Allied Tactics

[TIMJOT]

[QUOTE]------------------------------------------
It seems like you are saying that the Allied player after all should not be allowed to redeploy anything or have any readiness increase in an ahistorical start. That which you have proposed is simply that which the Allies should already be able to do. Once the war begins, the Allies should be allowed to attempt to redeploy anything they want, regardless of the presence of detected TFs in the area.
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I was assumeing the war had NOT started. The Nov 41 start is to allow for NON PH strategies and redeployments on both sides. If the Japanese player attacks on turn 1 of the Nov. start then anything goes and allies are free to do anything they want. If the Jpn player does not attack, but a TF is sited in allied ZOC then the allies are free to act. What the allied player cant do absent a Jpn. attack or siteing in allied ZOC is mount a PH raid on the Marshall islands and initiate the start of the war.


(quote)
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The redeployment in an ahistorical game should happen prior to the start of the game if the Jpn player selects anything other than a historical first move. That means readiness increases occur before any Jpn TFs are sighted, because readiness affects search. If the Jpn player selects an ahistorical start, the Allied player's search should be more effective, resulting in a much greater chance of an at-start lack of surprise, and generally all around greater mystery, for the Jpn player, regarding the locations, quality and strengths of the opposition.
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As long as the Japanese TFs remain unsited, I see no reason the allies would be anymore ready than they were historically prior to Dec 7th. Why should search be better than historical, nothing changes historically until something un-historical is detected like a siteing of a Jap TF heading toward Hawaii.

I think you are confuseing game start with war start. A Nov *game* start would have a variable *war* start. An Nov game start should be looked as a redeployment phase for both sides. War would be triggered in various ways. for example; It could start with a Japanese attack on the PI on Nov 29 or it could start with an allied siteing of a Japanese TF heading toward Hawaii on Dec 6th. And yes, the allied player would be able to reinforce Midway, Wake, Guam and PI with as much as he logistically can prior to an actual war start.

[mdiehl]

Mike --

I thought Pbear meant PH was the biggest PacFleet base other than the ones on the west coast.

In all other respects your observations about sneaking an invasion force there and landing it in the face of the 2 division garrions and coast artillery are additional points that obviate against a Japanese invasion of Oahu.

[mdiehl]

I was assumeing the war had NOT started. ...

Comprendo. My bad.

What the allied player cant do absent a Jpn. attack or siteing in allied ZOC is mount a PH raid on the Marshall islands and initiate the start of the war.

Agreed, with the caveat that a Japanese attack on Malaya, Borneo or Indonesia might immediately give the Allied player leverage to get the US into the war. One could model it as a series of "crises" whereby the invasion of each new port, or bombing civilians, is accompanied by a random check against some modest probability of having exceeded the US tolerance for Jpns expansionism.

As long as the Japanese TFs remain unsited, I see no reason the allies would be anymore ready than they were historically prior to Dec 7th. Why should search be better than historical, nothing changes historically until something un-historical is detected like a siteing of a Jap TF heading toward Hawaii.

Everything changes. There are new and different opportunities for decrypt, Japanese ships in different starting locations and different US assets in the area that might be aware of same. It could be the Isabella effect.

I think you are confuseing game start with war start.

No, I'm not. If the game starts in November, the Allied player should be able to move whatever he wants during set up, prior to the execution of the first November turn, regardless of whether or not the US, UK, or anyone else is at war with Japan.

And yes, the allied player would be able to reinforce Midway, Wake, Guam and PI with as much as he logistically can prior to an actual war start.

I completely disagree. The at-start set up should allow the Allied player to have already deployed any available ground units, supplies, and fortification levels to any Allied location, within a few general nationality limits (Chinese must start in China, Phil Militia units must set up in the PI, India Army units must start in India or SE Asia).

[Snigbert]

It is manifestly illogical to assume or allow flexibility for the Jpn at start deployment and attacks without allowing comparable flexibility among the Allied pools.

I disagree. I actually think it is manifestly illogical to think that the location of the Japanese attack would have an effect on what the level of American readiness was on Dec 7th.

[mdiehl]

I actually think it is manifestly illogical to think that the location of the Japanese attack would have an effect on what the level of American readiness was on Dec 7th.

That's because you do not grasp the obvious. Since one is presuming an ahistorical start, it follows that the start is indeed "ahistorical." Constraints of historical readiness levels are obviated the instant that you assume that Japan has detailed and implemented the necessary deployments for alternative op plans.

The fundamental reason for that is that different op historical plans mean different pre-war deployments, communiques, and other manifestly trackable (intel wise, observation wise, and otherwise) events that differ from the historical pathway. There is no reason to assume that the ambiguity surrounding the events of historical 7 Dec would have been the same given an ahistorical set of pre-7 Dec deployments and preparations.

[TIMJOT]

[QUOTE]-------------------------------------
Everything changes. There are new and different opportunities for decrypt, Japanese ships in different starting locations and different US assets in the area that might be aware of same. It could be the Isabella effect.
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Yes, but it that doesnt have to be built into the game. The player would be free to shift assets and resources and benefit from any outcomes of said moves. For example increasing reon assets in a particular area that you think your opponent will strike would correspondly increase you chances of siteing his moves. I cant say how decrypts are going to be handled but would guess it will be handled as a variable.


(quote)
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No, I'm not. If the game starts in November, the Allied player should be able to move whatever he wants during set up, prior to the execution of the first November turn, regardless of whether or not the US, UK, or anyone else is at war with Japan.
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I didnt think pre-turn setup was even being considered. I assumed a say Nov 7 start for example would begin with the historical oobs in the historical their deployments. Players then would be able to shift forces as he desired from turn one on.



(quote)
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I completely disagree. The at-start set up should allow the Allied player to have already deployed any available ground units, supplies, and fortification levels to any Allied location, within a few general nationality limits (Chinese must start in China, Phil Militia units must set up in the PI, India Army units must start in India or SE Asia).
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Huh? Again I dont think pre-turn set up is even being considered. Frankly you lost me. How does a decision not to attack PH in Nov. increase fortification levels or allow you to redeploy units all of the map prior to that decision? This alternative scenerio presupposes everything up to the final exceptance PH plans remain the same.

[mdiehl]

This alternative scenerio presupposes everything up to the final exceptance PH plans remain the same.

That is precisely the presupposition to which I object. It amounts to the same thing as allowing the Jpn player to completely rewrite the start of the war, knowing as he will the many lessons of history and with full knowledge of at-start deployments, without imagining any kind of altered Allied deployment. It's in effect "1 sided alt history."

Its not justifiable as reasonable alt-history, IMO. All of the pre-war deployments occurred, after all, as part of a sort of non-combat chess match involving deployments and political moves on both sides of the Pacific.

Frankly, the only reason I'd consider purchasing this game is to play it against a human opponent. But if the Jpn player is given initial flexibility (and merely being able to retarget the initial moves is a potentially huge asset) without comparable Allied flexibility, I won't feel the urge to purchase this game until it hits the used software rack.

[iceboy105]

Originally posted by TIMJOT
I agree that the allied player should be free to redeploy at start units, just not attack unless Jap forces are sited within the allied ZOC. I think an automatic 50% increase in readiness, morale, support and fortification is too arbitrary. It would be much more realistic to increase them imcrementally for each turn past the historic start date, all the way up to 100%. The surprise modifier should only be eliminated if the enemy TF is sited prior to attack. Admittedly though, if UV is any indication, the chance of a TF will not be sited is almost ZERO. So the distinction is probably moot.

Although I agree that spotting is very frequent I have been making quite a few suprise attacks on my allied opponents fleets and bases so it is possible. Of course you have to follow certain routes and have certain weather and other conditions. Just like what happened in the pearl harbor attack historically.

[iceboy105]

Originally posted by Mike Scholl
....JUST MAKE CERTAIN IT APPLIES TO BOTH SIDES! Japanese
will be able to strike anywhere they want---and the Allies will be
able to make certain that there is nothing for them to attack.

On the side of realism, it took the Japanese months to plan
their opening attacks, and they were based on the allies being
in more-or-less "fixed" positions. If the carriers weren't in P.H.,
then the carriers wouldn't be attacked! Almost every portion of
their opening phase of offensives was interlocked..., each step
leading to the next. It was very flexible in terms of speeding up
or slowing down depending on the results---but did not provide
much ability to switch objectives in mid-stride.

Let's hope that 2by3 doesn't get too generous with just
letting ONE side re-design their starting position. The Japanese
will already be getting a lot of flexibility of action based on a
level of hindsight their historical counter-parts could never have.
If you give them total ability to "fiddle" with their starting positions as well, then they should at least have to deal with
the possibility of losing suprise. Like if they decide to "wait
until the Enterprise arrives back in P.H." before attacking on
Monday Morning, they also risk having Kido Butai "spotted on
Sunday" and flying into fully aroused and deployed CAP and
AAA defensives---and the possibility of a counter-strike! Or
flying in Monday AM and finding the Pacific Fleet sortied Sunday
Night. Be interesting to see how bold the Japanese player
would be if everytime he "diddled" with history he ran the risk of
history "diddling" him!

Hey I am all for it applying to both sides. Please do move all your forces to protect the phillipines while I move in and invade the Hawaiian islands!!! It is all relative. Despite what we know about history if you move forces to protect one historically attacked area then I can just as much attack the place you left undefended.

[mdiehl]

The thing is, you will not know which areas are well defended, marginally defended, or undefended. As it should be.

[Tanaka]

Originally posted by mdiehl
The thing is, you will not know which areas are well defended, marginally defended, or undefended. As it should be.

Which is exactly what makes a game fun, variable, and replayable!!! No game in UV ever starts out or begins the same and player styles are always different. This makes for always an interesting game as you never know what will happen. I sincerely hope that this is considered in WITP!!!

[Chijohnaok2]

Perhaps Martians would have seized control of Washington or London, or maybe the V3s would have been shot down by Shrike or Sprint SAMs. Maybe the USS Nimitz would have time warped back...

mdiehl:

You got it slightly wrong----it wasn't martians that tried to seize Washington or London---it was the Lizards from outer space.

You need to read the Harry Turtledove series of science fiction titled "Worldwar" in which an advanced race of lizards from outer space invade the Earth (I believe in 1942 or so). The Allies and Axis must come to a tenuous cease fire and focus their attention on fighting off the lizards rather then each other. Odd alliances form (for instance--Polish Jews ally themselves with the lizards against the Nazis).

It makes for some interesting, although far-fetched reading.


John

[Snigbert]

That's because you do not grasp the obvious. Since one is presuming an ahistorical start, it follows that the start is indeed "ahistorical." Constraints of historical readiness levels are obviated the instant that you assume that Japan has detailed and implemented the necessary deployments for alternative op plans.

You dont have to be a jackass about it...I can *grasp* what you are saying, but I disagree.

So by your reasoning if you digress from historical accuracy in any way you have to through away all presuppositions of what the conditions of the Pacific theatre were on Dec 7th 1941.
If the Japanese player is given the freedom to make choices on what their initial plans of attack are going to be, it would have required alternative planning which could have conceivably been decoded/spotted by the Allies. Although since we were painfully unaware of the PH attack I dont know how much better our odds of predict an attack on any other location would have been. Or the Allies could have discovered the Japanese plans to attack and made plans with the Lizardmen from Mars to spoil the Japanese offensives. I think the game designers simply want to create more options for the Japanese player to make the game more replayable. If the Allied player suffers some kind of penalties on the first few turns of the game because they were unprepared to go to war, they are going to be unprepared wherever the first attack occurs.
It isn't fair that one side would have more options than the other for the deployment on the first turn, but the fact remains that Japan was prepared for war, and the Allies were not.

[Mike Scholl]

Instead of venturing into the realms of "Lizards from Space"
and other fantastic (if fun) foolishness---let's take a minute and
look at the subject at hand. What kind of reasonably realistic
"variants" can 2by3 offer for the WitP "start"?

The JAPANESE were already "pushing the envelope" in terms
of their deployment and expansion plans. Bold almost to the
point of foolhardyness, they had measured their opponants and
their capabilities VERY closely---many in their own Staffs feared
disaster. They were pushed to desperate measures by the
West's determination to reduce them to a third-rate power
by economic means over China. They thought they saw a slim
"window of opportunity" and they took it. But to be much bolder
in their plans given their resources calls for a lot of imagination.
Where the Japanese side COULD REALISTICALLY have gotten a
boost would have been in better economic and training developments made BEFORE the war. Investments in aircraft
plants and pilot training and and production standardization
could easily have provided a larger and steadier supply of air
units and replacements to the front from the War's start. Other
areas could benefit as well. Japan is never going to be able to
match Western Production---but it could have been in better
shape with better preparation.


The AMERICANS, on the other hand, were boosting their
production about as much as circumstances would allow until
Pearl Harbor "broke all restrictions' and allowed the world's
most powerful, well-supplied, and effecient economy to really
"Gear Up". Clearly the Western Powers don't need or really
have justification for additional production. But where the
Japanese were fumbling badly with there economy, the West
was fumbling badly with it's intelligence, deployment, and
preparedness. The degree of suprise the Japanese were able
to achieve in their opening offensives exceeded their own expectations---and the confused and often foolish dispositions
and reactions of Western Forces resulted in Japanese losses
being much lower than expected. This is the area where Japan's
opponants could justify "positive improvements".

[mdiehl]

You dont have to be a jackass about it...I can *grasp* what you are saying, but I disagree.

Tit for tat chum.

So by your reasoning if you digress from historical accuracy in any way you have to through away all presuppositions of what the conditions of the Pacific theatre were on Dec 7th 1941.

No. You have to begin by knowing wtf about the history to understand why the Japanese historical move began where it did, and why fundamentally altering Japan's strategic plan for the opening stages of the war means developing resources and putting assets, supplies, and men in other areas where the threats would have been more easily detectable.

f the Japanese player is given the freedom to make choices on what their initial plans of attack are going to be, it would have required alternative planning which could have conceivably been decoded/spotted by the Allies.

You bet it could.

Beyond that, for a variety of reasons, had the Japanese delayed the strike on PH for 24 hours it is substantially less likely that they'd have found the PH defense unprepared. If they'd delayed a whole week, it is likely that they'd have found all the Allied assets in the Pacific Theater much better prepared. The "wind messages" were known to be code for deployment orders, and the decrypt of the signal "East Wind Rain" was on its way up the chain of command when the attack happened. Even a day might have seen all Allied forces on a war footing merely on the basis that a wind msg had been transmitted, and search efforts would already have been in place to locate the threat.

Although since we were painfully unaware of the PH attack I dont know how much better our odds of predict an attack on any other location would have been.

The US knew an attack could happen at any time. The strat planning supposed that the first move would come in the PI, but even so, PH was transitioning to a higher alert status. With less time (in effect prior to 7 December), Japan would probably been able to strike quicker but with a less well prepared shot. With delay, the US probably would have figured out the significance of "EAST wind: rain." Even without that, a delay of a few days sees the Diamond Head radar worked up to full operational status and PH on a war footing.

I think the game designers simply want to create more options for the Japanese player to make the game more replayable.

We do not know that they intend to make this a Japanese only option. It goes without saying that the game is less replayable, by giving the Japanese player more at-start options, than it is with both players given more at-start options.

If the Allied player suffers some kind of penalties on the first few turns of the game because they were unprepared to go to war, they are going to be unprepared wherever the first attack occurs.

If the game so penalizes the Allies it would be a flawed model. Japan came so close to tipping its hand with the extant deployments that, frankly, any other at start deployment (with, for example, Kido Butai skulking around in the Marshalls rather than, for example, in the Phillippine Sea where there were plenty of a/c and ships in major traffic lanes to note their movement), should be virtually guaranteed to lose the element of surprise.

It isn't fair that one side would have more options than the other for the deployment on the first turn, but the fact remains that Japan was prepared for war, and the Allies were not.

Incorrect on both accounts. Japan was woefully unprepared for the war. The US was somewhat prepared and daily becoming much better prepared. Frankly, the historical japanese success was an optimal performance combined with some significant help from local Allied strategic blunders. If an ahistorical pathway is taken, it should require optimum play on the part of the Jpn player and significant blunders on the part of the Allied player to achieve comparable Jpnse initial success.



Mike
For reasons that I stipulated before, Japan was not going to substantially ratchet up war production. Add to that the fact that the civilian economy was already suffering under the dedication of 30% of the Jpns GDP to war production, and the fact that Japanese shipping capacity was already too short to support industrial expansion, about the only way Japan could have improved their strategic position at start would have been to cut substantially into their oil reserves for pilot training. This might have fallout in the form of less fuel available to support at-start operations.

[Snigbert]

No. You have to begin by knowing wtf about the history to understand why the Japanese historical move began where it did, and why fundamentally altering Japan's strategic plan for the opening stages of the war means developing resources and putting assets, supplies, and men in other areas where the threats would have been more easily detectable.

Incorrect. If the forces were in place to follow their carefully caculated plans and they had no way of shifting their objectives at such a late hour, what was the point of 'North Wind, Cloudy' and 'West Wind, Clear' which were the other options to attack just Britain, or to go after the Northern Resource Area and attack the SU?
Which locations would have been more easily detectable? Locations more remote than Hawaii where the US had less search capability, forces, and interest in defending?
Why would the US have gone to a more prepared war footing if Japan was building up forces to attack, for example, the SU (if we detected the build up) or some colonial posessions of other countries such as NEI? I think that putting assets, supplies and men in position to attack PH and the PI would have been of the highest interest to the US.


Even a day might have seen all Allied forces on a war footing merely on the basis that a wind msg had been transmitted, and search efforts would already have been in place to locate the threat.

I doubt that, based on the East Wind message, we would have figured out the attack was coming...because it was only in hindsight that it was revealed to the Allies that the East Wind message was anything other than a poor Japanese weather forecast. I agree if the Japanese fleet spent a long time cruising around near Hawaii they would have been detected soon enough but that would be a fairly stupid thing for the Japanese to do.

The US knew an attack could happen at any time.

Dont we always? That doesnt mean we know where, when or how it will happen. Nor does it mean we would be ready to deal with it.

We do not know that they intend to make this a Japanese only option. It goes without saying that the game is less replayable, by giving the Japanese player more at-start options, than it is with both players given more at-start options.

Incorrect. I know what they have put into the Alpha version, which doesnt mean it will make it into the final product. I agree that giving the Allies options on initial deployment would add to replayability, if not adding to the historical accuracy.

Incorrect on both accounts. Japan was woefully unprepared for the war. The US was somewhat prepared and daily becoming much better prepared. Frankly, the historical japanese success was an optimal performance combined with some significant help from local Allied strategic blunders. If an ahistorical pathway is taken, it should require optimum play on the part of the Jpn player and significant blunders on the part of the Allied player to achieve comparable Jpnse initial success.

Japan felt they were prepared for the war, if forced into it. Their weapons and tactics had up until that point worked well against colonial enemies and they had confidence they would continue to be sufficient. They had a history of victories including the war with the SU, taking Manchuria, Korea, much of China. Their forces were in place, they were ready to go into the war. I call that prepared. They would spend the next year or so on the offensive, taking enemy territory with mixed levels of difficulty. I agree they never had the ability to win the war, but that doesnt make them 'unprepared'. Look up the word 'prepared' in the dictionary.
The United States, on the other had, was slowly ramping up it's military. It took 9 months from the beginning of the war before they were capable of going on the offensive at Guadalcanal, and that was a 'Shoestring' Operation. They initially planned on waiting until the destruction of Germany's fighting capacity was assured before they could really go on the offensive against Japan, because they were no prepared for a war in the Pacific.

[TIMJOT]

[QUOTE] mdiehl
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That is precisely the presupposition to which I object. It amounts to the same thing as allowing the Jpn player to completely rewrite the start of the war, knowing as he will the many lessons of history and with full knowledge of at-start deployments, without imagining any kind of altered Allied deployment. It's in effect "1 sided alt history."
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No its not. I said neither side gets to redeploy pre-game start. If the game starts on Nov 7 for example. 1st carrier fleet is anchored at (Harajima?) All the other fleets would also be in their respective anchorages. After the first turn no one could be sure of anyones deployments. The allied player could send the Pac fleet to the SD or he could load up the Philipine Div. and send it to Guam, although that particular move probably would be detected due to Guams proximity to Jpn bases. Point is it would be a chess match in which neither side would benetit from hindsight. The only limiting factors would be logistics, an allied prohibition on an *unprovolked* first strike and some special case deployment restrictions (ie China) along with a certain garrison level requirements for both sides.



(quote)
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Its not justifiable as reasonable alt-history, IMO. All of the pre-war deployments occurred, after all, as part of a sort of non-combat chess match involving deployments and political moves on both sides of the Pacific.
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I think in this case all the pre-decision deployments and political moves would still be applicable. According to Wilmont ( I know you have read him) there was almost an eleventh hour cancellation of the PH portion of the op plan at the begining of Nov. Its really not a stretch that the PH operation could have been cancelled for any number of reasons that would not have effected anything prior to it.


(quote)
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Frankly, the only reason I'd consider purchasing this game is to play it against a human opponent. But if the Jpn player is given initial flexibility (and merely being able to retarget the initial moves is a potentially huge asset) without comparable Allied flexibility, I won't feel the urge to purchase this game until it hits the used software rack.
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I have advocated no such one sided flexibility. Retargeting
is only a huge asset if the allied player does nothing to counter it. If anything the allied player has the advantage in a Nov 7 start date because it makes a PH attack all but impossible. Taking PH out of the equation means an allied player is free to push forces forward to Guam, Wake, Midway and Somoa early on. It Complicates any Japanese move greatly. The only advantage the Japanese player has is that of historical initiative, but historically speaking he will always have that advantage unless he chooses not to attack the US in a move south against the Brits and Dutch. Something alas I very much doubt will be modeled in the game. Ah.... second thought thats not quite correct. Jpn would still have the initiative against the Brits and Dutch just not the US.

[Heeward]

The reason for “a-historical” deployments / options are to allow players to be “Better than Napoleon”. Given a historical start period and amount of assists can “I” do better. Game Editors allow this.

If as the IJN / IJA he decides to invade Hawaii, then he can try. And if he succeeds then he can support a large civilian population at the end of a long supply line. Meanwhile he does not have the troops and more importantly shipping to invade Malay and the Philippines.

For the USN / US Army they can implement War Plan Orange with the Pacific Feet Battleline at sea in the vicinity of Wake, and a CA / CL screen stretching for the Mandates to Iwo Jima, backed up the scouting forces (USN CV’s).

As for results if the USN / US Army implements War Plan Orange, I believe that MacArthur would still invite the December 7th disaster the Philippines. The USN scouting forces including the CV’s would end in a watery grave in the Mid Central Pacific on the opening day of the war. The Battleline would either fatally more forward into the “decisive engagement” and be defeated or retreat back to Pearl Harbor or the west coast.

And of course there is the favorite Final Countdown scenario where the Nimitz’s Air Wing crushes the Kido Butai on December 7th and the war ends days latter with the US using nuclear weapons on Japan from the Nimitz’s stores. Hey quick game, if you want to play it’s up to you.

And that’s the final point of these games / simulations is that they are entertainment / learning tools. It’s supposed to be fun.

[Snigbert]

I agree, I dont think it is unrealistic to have initial deployments realistic to the situation on Dec 7th but allow the players the freedom to do what they want from there. If you player isn't allowed complete control of his forces, it's not as fun (in my opinion). Sure, if you do stupid things like move all of your troops out of China and end up losing all the Japanese gains there, then so be it. But forcing the player to keep static troops in China would suck.

Keep in mind the most popular scenarios in UV are both historical alterations of OOBs, etc. Because they make for a fun and playable game rather than being forced to follow history for the sake of history.

Keep in mind, Mdiehl is only here to be argumentative and criticize games he has no intention of buying or playing. At least, that was the impression I got when he was trashing UV.

As for results if the USN / US Army implements War Plan Orange, I believe that MacArthur would still invite the December 7th disaster the Philippines. The USN scouting forces including the CV’s would end in a watery grave in the Mid Central Pacific on the opening day of the war. The Battleline would either fatally more forward into the “decisive engagement” and be defeated or retreat back to Pearl Harbor or the west coast.

I agree, the 3 US carriers couldn't have taken out the 6 Japanese carriers unless they were very lucky. At best they would take out a few Japanese carriers and succumb to the rest. At which point the Battleships steaming for the Phillipines would succumb to the remaining Kido Butai, or if they were smart enough turn around and head back to Hawaii.

[Tanaka]

Originally posted by Snigbert
I agree, I dont think it is unrealistic to have initial deployments realistic to the situation on Dec 7th but allow the players the freedom to do what they want from there. If you player isn't allowed complete control of his forces, it's not as fun (in my opinion). Sure, if you do stupid things like move all of your troops out of China and end up losing all the Japanese gains there, then so be it. But forcing the player to keep static troops in China would suck.

Keep in mind the most popular scenarios in UV are both historical alterations of OOBs, etc. Because they make for a fun and playable game rather than being forced to follow history for the sake of history.

Keep in mind, Mdiehl is only here to be argumentative and criticize games he has no intention of buying or playing. At least, that was the impression I got when he was trashing UV.

As for results if the USN / US Army implements War Plan Orange, I believe that MacArthur would still invite the December 7th disaster the Philippines. The USN scouting forces including the CV’s would end in a watery grave in the Mid Central Pacific on the opening day of the war. The Battleline would either fatally more forward into the “decisive engagement” and be defeated or retreat back to Pearl Harbor or the west coast.

I agree, the 3 US carriers couldn't have taken out the 6 Japanese carriers unless they were very lucky. At best they would take out a few Japanese carriers and succumb to the rest. At which point the Battleships steaming for the Phillipines would succumb to the remaining Kido Butai, or if they were smart enough turn around and head back to Hawaii.

Very good points!!! I totally agree!!!