ORIGINAL: Ol Choctaw
Go back and look at Big Bethel. That was the use of strong fortifications before Bull Run.
It was the decision of the commander how he fought. Entrenchments are limited in the early years even more than they need be. Both armies lacked doctrine as to how to fight. Commanders learned on the job. New commanders made the same mistakes as those before them.
Commanders facing steep odds were either going to fight behind field works or withdraw. Armies of equal numbers might maneuver to gain advantage, as at bull run, but you don’t find it other wise.
At Pea Ridge the Union was in a very strong fortified position. The Confederate forces tried to gain advantage by deploying behind the enemy. This failed and they still faced a foe that was in strong defensive positions, Even though they outnumbered the enemy by around 3:2 or better, they lost.
The Confederate Forts at Island 10, Ft Pillow, Ft. Henry, & Ft. Donelson were hasty field works. Ft. Henry was poorly sited and fell at once to naval bombardment. Ft. Donelson also had extensive entrenchments. Its quick fall was due to the demoralization of the leadership rather than the weakness of the position.
The use of entrenchments is still the commanders decision, be it Virginia in 61 or Vicksburg in 63.
If the player is outnumbered or cautious then fighting from fortifications is justified.
I would agree there is no way to outflank entrenchments and reduce there level. At least some commanders need such an ability.
I am not one who used militia to entrench everything but do be advised, historically they did and the Union complained bitterly that the whole south was on fort after another. If you are not fighting on equal terms you should not expect the enemy to meet you in the open.
Sherman’s Atlanta Campaign was not going very quickly until Davis replaced Johnston with Hood. The new commander thought he could beat the Union in field. The new commander had not learned the lessons of the previous one.
Most of the tactics you cite are just that, tactics. This is a grand strategy game and so battlefield tactics are very limited. Most of it is very abstract.
It is not that I object to the ideas, I just think you might need a different engine or a different game focus to get what you are looking for.
Of course there were such frontal assaults, and they proved quickly enough that this wasn't the way to do it. But come on you can't deny that between 61 and late 63, almost all the big battles so manouvering from both sides, not assaulting head on a defensive position.
In game this would be a failed roll : a bad enough leader, etc and boom you get an offensive force impaling itself on the defensive position, but for most of the time it wasn't the case. fighting from entrenchments is of course preferable, but the whole point is that it was hard to pull off !
Until late in the war in Virginia, when Grant saw he had to go sort of head on (and even so the Overland campaign is full of flank marches), the different campaign always consisted of the offense trying to manouver to get the defense to leave its positions.
Fighting from defensive positions could prove a deadly mistake : Fort Donelson proved clearly that letting one self be turned by refusing to leave good defensive positions could be a deadly mistake. Those 15 000 men were sorely missed by A.S. Johnston in 62. As you point out Donelson isn't a siege per se, as in it isn't a fortress. It is the encercling and defeating of a small army which refuse to manouver to escape because it didn't want to leave its positions...
Again, all I am trying to say is that the approach in game is very static and encourages entrenchment spamming in a ahistorical way, not because militias weren't used to dig, but because in game it means that a whole province is dug in, and almost a whole state in the case of Virginia.
A more dynamic approach by the engine, not getting the player bogged in to many detais, but actually the engine dealing with it himself, would make for a better game, that is all.
EDIT : Big Bethel (although a very small battle really) and Fort Donelson are both case in points : They showed fairly early the dual stupidity of : assaulting a well defended position head on and of staying put in a good defensive position while letting one be turned and out manouvered by the ennemy.
The way the game is modelled, everytime an army in offensive stance enters a province where there is a force in defensive stance and entrenched, it emulates a head on attack on that position. it is just wrong. For all the big battles of the war in Virginia (including Fredericksburg) until the Overland campaign (included for most), there was big manouvering beforehand to force the defense to give battle in less favourable terms. This is just the very essence of this war !
And last but no least, to say that Sherman's advance against Johnston was slow is untrue, he outmanouvered him repeatedly, starting in early may at the border of Tennessee and by late june he was almost at the doors of Atlanta ! That Hood bled his army to destruction is true, but that Johnston let himself be repeatedly pushed back because he refused to aggressively try to stop Sherman and let himself be flanked repeatedly is also true. Trading space for time is part of war, but it you give space too quickly, you put yourself in trouble.. Johnston's leading of that campaign was flawed to say the least.
Adieu Ô Dieu odieux... signé Adam
