, and other SAMs farther in the rear" which is not what can be observed in game nor within the majority of TOE for combat units, however the author goes on to talk about 'friendly fire' in which he expresses aircrews concerns that AAA/SAM operators may not be able to maintain discipline. Is this comment an insight into NATO airforces wanting to limit ground based AD systems not directly under their control for fear of friendly fire (tin foil hat time).

[TheWombat_matrixforum]

All good stuff. History may play a role as well. During WWII, the US Army fielded enormous numbers of AAA systems and units, and most of them found very little employment in their intended roles. By late in the war, the AA troops were being reassigned to the Infantry, and AA guns being repurposed as AT weapons. So coming out of the war, which was a very formative experience for the US military, the lessons certainly did not reinforce the need for ground-based AA defenses.

During the postwar era, anti-aircraft efforts focused on strategic systems, designed to protect the USA against Soviet manned bombers, and on naval SAM systems, designed to protect carrier groups against mass air and missile attack. Lower level systems did exist--notably, HAWK and later Patriot--but these pretty much stopped at the Corps level in terms of ground forces. As noted above, tactical units were expected to operate with air cover and air superiority.

By the 1970s, when it was becoming clear to many that the SHORAD capability of our troops in Germany was pretty weak, there was no institutional support for this type of development, and no real reservoir of expertise--or contractors. Attempts to use the best of NATO tech--Gepard, Roland, Rapier, etc.--met with the "Not Invented Here" (or more accurately, "not funneling enough defense dollars to US contractors") argument. Local attempts to cobble something together led to things like the Sgt. York, one of the great boondoggles of the era, and the Army was left with stop-gaps like Vulcans and Chapparals (which, IIRC, are nothing more than Sidewinder AAMs on a tracked vehicle). The Army couldn't compete on the Hill with the Air Force fighter mafia, which assured all and sundry that they had air defense well in hand. After all, fighter jets were a hell of a lot sexier--and expensive--than ground based AAA.

Truth be told, I don't think very many people really thought a full-on Pact invasion of the West was that likely. There simply was no end-game payoff for the USSR. The most likely conditions for an attack would have evolved from a crisis that got out of hand, or a miscalculated bluff, rather than a planned political gamble. In those conditions, it was a lot more cost-effective to have a marginally credible conventional deterrent backed by a much more robust and scarier nuclear deterrent, than it was to spend even more money making sure a true conventional defense was really viable.

[Rob322]

If anyone is interested, there's a PDF out there titled "Military Planning for European Theatre Conflict During the Cold War." It's a 200+ page transcript of a round table discussion involving former NATO and Warsaw Pact officers, academics and diplomats on how they would've fought WW3. It's fascinating. I bring this up here because one US army officer was remembering a chat he had with US divisional commanders in the US who would reinforce Germany in war and their concerns about receiving proper air cover. He bluntly told them the plan for most multi role NATO aircraft (F-16s) would be to conserve them for nuclear release contingencies.

[Oberst_Klink]

ORIGINAL: Rob322

If anyone is interested, there's a PDF out there titled "Military Planning for European Theatre Conflict During the Cold War." It's a 200+ page transcript of a round table discussion involving former NATO and Warsaw Pact officers, academics and diplomats on how they would've fought WW3. It's fascinating. I bring this up here because one US army officer was remembering a chat he had with US divisional commanders in the US who would reinforce Germany in war and their concerns about receiving proper air cover. He bluntly told them the plan for most multi role NATO aircraft (F-16s) would be to conserve them for nuclear release contingencies.

Military Planning for European Theatre Conflict During the Cold War

I presume Rob means this one:

http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/ZB-79.pdf

Klink, Oberst

[Rob322]

Oberst, yes! I have it downloaded and forgot the link.

[Mad Russian]

The issue I see with US ADA in the game is that sometimes it doesn't fire. Not at all. Soviet helo's can fly right next to a Vulcan and they don't fire. Chapparal's not so much.

Gepards, Roland's, Rapiers. They shoot fine. They don't always hit good but they shoot fine. For whatever reason I see my Vulcan crews not even firing at times. That's really frustrating when the Hinds are kicking you while you're down. [:@]

Good Hunting.

MR

[Rob322]

That's when the M1A1 crews looses a HEAT round next to the Vulcan to "encourage" them. [;)]

[Kommissar]

Well that certainly answers my question about inadequacy of NATO/US air defense in the helo thread. Basically, it's a list of numerous reasons from money concerns to bureaucratic politics. If NATO didn't really consider Soviet helos as a huge concern until Afghanistan, that would be really surprising. In comparison, Soviet military writings seems to be rather focused on the effects of both helos and ICMs and their potentials on the battlefield, almost like a mini revolution in military affairs. Their combined effects on massed armored formations were of great concern to them.

[Mark Florio]

Just a note on air-defense for NATO. Each US tank is equipped with the M2 .50, which is pretty effective against helo's especially if they are moving above a tree line. We also trained in simulators to fire sabot at Helo's that appear over a horizon. With the preponderance of .50's on all vehicles and the Bradley .25mm there was a lot of organic ability to knock down Hind's. I do agree that the game models the Vulcan's to be very passive for some reason. The Hinds were better at fast attack runs using several gunships at once. They are not so great at hovering and acquiring targets through optics. The Apache's were more like snipers and the Hinds more like big charging tanks in the sky. Nonetheless, US doctrine was not as heavy on AAA because of the organic ability to defend against Helo's. Fast movers are another matter and that is where the Stinger came in.

[Mad Russian]

I think there are a few reasons the WP helicopter threat was downplayed.

1) The Americans started helicopter use in combat at a large scale. So, obviously they were the ones that knew how to do it. Everybody else was at least one level below that. Considering the US vs USSR bias that would put the Soviets at least three levels below them. Nothing to worry about.

2) After Vietnam US defense spending was cut. The ADA was one area that was actually needing upgraded when those cuts hit. Not to mention the fact that the Sgt. York ADA system proved to be a complete failure at very high cost. We would soldier on with what we had. It was good enough for what the WP could throw at us anyway. Sgt. York was just looking down the road to the future. This was totally incorrect and more than likely face saving BS.

3) There was a time when it was thought that the lower level combat units could defend themselves. With weapons like the Stinger, AA MG's on tanks/APC's/IFV's. This had been proven out in Afghanistan over and over right? Wrong. Afghanistan is nothing like North Western Europe.

4) By the time the issue was actually starting to get serious attention would have been the time frame covered in the game. This doesn't help that you are ready to finally upgrade equipment levels then. Too late.

Good Hunting.

MR

[CaptCarnage]

ORIGINAL: Oberst_Klink

ORIGINAL: Rob322

If anyone is interested, there's a PDF out there titled "Military Planning for European Theatre Conflict During the Cold War." It's a 200+ page transcript of a round table discussion involving former NATO and Warsaw Pact officers, academics and diplomats on how they would've fought WW3. It's fascinating. I bring this up here because one US army officer was remembering a chat he had with US divisional commanders in the US who would reinforce Germany in war and their concerns about receiving proper air cover. He bluntly told them the plan for most multi role NATO aircraft (F-16s) would be to conserve them for nuclear release contingencies.

Military Planning for European Theatre Conflict During the Cold War

I presume Rob means this one:

http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/ZB-79.pdf

Klink, Oberst

Afyer seeing your link I read the document entirely. It is surely one of the most interesting things I have read in ages! Thanks!

[pzgndr]

ORIGINAL: Rob322
If anyone is interested, there's a PDF out there titled "Military Planning for European Theatre Conflict During the Cold War."

Very insightful, thank you. While both sides may not have intended for offensive operations, Hackett's book "The Third World War: August 1985" offered a plausible scenario where events in the Middle East may have prompted a European conflict. Once things start spiralling out of control, it's anyone's guess how plans would have changed. That was my nagging concern while I was there 87-90.

ORIGINAL: Mad Russian
I think there are a few reasons the WP helicopter threat was downplayed.

With the Soviets fighting in Afghanistan throughout the 1980's, their helicopter doctrine was pretty well understood and the threat recognized. My gripe about the Soviet helicopters in this game (at least for AI) is how they seem to used for movement-to-contact missions in advance of lead ground elements and are able to destroy whole units in stationary covered positions. That's a bit unbelievable. They would more likely be used as an aerial attack force or counter-attack force once a situation develops on the ground. Then we can haggle about air defense...

[Rob322]

ORIGINAL: pzgndr

Very insightful, thank you. While both sides may not have intended for offensive operations, Hackett's book "The Third World War: August 1985" offered a plausible scenario where events in the Middle East may have prompted a European conflict. Once things start spiralling out of control, it's anyone's guess how plans would have changed. That was my nagging concern while I was there 87-90.

Mine too. I distrusted the demonizing propaganda from both sides during this period and assumed neither alliance was simply going to attack the other unless they felt that they had no other choice or that outside events took over. The risks exceeded the rewards for both sides in such a conflict but there were several times outside concerns (Cuba 62, Middle East 73 and the issues in late 1983) almost overwhelmed things.