Degrees of Scuttleing
Moderators: Joel Billings, wdolson, Don Bowen, mogami
I did not say anything about the fall of Manila. Only that the Japanese could not prevent the escape of ships from Manila without holding Corregidor or else sinking them. If the Japanese take Manila, and there are ships in port, if the ships have steam up, they're likely to escape or else require sinking by aircraft or gunfire.
Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.
Didn't we have this conversation already?
Didn't we have this conversation already?
[QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl
Ah. In the words of Pres Bush "You misunderestimate me." I was not advocating all or nothing. Had in mind something akin to a historical map of captured vessels by port. If the port's capture is delayed beyond historical timetable (say, 10% delay), the ships in that port put to sea. Or, alternatively, there is a radom check for each ship to exit port based on the current delay vis historical schedule. Ships that so exit are presumed to have escaped and evaded.
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Forgive me if I misunderstood, but it does seem like you're hedging at bit now with the 10% delay range and the random checks. In any case, the problem with requireing individual port captures to specific historical dates is that it in effect mandates the player to follow the exact order of historical conquest. If captureing Hong Kong at later date than historical results in less ships captured in that port. Then conversely shouldnt the capture of say Soerebaya at an earlier date result in more ships captured in said port. Regardless of the order of capture. The aggregate amount of ships captured shouldnt change much as long as they are all captured by March 9th. If captured by that date they should get the historic number added to the reinforcement pool. Ships should be subtracted everyday after that date and added for everyday before that date.
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I understand what you are saying. I disagree. The Jpn player has complete knowledge of the disposition of Allied forces at start and has also complete historical knowledge that the Malaya forces, for example, will substantially underperform, and that his initial raids on Clark and PH will be a substantial success. It's almost hard coded in the sense that these forces are given initial combat/exp/morale values that are quite low. Knowing this, the Jpn player may easily aspire to conquer a much broader region at a much faster pace than historically. This was easily done in PW, for example.
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Actually you might be suprised on just how well appraised the Japanese were of the exact dispositions and number of forces in both the PI and Malaya. So this foreknowlede isnt really as unhistorical advantage as you might think. Besides it can also be expected that an allied player will not make the same historical mistakes. For example not trying to defend the whole Malaya penesular but instead withdrawing all forces immediately into Singapore probably means that port will hold out longer than historically.
Ah. In the words of Pres Bush "You misunderestimate me." I was not advocating all or nothing. Had in mind something akin to a historical map of captured vessels by port. If the port's capture is delayed beyond historical timetable (say, 10% delay), the ships in that port put to sea. Or, alternatively, there is a radom check for each ship to exit port based on the current delay vis historical schedule. Ships that so exit are presumed to have escaped and evaded.
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Forgive me if I misunderstood, but it does seem like you're hedging at bit now with the 10% delay range and the random checks. In any case, the problem with requireing individual port captures to specific historical dates is that it in effect mandates the player to follow the exact order of historical conquest. If captureing Hong Kong at later date than historical results in less ships captured in that port. Then conversely shouldnt the capture of say Soerebaya at an earlier date result in more ships captured in said port. Regardless of the order of capture. The aggregate amount of ships captured shouldnt change much as long as they are all captured by March 9th. If captured by that date they should get the historic number added to the reinforcement pool. Ships should be subtracted everyday after that date and added for everyday before that date.
(QUOTE)
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I understand what you are saying. I disagree. The Jpn player has complete knowledge of the disposition of Allied forces at start and has also complete historical knowledge that the Malaya forces, for example, will substantially underperform, and that his initial raids on Clark and PH will be a substantial success. It's almost hard coded in the sense that these forces are given initial combat/exp/morale values that are quite low. Knowing this, the Jpn player may easily aspire to conquer a much broader region at a much faster pace than historically. This was easily done in PW, for example.
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Actually you might be suprised on just how well appraised the Japanese were of the exact dispositions and number of forces in both the PI and Malaya. So this foreknowlede isnt really as unhistorical advantage as you might think. Besides it can also be expected that an allied player will not make the same historical mistakes. For example not trying to defend the whole Malaya penesular but instead withdrawing all forces immediately into Singapore probably means that port will hold out longer than historically.
Originally posted by mdiehl
I did not say anything about the fall of Manila. Only that the Japanese could not prevent the escape of ships from Manila without holding Corregidor or else sinking them. If the Japanese take Manila, and there are ships in port, if the ships have steam up, they're likely to escape or else require sinking by aircraft or gunfire.
And they did not historically, WHY? Are you not forgetting there was a IJN blockadeing force outside of Manila bay.
Historically, except for a few auxillaries and the PTs, all ships that remainded in Manilla bay when Manilla fell were either captured or scuttled.
The blockading force did not capture a single ship, IIRC. Moreover, they could not approach close enough to effectively blockade Manila Bay or Corregidor to prevent the escape of numerous smaller vessels, largely owing to the Ft, er, Hood? (that concrete battleship in the middle of the bay) and Corregidor.
Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.
Didn't we have this conversation already?
Didn't we have this conversation already?
Originally posted by mdiehl
Homma's troops would have suffered just as badly at the hands of USAFFE in the PI during January and February as any others. The Japanese were decisively beaten, tactically speaking, by superior firepower and morale in January and February in the PI, despite the many blunders committed by USAFFE. The only success came after the strategic effects of a prolonged siege. If Jpns player delays the start of the PI campaign by even a week, the likelihood should be protracted, serious and effective resistence throughout 1942 in the PI.
Not takeing anything away from USAFFE. Under the circumstances they performed heroically. But....
(quote)
"Homma's troops would have suffered just as badly at hte hands of USAFFE in the PI during January adn February as an others"
You know this so unequivically, HOW?
" superior firepower and morale"
Yes, but largely because the vetran, well equiped and well trained 48th division along with most of its support units were replaced the 65th Bgd. a low morale, understrength, underequiped, poorly trained garrison unit. It was largely with this unit that Homma attempted to break the Albucay line. Again not takeing anything away from the "Battle Bastards" because they were equally in bad shape and performed well beyond what one could reasonably have expected them to. However add the fact that all of the 11th airfleet along with most of the 5th air Bgd. were also withdrawn to the NEI demonstrates that after the primary goals of destroying the naval base, destroying the airforce and captureing the areodromes from which they operated. The Philipines became a secondary operation.
Not hedgeing at all. You've proposed a new mechanism for handling this. I think the morale check thing is just bad as mentioned before. Tying ship captures to *where* the ships were and *when,* historically, is at least a model of something tangible and more easily researched.Forgive me if I misunderstood, but it does seem like you're hedging at bit now with the 10% delay range and the random checks.
Most likely yes, unless, of course, the port is captured before the historical arrival date of ship to port.If captureing Hong Kong at later date than historical results in less ships captured in that port. Then conversely shouldnt the capture of say Soerebaya at an earlier date result in more ships captured in said port. Regardless of the order of capture.
I agree. It's why hard coding is not sucha bad proxy for all this detail, IMO.The aggregate amount of ships captured shouldnt change much as long as they are all captured by March 9th.
I think that's making it too easy for the Japanese. Bear in mind that the Jpn player already knows the disposition of everything. The role of the Jpn as a game player is much, much easier and the conquests much easier than historically, primarily because of the existence of knowledge that the real Jpns never had. You say that the Allied player is not locked into making the same mistakes. Unless the Allied player gets to alter the set up from the get go, I do not see how you can make that claim. Will, for example, the PI contingent under Mac simply be presumed to have relocated all its supplies according to WPO from the start of hostilities? Unless the Allied player has that option, the USAFFE is not going to perform to its potential.If captured by that date they should get the historic number added to the reinforcement pool. Ships should be subtracted everyday after that date and added for everyday before that date.
From the same authoritative source of universal knowledge by which you claim that the rest of Homma's forces would have fared substantially better if they had been used in the PI.You know this so unequivically, HOW?
Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.
Didn't we have this conversation already?
Didn't we have this conversation already?
Bataan
quote:
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Originally posted by mdiehl
Homma's troops would have suffered just as badly at the hands of USAFFE in the PI during January and February as any others. The Japanese were decisively beaten, tactically speaking, by superior firepower and morale in January and February in the PI, despite the many blunders committed by USAFFE. The only success came after the strategic effects of a prolonged siege. If Jpns player delays the start of the PI campaign by even a week, the likelihood should be protracted, serious and effective resistence throughout 1942 in the PI.
" superior firepower and morale"
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Everything I have read about Bataan suggests that the January-February battle on the second line was a near thing. I Corps had lost its artillery during the retreat from the first line. (On the East Coast the attack was stopped largely due to superiority in artillery). The Japanese had the misfortune to be attacking with inferior numbers. The ability of Phillipine Army units to attack was near non-existent, such abilities were pretty much confined to the regular Phillipine Division, the regular 26th Cav, and the remnants of the tank battalions - a portion of the force. The Japanese command of the replacement units was also less qualified and less experienced. The chances of the defense surviving an attack of the crack, large 48th Division in place of the weak substitute units, I would rate as quite poor.
The Phillipine Scouts were probably as good as many of our better troops in the war, but their numbers and the quality of their supplies (dud mortar shells and grenades, for example) would have been insufficient to hold against a coordinated attack by the first-rate units of the Invasion force, supported by air power.
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Originally posted by mdiehl
Homma's troops would have suffered just as badly at the hands of USAFFE in the PI during January and February as any others. The Japanese were decisively beaten, tactically speaking, by superior firepower and morale in January and February in the PI, despite the many blunders committed by USAFFE. The only success came after the strategic effects of a prolonged siege. If Jpns player delays the start of the PI campaign by even a week, the likelihood should be protracted, serious and effective resistence throughout 1942 in the PI.
" superior firepower and morale"
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Everything I have read about Bataan suggests that the January-February battle on the second line was a near thing. I Corps had lost its artillery during the retreat from the first line. (On the East Coast the attack was stopped largely due to superiority in artillery). The Japanese had the misfortune to be attacking with inferior numbers. The ability of Phillipine Army units to attack was near non-existent, such abilities were pretty much confined to the regular Phillipine Division, the regular 26th Cav, and the remnants of the tank battalions - a portion of the force. The Japanese command of the replacement units was also less qualified and less experienced. The chances of the defense surviving an attack of the crack, large 48th Division in place of the weak substitute units, I would rate as quite poor.
The Phillipine Scouts were probably as good as many of our better troops in the war, but their numbers and the quality of their supplies (dud mortar shells and grenades, for example) would have been insufficient to hold against a coordinated attack by the first-rate units of the Invasion force, supported by air power.
I do not agree. The 48th was not armed with substantially different weapons or tactics than the other Japanese divisions. The attack in Bataan was organized and conducted in ways consistent with Japanese army experience in China. American firepower, despite early losses, ripped the attacking units apart. As the attack stalled, the failure of the campaign to succeed with all the celerity originally imagined resulted in significant logistical shortfalls among the Japanese troops.The chances of the defense surviving an attack of the crack, large 48th Division in place of the weak substitute units, I would rate as quite poor.
In short, the Japanese op plan underestimated the quality of the opposition in the PI.
Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.
Didn't we have this conversation already?
Didn't we have this conversation already?
Originally posted by mdiehl
The blockading force did not capture a single ship, IIRC. Moreover, they could not approach close enough to effectively blockade Manila Bay or Corregidor to prevent the escape of numerous smaller vessels, largely owing to the Ft, er, Hood? (that concrete battleship in the middle of the bay) and Corregidor.
Actually...
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Merchant ships captured while attempting to escape Manila
SS Paz (4,260 ton) Freighter
Captured off Manila by IJN 1/2/42
SS Mindanao (5,236 ton) Freighter
Captured off Luzon by IJN 2/10/42
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Merchant Ships sunk while attempting to escape Manila
SS Lahaina (5,645 tons)Freighter
sunk by IJN I-9 off the Philipines
SS Manatawny (5,030 tons) Tanker
Sunk by a/c off Manila 12/10/41
SS Sagoland (5,334 tons) Freighter
sunk by a/c off Manila 12/11/41
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Merchant ships scuttled in Manila to prevent capture when Manila fell, but while USAFFE controlled Corregidore
SS Taurus Freighter (scuttled)
SS Mauban Freighter (scuttled) refloated put into IJN service
SS Aloha Freighter (scuttled)
SS Bicol Freighter (scuttled)
SS Bicol Freighter (scuttled)
SS Palawan Freigher (scuttled) refloated put into IJN service
SS Don Hermes Freighter (scuttled) refloated put into IJN service
SS Magallenes Steamer (scuttled)
SS Montanes Steamer (scuttled)
SS Vizcaya Steamer (scuttled)
SS Anakan Freighter (scuttled) refloated put into IJN service
SS Bisayas Freighter (scuttled) refloated put into IJN service
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Merchants captured in port
SS Lepus Freighter (captured intact)
SS Regulus Freighter (captured intact)
SS Princess Negro Freighter (captured intact)
SS Sarangamei (captured intact)
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If you mean by; "numerous small vessels escaped", Banka boats very small coastal steamers and lighters, then yes a few did escape. However, as far as I know the only merchant ship of any real size that escaped after Manila fell was the SS Legaspi. Please feel free to enlighten me if you know of any others.
BTW the name of the concrete battleship was Fort Drum.
quote:
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I do not agree. The 48th was not armed with substantially different weapons or tactics than the other Japanese divisions. The attack in Bataan was organized and conducted in ways consistent with Japanese army experience in China. American firepower, despite early losses, ripped the attacking units apart. As the attack stalled, the failure of the campaign to succeed with all the celerity originally imagined resulted in significant logistical shortfalls among the Japanese troops.
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A brief quote from the Official U.S. Army History of the campaign:
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Southern Army had stripped General Homma of some of his best ground and air units just before the start of the battle of Bataan. All he had left was the 16th Division, which "did not have a very
good reputation" for its "fighting qualities," the 65th Brigade, the 7th Tank Regiment, supporting arms and services, and a small air unit of less than seventy fighters, bombers, and reconnaissance
planes.[60] Only in the air were the Japanese assured of superiority. The brigade which replaced the well-trained and equipped 48th Division was, in the words of its commander, "absolutely unfit for combat duty."[61] Organized in early 1941 as a garrison unit, it had a total strength of about 6,500 men. Its three infantry regiments, the 122d, 141st and 142d Infantry, consisted of but two battalions, each organized into three rifle companies and one machine gun company. The brigade had few vehicles and no artillery unit, but at least one of the regiments and possibly the others had a battery of field artillery. Organic to the brigade was a field hospital, an engineer units, and a signal unit no larger than a "telegraph platoon." The
majority of the enlisted men were conscripts and the month of training at Formosa was entirely inadequate. Unit training had progressed only as far as the company.[62]
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The Japanese made a sound strategic decision that it was important to speed up the conquest of the Dutch Indies even if that greatly increased the risk of the campaign in the Philippines would not conclude. For a large unit with abundant artillery trained up to the same level of the Philippine Scouts they substituted a small unit with virtually no artillery trained to the level of the Philippine Army. Even at the time 14th Army felt it had been deprived of the forces needed to take Bataan. With the capture of Davao, Manila, and the Luzon airfields the Japanese had accomplished their strategic objectives and eliminate the strategically irrelevant Philippine force at their leisure. They paid the price for their strategic choice, but it was still worth it.
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I do not agree. The 48th was not armed with substantially different weapons or tactics than the other Japanese divisions. The attack in Bataan was organized and conducted in ways consistent with Japanese army experience in China. American firepower, despite early losses, ripped the attacking units apart. As the attack stalled, the failure of the campaign to succeed with all the celerity originally imagined resulted in significant logistical shortfalls among the Japanese troops.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A brief quote from the Official U.S. Army History of the campaign:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Southern Army had stripped General Homma of some of his best ground and air units just before the start of the battle of Bataan. All he had left was the 16th Division, which "did not have a very
good reputation" for its "fighting qualities," the 65th Brigade, the 7th Tank Regiment, supporting arms and services, and a small air unit of less than seventy fighters, bombers, and reconnaissance
planes.[60] Only in the air were the Japanese assured of superiority. The brigade which replaced the well-trained and equipped 48th Division was, in the words of its commander, "absolutely unfit for combat duty."[61] Organized in early 1941 as a garrison unit, it had a total strength of about 6,500 men. Its three infantry regiments, the 122d, 141st and 142d Infantry, consisted of but two battalions, each organized into three rifle companies and one machine gun company. The brigade had few vehicles and no artillery unit, but at least one of the regiments and possibly the others had a battery of field artillery. Organic to the brigade was a field hospital, an engineer units, and a signal unit no larger than a "telegraph platoon." The
majority of the enlisted men were conscripts and the month of training at Formosa was entirely inadequate. Unit training had progressed only as far as the company.[62]
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The Japanese made a sound strategic decision that it was important to speed up the conquest of the Dutch Indies even if that greatly increased the risk of the campaign in the Philippines would not conclude. For a large unit with abundant artillery trained up to the same level of the Philippine Scouts they substituted a small unit with virtually no artillery trained to the level of the Philippine Army. Even at the time 14th Army felt it had been deprived of the forces needed to take Bataan. With the capture of Davao, Manila, and the Luzon airfields the Japanese had accomplished their strategic objectives and eliminate the strategically irrelevant Philippine force at their leisure. They paid the price for their strategic choice, but it was still worth it.
Thanks TIMJOT. Do you have a source for these? Not disputing your claim, I'd like to find the thing. You have access to more detail than the general op histories have provided, and I'd like to procure same for myself. I stand corrected - the blockading force captured 2 ships attempting to escape. 1 got through.
To model it in something other than a hard-code way, it'd be interesting to see which decisions led to the escape of Lagaspi where Paz and Mindanao were captured.
The other examples are non sequitur to our particular discussion. As I've said, if Jpn player bypasses the PI in favor of quick seizure of more distant targets like Midway, Port Moresby, or New Caledonia, it seems quite fair to me that all the ships you mentioned are presumed "escaped" -- less the ones sunk by Jpn aircraft out of Formosa.
To model it in something other than a hard-code way, it'd be interesting to see which decisions led to the escape of Lagaspi where Paz and Mindanao were captured.
The other examples are non sequitur to our particular discussion. As I've said, if Jpn player bypasses the PI in favor of quick seizure of more distant targets like Midway, Port Moresby, or New Caledonia, it seems quite fair to me that all the ships you mentioned are presumed "escaped" -- less the ones sunk by Jpn aircraft out of Formosa.
Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.
Didn't we have this conversation already?
Didn't we have this conversation already?
[(quote)originally posted by mdiehl
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Thanks TIMJOT. Do you have a source for these? Not disputing your claim, I'd like to find the thing. You have access to more detail than the general op histories have provided, and I'd like to procure same for myself. I stand corrected - the blockading force captured 2 ships attempting to escape. 1 got through.
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Your welcome. My primary sources are
The Worlds Merchant Fleets 1939
"The Particulars and Wartime Fates of 6000 ships"
by Roger W. Jordan; Naval Institute Press
US Merchant Vessel Calsualties of WWII
by Robert M. Browning; Naval Institute Press
And dont forget 3 were sunk. That makes 5 out of 6 did not get through.
(quote)
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To model it in something other than a hard-code way, it'd be interesting to see which decisions led to the escape of Lagaspi where Paz and Mindanao were captured.
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The Legaspi was a coastal steamer, larger than most, but much smaller than the Freighters Paz or Mindanao. It could hug the PI jagged shoreline and ply the numerous narrow and shallow straits that make up most of the PI inter island waterway. The Paz and Mindanao had no such luxury. They had no choice but to run the South China Sea.
(quote)
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The other examples are non sequitur to our particular discussion. As I've said, if Jpn player bypasses the PI in favor of quick seizure of more distant targets like Midway, Port Moresby, or New Caledonia, it seems quite fair to me that all the ships you mentioned are presumed "escaped" -- less the ones sunk by Jpn aircraft out of Formosa.
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Oh,
I wasnt discussing by passing Manila. I thought we were discussing the effects of capturing Manila in lew of secureing Corregidore. It is my contention that the evidence suggest that Corregidore should hav no effect on the number of ships credited as captured, but only *when* they can be deployed. Regardless, I dont think we can persume that they would all "escape". Since as you, yourself has suggested some ships were undoubtledly scuttled because sys damage. Surely some of these ships should be counted as being refloated. Still others were scuttled because their crews determined that descretion is the better part of valor and elected not to tempt fate in the South China Sea.
I understand your point about unorthrodox moves, but players would be penalized for such moves, since this would assuredly mean that the ports in question will not be captured within the historical timeframe and thus reduceing the number of ships captured. The more outlandish the move, the more time it will take and the less ships he will get.
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Thanks TIMJOT. Do you have a source for these? Not disputing your claim, I'd like to find the thing. You have access to more detail than the general op histories have provided, and I'd like to procure same for myself. I stand corrected - the blockading force captured 2 ships attempting to escape. 1 got through.
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Your welcome. My primary sources are
The Worlds Merchant Fleets 1939
"The Particulars and Wartime Fates of 6000 ships"
by Roger W. Jordan; Naval Institute Press
US Merchant Vessel Calsualties of WWII
by Robert M. Browning; Naval Institute Press
And dont forget 3 were sunk. That makes 5 out of 6 did not get through.
(quote)
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To model it in something other than a hard-code way, it'd be interesting to see which decisions led to the escape of Lagaspi where Paz and Mindanao were captured.
-------------------------------------------------------
The Legaspi was a coastal steamer, larger than most, but much smaller than the Freighters Paz or Mindanao. It could hug the PI jagged shoreline and ply the numerous narrow and shallow straits that make up most of the PI inter island waterway. The Paz and Mindanao had no such luxury. They had no choice but to run the South China Sea.
(quote)
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The other examples are non sequitur to our particular discussion. As I've said, if Jpn player bypasses the PI in favor of quick seizure of more distant targets like Midway, Port Moresby, or New Caledonia, it seems quite fair to me that all the ships you mentioned are presumed "escaped" -- less the ones sunk by Jpn aircraft out of Formosa.
-----------------------------------------------------
Oh,
I wasnt discussing by passing Manila. I thought we were discussing the effects of capturing Manila in lew of secureing Corregidore. It is my contention that the evidence suggest that Corregidore should hav no effect on the number of ships credited as captured, but only *when* they can be deployed. Regardless, I dont think we can persume that they would all "escape". Since as you, yourself has suggested some ships were undoubtledly scuttled because sys damage. Surely some of these ships should be counted as being refloated. Still others were scuttled because their crews determined that descretion is the better part of valor and elected not to tempt fate in the South China Sea.I understand your point about unorthrodox moves, but players would be penalized for such moves, since this would assuredly mean that the ports in question will not be captured within the historical timeframe and thus reduceing the number of ships captured. The more outlandish the move, the more time it will take and the less ships he will get.
I guess that's two miscues. I thought we were discussing captures that might be made available to Jpn after sufficient repair and refit.And dont forget 3 were sunk. That makes 5 out of 6 did not get through.
Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.
Didn't we have this conversation already?
Didn't we have this conversation already?