Well, nevertheless I've quick translated that informative post for interested people to see:
The official in charge for fuel matters in the OKH, Major Pollex, warned numerous times during the planning of "Fall Blau" that with the fuel provided the success of the offensive could be precluded with mathematical certainty (cmp. Wagner, 1977, p.219). [...] The Quartermaster-general Wagner also had concerns regarding the transportation. [...]
Already seven days after the beginning of Blau (4th July 1942) XXXX. Panzer Corps was so restricted by fuel shortages, that only parts of the corps were able to attack in order to attempt the encirclement of the Soviet forces. Four days later the leading elements of 4th Panzer Army had to halt at the Tikhaya Sozna for the same reason. Part of the reason for LSSAH's withdrawal was the doubt that the Germans could guarantee its mobility due to fuel shortages (cmp. Krumpelt, 1968, p.205). After the offensive was split up in late July the Caucasus forces had to require transportation space from Army Group B. Due to this measure alone the entire 6th Army lost its mobility for six full days in July (cmp. Wegner, 1990, p.892). So only a short time into Blau fuel shortages were a constant companion of the German forces and not only restricted freedom of operations, but also gave the Soviets valuable time. Therefore the Red Army was not only able to detach themselves from the Wehrmacht, but also strengthen defensive lines and deliver reinforcements to the front.
The fuel shortages were not only due to the problem of the initial provision of fuel, but also due to transportation.
The major rail lines in the South of the Soviet Union all converged at the bottle neck of Rostov and the lines towards Stalingrad and Caucasus were not built up very well. They were mostly single track and moreover left with significant damages needing repairs. In addition personnel and material shortages significantly reduced the performance of the German rail system. The Germans only reached 50% of the calculated capacity (cmp. Doerr, 1955, p.30). Therefore the Germans had to resupply their troops by air which provided a certain lift, but didn't correct the problem itself. The chief of transportation of the Wehrmacht, General Gercke, was asked for his opinion about the effects of the splitting of the offensive on the transportation system. His verdict was very explicit: a simultaneous supply of both spearheads was impossible. The available vehicle transportation space was not sufficient to compensate the efficiency drop of the rail system. Therefore he advised against the splitting of the offensive (cmp. Bork, 1953, p.32).
Initially 11th Army was to cross the Straits of Kerch after conclusion of the battles on the Crimea and support the drive into the Caucasus. Yet a reason for the cancellation of this operation was the capacity overload of the rail network (cmp. Doerr, 1955, p. 31).
How terrible the logistical situation was, is reflected in the fact that in the course of the offensive the trains were backed up to Silesia. That's around 2000 kilometres to the west (cmp. Philippi; Heim, 1962, p.163). Over 1.000 trains were affected by these hold-ups, a record number at that time (cmp. Rhode, 1971, p.158). The train lines beyond Rostov meanwhile had a capacity of 12 trains per day (cmp. Bork, 1953, p.33).
General Doerr, during Blau Chief of Staff of LII. AK, came to the conclusion that the hold-ups of the fuel supply alone was enough to wreck the campaign (cmp. Doerr, 1955, p.31).
The catastrophic supply situation led to Major Weinknecht, quartermaster of Army Group B at that time, demanding the withdrawal of 6th Army and 3rd Rumanian Army to a position around Don - Donets. His concerns were rebutted and a month later he was relieved of duty (cmp. Krumpelt, 1968, p. 206).
Especially problematic in all this is, that already in 1941 the demands of the logistical planners to adjust the operations to the capabilities of the supply system was ignored. A year later the Germans till hadn't learned out of this experience and the consequence were borne by the ordinary soldiers.
Literature:
Bork, Max: Comments on Russian Railroads an Highways, USAREUR, 1953
Doerr, Hans: Der Feldzug nach Stalingrad, Frankfurt/Main 1955
Halder, Franz: Kriegstagebuch. Tägliche Aufzeichnungen des Chefs des Generalstabes des Heeres 1939-1942. Hrsg. v. Arbeitskreis für Wehrforschung. Bearb. v. Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, Band III, 1964
Hartmann, Christian: Halder. Generalstabschef Hitlers 1938-1942, Paderborn 2010
Krumpelt, Ihno: Das Material und die Kriegführung, Frankfurt/Main 1968
Philippi, Alfred; Heim, Ferdinand: Der Feldzug gegen Sowjetrussland 1941 bis 1945 - ein operativer Überblick, Stuttgart 1962
Rhode, Horst: Das deutsche Wehrmachttransportwesen im Zweiten Weltkrieg, Stuttgart 1971
Wagner, Elisabeth: Meine Erlebnisse nach dem 20. Juli 1944. Die Zeit von Juli 1944 bis September 1945, in Erinnerung an den Generalquartiermeister Eduard Wagner. München 1977
Wegner, Bernd: Hitlers zweiter Feldzug. Militärische Konzeption und strategische Grundlagen, in: Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Band 6, S. 761-1102
