Allied Tactics

[Mike Scholl]

To return from the realms of the silly to the actual subjects
of this thread..., DON'T FORGET THE POLITICS OF COLONIALISM.
Britian in Malaya and Burma; and America in the Phillippines had
a problem. The colonial and native populations might forgive
them for being defeated---but "running away without a fight" is
another story. This kind of thing was a very real consideration
at the time---and might have triggered greater support of the
Japanese invaders (at least until the true nature of the "Greater
East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere revealed itself).

Certainly if the game is accurate historically the Western
Powers are going to have to make some effort to hold out. And
if the forces at hand had been commanded competantly a respectable defence was certainly possible. A lot is going to
depend on how accurate the game actually is, or tries to be.

[CynicAl]

Originally posted by pbear

The fact that the Allies went on the offensive while commiting the majority of their resources to the European theater, can only be atribuited to Japan be very overextended.

There's at least one other possible explanation: the Pacific War was a gross mismatch. The Allies, and particularly the US, were ridiculously more powerful than Japan. Much of that was still unrealized potential until 1943, but even the more limited assets available in 1942 sufficed first to stop the Japanese offensive, then to go on the attack in turn. The Japanese never had a prayer.

Originally posted by Mr.Frag

Hmm, thats certainly amusing, so the USA lets Germany invade the UK and take the islands, lets Russia fall to Germany, but help out and makes sure the Aussies don't get scratched???

No, that's amusing. Nazi Germany conquer the USSR? Unlikely. Logistics, logistics, logistics... Successfully invade Britain? Bloody unlikely. Little matter of crossing the Channel in the face of strongly contested air superiority - and enemy naval superiority bordering on outright supremacy, at least locally. And even in the highly unlikely event they could pull that off, once again it's logistics, logistics, logistics...

[madflava13]

CynicAl-
While I think you are correct about the Pacific theatre, I believe you're incorrect about the ETO...
Had Hitler let his generals do the thinking and let the troops get the winter gear they needed, its not out of this realm that the Nazis march on Moscow. The lead elements of the Wehrmacht were almost within sight of the place when they were stopped. Had the capital fallen, the whole country might not have collapsed, but is a cease fire out of the question? Or maybe the far east forces come west -- and Japan gets frisky? These are certainly a-historical hypotheticals, but not out of the question by any means.

As for Operation Sea Lion - again, had Hitler not been a moron when it came to Ops, the Luftwaffe would have had the RAF on the ropes -- they did actually. It has been stated by any number of historians and survivors of the Battle of Britain that another week would perhaps have been decisive -- the RAF was that close to folding. Hitler ordered the night bombings though, and the rest is history...
Yes, the Royal Navy was incredibly powerful, but with Air Superiority on the German side, its questionable whether they could have stopped an invasion. I'm not saying the Whermacht wins this scenario - they probably don't considering everyone on the island would have fought to the death, but the invasion itself is not that far-fetched.

My $.02 -- let me know what you think.

[Splinterhead]

[QUOTE]Originally posted by CynicAl
There's at least one other possible explanation: the Pacific War was a gross mismatch. The Allies, and particularly the US, were ridiculously more powerful than Japan. Much of that was still unrealized potential until 1943, but even the more limited assets available in 1942 sufficed first to stop the Japanese offensive, then to go on the attack in turn. The Japanese never had a prayer.[QUOTE]


Which is why the North Vietnamese were so easily defeated by the US and why the British so easily put down the rebellion in the American colonies.

The Japanese didn't have to destroy the US to win, they only had to inflict enough casualties to convince the US it wasn't worth the cost. They underestimated the US casualty threshold, they failed to counter the US submarine threat, and they suffered a debacle at Midway. Their odds weren't particularly good, but they did have a chance.

[Mr.Frag]

One more interesting twist to this:

What would have happened if Japan went about their business WITHOUT attacking Pearl Harbour which turned the public against them, certainly a lot less USA support from the home front if that was the case. Perhaps not attacking Pearl Harbour as the Japan player will keep a much tighter resource limit on the USA side (only USA, not allies) ...

CynicAl, if you are not aware just how close Germany was to winning the Battle of Britain, I suggest you go back and read a little about it. If it was not for meddling due to a mistaken attack on a city causing Hitler to get all pissy and waste resources on pointless bombing, they would have won hands down. Period!

Russia was borderline, but remember, again we have political stupidity at play. They could have made it. Had they established a foothold strong enough to be able to kill all the convoys coming around the north, Russia would have folded in no time.

I suggest you grab a copy of Gary's other game, Battle of Britain, and find out just how easy it is to take the UK out. It's funny how even England states that they were within a week of loosing the air war, yet you know so much better then them eh?

[Admiral DadMan]

Originally posted by Splinterhead
Which is why the North Vietnamese were so easily defeated by the US and why the British so easily put down the rebellion in the American colonies.

The Japanese didn't have to destroy the US to win, they only had to inflict enough casualties to convince the US it wasn't worth the cost. They underestimated the US casualty threshold, they failed to counter the US submarine threat, and they suffered a debacle at Midway. Their odds weren't particularly good, but they did have a chance.

The Allies did not have to face the prospect of having to identify friend from foe while pushing Japan back from her conquests.

The WWII effort against Germany and the wars in Korea, Vietnam, and now Iraq were and are now ones where we are actually invading the enemy's home country. There is a certain psychological difference between pushing the enemy back from conquest, and subjugating his homeland.

The US has not learned the lesson that you cannot fight an ideological war with military operations. We still do not pick our fights well these days.

[Admiral DadMan]

Originally posted by Mr.Frag
One more interesting twist to this:

What would have happened if Japan went about their business WITHOUT attacking Pearl Harbour which turned the public against them, certainly a lot less USA support from the home front if that was the case. Perhaps not attacking Pearl Harbour as the Japan player will keep a much tighter resource limit on the USA side (only USA, not allies) ...

The Attack on Pearl Harbor fundamentally changes so many things: Public Opinion; Strategy; Force Structure; Tactics. I could write a thesis on it.

With the US-led oil embargo clamped on in mid-1941, Japan would have run out of oil by mid-1942. They HAD to do something to get the oil flowing again. Hindsight says that they should have just made their move for the "Southern Resource Area" while taking pains to keep the US and UK on the sidelines as long as possible. But Japan was aggresively militaristic by then, and war was the upright and honorable way to achieve their aims.

That being the chosen course of action, then an attack to neutralize Allied forces in the Far East (Hong Kong and Phillipines) would seem logical to us. But some in Japan realized that they could not last in a long war against the US, and so decided on a "Shock and Awe" operation of their own - attack the symbol of US power in the Pacific - Pearl Harbor and the Fleet based there.

Attacking the main portion of the US Fleet so close to the US Mainland and hitting a US Territory was a double whammy, topped only by mis-timing the severing of diplomatic ties that day. Those items galvanized the US public like nothing else would. It made them feel threatened. Hurt turned to fear, fear turned to anger, anger turned to hate (young Jedi). Japan badly mis-calulated the effect the attack would have.

Better to have not declared war, made their move into the "SRA", and make the US come after them .

[Wallymanowar]

Speculation about whether the ETO could have been ignored is inappropriate since a) Germany declared war on the US and b) Churchill and Roosevelt had determined the 'Germany First' stategy prior to the US actually entering the war. Besides the US only used 20% of her production capability against Japan and still won decisively.

All the political decisions have to be taken into account.

Japan had to go to war in Dec '41 because the oil embargo had reduced her stocks of oil to the point that she would have run out by Jun'42. The United States had to be attacked because she was the instigator of the embargo. The NEI had to be taken because that was the source of oil. Malaya (Singapore in particular) and the Philippines had to be taken because they threatened the supply lines of that source of oil - besides Malaya also supplied good strategic sources of rubber and tin. In the rest of Japan's plans all the territory she took was related to setting up a buffer zone to a) prevent an interruption to her supply of oil b) force the Allies to suffer large numbers of casualties to the point where they would agree to end the war and allow Japan to keep some of her gains as well as pursue her war in China.

Allied intentions would be central to preventing Japan from attaining her goals. While in hindsight it would be considered prudent for the Allies to accept the losses of these territories and reduce their own casualties by withdrawing wholesale. In practical terms it cannot be done. Hong Kong and particularly Singapore were 'Crown Jewels'. The loss of these colonies represents a significant loss of prestige to the British - abandoning them was unthinkable. The Philippines were going to be getting their independance from the US in 1944. The Americans were committed to defending them until then - the loss of Prestige to the Americans for abandoning an Ally would have been devastating - this also contributed to the need to recapture the Philippines in 1944-45. The Dutch East Indies were also one of the 'Crown Jewels' of the Dutch empire. The Dutch were committed to defending them by their potential loss of prestige, and the other Allies were drawn into that by their support for their Ally.

All in All things like prestige, morale, logistics have to be taken into account when planning stategy.

[wpurdom]

Where does the 20% production figure come from. IIRC the usual figure given is that 30% of production went to the Pacific.

[Snigbert]

If WitP allows variable results at Pearl Harbor

There is no fixed outcome for the Pearl Harbor strike. The Japanese player doesnt have to even attack Pearl Harbor if they have other plans.

[Snigbert]

I think there is a lot of speculating about how alternative histories might be worked into the game. I think the player is going to be able to control production, but 'what if event x occurred in some other part of the world' scenarios wont be a part of the regular grand campaign game. Although they might be in speculative scenarios included in the game, or players may create alternate history scenarios with the editor.

[TIMJOT]

Originally posted by Snigbert
If WitP allows variable results at Pearl Harbor

There is no fixed outcome for the Pearl Harbor strike. The Japanese player doesnt have to even attack Pearl Harbor if they have other plans.

Does this means the campaign game does not start on Dec 7th? I assumed if it did that the game would start with the Kudo Bhutai posititioned off Hawaii. If it does start that way. What real choice does the Japanese player have, but to attack Pearl?

[Wallymanowar]

Where does the 20% production figure come from.

Sorry, couldn't find my original source. It may have been 30% as you recall - that doesn't really affect the outcome of my point;)

If the Japanese player doesn't have to attack PH then it becomes like PacWar and opens up a lot of Stategic alternatives to the Japanese player and IMO opens the game wide open. Of course the logical move for the Japanese is to attack PH in order to remove the threat of the American fleet but can the Kudo Bhutai be used more effectively somewhere else? Like setting up an ambush for the Americans? HMMMMM!!

[Mike Scholl]

Just over 30% of American Military Effort overall for the War
went to the Pacific (not including the A-Bomb---100% of which
wound up in the Pacific, though scheduled for the ETO). This
wasn't an even percentage throughout, as in 1942 over half
of the US effort went to the Pacific to sieze bases and shore
up Australia/New Zealand to halt the Japanese onslaught.

[derwho]

If the Japanese player doesn't have to attack PH then it becomes like PacWar and opens up a lot of Stategic alternatives to the Japanese player and IMO opens the game wide open. Of course the logical move for the Japanese is to attack PH in order to remove the threat of the American fleet but can the Kudo Bhutai be used more effectively somewhere else? Like setting up an ambush for the Americans? HMMMMM!!

This should also mean that if Japan does not initiate hostilities by attacking Pearl Harbour the US might not declare war. According to most what I've read about the war in the pacific and US politics prior to Pearl Harbour, it would have been politically very difficult for Roosevelt to declare war on Japan. Most Americans ware very anti-war and isolationist before PH that actually got America to get into WW2 as Germany only declared war after Japan.

An interesting scenario would be that the US would only enter the conflict late 43, early 44 (by some political pretext) and the IJN would actually be defending a well fortified empire and co-prosperity sphere with ample supplies and resources. In my opinion the IJN didn't do a very good strategic move when they attacked Pearl. The IJN could easily have disposed of the USN Pacific fleet if they would have gone into the defence of the Philippines according to war plan orange. If that would have happened, again poilicis would have entered that game and it's quite reasonable to think that Roosevelt would have had a very hard time in convincing the American public that it was necessary to sacrifice the whole fleet in defending Philippines. Most Americans then and today couldn't put it on the map anyway.

[Mike Scholl]

Your scenario must also include the Japanese ignoring
Guam, Wake, and the Phillipine Islands---which were already
recieving reinforcements in December of 1941. If the Philli-
pines does get turned into an "impregnable" base then the
Japanese convoys from SE Asia are "toast".

Late '43/Early '44 seems a bit optimistic from the Axis side.
The US Navy was already exchanging fire with the Germans in
the Atlantic, and American Public Opinion had swung a fair
piece since September of 1939. You need to take into account
our sympathy for the "underdog" (the Brits, being "stabbed in
the back by the Japanese" while fighting in Europe; and the
"homeless" Dutch being attacked) coupled with our irrational
sympathy for China and it's resulting antipathy for the "Rapists
of Nanking" Japanese. Mid-1942 seems more likely...

[mdiehl]

This should also mean that if Japan does not initiate hostilities by attacking Pearl Harbour the US might not declare war.

What it should mean is that the US gets to declare war when and where it wants. Would the US have used a Japanese invasion of Borneo, Indonesia or Malaya as a causus belli? You bet they would. Americans were in 1941 generally split about the desire for war against Germany, whose "colonial" track record in the occupied nations was not well known. After 1936, many Americans assumed that an eventual war with Japan was guaranteed, and a good portion thought Japan needed to be confronted.

Most Americans ware very anti-war and isolationist before PH that actually got America to get into WW2 as Germany only declared war after Japan.

That's really so simplistic as to constitute a garden variety urban legend.

An interesting scenario would be that the US would only enter the conflict late 43, early 44 (by some political pretext) and the IJN would actually be defending a well fortified empire and co-prosperity sphere with ample supplies and resources.

That would be an intersting scenario. We may presume as a matter of course that Japan, not sensing the American capacity for war, would have continued it's pilot training and shipbuilding levels apace at pre-US-war levels (after all, they resisted increasing the pace of training long after the point where better strategists would have changed their policies).

The US starts the war with a larger fleet, better intel on Japanese codes and movements, ASW that is that much better, and 1st line a/c far superior to anything in the Japanese arsenal. Since US pilots will have had that much more training time, and used better tactics from the start, the loss ratios for the USN vs Kido Butai (historically about 1.3:1 in 1942 then increasing) would start at 3:1 or 4:1. All Japanese airstrikes would find their floating Allied targets equipped with vt fused shells and substantial 40mm.

Since the US economy and R&D program has the luxury of resting without severe attrition losses, the Japanese can also expect to find the US with better early jet prototypes, better torpedoes, acoustically guided ASW, and perhaps even some wire guided plane-dropped anti-ship weapons.

In my opinion the IJN didn't do a very good strategic move when they attacked Pearl. The IJN could easily have disposed of the USN Pacific fleet if they would have gone into the defence of the Philippines according to war plan orange.

The problems with that analysis are multifold. First, WPO did not imagine the PacFleet sailing to the PI in a airpower vacuum. If Japan does not start the war by taking out PacFleet and US possessions in the Pacific, then by 1943 every US base in the Pac will be better prepared than any Japanese position was at any time during the war, with bigger, better airfields and radar equipped, and more, faster, and better planes. Since your premise is that the PI has three years to prepare, every Phillippine Natoinal Army unit becomes the equivalent in firepower and training to a US infantry division, and all the landing beaches are so well prepared that when the war starts the Japanese can expect to lose 50,000 men merely trying to swim ashore. Also, when the war begin, Japan immediately loses control over the supply route to the southwest, wit the only open shipping passage for them to be found in the stratits of Formosa.

Frankly the Japanese move was unquestionably the best one available. It was then or never at all.

If that would have happened, again poilicis would have entered that game and it's quite reasonable to think that Roosevelt would have had a very hard time in convincing the American public that it was necessary to sacrifice the whole fleet in defending Philippines.

Non sequitur. By 1943, any "decisive battle" would have been a decisive defeat for Japan owing to the American schedule of shipbuilding and a/c production and replacement, and the complete American dominance of teh air from Hawaii all the way to the PI.

Most Americans then and today couldn't put it on the map anyway.

Horse hockey.

[Mr.Frag]

Interesting comments about the USA entering the war in late '43 being about to steam roll over Japan with no effort. With Japan not having to absorb almost 2 years worth of losses and having secured their supply chain completely, what makes you think they would have (a) no better technology to throw at the Americans and (b) would have been such a cake walk?

I would presume that an unharrassed Japan would have some pretty nice advanced U-boat clones by then and at a minimum FW/190 level of aircraft to throw against the americans, resulting in a fairly high rate of losses against the big bombers who we find to be completely invulnerable in Uncommon Valor.

Would this late entry also mean that Germany got time to gear up completely to war production, increasing the threat levels in the west? Perhaps the V3 ( ) would be landing in Washington DC by that point in the war had resources not been wasted elsewhere ...

A million and one possibilities ensue with a late entry by the USA. Perhaps Germany gets the first A-Bomb

[Heeward]

Yes if the war stared in 1943 Germany would have won the A-Bomb Race....

In several large Metropolitan Areas.


Of course we can believe that Hitler could have diverted a large amount of amount of R&D and industrial capacity to this project, but then Germany would not have army and airforce to face the USSR.

[Mike Scholl]

What portion of "never-never land" is Toronto located in?

You assume that without the US the Japanese would have had no opposition and no losses, and that all of SouthEast
Asia was going to fall undamaged into their hands. What about
the Brits and the Dutch? They're still going to fight---and more
importantly blow the hell out of all those resources you blindly
imagine getting. The first Japanese estimates for getting them
back on line after they assessed the damage historically were
at least 18 months---and they proved wildly optimistic.

True, the Japanese might have brought some better aircraft
designs (of their own---Germany's were too short ranged for a
Pacific War) on line during the intervening period. But remember,
these are the same clowns who KNEW they were going to have
to go to war at least a year before they did---and still didn't increase the volumn of their pilot training. They could have been
building U-Boat type submarines for many years---but chose instead to go their own way with a completely rediculous (in hindsight) submarine doctrine of huge boats with airplanes on
them. Nothing in your argument provides any opposition (and therefor, reason to change their thinking or doctrine), so it's hard to see WHY you should make such assumptions.

And quite frankly, the only way Germany gets a win against
the Soviets is with political efforts Hitler could never countinance.
Otherwise, the Russians are going to win (lend-lease or not---it
speeded the decision, but it didn't make it.) Germany's A-Bomb
program was a practical disaster with no likelyhood of succeeding
quicky in reality. Fiction writer's have made a "boogieman" out of
it in the West, but in reality the resources just didn't exist.

MDIEHL's analysis is a "voice of reality"....., your's is more "Hollywood" than "History".