Degrees of Scuttleing

[TIMJOT]

To the Alpha testers

Since we can scuttle ships in UV, I assume we will be able to also in WitP. My question is. Will we able to re-float scuttled ships in WitP and if so shouldnt there be degrees of scuttleing? It occurs to me that all scuttleing is not equal. For instance scuttleing a military ship often entailed detonateing explosive charges which not only sunk the ship but also wrecked it. For most merchant vessels however scuttleing more often than not simply meant opening the sea cocks and flooding the vessel.

I only ask because of the 65 allied merhant ships I can confirm as being scuttled between Dec 7, 1941 thru March 9th, 1942; Forty were eventually re-floated and put into service by Japan. That's a significant number of vessels and would seem to indicate that the ability to re-float merchant vessels at least is warranted.

Any hints if something like this will be modeled in the game?

Thanks

[Nikademus]

At this stage, the Alpha treats scuttling the same as UV does. Too early to say whether or not this will be modified in light of more immediate issues. Speaking strictly for myself, i would like to see at least Pearl Harbor treated as a special case due to both the shallowness of the harbor coupled with the fact that it was also a major shipyard. Never liked how in PacWar any ship "sunk" at Pearl was lost for the entire game.

[TIMJOT]

Yeah I agree, but would include any ships scuttled in ports to at least have a chance to be refloated since ships were refloated not only at Peal, but also Hong Kong, Shanghai, Singapore, Soerebaya, Batavia, Tjlaptapt and Manila. I am refering to scuttleing though. Ships sunk by enemy action probably should only have a chance to be refloated if in major ports like Pearl, Singapore, Brisbane, SF, Yokahama, Kure ect....


Thanks for the insight:)

[Snigbert]

I highly doubt various degrees of scuttling will be in the game, in light of the coding time it would take and the list of higher priority features. I think it more likely that they would simply add ships to the Japanese reinforcement schedule to reflect ships that would be captured/refloated and renamed.

[Yamamoto]

Originally posted by Snigbert
I think it more likely that they would simply add ships to the Japanese reinforcement schedule to reflect ships that would be captured/refloated and renamed.

That does seem like the simplest way to go. We want to keep things simple wherever possible to reduce the chance of introducing bugs into the code.

Can you imagine a bug in the re-floating code where ANY ship sunk had a chance of turring up on the reinforcement track a few months later? I can just see the threads complaining about "Zombie" ships comming back from the dead.

Yamamoto

[TIMJOT]

Agreed, it probably is the most workable if not ideal method. It has the disadvantage of giving the Japanese player something for nothing and will ultimately result in many more merchants ships in the pacific than was historical. It does have the advantage of somewhat negateing the effects of an allied player unrealistically withdrawing his whole merchant marine from the western pac on turn one.

I would suggest that the reinforcements be at least tied to the capture of particular ports like Hong Kong, Manila, Singapore ect.....

[mdiehl]

In other words, hard-coding the merchant captures is the most appropriate plan?

[TIMJOT]

Originally posted by mdiehl
In other words, hard-coding the merchant captures is the most appropriate plan?

Yes, if re-floatation and capture are not going to be modeled.

[Snigbert]

It's hard to imagine the Japanese player screwing up so badly that he doesn't capture Hong kong, Manila and Singapore.

[mdiehl]

If they're hard coded, I don't think the Jpn player should get the merchant unless he matches or beats the historic timetable for conquest of HK, Singapore, the PI and Indonesia.

[TIMJOT]

Originally posted by mdiehl
If they're hard coded, I don't think the Jpn player should get the merchant unless he matches or beats the historic timetable for conquest of HK, Singapore, the PI and Indonesia.

I don't think it should be so cut and dry as that. It isnt as though Hong Kong being captured on the Dec. 26th instead of the Christmas, would have made much difference in the amount of ships scuttled and eventually refloated in that port. Perhaps for every day past the historic timetable ships are subtracted from the reinforcement pool and for everyday ahead of the historic schedule ships are added to the pool.

[mdiehl]

If HK holds out until, say, December 27, because the Jpns player knows that he can take this little gem any time he wants and contributes the historic forces to some other campaign, I think all the ships in HK should be counted among the escaped or presumed lost at sea or more thoroughly destroyed. In all events, completely unaccessible to the Jpn player.

[Yamamoto]

Originally posted by TIMJOT
Perhaps for every day past the historic timetable ships are subtracted from the reinforcement pool and for everyday ahead of the historic schedule ships are added to the pool.

Yes, that sounds good. Perhaps add 5% more ships for each day the port is captured early (to a maximum of 200%) and subtract 5% for each day the port is captured later than historical.

Yamamoto

[TIMJOT]

Originally posted by mdiehl
If HK holds out until, say, December 27, because the Jpns player knows that he can take this little gem any time he wants and contributes the historic forces to some other campaign, I think all the ships in HK should be counted among the escaped or presumed lost at sea or more thoroughly destroyed. In all events, completely unaccessible to the Jpn player.

Two days and its all or nothing? Whats wrong with a sliding scale; plus or minus? It gives the Japanese incentive to capture the ports as quickly as possible while giving the allied player incentive to hold out as long as possible.

[mdiehl]

Let's get real here. The Allies have plenty of incentive to hold out as long as possible, since it delays Jpns advance. But if we were playing PW, there would be zero chance of affecting any sort of delay in the conquest of HK, or the Phillippines or Singapore should the Jpn player throw the histiorical amount of effort into the job. Indeed, PW would allow the Japanese player to simultaneously attack almost everywhere at once, and delay some major offensives in areas that were historically "tough nuts" (like the PI) in order to, for example, sieze the entire Solomons chain, and continue through NC and Fiji. Totally unrealistic of course but the capacity is there.

So, yeah, at the beginning of the war when the Allies have no assets and when the staring disposition of all Allied units is known, any ahistorical delay should penalize the Japanese player.

[TIMJOT]

Originally posted by mdiehl
Let's get real here. The Allies have plenty of incentive to hold out as long as possible, since it delays Jpns advance. But if we were playing PW, there would be zero chance of affecting any sort of delay in the conquest of HK, or the Phillippines or Singapore should the Jpn player throw the histiorical amount of effort into the job. Indeed, PW would allow the Japanese player to simultaneously attack almost everywhere at once, and delay some major offensives in areas that were historically "tough nuts" (like the PI) in order to, for example, sieze the entire Solomons chain, and continue through NC and Fiji. Totally unrealistic of course but the capacity is there.

So, yeah, at the beginning of the war when the Allies have no assets and when the staring disposition of all Allied units is known, any ahistorical delay should penalize the Japanese player.

Well we are not talking PacWar, we are talking WitP. Frankly if WitP is that unbalanced then I will be very disapointed. I for one do not think the historical timetable should be the default, when you consider that it was completed; for the most part weeks if not months ahead of schedlule (exceptions PI, Wake..). IMHO a properly modeled game should mean only very good players should be able to duplicate the Japanese historic completion of the campaign. An exceptional player should have a chance to do marginally better and an average player should be able to do it within the planed timetable.

Mdiehl, this is a NEW game. I thought we were discussing how we feel it SHOULD be. Not what you think what the game WILL be based on your passed expirences with a decade old game. That being said if the game is balanced to your satisfaction wouldnt a sliding scale be appropriate?

[mdiehl]

I for one do not think the historical timetable should be the default, when you consider that it was completed; for the most part weeks if not months ahead of schedlule (exceptions PI, Wake..). IMHO a properly modeled game should mean only very good players should be able to duplicate the Japanese historic completion of the campaign. An exceptional player should have a chance to do marginally better and an average player should be able to do it within the planed timetable.

Well, we seem not to agree on this one either. But look, we're talking about captures that happened in a historical context. If the context is ahistorical I think it follows that the captures do not necessarily occur. Also, I think setting the standards against the Japanes op planning is an extremely poor idea. Japanese op planning was adequate, and in some cases (Singapore) they did for example succeed much faster than anticipated. In the PI they performed much worse than anticipated. IN some campaigns, like the Midway and Wake campaigns, their op planning was unrealistic (in both cases imagining easy victories). So were one to judge against historical planning, the Allies should score huge bonus VPs for historical performance at Midway, Wake, and the PI.

Mdiehl, this is a NEW game. We are discussing how we feel it SHOULD be. Not what you think what the game WILL be based on your passed expirences with a decade old game. That being said if the game is balanced to your satisfaction wouldnt a sliding scale be appropriate?

We can't divorce the design from its context (it is a 3rd gen version of PW as UV is a 2nd generation derived campaign game based heavily on PW), nor from its designers (who've made numerous errors in modeling fairly abstract concepts concerning "experience" how aircraft combat each other and so forth).

I'm not sure what is meant by "balanced." A sliding scale of VPs for timely capture of objectives seems appropriate, but IMO the "neutral" point on the scale should be set at duplicating Jpns historical performance. Slower than historical performance should benefit the Allies. Faster than historical benefit the Jpn player. That gives some reward to the Allies for successfully resisting a little when, for example, the otherwise smart thing to do with Asiatic fleet and USAFFE is to get the hell out of Dodge.

[TIMJOT]

Originally posted by mdiehl
Well, we seem not to agree on this one either. But look, we're talking about captures that happened in a historical context. If the context is ahistorical I think it follows that the captures do not necessarily occur. Also, I think setting the standards against the Japanes op planning is an extremely poor idea. Japanese op planning was adequate, and in some cases (Singapore) they did for example succeed much faster than anticipated. In the PI they performed much worse than anticipated. IN some campaigns, like the Midway and Wake campaigns, their op planning was unrealistic (in both cases imagining easy victories). So were one to judge against historical planning, the Allies should score huge bonus VPs for historical performance at Midway, Wake, and the PI.

Yes, we are talking about captures in the historical context. Thats exactly why the all or nothing method you suggested is too ambiguous. For example; say a player captures Shanghai, Hong Kong, Manila and Singapore all ahead of the historical schedule, but fail to take all the Java ports before the historical end of the campaign. The Japanese player would get nothing? How does that adequately model the captures and scuttleing of all those ships captured in those other ports? How does it follow that those previous captures do not occure? Not to mention the two dozen or so ships captured on the first 2 days of the war.

RE: Standards; I am not suggesting that op plans should be used as a standard for VPs at all. I merely suggested that in my opinion, a game that makes it *easy* for a Japanese player to duplicate the historical success is improperly balanced. IMO, its hard to imagine the Japanese doing much better than the historical, but is easy to see; given a little less luck along with less fumbleing and indeciveness on the part of the allies; that they could have done not as well.

RE: The PI: Yes it was optimistic, but actually the main reason it fell behind schedule, was the unexpected early collapse of the Brits in Malaya, resulted in a change in the op plan, that caused the much earlier redeployment of Homma's best troops to the NEI. The main reason for the PI campaign from the Japanese perspective was to eliminate it as an offensive threat and making it imcapable of interfering with the southern ops. That part a least was completed on schedule.

BTW, what do you consider the *historical* end of the campaign. March 9th 1942 the Fall of Java or May 6th the Fall of Corredore?

[mdiehl]

For example; say a player captures Shanghai, Hong Kong, Manila and Singapore all ahead of the historical schedule, but fail to take all the Java ports before the historical end of the campaign. The Japanese player would get nothing?

Ah. In the words of Pres Bush "You misunderestimate me." I was not advocating all or nothing. Had in mind something akin to a historical map of captured vessels by port. If the port's capture is delayed beyond historical timetable (say, 10% delay), the ships in that port put to sea. Or, alternatively, there is a radom check for each ship to exit port based on the current delay vis historical schedule. Ships that so exit are presumed to have escaped and evaded.

Not to mention the two dozen or so ships captured on the first 2 days of the war.

If the Jpns player elects to begin his campaign elsewhere, for example, with landings at Midway (if modeled correctly the ambguity ino at-start forces at Midway would allow the US to set up substantial forces there, and the IJN player would therefore have to expect to deploy significantforces to capture that objective, and therfore use less force in the Malaya, PI, Indonesian Barrier), ships in the Malaya, PI, Indonesia barrier are highly likely to escape.

I merely suggested that in my opinion, a game that makes it *easy* for a Japanese player to duplicate the historical success is improperly balanced. IMO, its hard to imagine the Japanese doing much better than the historical, but is easy to see; given a little less luck along with less fumbleing and indeciveness on the part of the allies; that they could have done not as well.

I understand what you are saying. I disagree. The Jpn player has complete knowledge of the disposition of Allied forces at start and has also complete historical knowledge that the Malaya forces, for example, will substantially underperform, and that his initial raids on Clark and PH will be a substantial success. It's almost hard coded in the sense that these forces are given initial combat/exp/morale values that are quite low. Knowing this, the Jpn player may easily aspire to conquer a much broader region at a much faster pace than historically. This was easily done in PW, for example. So, unless the Allies are given a completely optional at-start set up and there is some sort of secret VP modifier by which the Allies can elect, for example, to have the Malay forces at full strength, high morale, and better deployment (thereby throwing real historical ambiguity into the Jpn player's op planning), I see no need to make the job "easy" for the Japanese. Certainly it should be much, much more challenging than the ease of conquest in PW. IMO it should be challenging for the Jpns player to make the historical conquests, and failure to accomplish these should have adverse consquences for the Jpn player, and beneficial consequences for the Allied player. That way there is an incentive for the Japanese player to duplicate historical success and for the Allied player to offer resistence.

Yes it was optimistic, but actually the main reason it fell behind schedule, was the unexpected early collapse of the Brits in Malaya, resulted in a change in the op plan, that caused the much earlier redeployment of Homma's best troops to the NEI.

Homma's troops would have suffered just as badly at the hands of USAFFE in the PI during January and February as any others. The Japanese were decisively beaten, tactically speaking, by superior firepower and morale in January and February in the PI, despite the many blunders committed by USAFFE. The only success came after the strategic effects of a prolonged siege. If Jpns player delays the start of the PI campaign by even a week, the likelihood should be protracted, serious and effective resistence throughout 1942 in the PI.

BTW, what do you consider the *historical* end of the campaign. March 9th 1942 the Fall of Java or May 6th the Fall of Corredore?

For the PI, the capture of Corregidor. Unless that is done, any Allied ships in Manila that are capable of making way at good speed can escape. Likewise, any ships scuttled or abandoned in Manila are unavailable to the Japanese for repair or immediate use.

[wpurdom]

"For the PI, the capture of Corregidor. Unless that is done, any Allied ships in Manila that are capable of making way at good speed can escape. Likewise, any ships scuttled or abandoned in Manila are unavailable to the Japanese for repair or immediate use."

Surely you don't mean that! Allied ships can't remain in Manila past the fall of the city and even then their chances of escape aren't great. I suspect you're right that until Corregidor falls they can't actually repair anything - did they at Manila anyway? - but whatever is there when Manila is secured is eventually going to be available.