Was Shokaku class the best CV class in Dec 41?

[wdolson]

There is a sort of engineering maxim:

Good
Fast
Cheap

Pick two.

(Fast being the time to get the job done)

Sometimes you can only afford one of the three. The US had the industrial capacity and the wealth to be able to do Good and Fast. Even at that, war time contingencies usually meant "good enough". The Yorktown class was designed while still completely hamstrung by the treaty limits. The Essex class was a sort of Yorktown the way they would have built them without treaty limits. The Midways was a rethinking a carrier into a true capital ship. It was also the first US carrier class designed late enough that real wartime experience could be worked into the design. The ability of British carrier to survive dive bomber attacks really impressed the USN.

The Shokaku was built during a narrow window when the IJN could afford the luxury of building the best. She was built at the same time as the Yamato class. Japan would have been better off if they had thrown the resources that went into the Yamatos at more Shokakus. That would have been a nightmare for the US.

I agree with Nik's points about the Shokaku's survivability. If you look at the dimensions, tonnage, and horsepower between the Shokaku and the Essex, they are very similar. The full load tonnage of an Essex was 8000 tons more than a Yorktown and an Essex was 7000 tons more empty. That extra tonnage went into extra armor, extra spaces for better survivability, and better range.

Both the Yorktown and Hornet were lost in part because hits in the machinery spaces disabled the ship. The Yorktown had all the boilers go out at Midway when a bomb went down the stack. This left the ship dead in the water at a critical time. She was back under steam by the time the torpedo bombers arrived, but if she hadn't lost power, she might have been out of the area by the time the Kates showed up.

The Yorktowns carried a larger airgroup later in the war, but in 1941 the standard USN air group on the Lexingtons and Yorktowns was not much different from the Shokakus. The allocated air group at war's start was 1 VF (18 fighters), 1 VB (18 SBDs), 1 VS (18 SBDs), and 1 VT (18 TBDs). That's 72 aircraft. The Shokaku's at start air group was also 72 with 12 in reserve. So she shipped more aircraft initially.

The difference again is in doctrine and the planes available. As the war went on, USN aircraft also tended to pack down tighter when stowed. The Zero never had fully folding wings. Only the wingtips folded. The Val didn't have any folding mechanism at all. The Judy didn't have folding wings either. At war's start neither the SBD nor the Wildcat had folding wings, but the folding wing F4F-4 became available in the first months of the war. For the same space on deck, the USN could store more F4Fs. As the Helldiver became available and worked out its teething problems, it compacted down more than an SBD. But by the time the Helldiver fully came into fleet operation, most of the air group were Hellcats.

The USN also made more use of the deck park which put vulnerable planes out on top of the ship so they could be easily shoved overboard if they catch fire due to a hit. The hanger was mostly reserved for long term storage and aircraft maintenance. This meant extra work for the deck crews, but it allowed USN carriers to carry bigger air groups. The Japanese tended to keep planes below deck when not doing flight ops. Many of their carriers had two hanger decks. Which complicated aircraft handling, and made the ships more cramped, but in the end didn't improve capacity by much.

Bill

[IdahoNYer]

Wdolson - I'm surprised you didn't emphasize the enclosed hangers on the IJN Carriers....

From Shattered Sword, the enclosed hangers and the doctrine of rearming in the hangers vs. the carrier decks seemed
to be the IJN Carriers Achilles heel - not just the four at Midway, but all IJN designs.

[wdolson]

I guess I touched on it with the deck park, but yes, the USN designed carriers with open hangers that had a lot more air flow than IJN or RN carriers.

Bill

[witpqs]

ORIGINAL: IdahoNYer

Wdolson - I'm surprised you didn't emphasize the enclosed hangers on the IJN Carriers....

From Shattered Sword, the enclosed hangers and the doctrine of rearming in the hangers vs. the carrier decks seemed
to be the IJN Carriers Achilles heel - not just the four at Midway, but all IJN designs.

I think that was mentioned by someone in an earlier post. [:)]

[Lokasenna]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

What on earth did you come out with that snide remark for you twat?

The question was whether the Shokakus were the best carriers in 1941. That - as I made clear in my earlier post - meant a comparison between the Yorktowns and the Japanese ships. I didn't mention the British carriers at all as part this discussion. The only reason I mentioned them subsequently was because someone brought up the armoured deck - and I recalled that famous quote.

Well, taking a page from your book...

I've never heard that quote before. Therefore it isn't famous. That's classic warspite1 logic right there. You don't even play our game, and I know you that well!

[Lokasenna]

ORIGINAL: wdolson

There is a sort of engineering maxim:

Good
Fast
Cheap

Pick two.

(Fast being the time to get the job done)

Sometimes you can only afford one of the three. The US had the industrial capacity and the wealth to be able to do Good and Fast. Even at that, war time contingencies usually meant "good enough". The Yorktown class was designed while still completely hamstrung by the treaty limits. The Essex class was a sort of Yorktown the way they would have built them without treaty limits. The Midways was a rethinking a carrier into a true capital ship. It was also the first US carrier class designed late enough that real wartime experience could be worked into the design. The ability of British carrier to survive dive bomber attacks really impressed the USN.

The Shokaku was built during a narrow window when the IJN could afford the luxury of building the best. She was built at the same time as the Yamato class. Japan would have been better off if they had thrown the resources that went into the Yamatos at more Shokakus. That would have been a nightmare for the US.

I agree with Nik's points about the Shokaku's survivability. If you look at the dimensions, tonnage, and horsepower between the Shokaku and the Essex, they are very similar. The full load tonnage of an Essex was 8000 tons more than a Yorktown and an Essex was 7000 tons more empty. That extra tonnage went into extra armor, extra spaces for better survivability, and better range.

Both the Yorktown and Hornet were lost in part because hits in the machinery spaces disabled the ship. The Yorktown had all the boilers go out at Midway when a bomb went down the stack. This left the ship dead in the water at a critical time. She was back under steam by the time the torpedo bombers arrived, but if she hadn't lost power, she might have been out of the area by the time the Kates showed up.

The Yorktowns carried a larger airgroup later in the war, but in 1941 the standard USN air group on the Lexingtons and Yorktowns was not much different from the Shokakus. The allocated air group at war's start was 1 VF (18 fighters), 1 VB (18 SBDs), 1 VS (18 SBDs), and 1 VT (18 TBDs). That's 72 aircraft. The Shokaku's at start air group was also 72 with 12 in reserve. So she shipped more aircraft initially.

The difference again is in doctrine and the planes available. As the war went on, USN aircraft also tended to pack down tighter when stowed. The Zero never had fully folding wings. Only the wingtips folded. The Val didn't have any folding mechanism at all. The Judy didn't have folding wings either. At war's start neither the SBD nor the Wildcat had folding wings, but the folding wing F4F-4 became available in the first months of the war. For the same space on deck, the USN could store more F4Fs. As the Helldiver became available and worked out its teething problems, it compacted down more than an SBD. But by the time the Helldiver fully came into fleet operation, most of the air group were Hellcats.

The USN also made more use of the deck park which put vulnerable planes out on top of the ship so they could be easily shoved overboard if they catch fire due to a hit. The hanger was mostly reserved for long term storage and aircraft maintenance. This meant extra work for the deck crews, but it allowed USN carriers to carry bigger air groups. The Japanese tended to keep planes below deck when not doing flight ops. Many of their carriers had two hanger decks. Which complicated aircraft handling, and made the ships more cramped, but in the end didn't improve capacity by much.

Bill

As always, you're a font of great information.

[PaxMondo]

ORIGINAL: Lokasenna

ORIGINAL: wdolson

There is a sort of engineering maxim:

Good
Fast
Cheap

Pick two.

(Fast being the time to get the job done)

Sometimes you can only afford one of the three. The US had the industrial capacity and the wealth to be able to do Good and Fast. Even at that, war time contingencies usually meant "good enough". The Yorktown class was designed while still completely hamstrung by the treaty limits. The Essex class was a sort of Yorktown the way they would have built them without treaty limits. The Midways was a rethinking a carrier into a true capital ship. It was also the first US carrier class designed late enough that real wartime experience could be worked into the design. The ability of British carrier to survive dive bomber attacks really impressed the USN.

The Shokaku was built during a narrow window when the IJN could afford the luxury of building the best. She was built at the same time as the Yamato class. Japan would have been better off if they had thrown the resources that went into the Yamatos at more Shokakus. That would have been a nightmare for the US.

I agree with Nik's points about the Shokaku's survivability. If you look at the dimensions, tonnage, and horsepower between the Shokaku and the Essex, they are very similar. The full load tonnage of an Essex was 8000 tons more than a Yorktown and an Essex was 7000 tons more empty. That extra tonnage went into extra armor, extra spaces for better survivability, and better range.

Both the Yorktown and Hornet were lost in part because hits in the machinery spaces disabled the ship. The Yorktown had all the boilers go out at Midway when a bomb went down the stack. This left the ship dead in the water at a critical time. She was back under steam by the time the torpedo bombers arrived, but if she hadn't lost power, she might have been out of the area by the time the Kates showed up.

The Yorktowns carried a larger airgroup later in the war, but in 1941 the standard USN air group on the Lexingtons and Yorktowns was not much different from the Shokakus. The allocated air group at war's start was 1 VF (18 fighters), 1 VB (18 SBDs), 1 VS (18 SBDs), and 1 VT (18 TBDs). That's 72 aircraft. The Shokaku's at start air group was also 72 with 12 in reserve. So she shipped more aircraft initially.

The difference again is in doctrine and the planes available. As the war went on, USN aircraft also tended to pack down tighter when stowed. The Zero never had fully folding wings. Only the wingtips folded. The Val didn't have any folding mechanism at all. The Judy didn't have folding wings either. At war's start neither the SBD nor the Wildcat had folding wings, but the folding wing F4F-4 became available in the first months of the war. For the same space on deck, the USN could store more F4Fs. As the Helldiver became available and worked out its teething problems, it compacted down more than an SBD. But by the time the Helldiver fully came into fleet operation, most of the air group were Hellcats.

The USN also made more use of the deck park which put vulnerable planes out on top of the ship so they could be easily shoved overboard if they catch fire due to a hit. The hanger was mostly reserved for long term storage and aircraft maintenance. This meant extra work for the deck crews, but it allowed USN carriers to carry bigger air groups. The Japanese tended to keep planes below deck when not doing flight ops. Many of their carriers had two hanger decks. Which complicated aircraft handling, and made the ships more cramped, but in the end didn't improve capacity by much.

Bill

As always, you're a font of great information.

+1

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Lokasenna

ORIGINAL: warspite1

What on earth did you come out with that snide remark for you twat?

The question was whether the Shokakus were the best carriers in 1941. That - as I made clear in my earlier post - meant a comparison between the Yorktowns and the Japanese ships. I didn't mention the British carriers at all as part this discussion. The only reason I mentioned them subsequently was because someone brought up the armoured deck - and I recalled that famous quote.

Well, taking a page from your book...

I've never heard that quote before. Therefore it isn't famous. That's classic warspite1 logic right there. You don't even play our game, and I know you that well!

warspite1

You've never heard of it therefore it isn't famous?.......ooookkkaayyyyy....

I don't play the game? What has that got to do with the price of fish? Playing a game is not a prerequisite for visiting a forum. I do so, as I've said before, because of the historical aspects - and this thread is an example of that. I've paid my money, I've bought the game (not that that is a prerequisite either) I have every right to visit, and participate, in this forum.

[Jorge_Stanbury]

+2

As always amazed by the quality of information you can get in this forum [:)]

[John 3rd]

ORIGINAL: Nikademus

The Shokaku class tends to rate higher in terms of survivability over the Enterprise class due to it's better arrangement of the machinery spaces, reducing the liklihood of a singular disabling hit to the machinery spaces. Friedman's carrier book waxed poetic on this. Hornet's disablement was one example of this.

a big factor that often gets missed though is ordinance type. The USN benefited from the fact that their pre-war carriers faced nothing bigger than 250kg bombs of the HE and SAP variety. (550lb) This helped make flight deck repairs more manageable....esp if the hit was SAP. (the con of course being assuming proper detonation, the latter type might penetrate deep into the hull causing damage that would make an intact flight deck superfluous) Enterprise got lucky on at least one occasion when a deep penetrating SAP failed to detonate properly.

The Shokaku's at times took hits from bombs of twice the weight (1000LB "General Purpose"....which could be fused for HE or SAP though in 42 it tended to act primarily as HE)

This resulted in big blasts at the flight deck and hanger deck level, resulting in disablement of flight operations but along with hull deck armor helped keep damage above the waterline.

Against the type of bombs encountered in the Med theater.....I don't think either Pacific oriented carrier design would have faired well though if i'm a betting man i'd rather have a Shok than an Enterprise for getting out of the combat zone purposes for repairs. I think the class did hold up remarkably well given the pounding it took.

Air Group size is a contentious subject and people will tend to never agree fully on the pros and cons. Some argue a bigger Air group will lead to bigger protection thus ensuring survivability yet it can be noted that no determined air attack in the four Pacific battles ever fully stopped an attack resulting in hits and in 3 of 4, a carrier was lost. The UK carriers took a beating that I don't think any IJN or USN pre-war design would have survived and made it back to base. Yes....RN fighter assets were more sparce but this was partially compensated by at the time the world's best developed Fleet Defense doctrine. It should be recalled too that in 41, USN and IJN fighter groups were not much bigger than UK ones. (18-21 fighters) Over time all 3 navies saw the need for more fighters. The UK eventually found ways to foot more planes despite the capacity limitations.

Nik: Which book? Could you provide the full title?

[John 3rd]

I think, from the angle of air doctrine, the Japanese were so far ahead of the Americans that it makes the assertion correct in 1941. Am re-reading Shattered Sword and am always amazed at how Japanese air doctrine so meshed the Carrier Division's into a single unit. Shokaku launches 9 Zero and 27 Val while Zuikaku launches 9 Zero and 27 Kate. They function as a single strike force. Roughly 90 minutes later they can send the exact same strike package at the target by simply reversing the order. That was revolutionary work in 1941.

Course it did help much at Midway since Nagumo and every other staff officer was wedded to the combined arms attack. Think Yamaguchi had it right when he proposed sending just CARDIV2's Vals out against the American. How would a strike of 12-18 Zero and 36 Val have done against old Yorktown? The Kido Butai was GOING to be crippled no matter what by that point of the battle but wouldn't it have been something to think of the ramafications of that strike hitting and then coming back to Hiryu for future use? LOVE 'what ifs!'

[Sardaukar]

Shattered Sword has very good info about Japanese carrier design and some of it's fundamental flaws. Basically, they were designed to dish out damage but not to take it.

On the other hand, as John 3rd says, they were way ahead in carrier doctrine. US started to match that in 1943/44, but then it didn't really matter that much. Japanese doctrine had also it's fundamental flaws, derived from same source as their carrier design. Fixation to "decisive battle" and massed firepower, derived from Battle of Tshushima. Shattered Sword discusses about these things a lot too.

[Symon]

ORIGINAL: Jorge_Stanbury
I am reading "Kaigun", and the authors made the claim that I quote :

In 1941, the two Shokakus - the culmination of prewar Japanese carrier design- were superior to any carrier in the world then in commision"
page 323, chapter Carrier Design and Construction for those that own that excellent book.

The Shokaku class was a superb design, probably the best Japan built, but better than anything in comission in 1941 means, of course, to be superior to the Yorktown class, which in my very amateurish opinion, look better on paper (better fire control, more planes, radar, just to mention some easy to spot capabilities).

Question is, was Shokaku superior? if so why?

It’s the old story of getting 10 analysts in a room and getting 15 different opinions. All ship designs are the result of many, many, many compromises, and warship designs are the worst of the lot in this respect: they must fit institutional and doctrinal considerations into everything else.

When one looks at determining the “best” of anything, it’s a matter of setting up the metrics, determining what weight to give each metric, and deciding the order of importance of each metric. This will be completely arbitrary, and individualistic, as to each analyst. In other words, there is no “answer”; there is only a set of ‘loaded’ opinions. And as you have seen, the opinions, and their metric bases, are endless. One most always understand the subjective imperatives of the analyst, their backgrounds, experience, interest, immersion in the subject, to comprehend their conclusions.

And those conclusions are nothing but a smorgasbord of opinion that may, or may not float your particular boat.

Having said all this, and acknowledging that I am no expert, in any way, I do have an opinion on the OP question. The “Kakus” were the class of the IJN in Dec ’41. By every metric, they were better than Hiryu/Soryu, and by most, better than Akagi/Kaga. Using the same metrics (mine), they were more operationally capable than Lexington/Saratoga. Using my metrics, they were darn near close to the Yorktown class. Some metrics were better, some not so good.

Personally, in Dec ’41, given the doctrinal utilization of the time, I would say they were equal to, or perhaps a teensy skoosh better than the Allied alternatives. A good design, a good implementation, and well executed. Worthy of consideration as the ‘class’ of Dec ’41.

[wdolson]

ORIGINAL: Sardaukar

Shattered Sword has very good info about Japanese carrier design and some of it's fundamental flaws. Basically, they were designed to dish out damage but not to take it.

On the other hand, as John 3rd says, they were way ahead in carrier doctrine. US started to match that in 1943/44, but then it didn't really matter that much. Japanese doctrine had also it's fundamental flaws, derived from same source as their carrier design. Fixation to "decisive battle" and massed firepower, derived from Battle of Tshushima. Shattered Sword discusses about these things a lot too.

In combined carrier ops, the Japanese were ahead of the US early war. However, in other ways, they were not ahead. The USN carrier air groups and the carriers were separate entities that were wedded together for operational purposes. When an air group was depleted or a carrier was damaged, they readily swapped out air groups. That flexibility was a decisive advantage at Midway. The Shokaku and Zuikaku were scheduled to join up with the rest of the KB for Midway. Both had ravaged air groups from Coral Sea and the Shokaku was damaged. If the Japanese had been flexible, they could have combined air groups and sent the Zuikaku to Midway. Instead they sent both carriers home.

The Yorktown took a lot of losses at Coral Sea too. When it got back to Pearl Harbor, it's air group was reconstituted with squadrons from the Saratoga and some of Air Group 5. That put a deck into the battle that under Japanese doctrine would have spent the battle at home.

The Japanese were also more fond of sticking to a plan from on high and put less emphasis on tactical changes as the situation warranted. Against light opposition, this worked well, but broke down as soon as the US started getting some skill. US commanders were given a lot more flexibility once a plan was underway.

I have a friend who is retired Navy. He's always been one to push the rules to the limit. He said he never would have made it in the Air Force or the Army. He points out that in the Navy, everything is allowed unless there is a specific regulation preventing it. In the other services it's the opposite. He gives the reason for this is the nature of command at sea. A commanding officer at sea might face having to improvise his way out of a tough situation with no contact with higher command and needs to have the doctrinal flexibility to do what needs to be done. In the Air Force and Army, those situations happen, but less often.

Bill

[Sardaukar]

ORIGINAL: wdolson

The Shokaku and Zuikaku were scheduled to join up with the rest of the KB for Midway. Both had ravaged air groups from Coral Sea and the Shokaku was damaged. If the Japanese had been flexible, they could have combined air groups and sent the Zuikaku to Midway. Instead they sent both carriers home.

The Yorktown took a lot of losses at Coral Sea too. When it got back to Pearl Harbor, it's air group was reconstituted with squadrons from the Saratoga and some of Air Group 5. That put a deck into the battle that under Japanese doctrine would have spent the battle at home.

Indeed, Midway is one great example to show US flexibility compared to Japanese. Plus massive effort getting Yorktown ready for battle. It'd have been lot more dicey for US if IJN had had 5 carriers in Midway instead of 4.

[Symon]

Let me throw something out, that most people might not consider: Brits couldn't do deck park in the Med, but finally went to deck park in the IO in'45, so they had a very decent airgroup capability at the end of things. Factoring all this in, let me suggest HMS Ark Royal as a serious contender for the "class" of Dec '41.

[Sardaukar]

ORIGINAL: Symon

Let me throw something out, that most people might not consider: Brits couldn't do deck park in the Med, but finally went to deck park in the IO in'45, so they had a very decent airgroup capability at the end of things. Factoring all this in, let me suggest HMS Ark Royal as a serious contender for the "class" of Dec '41.

Indeed. But RN still had smaller air groups than USN CVs, because of armoured deck. It did have benefit against those "pesky" kamikazes (albeit maybe not as big benefit as some say), enabling carrier to survive hit that would have been disabling for US carrier. It's a trade off..and with CV air group size, "quantity has quality of it's own", to quote Uncle Joe.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Sardaukar

ORIGINAL: Symon

Let me throw something out, that most people might not consider: Brits couldn't do deck park in the Med, but finally went to deck park in the IO in'45, so they had a very decent airgroup capability at the end of things. Factoring all this in, let me suggest HMS Ark Royal as a serious contender for the "class" of Dec '41.

Indeed. But RN still had smaller air groups than USN CVs, because of armoured deck. It did have benefit against those "pesky" kamikazes (albeit maybe not as big benefit as some say), enabling carrier to survive hit that would have been disabling for US carrier. It's a trade off..and with CV air group size, "quantity has quality of it's own", to quote Uncle Joe.

warspite1

Not a feature of Ark Royal.

[wdolson]

The Ark Royal was probably the best looking pre-war carrier. However, she did not prove herself as tough as the Shokaku or Yorktown class. Both the Enterprise and Shakaku survived damage on multiple occasions and returned to action. I don't know that much from the sinking of the Ark Royal. Part of the loss was due to human error on the part of the captain, but design features of the ship contributed. In the end she was a one hit wonder (one torpedo did her in).

Being commissioned in 1938, she was a contemporary of the Hiryu/Soryu and Yorktown classes.

Bill

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: wdolson

The Ark Royal was probably the best looking pre-war carrier. However, she did not prove herself as tough as the Shokaku or Yorktown class. Both the Enterprise and Shakaku survived damage on multiple occasions and returned to action. I don't know that much from the sinking of the Ark Royal. Part of the loss was due to human error on the part of the captain, but design features of the ship contributed. In the end she was a one hit wonder (one torpedo did her in).

Being commissioned in 1938, she was a contemporary of the Hiryu/Soryu and Yorktown classes.

Bill

warspite1

I would add this though "she did not prove herself as tough" is perhaps a little unfair. I say this for two reasons:

a) As you say, human error was involved in her loss. Yes, a design shortcoming led to her ultimate end BUT I believe better damage control action ordered by her captain would likely have meant that that design shortcoming never became a factor.

b) She was hit and sunk by torpedo - as was Hornet and Yorktown - generally a more fatal weapon than bombs. How would Ark Royal's design have fared with similar bomb hits? She never was hit in that way and so we will never know.

So "I do not think she proved herself as tough" is a subjective statement as like for like comparisons do not exist.

And just for the avoidance of doubt (and to be clear to certain people) - no I am not suggesting that Ark Royal be classified as "Carrier of 41" - which I believe should remain between the Yorktown and Shokaku-classes.