Allied Tactics

[Snigbert]

Very good points!!! I totally agree!!!

Thanks, and welcome to the boards.

[Tanaka]

Originally posted by Snigbert
Very good points!!! I totally agree!!!

Thanks, and welcome to the boards.

Oh Im not new. I used to be Iceboy but I changed my profile to reflect my Japanese side playing status.

[CynicAl]

Snigbert - "history of victories including the war with the SU"? Surely you can't mean Nomonhan! But when else did the USSR and Japan go at it prior to 12/41?

3 USN vs 6 IJN CVs? Depends on the situation. I think a "Busted PH Raid," for example, could work out quite nicely for the Americans. IF the USN can concentrate all 3 PacFleet CVs near PH, they only need one piece of luck: somebody has to spot Kido Butai, either on the way in, or before they get too far out. The Japanese almost certainly would NOT spot the US CVs - they weren't flying recon for fear that their recon flights would be spotted and give their presence away. And it gets worse: with so many of the Zeros on TARCAP over Oahu, there wasn't much kept back to fly CAP over Kido Butai itself. So IF there's a fight, the Americans are going to get in an unopposed first strike against a nearly defenceless target. Under the circumstances, I'd say two CVs sunk plus two more damaged badly enough that they can't conduct flight ops is being at least fair to the IJN - of course the damage spread is going to be dependant on local weather conditions over Kido Butai (ie how many ships can duck under storm squalls and avoid being attacked), and severity of damage is going to be greatly influenced by the readiness of specific ships. The Japanese might fare better than that - though that is a pretty fair bit of firepower coming at them. They could also fare Much, Much Worse - though Ultimate Disaster would require not only that Kido Butai be caught in a Midway-esque state of unreadiness, but would also require a degree of raid coordination from the USN which, honestly, they didn't achieve until 1945 (and the IJN never managed against moving targets). So then, after soaking up the worst three US CVGs could throw at him, with probably two-thirds of his flight decks out of order, Nagumo has to start looking for an American fleet which probably now outnumbers him in functioning flight decks. That would be: a) stupid, b) contrary to orders, and c) totally out of character for Nagumo - no, he's going to run, which might or might not give the US CVs a chance to finish off any cripples. Of course, this whole setup also requires that the US crack Japanese naval codes about 6-7 months earlier than they did historically, to allow time to set up the ambush.

I also don't think the US battle line would be as helpless as you make out if attacked at sea. At Pearl Harbor, Japanese torpedo bombers achieved well under 50% hits (40 TBs got either 14 or 15 hits: 1 on NV, 2 on CA, 5 on OK, and 6 or 7 on WV), against stationary, surprised targets, and took disproportionately heavy losses (over 25% for the 40 torpedo-armed aircraft, including those written off upon retrn to their carriers). Sortie those same ships, close them up to battle stations and have them both shooting back and maneuvering evasively... you'll still lose a couple of them, but not all of them; and the Kates won't be back for a second round. I'm not saying that aircraft couldn't kill battleships in 1941; but it worked better when lots of torpedo bombers could concentrate against one or two BBs, and preferably BBs with subpar AA suites. The US battle line would be out in force or not at all; their AA batteries, directed by the Mk37 Fire Control System, were as good as any in the world even before the introduction of the superlative 5"/38 guns and VT-fused shells turned them into uber-flak-batteries-of-death. An attack by Kido Butai on an alerted US Battle Fleet would far from a walkover.

[Mike Scholl]

You are ignoring the fact that the Japanese DID manage to
"rachet up" their production throughout the war. And they did
it in spite of NOT being able to exploit most of the resources
they siezed in the opening run of victory. They wound up having
to base most of their fleet in the Southern Philippines and the
Dutch East Indies because they couldn't bring the oil to the
fleet in Japan. And the fleet wound up using unrefined crude
because they couldn't bring the enough refineries "on line".

Most of the increase in Japan's production during the war
came from RATIONALIZATION of their production capacity----
from getting more bang from their resource buck. Same kind
of thing Albert Speer did in Germany. Germany's maximum
expansion (and resource availability) came in 1942---but peak
production was in 1944 when the resources available were a
lot smaller. In spite of a tradition of technical exellence, NONE
of the Axis powers had anything resembling the American
wealth of MANAGERIAL experiance in large scale production,
nor the experiance in MASS PRODUCTION. During the war they
were forced to adopt this kind of production to try and compete,
and as they did their production efficiency rose.

I simply suggest that having Japanese Industry adopt some
more rational Western production methods in 1940-41 instead
of 1942-3 would make a more interesting and "fun" game for
the Japanese player as his forces would remain more competative
for a longer period. And would be more believable than some
of the redeployment options mentioned. In truth, about the only
place in the Pacific Basin that Kido Butai COULD have sailed
un-noticed in December 1941 was the North Central Pacific.
Anywhere else would have been noticed by civilian shipping if
not by military reccon. And from that location, they could attack
either Hawaii or Alaska (no, they couldn't approach the US
West Coast without tripping over civilian traffic or military recce)
Taking the Carriers south to the Philippines or Malaya would
help those campaigns---but it would be virtually impossible to
achieve the suprise of Pearl Harbor. Which should trigger some
possibility of Western reaction.

[Aussie]

It's obvious that we could muse about these alternative histories (& dimensions in some cases) till the cows come home. One would think that the basic building blocks and components of the game need to be solid to begin with, before we start thinking about adding extra bells and whistles.

[mdiehl]

As for results if the USN / US Army implements War Plan Orange, I believe that MacArthur would still invite the December 7th disaster the Philippines. The USN scouting forces including the CV’s would end in a watery grave in the Mid Central Pacific on the opening day of the war. The Battleline would either fatally more forward into the “decisive engagement” and be defeated or retreat back to Pearl Harbor or the west coast.

If that was meant to be a funny spoof on Japanese propaganda I join you in the sarcasm. If not, the joke's on you.

You are ignoring the fact that the Japanese DID manage to "rachet up" their production throughout the war.

Yes, I agree that they increased production. But look, the original post to which both you and I responded fantasized about Japan achieving production levels comparable to the US. Japan never came remotely close. The models in which producton was veru substantially increased were the simpler, pre-war models (at least when it comes to aircraft). In shipbuilding and maintenance Japanese power plant production and repair was so inadequate that by mid-1944, about 1/3 of Japan's lift capacity was permanently (indefinitely, with no immediate schedule for maintenance) laid up in port for want of repairs. This was not due primarily to losses in oil, but inadequate capacity in yard space and maintenance staff. With unlimited access to resources and no war at all, Japan could possibly have met US 1939 production levels by 1952. Lacking a huge research and induistrial complex comparable to the US (not saying that Jpn had no research capability, just not remotely comparable to the US or UK), they'd have fallen far behind in the weapons tech escalation. It would not have been "The Final Countdown," but it would have been more lopsided than even the historical 1944-45 circumstances.

the increase in Japan's production during the war
came from RATIONALIZATION of their production capacity----
from getting more bang from their resource buck.

Yeah, I agree. The US took rationalization to levels beyond that of the Axis, but it was also our extraordinary capacity for machine tools production that, for example, allowed Chrysler and Ford to manufacture B-24s. That kind of radical production shift was largely beyond the ability of any axis power. Japan otherwise brought very few new production facilities on-line during the war. If I remember right, Boeing alone added three major assembly plants. Increasing capacity (rather than making extant capacity more efficient) requires machine tool production. Machine tool production in turn requires capacity, and Japan did not have alot of capacity in machine tool production at the war's start.

So, belaboring the point, (not for you, Mike, but for for the Axis fanboys who think that a couple years of peace sees Japan cranking out swarms of FW190s comparable to Germany's production): first you have to use your machine tools to build more machine tool plants. Then, when you have enough of those, your machine tool plants build the tools that you need to increase your production capacity for fuel, engines, sheet metal, rivets, switches, bats, cats rats stoats goats, old Gnus and everything else you think you'll need to wage war (except for men and food). Along the way, you have to increase your producton of scholars and techs, so that these guys can train the people to operate all that new capacity. Given that the civilian economy was already falling apart by mid 1941, there's no way Japan continues to wage a war, even in China, while simultaneously catching up to the west with respect to capacity.

I simply suggest that having Japanese Industry adopt some more rational Western production methods in 1940-41 instead of 1942-3 would make a more interesting and "fun" game for the Japanese player as his forces would remain more competative for a longer period. And would be more believable than some of the redeployment options mentioned.

OK. Then I agree, that kind of production increase (via rationalization) would have made Japan more competitive if they'd had another year of half-war (vs China) rather than total war (vs. everybody else).

In truth, about the only place in the Pacific Basin that Kido Butai COULD have sailed un-noticed in December 1941 was the North Central Pacific. Anywhere else would have been noticed by civilian shipping if not by military reccon. And from that location, they could attack either Hawaii or Alaska (no, they couldn't approach the US West Coast without tripping over civilian traffic or military recce) Taking the Carriers south to the Philippines or Malaya would help those campaigns---but it would be virtually impossible to achieve the suprise of Pearl Harbor. Which should trigger some possibility of Western reaction.

Well, yeah I agree. I think I said something similar a few posts back.

The folks who assert that the PH and Clark attacks were a success because the US was somehow systematically lax really do not understand the circumstances that made the PH and Clark raids unique in their own ways. Certainly there were other places that Kido Butai could have sailed and opened the war with a sneak attack: Alaska, Midway, places in the Solomons chain. But what would have been there to attack? Might as well just issue a DoW and say "Here we come: we're gonna get ya!"

[Mike Scholl]

...Looks as if we are beating opposite sides of the same dead
horse. Don't want to end up having an argument with one of
the few folks out there with a real grasp on the history of the
period. Maybe together we tossed a rope around some of the
sillier ideas that have been released in this forum---but I really
don't think we're ever going to get through to some of our
fellow contributors.

[mdiehl]

Keeping in mind that you are an Axis Fanboy with a primitive understanding of the situation in 1941 and no interest in seeing a game that simulates reality, but instead are only interested in being argumentative and remaining uninformed, I accept the fact that none of the following evidence will be interesting to you.

For example.

DECEMBER 2 1941 Diplomatic msg from the US to Japan:
The United States asked Japan for reasons for increasing its forces in Indochina.

"It was my clear understanding that by the terms of the agreement-and there is no present need to discuss the nature of that agreement-between Japan and the French Government at Vichy that the total number of Japanese forces permitted by the terms of that agreement to be stationed in Indochina was very considerably less than the total amount of the forces already there.

"The stationing of these increased Japanese forces in Indochina would seem to imply the utilization of these forces by Japan for purposes of further aggression, since no such number of forces could possibly be required for the policing of that region. . . . because of the broad problem of American defense. I should like to know the intention of the Japanese Government."

(President Roosevelt in note handed to Japanese envoys by Under Secretary Welles.) Peace, p. 823 f.) See doc. Bulletin, Vol. V, No. 130, pp. 540 f.

There's plenty more of this sort of stuff at:

http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/timeline/

Also, in regard to US reaction to a Japanese attack only on the Netherlands East Indies, see for example the following Japanese naval signal of 27 November decrypted by the US Navy on 5 December, 1941:

(Secret)

From: Tokyo (Togo)
To: Washington
27 November 1941
(Purple)
#842


In the middle of your message #1280*, there is the part which mentions that the United States might make a protective occupation of the Dutch East Indies. Now this is a very important matter, and a point which we would like to know more about.

Will you please give us the reason for your mentioning this point, and any other item which might be of help to us in this matter.


25781
JD-1: 7080 (Y) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (6-AR)

And this Japanese note on intensifying Allied preparations and scouting. Trasmitted on 3 December, decrypted by the US on 4 December. So much for fantasies about delayed decryption. My emphases added in boldface.

(Secret)

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
3 December 1941
(Purple)
#878 (In 2 parts, complete)

Re your #1225*.

Chief of Office routing.

1. Apparently, the United States is making much of the statements issued by our governmental organs, the trend of the public opinion, as well as of our troop movements in the south. They have used these as an excuse to doubt our sincerity in wanting to bring about a successful settlement in the Japanese-U. S. negotiations.

We explained the truth behind the alleged Tojo statement in my message #866**. The English translation (this was done in the offices of the Domei News agency) of that statement was very different from the original, and that was responsible for the unexpected reactions.

With regard to guiding general public opinion, this Minister himself has made considerable effort.

The State Department should be in receipt of a report from the U. S. Ambassador in Tokyo regarding this point. As a matter of fact, as your report in your message #1148*** Secretary Hull has expressed his satisfaction over the change for the better along these lines.

In spite of this, the tone of some of the U. S. newspapers seem to be unduly ominous. Moreover, the radio (particularly those which are aired via short wave from San Francisco very recently) has been daily broadcasting in considerable detail, the progress being made in the negotiations. It is quite evident that persons who have access to the records of the meetings are acting as liaison agents for those broadcasts, for otherwise it would be impossible to obtain some of the information that is being aired. We feel that it is very inappropriate for the United States to criticize us without looking after her own house.

(Part 2)

2. Recently, Britain, the United States, and others have been making military preparations against Japan at an every increasing tempo. At the same time, they have been acting in a more and more antagonistic. manner of late. For example, on the 20th of last month, a U. S. plane made a reconnaissance flight over Garanpi in the southern part of Formosa. (We filed a protest with the U. S. Ambassador on the 27th regarding this matter). Since then, however, the British and the United States have shown no indication of ending such activities. In view of the very critical times, we cannot help but hope that such incidents would cease.

3. Our proposal which was submitted on 20 November was based on just principles. Will you please point out again that these principles undoubtedly offer the best chance of leading to an eventual settlement. (We assume that when the United States says in their counter proposal that our terms are not in sympathy with the existing principles, they refer to the contents of Article 4 in which it is stated that the peace between Japan and China shall not be disturbed. We are insisting that all aid to Chiang cease as soon as Japanese-Chinese negotiations, at the instigation of the President of the United States, are launched. Hence, our proposal in no way conflicts with the spirit of the so-called fundamental principles being proclaimed by the United States. Please bear that in mind.

25720
JD-1: (D) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (S-TT
*JD-1: 7042 (S.I.S. #25715).
**Available, dated 3 December.
***JD-1: 6737 (S.I.S. #25174).

(EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE , EXHIBIT NO. 1 INTERCEPTED DIPLOMATIC MESSAGES SENT BY THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT BETWEEN JULY l AND DECEMBER 8, 1941)

Then there is this very interesting evaluation by CNO of a suggestion that the NEI declare a naval exclusion zone in addition to maintaining the already stepped up search patrols. In this case the msg illustrates some of the "ahistorical alternatives" that the Allies might have pursued.

Note that this recommendation was made on 5 December.

Top Secret
5 December 1941
From: CNO
Action: Spenavo London
Info:
042230
While CNO agrees with you that November reports of a Japanese concentration in the Pelews were unfounded, the possibility of an attack by the Japanese from that region against the Philippines or Nei cannot be ruled out. This replies to your 031411 and gives CNO views as to the military aspects of the Dutch project to declare areas south and west Davao dash Waigeo dash equator line dangerous to shipping in order that Dutch forces might attack suspicious vessels entering from north and east. Were this area declared dangerous to shipping the prohibition would apply to all merchant shipping of whatever nationality and to naval vessels of the United States and United Kingdom as well as to those of Japan. Large amounts of shipping traverse this general area and it is questionable if Dutch could set up promptly a naval control system that would obviate excessive delays of shipping most important to the United States and particularly shipping carrying United States naval and army reenforcements to the Philippines as all United States shipping between west coast of United States and the far east area is now routed via Torres Strait. If NEI declares this large area closed it would be quite a different matter from the British closure of the Jahore area which is a very small one. Japan would be free to close Okhotsk Sea, the Sea of Japan, and all the western portion of the South China Sea and the Gulf of Siam. Were the United States to acquiesce in the Dutch declaration it would have few grounds for objecting to a Japanese declaration of the same character. At present United States defense aid is going to Russia via the Okhotsk Sea and the Sea of Japan, and the United States, United Kingdom, and Netherlands East Indies are executing extensive reconnaissance measures in all directions considered dangerous. Shipments to Siberia and reconnaissance measures ought to continue and CNO is convinced a declaration by the Dutch closing the area in question would be most prejudicial to naval and military interests of the three powers. If Dutch authorities consider some warning should be given Japan CNO believes it should take the form of a declaration to Japan that in view of the current situation Japanese naval vessels or expeditionary forces crossing the Davao Waigeo line would be attacked. Communicate these views to the admiralty and the Dutch naval command in London.

(PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY EXHIBIT NO. 79 DESPATCHES ON DUTCH ALERT )

[mdiehl]

And, putting the stake through the heart of the uninformed Snigbert's claim that the US had no idea what "East Wind Rain" might mean, there is this November 28, 1941 decrypt of Japanese communique of 19 November.

(Secret)

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
19 November 1941
(J 19)
Circular #2353

Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.

In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast.

(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger: HIGASHI NO KAZEAME. *

(2) Japan-U. S. S. R. relations: KITANOKAZE KUMORI.**

(3) Japan-British relations: NISHI NO KAZE HARE.***

This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard please destroy all code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement.

Forward as urgent intelligence.

25432
JD-1: 6875 (Y) Navy Trans. 11-28-41 (S-TT)

*East wind rain.
**North wind cloudy.
***West wind clear.

[TIMJOT]

[QUOTE]Originally posted by Mike Scholl
-------------------------------------------------
In truth, about the only place in the Pacific Basin that Kido Butai COULD have sailed
un-noticed in December 1941 was the North Central Pacific.
Anywhere else would have been noticed by civilian shipping if
not by military reccon
--------------------------------------------------


Not entirely true. I believe Kondo's Southern Covering Force; 2BBs, 7 CAs and dozen or so DDs2 managed to sail south undetected. Part of the transport force was spotted, but even with that, heading and intent could not be determined. So its plausible that Kido Butai could sail south undetected. It also could very easily sailed to the Mandates ( No civ. shipping allowed) via the Bonin's and lie in wait under the protection of the many anchorages and airfields to ambush a sorte of the Pac Fleet. Not a bad plan if you consider Kimmels op plan called for the Pac Fleet to conduct a sweeping raid through the Mandates at the start of hostilities. There are a myriad of other possibities that I wont get into. but the point is, it isnt as PH is a slam dunk. Many in the IJN and IJA were against it including key commanders like Kondo and Nagumo. It was an incredible gamble concieved by a degenerate gambler. In the end it almost completely failed achieve any of its stated goals. Rainbow 5 had much more to do with restraining the USN than the tactically insignificant losses a PH.



(quote)Mike Scholl
-----------------------------------------------
Taking the Carriers south to the Philippines or Malaya would
help those campaigns---but it would be virtually impossible to
achieve the suprise of Pearl Harbor. Which should trigger some
possibility of Western reaction.
-----------------------------------------------


Yes and No. If you mean they couldnt have achieved strategic surprise, then I agree. The allies expected them to attack Malaya and the Philipines, but they certainly could and did achieve tactical surprise.

[Tanaka]

Originally posted by TIMJOT

Originally posted by Mike Scholl
-------------------------------------------------
In truth, about the only place in the Pacific Basin that Kido Butai COULD have sailed
un-noticed in December 1941 was the North Central Pacific.
Anywhere else would have been noticed by civilian shipping if
not by military reccon
--------------------------------------------------


Not entirely true. I believe Kondo's Southern Covering Force; 2BBs, 7 CAs and dozen or so DDs2 managed to sail south undetected. Part of the transport force was spotted, but even with that, heading and intent could not be determined. So its plausible that Kido Butai could sail south undetected. It also could very easily sailed to the Mandates ( No civ. shipping allowed) via the Bonin's and lie in wait under the protection of the many anchorages and airfields to ambush a sorte of the Pac Fleet. Not a bad plan if you consider Kimmels op plan called for the Pac Fleet to conduct a sweeping raid through the Mandates at the start of hostilities. There are a myriad of other possibities that I wont get into. but the point is, it isnt as PH is a slam dunk. Many in the IJN and IJA were against it including key commanders like Kondo and Nagumo. It was an incredible gamble concieved by a degenerate gambler. In the end it almost completely failed achieve any of its stated goals. Rainbow 5 had much more to do with restraining the USN than the tactically insignificant losses a PH.



(quote)Mike Scholl
-----------------------------------------------
Taking the Carriers south to the Philippines or Malaya would
help those campaigns---but it would be virtually impossible to
achieve the suprise of Pearl Harbor. Which should trigger some
possibility of Western reaction.
-----------------------------------------------


Yes and No. If you mean they couldnt have achieved strategic surprise, then I agree. The allies expected them to attack Malaya and the Philipines, but they certainly could and did achieve tactical surprise.

Very well put!!!

[mdiehl]

Yes and No. If you mean they couldnt have achieved strategic surprise, then I agree. The allies expected them to attack Malaya and the Philipines, but they certainly could and did achieve tactical surprise.

In the PI, the achievment of "tactical surprise" was an accident that had nothing to do with Japanese operational planning beyond putting the a/c in the air.

[TIMJOT]

Originally posted by mdiehl
In the PI, the achievment of "tactical surprise" was an accident that had nothing to do with Japanese operational planning beyond putting the a/c in the air.

The question was not *HOW* but *WOULD* they achieve tactical surprise.

That being said. I would say it was endemic more than accident. I know very well the chain of events that lead to the FEAF being caught on the ground at Clark. The false alarms, the poor comunications, undecipline comand and control, even plain bad luck. That doesnt change the FACT that the Japanese achieved complete TACTICAL SURPRISE over both Clark and Iba fields. That there had been no warning of their immediate approach and, the first wave was almost at the release line when they were sighted. Is by definition acheiving tactical surprise.

[mdiehl]

Look, I know you're pretty well informed. I think the point where we differ is the nature of the "endemic" part. The Clark/Nichols raid was the first of many "tactical surprise" airstrikes delivered by both sides in the PTO. The Allies were not particularly more vulnerable to this sort of thing than the Japanese. As Allied radar sets became more common, the Allies became particularly less vulnerable.

[panda124c]

Originally posted by mdiehl


Incorrect. Assuming even that the Japanese hit the fuel facilities (which they can do with or withut PacFleet there and which history shows them unable or unwilling to fathom since they did not do so), you're looking at an immediate limitation on the number of ships that can be fueled from PH based on the number of auxiliary tankers that can be brought to service in the area. Fuel tanks are, of themselves, notoriously difficult to set alight; it'd require extensive use of both HE and incendiaries, so any Jpns strike aimed at the fuel tanks loses all anti-ship capability against armored vessels. Even then, all that has been accomplished is essentially to destroy some gigantic fuel drums. Fuel storage tanks could have been completely replaced and refilled withing three months.

There were no other strategically vulnerable assets at PH. About the only way that Japan could have shut down PH for a significant period of time would have been to scuttle Yamato and Musashi at the harbor entrance.

Except for repair facilities (limited yes but much closer than the West Coast), command and control, air bases (used as a staging area for long range AC), training facilities and sub bases.

Incorrect. For Japan to contest the HI (which was heavily garrisoned) they'd need to cancel all ops against the PI and Malaya in order to have sufficient transports and supply train to sustain such an operation. Even then, that does not guarantee a successful conquest of Honolulu, never mind any of the other islands in the HI island chain. If the Jpns get a foothold in the HI, what they then have is an isolated outpost of Japanese units that have to rely on having 6 Jpn carriers permanently stationed en location in order to provide air cover. In these circumstances the US merely has to ramp up other airbases in the region (a matter of a few weeks tops), move in US air units, and let the attrition begin. It'd be the worst sort of tar baby the Japanese could possibly stick their hands or feet into. It'd be like Guadalcanal, except that there would be forty "Henderson Fields" rather than just one, and no Japanese land based air would be able to operate in the area. In these circumstances, none of the 6 PH strike carriers would likely live past February 1942.
[/B]

Any changes in the disposition of major US fleet elements would require Japan to re-think their initial moves.

Japan had no idea of where the US CVs were and had no guarantee that the rest of PacFleet would be, for example, in harbor on 7 December rather than smashing into their flank. Frankly, most of the people who fantasize about what more Japan might have accomplished near the HI during the first week of the war seem to lack any real grasp of the extreme risk that Japan assumed. [/B]

Japan was well aware of the location of the US Fleet units. Their traing facalites for the PH attack were almost 100% correct in name and location. They missed the CV because they moved just before the attack.

[mdiehl]

Except for repair facilities (limited yes but much closer than the West Coast), command and control, air bases (used as a staging area for long range AC), training facilities and sub bases.

That is true, but all of these facilities are, if anything, even less vulnerable to air attack than the oil storage tanks. "Command and control" amounts to personnel and electronics and office equipment. Unless Japan invades the island, they're not going to be effective in eliminating or substantially reducing these assets.

"Air bases" are buildings, fuel facilities and ground equipment: all easily replaced in a fortnight. With respect to air bases Japan historically hit the most vulnerable target and the most difficult one to replace: aircraft. Runway damage is the sort of thing that US can fix in a few hours or less.

US submarine "bases" were tenders and machine shops. The tenders could have been attacked but these were, again, easily replaced. The most effective thing that Japan could have done to the submarines would have been to determine, if they could, where the torpedoes were stored and blow those up. Kido Butai would have been much less likely to achieve this than a well planned saboteur effort.

Machine shops, and the other "repair facilities" that you mention are also easily replaced and in any case not vulnerable to the, frankly, low intensity raid that Kido Butai could muster on its best day. For an understanding of how difficult it is to knock out a machine shop or repair facility for a long time, consider the effort that USAAF 8th AF devoted to assaulting the Me and ball bearing facilities. More tonnage dropped squarely on some of these factories by B17s in single raids than all the planes in Kido Butai could drop if they exhausted all the stores on their CVs.

The US in 1941 did not maintain substantial training facilities in PH, and of those in and around Oahu, even if all had been shut down and never reopened it would not have affected US training schedules in the slightest.

Any changes in the disposition of major US fleet elements would require Japan to re-think their initial moves.

Assuming that they knew about such changes, quite so. Similarly, any changes in Japanese disposition of forces preparatory to different (ahistorical) initial moves might be countered by different deployments of US assets, fleet-wise and otherwise.

Japan was well aware of the location of the US Fleet units.

Japan was not well aware of the locations of US fleet units. They assumed they knew where the US CVs were, and they were wrong. Considering that the CVs were the highest priority target, despite all the success against parked battleships, the raid achieved much less than Jpns op planners had hoped.

Japan was well aware of the layout of PH. It's easy to be correct about which berth will be occupied by, for ex, USS California, because that berth was California's permanent station. Japan could not know, a priori, that California would be in that berth on 7 Dec, because the possibility existed that CA would be at sea at the time of the strike, just as the US CVs were.

They missed the CV because they moved just before the attack.

Japan missed three CVs that were not in harbor where Jpn expected them to be. They did not know where these CVs were, and did not know where they were going. This observation is one of the reasons why I think folks who play monday morning quarterback to Nagumo, arguing that Nagumo should have launched a third wave of strikes, really don't have any knowledge of carrier warfare or of strategic logistics. A third wave could have achieved no significant additional strategic damage at PH, and would have left Kido Butai vulnerable to a potential flanking attack from up to three US CVs.

There is an old AH game, Victory in the Pacific. It has varied starting positions for the US CVs. The game appeals to Axis fanboys because often the US CVs are more vulnerable than they historically were. Sometimes, however, it happens that the two or three US CVs are together and location unknown. Then the Axis fanboys whine and simper because, whilst they pound PacFleet in PH, 2-3US CVs worth of aircraft sink four or five Jpns carriers. A disaster from the outset. This, however, is a highly realistic version of alt history, and its possibility gives more credibility to Nagumo's decision to leave than to any other course of action. A surprise attack from even one US CV might well sink three Japanese CVs. The US would probably then lose the 1 CV to a counter strike, but those sorts of trades are trades that the US can afford to make.

[Yamamoto]

Originally posted by mdiehl
Japan was not well aware of the locations of US fleet units. They assumed they knew where the US CVs were.

The Japanese assumed that the CVs would be in port on Sunday because they had been in port all other SUndays for MONTHS. The fact that they were ordered to remain at sea that weekend only leands more eveidence to support the belief that the president knw about the attack before it happened.

A surprise attack from even one US CV might well sink three Japanese CVs. The US would probably then lose the 1 CV to a counter strike, but those sorts of trades are trades that the US can afford to make.

An attack by 1 CV against 6 CVs would probably result in every attacking plane getting shot down and the attacking CV sunk. We've all seen it happen enough in UV. Any CV vs CV battle in December of 1941 would have been a disaster for teh US, barring some divine intervention ala Midway.

Yamamoto

[mdiehl]

The Japanese assumed that the CVs would be in port on Sunday because they had been in port all other SUndays for MONTHS.

Incorrect. I recommend you visit records of US CV troms. IN any case it illustrates my point exactly. Japan could not be certain where at any given time any American ship could be. Just like every other combatant, they could only operate on the basis of their most current intel and their best guess as to how the situation might conceivably differ from their intel. Frankly, Japan's capability for tracking US ship movements was woefully underdeveloped, and almost completely dependent on visual observation. Their true talent for overlooking the obvious was only made plain at Midway (where the US telegraphed the move in so many ways that the failure of the submarine based aerial recon missions was just the last failure in a string of intel failures).

An attack by 1 CV against 6 CVs would probably result in every attacking plane getting shot down and the attacking CV sunk. We've all seen it happen enough in UV. Any CV vs CV battle in December of 1941 would have been a disaster for teh US, barring some divine intervention ala Midway.

I was talking about historically realistic outcomes. A surprise attack by even 1 US CV while Kido Butai is involved in launching or recovering a/c from the PH strikes would likely (this is my conservative guess) have sunk two Japanese CVs. Japanese CAP-CAC was crude and ineffective. The degree of success of a 1 US CV strike would depend entirely on the circumstances of the strike's arrival. Given that Kido Butai had no scouting missions out and a minimal CAP during the PH operation, I'd say the odds highly favor an effective US surprise attack, had any American CV been in the area to launch one.

As to UV, I agree that probably the game would probably not give much chance of US success even with a 1 CV raid achieving total surprise. The game is highly flawed, and UV has carried this particular flaw (Jpns multi CV TF omnipotence) down from PW.

[mdiehl]

Any CV vs CV battle in December of 1941 would have been a disaster for teh US, barring some divine intervention ala Midway.

Divinity had no part of the US success at Midway. Outstanding US intel was no accident. Putting the US Cvs en location was no accident. Having Yorktown operational in 24 hours was no accident. Having extra search assets at Midway was no accident. That Japan multitasked their CVs to simultaneously attempt to accomplish three missions at once was no accident. It was standard bad operational planning for Japan once all the set piece battles had been won in the first three months of the war. Japan failing to grasp the implications of enhanced US search assets all along the string of islands that link the Hawaiian Islands to Midway was no accident. Japan failing to grasp the odd coincidence that American surface vessels just happened to be in their strategic recon lagoon at the right moment, along with all the other obviously wierd s__t going on in the CenPac was no accident. The latter two were the result of poor pre-war Japanese commitment to intel and their inability to commit resources to (indicative of their contempt for) strategic intelligence.

Midway happened because the Jpns were lax, poorly informed, and poorly prepared, and because the USN was well prepared, well informed, and ready to seize the easy meat that was stupidly handed out by Japan. The only "miracle" at Midway was that the Japanese did not lose *much* more than they actually lost when all the shooting stopped.

[TIMJOT]

Originally posted by mdiehl
Look, I know you're pretty well informed. I think the point where we differ is the nature of the "endemic" part. The Clark/Nichols raid was the first of many "tactical surprise" airstrikes delivered by both sides in the PTO. The Allies were not particularly more vulnerable to this sort of thing than the Japanese. As Allied radar sets became more common, the Allies became particularly less vulnerable.

Endemic in the historical context of USAFFE in 1941. Which had, A wholy inadequate early warning system; a primitive, non-redundant, non-compatible commincation system; and a convoluted, inefficient command and control structure. Everyday after Dec 8th would have seen the situation improve. By April 1942, USAFFE would have been very tough nut.

Look we are talking specifically about attacking the Philipines and Malaya in 1941. IMO the Allies were more vulnerable because The Japanese had the very considerable advantage of the initiative and 2. they had the advantage of an active 5th column providing significant assistance in both locations. Hypothetically though had USAFFE the luxury of the initiative, and an active 5th column, then I agree the Japanese were every bit if not more vulnerable to a first strike "tactical surprise".

Not nit picking, but I believe you ment Clark/Iba raids. Nichols wasnt attacked until Dec 10.