Allied Tactics

[mogami]

Hi, The main reason for avoiding carrier battles in UV is numbers.
In the Historical Coral Sea scenario it is OK to fight a carrier battle.
In scenario 17 and 19 the USN has to be very carefull. His 2 CV might have to fight 4 or more IJN CV (with at least 1 IJN CVL)
The odds are very bad. Then if he losses the Lex and Yorktown
(even if he sinks 2 IJN CV in return) the next carrier battle will once again be 2 USN CV versus 4 or more IJN CV. In UV it is better to play it safe and wait for at least 2 more USN CV (also this gives time for Lex and Yorktown to upgrade AA and build full size airgroups) Not to mention waiting on the CLAA's
IN UV 1 on 1 carrier battles the USN will match if not out right clobber the IJN

In the early battles it seems the IJN coordinate strikes better then USN. But 2TF of 2 CV each moving together can defeat 6 IJN CV. The one thing the Japanese player dreads is all 6 USN CV moving together in 3 TF's. The IJN loses almost every battle.

[Mike Scholl]

Fair enough, and I withdraw my own snideness. It was the
attitude and tone that the discussion had taken that I was reacting to. My appologies for any ruffled feathers.

I think we all (even the detested MDIEHL) want the same
thing---the best possible WAR IN THE PACIFIC that we can beg,
bully, request and cajol out of 2by3. And "sniping" at one another doesn't help us on that path. It's not each other that
we're trying to influence.

Most of us have one or more points that we would like to
see included in the new game. And we sometimes dissagree
as to what is most important. That's good---makes everyone
refine and re-think their own points. But the sarcasm isn't any
help as it allows the points to be lost in the rhetoric. So how
about we all take a deep breath and start again by stating one
problem that we think 2by3 needs to address. Those that feel
that UV WAS perfect can wait on the sidelines to offer opinion
on the subjects raised. Does that sound like an idea?

[Mike Scholl]

You maintain that US planes were "routinely" superior to
their Japanese counter-parts in the 1942 period, based as far
as I can tell on loss ratios. I can't fault your overall argument
on that basis, but what about effectiveness?

At Midway, the Japanese CAP kept every attack but the very
last from even scoring a hit---and on the last they had been
drawn totally out of position and didn't really engage. Yorktown's
CAP, however, was unable to stop either of the two "scratch-
force" attacks launched against her from scoring hits. And her
CAP certainly had as good a force ratio as the Japanese had had,
with radar to vector them in as well.

I'm not certain loss-ratios for the year reflect the skill of the
initial group of Japanese pilots in achieving results against their
targets. For most of the second half of 1942 the Japanese were
either trying to counter Allied advances from long ranges (as in
supporting Guadalcanal from Rabaul) or fighting "attritional"
battles with forces that were hurting for replacements and parts
against an enemy with a better supply of both (in New Guinea).
Pretty much makes their coming out on the short end of the
loss ratio guaranteed even it their opponants wearn't always
as skilled. I don't say your wrong---but I don't think you're
quite right either.

[Hoplosternum]

One of the big disadvantages that the US player has at the beginning of Scenario #17 is the fighter wings. There is not a huge difference in performance between the two Wildcat types but there is in numbers.

Yorktown and Lexington have 16-18 of the earlier Wildcats a piece so their fighter squadrons are below their usual strength of 36 each. There are no reinforcements for this type, but the replacement pool is filling up with the F4F-4s. Until one of these squadrons upgrades (towards the end of May) to it's full complement of 36 Wildcats the US CVs are at a disadvantage. The IJN fly 24 or 27 Zero's on each of Zuikaku and Shakaku plus some more on Shoho. Thats over 60+ fighters to the US 35+ until the upgrade.

That is not great odds, but with the improved flak and damage control of the US fleets not always suicide. I have certainly come off worse as the IJN in such an early duel Especially as a damaged IJN CV is likely to be out of action for much longer than a damaged US CV and sea supremacy is so vital for the IJN early on.

Once the upgrade takes place then both US Carrier wings go to full strength because the withdrawn F4F-3s go to the pool and then fill up the other CV's fighter wing. Most allied players - or at least the less cautious ones would relish a CV duel in the small window between getting their full fighter wings and before the extra Midway IJN CVs arrive.

Now whether this lack of fighters for the US Coral Sea CVs is accurate I don't know. But it is that or a general allied caution that leads to the US player avoiding an early CV confrontation - not invincible IJN CVs or planes. In my experience the IJN carrier planes tend to drop like flies (although they often get a lot of hits too).

Mdiehl you should try the game you might even like it

[mogami]

Hi, In UV you are forced into using IJN groups. In Pac War and WITP I would recommend using IJA airgroups in defense and save the IJN groups for offensive operations. You don't really want the IJN engaged in day to day activity.
(particulry the long range bombers and fighters-the carrier type bombers in non carrier groups can be utilized up front)

For airbase defense use IJA. The IJN units should be held for use in areas where their commitment will be short in duration and where they will have a numerical advantage. The bombers do not have to be kept in forward bases. Rather keep them in rear areas where they can reach the forward bases. When Allied invasion fleets show up "unleash the hounds"

[LTCMTS]

As far as it goes, Kimmel and Short could have had every strategic warning they had in Washington, and maybe even the decripts of JN-25 made later, and they probably would still have been surprised at Pearl Harbor. Remember that the Navy and War Departments had sent them a "War Warning" on 28 Nov 41, yet both commanders continued peacetime routines. To be caught with your ammo lockers locked and AA guns unmanned after over two years of a world at war was inexcusable.

But remember that what one side thinks another will do is conditioned by what they know of the other side's plans and strategies. The Japanese strategy of invading and conquering the Philippines and Guam, then sitting back and waiting on the USN to come charging through the Mandates to the rescue was based on what they knew about "Plan Orange" from the 1920's and early 1930's. This response was devined by USN attaches and ONI from the mid-1930s. It was for this reason that the "Through Ticket" strategy of immediate attack was replaced with a "cautionary" strategy of accumulating strength before fighting by phases through the Mandates. When Secretary Knox was told of the Pearl Harbor attack, his response was one of disbelief, "They mean the Philippines don't they?". Both Kimmel and Short believed from what we knew and what we planned that the PacFleet and the Hawaii garrison would have time to ramp up for war based on the initial attacks by the Japanese on the Philippines. Short figured that he had to conserve his assets from attack by sabotage and continue training ops in prep for war. Kimmel was saving his assets for a climactic battle he hoped to lure the Japanese into off Wake Island. Only an operational decript telling them the target was Pearl Harbor would have energized them and prevented the IJN from achieving surprise at Pearl Harbor.
Unless you remove MacArthur from the equation, you would also still have operational and tactical surprise and operational failure in the Philippines. It was MacArthur's vacililations that prevented a bomber recon-strike on Taiwan and the mishandling of the air defenses, which included radars that gave early warning of Japanese approachs. Worse, you would still have an egotistical battle plan which sought to stop the Japanese on the beaches with the under equipped, under trained PA divisions. The result was a precipitate retreat which prevented the proper movement of combat sustainment resources into Bataan.
An interesting Allied strategy would be to retire most Philippine/US ground forces into Bataan, leaving the 26th CAV and some PA assets in the San Carlos mountain area to strike into the IJA's rear. Even with the mistakes MacArthur made, the Philippines held out until May 42. With the supplies that had to be abandoned historically available to the defenders, that defense could have lasted 3-6 more months. What impact would that have had on US strategy in the Pacific, specifically the commitmant of major naval forces to combat in the Mandates?

[LTCMTS]

VF strengths on carriers were not just set by production and servicability rates. The F2A-3 and F4F-3 did not have folding wings. There was no air warning radar available before 1941 with which to provide early warning of an air attack, though the tactical disposition allowed for picket destroyers to spot attacks optically and warn the carriers. It did not make tactical sense to use limited hanger and deck space for fighters for an ineffective defense versus offensive capapbilities of VB, VSB and VTBs. That more fighters could be carried was shown by May 1942, when the USN had experience with radar for early warning and fighter control. The fighter complement was increased to 27 F4F-3s. If I remember right the first 36 F4F-4 VFs did not enter combat until Aug 42.
The British response to a similar tactical situation was to build armored carriers and strike down their "fighters" into the armored hanger and rely on AA guns to defeat enemy air attacks. When technology provided the means to defend the carriers and the fleet from air attack at ever greater distances, the British were at a disadvantage because of their dedication of weight and volume to armor and AA guns in lieu of hanger and deck space for fighters.
The IJN's response was to concetrate on offensive power. The Akagi and Kaga both only carried 18 A6M2s to Pearl Harbor. The IJN learned its lesson and increased its fighter complements by Midway, only to come up against the problem of fighters with non-folding wings limiting numbers that could be carried in the hanger (the IJNAF did not use deck parks).

[mdiehl]

Also, maybe I missed something. My available references say that the F4F-3 had superior speed at height, initial climb rate and range on the F4F-4 because of the F4F-4's added weight, the result of additional guns, armor and fuel. David Brown makes this point clearly describing his experiences with the Martlet I and the Wildcat IV.

LCTLMTS that is what I recall too. Snigbert's assessment of the relative merits other than the number of guns doesn't jib with my a/c encyclopedia. Snigbert, are you certain you are looking at the F4F3 stats and not the F3 stats?

Mike Scholl:

I can't fault your overall argument on that basis, but what about effectiveness?

At Midway, the Japanese CAP kept every attack but the very
last from even scoring a hit---and on the last they had been
drawn totally out of position and didn't really engage. Yorktown's
CAP, however, was unable to stop either of the two "scratch-
force" attacks launched against her from scoring hits. And her
CAP certainly had as good a force ratio as the Japanese had had,
with radar to vector them in as well.

Midway was a one-off in many ways. Japanese cap successfully intercepted all of the piecemeal, low altitude attacks. They were out of position for the DB attacks because the Jpns ships lacked the radar to detect the inbound DBs (in the USN, CAC procedure would have left some CAP at altitude to deal with the threat). Frankly, there were enough Jpns CAP available to deal with all the SBD and TBD strikes, given that these arrived largely unescorted. Yet all the Jpns cap were drown down to the duck-shoot at low altitude. It can scarcely be called Japan's best moment, CAP-CAC wise.

Similarly, the US strike coordination was atypically badly done for the time period. The only interesting "what if" scenario here is what would have happened had theJapanese CAP been in position and the US strikes had arrived in a coordinated fashion. For that study I take my cue from Coral Sea... except, of course, the Japanese CVs at Midway would still have been brimming to the gills with improperly stowed ordnance and planes in ready positions. IMO, the outcome is roughly the same, since Jpns CAP-CAC at the time, while effective, was incapable of simply shutting out a coordinated inbound strike.

As was Yorktown's by the way. It's the main reason why one cannot assume that in 1942, even a 1 carrier strike against a 3 carrier group is going to be a complete failure.

... not certain loss-ratios for the year reflect the skill of the initial group of Japanese pilots in achieving results against their targets.

I was specifically talking about USN vs IJN combats through Coral Sea, and the numbers are available in Glantz. At Guadalcanal, the loss ratio favored the US by 2:1, but in fighter vs fighter engagements it was almost exactly 1:1 and slightly favored the Japanese. The event that tilted the loss ratio at Cactus in favor of the 25th AF was, IIRC, a raid on 26 August or thereabouts in which an inbound IJN strike was not detected and caught the defenders out of position.

Range was not that much of a issue here. The Japanese A6M2s had about 10 minutes of air time over Guadalcanal, and most of the engagements lasted less than two minutes. Nor was post-furball losses of damaged Japanese a/c as they returned home. Glantz has done an outstanding job of documenting, momemnt by moment, using logs and records from both sides, which pilot was most likely shot down when and by whom. While both sides had a few instances of "missing, presumed lost" the majority of losses occurred right there over the island.

For most of the second half of 1942 the Japanese were either trying to counter Allied advances from long ranges (as in supporting Guadalcanal from Rabaul) or fighting "attritional"
battles with forces that were hurting for replacements and parts
against an enemy with a better supply of both (in New Guinea).
Pretty much makes their coming out on the short end of the
loss ratio guaranteed even it their opponants wearn't always
as skilled.

I haven't brought NG into this discussion because there is a ton of ambiguity about 25th AF vs PM engagements. You can find lots of accounts of devastated Allied units, but most of the losses were operational rather than to Japanese fights. Since pilot claims from either side are almost useless in this matter, one needs to turn to unit records. There are a couple of published unit histories for units at PM through June 1942, but I don't have them (yet), and no one in these forums has cracked them open to make any sort of case about the performance turned in by P40s vs A6Ms.

I don't say your wrong---but I don't think you're quite right either.

Then I'll try to be clearer about what ground I'm "defending." I'm saying that in any engagement between the USN (or a land based USMC air unit) where comparable numbers of a/c are engaged and the primary types are F4Fs, SBDs, TBD/TBFs, A6Ms, Kates and Vals, aircraft loss ratios in the first half of 1942 should tend to favor the USN. Where comparable numbers of CVs are involved, ship loss ratios should be relatively even.

Tactical surprise in 1942 should be very unlikely unless one player is assailing, for example, a land airbase with no supporting a/c from one of his own land bases. The Japanese defeat at Midway was a likely, expectable, predictable outcome (as both Japanese and American pre-engagement wargaming suggested might happen), when you overtask (the modern phrase is "mission creep") your CVs.


To all:

As to attitude, I'll brook no rebuke on that grounds. My patience is limited, and if you push my "nuke" button enough, don't be surprised when you get nuked.

[Snigbert]

LCTLMTS that is what I recall too. Snigbert's assessment of the relative merits other than the number of guns doesn't jib with my a/c encyclopedia. Snigbert, are you certain you are looking at the F4F3 stats and not the F3 stats?

It was the F4F-3 but unfortunately the site I was looking at doesnt quote a source.

http://www.acepilots.com/planes/f4f_wildcat.html

As to attitude, I'll brook no rebuke on that grounds. My patience is limited, and if you push my "nuke" button enough, don't be surprised when you get nuked.

The trick is, waiting until someone pushes them beforing nuking.

[mdiehl]

The trick is, waiting until someone pushes them beforing nuking.

True. Per my private communique I'll agree that I may have been hasty.

So, does UV rate the F4F3 as an inferior a/c with respect to speed and climb than the F4F4? If so, Matrix should consider amending the data.

From The Complete Encyclopedia of World Aircraft (Barnes and Noble 1997:474) the F4F3 is rated with a top level flight speed of 335 MPH @ 21,300 feet) in contrast with the F4F4 (318 mph @ 19,400 feet). Aircraft of WWII (Aerospace Publications, Fishwyck, Aus, 1998) gives the F4F4 a top speed of 320 mph @ 18,800. basically consistent between sources on the F4F-4. The airspeed of the F4F3 and climb rate is not given. I recall several sources mentioning a preferance for the F4F3, and late war FM2s, because both were lighter, more maneuverable, and had more gun time. Moreover, it stands to logic that the F4F3 had a greater climb and roll rate because it ws in fact a lighter plane, had the same wing and body configuration, and had the same engine.

The problem in PW was that the EXP ratings were so deterministic that one could not duplicate historical USN/USMC success owing to the difference between the EXPs assigned to the Japanese and American units. From the AARs in UV, it certainly looks like the problem is still there.

[LTCMTS]

The references I use are Green's Warplanes of the Second World War series, Brown's Wings of the Navy, Green and Swanborough's Complete Book of Fighters and Wagner's American Combat Planes. The problem in Wagner's is that the data tables for the F4F-4 and F4F-3 are definitely switched as max weight for the F4F-3 is given as 8152 lbs and F4F-4 is given as 6711 lbs, which doesn't track with other references. Remember that there was also an F4F-3A model with significantly different performance using the R1830-90 with a single stage suoercharger ILO the R1830-76 with the two stage supercharger. The F4F-3A was used primarily by the Marines. The USN and USMC received 185 F4F-3 and 95 F4F-3A, along with 108 F2A-3 and 43 F2A-2 by Dec 41. With seven carriers in service, there were more than enough aircraft, even after attrition to support 27 a/c VF squadrons in Dec 41, yet during the abortive relief of Wake Island the Lexington had 21 F2A-3 and the Saratoga had 11 F4F-3 and 14 F2A-3 (from VMF-221, intended as reinforcements) according to Lindstrom in First Team,

[LTCMTS]

The problem with using the IJAAF for air base defense outside the China, SEA and Home Islands is the IJA's antipathy for the IJN. IJAAF units served in the Rabaul and New Guinea areas, and later in the defense of the Philippines but the defense of those areas and the Pacific islands was left to the IJNAF. The other reason was the very short range of most IJAAF fighters which precluded self-deployment over any distance over water and the lack of a/c transports to deploy these units the way the US did with the train ferrys and the surplus of escort carriers.

[Admiral DadMan]

Originally posted by mdiehl
...
So, does UV rate the F4F3 as an inferior a/c with respect to speed and climb than the F4F4? If so, Matrix should consider amending the data...

UV Wildcat Values:

F4F-3
Speed 325; Cruise 155; Climb 2200; Combat Radius 210 Mi; Extended Radius 280 Mi


F4F-4
Speed 318; Cruise 155; Climb 1950; Combat Radius 187 Mi; Extended Radius 250 Mi


Geez, I'd trade the -4 for the -3 for the action range alone...

[Snigbert]

The problem with using the IJAAF for air base defense outside the China, SEA and Home Islands is the IJA's antipathy for the IJN. IJAAF units served in the Rabaul and New Guinea areas, and later in the defense of the Philippines but the defense of those areas and the Pacific islands was left to the IJNAF. The other reason was the very short range of most IJAAF fighters which precluded self-deployment over any distance over water and the lack of a/c transports to deploy these units the way the US did with the train ferrys and the surplus of escort carriers.

Fortunately for the Japanese player, there is no IJN/IJA rivalry in game terms...so the player has the (unhistorical) luxury of meshing his IJAAF and IJNAF units in a defensive network of his liking.
It would be cool if they could create an AI for the IJN or IJA only, and you could play either and let the AI control the other against the allied player or allied AI. That would help limit the game to realistic interactions between the two. Of course, then you would have the problem of one hand not knowing what the other was doing.

[Snigbert]

So, does UV rate the F4F3 as an inferior a/c with respect to speed and climb than the F4F4? If so, Matrix should consider amending the data.

I went and checked and the -3 has superior speed, manueverability and climb but lower firepower rating. Someone did their homework there, it seems.

I also checked the pilots ratings...

In May '42 (Start of the game) the Lexington and Yorktown have pilot experience ratings of 74 and 76 for their fighter squadrons.

In a scenario starting in Feb '43 the Saratoga's -4 pilots start with experience 80, and some of the escort carrier's squadrons were in the mid 80s. I'm not sure how drastic of an effect experience has on combat (morale has a very large effect) but it seems there is an average of 10 points difference from beginning to mid game.

[Drongo]

Posted by Mdiehl

If you knew any history you'd know that F4F3s, F4F4s throughout the first six months of 1942 USN pilots ran up an almost 2:1 favorable kill ratio when F4Fs of any kind confronted A6Ms.

Then I'll try to be clearer about what ground I'm "defending." I'm saying that in any engagement between the USN (or a land based USMC air unit) where comparable numbers of a/c are engaged and the primary types are F4Fs, SBDs, TBD/TBFs, A6Ms, Kates and Vals, aircraft loss ratios in the first half of 1942 should tend to favor the USN.

On my understanding, the first 6 months of 1942 covers only 2 engagements that involved clashes between the USN F4Fs and the IJN A6Ms. Are you stating that the overall exchange rate in head to head aerial combat between those 2 a/c types during that period favoured the F4F (almost) 2 to 1?

Since I don't know who this Glanz/Glantz is (I'm sure you'll excuse my ignorance), would you care to post which particular work of his you are referring to?

Even better would be to show a break down of his exact figures on the following :

May 7 1942 - losses from fighter vs fighter clashes during the attack on the Shoho.
May 8 1942 - losses from fighter vs fighter clashes during the USN attack and seperate losses for the IJN attack.
June 4 1942 - losses from fighter vs fighter clashes during the IJN attack on Midway, the USN attacks on the Jap CVs and finally, the Hiryu's strike on the Yorktown.

During testing, we have done comparisons between the combat model's results and historical results (using various references like John B. Lundstrom's First Team books). It would be interesting to see how Glanz/Glantz's figures sit with the others. Another view is always helpful.

Thanks for any effort.

[Mike Scholl]

Originally posted by Admiral DadMan
UV Wildcat Values:

F4F-3
Speed 325; Cruise 155; Climb 2200; Combat Radius 210 Mi; Extended Radius 280 Mi


F4F-4
Speed 318; Cruise 155; Climb 1950; Combat Radius 187 Mi; Extended Radius 250 Mi


Geez, I'd trade the -4 for the -3 for the action range alone...

The aircraft shown above are virtually identical except that
one is carrying slightly more weight in equipment/armament---
yet there is a distinct difference in performance and range.
This is one problem which UV doesn't address on a MISSION
basis for each aircraft type. Different missions required different
loading and attachments for the aircraft involved. Strap a bomb
on one of the above aircraft (such as was done at Wake) and
the range/performance falls off significantly.

A P-51 in "escort" mode could fly missions of almost 1000
miles with it's drop tanks, though usually the planning was for
5-600 with the tanks being dropped as soon as opposition was
encountered. But as a "fighter-bomber", with ordinance replacing
the feul tanks, the range fell to around 200 miles. To a greater
or lessor degree, the same is true of most fighters. They have
an "extended" fighter range which they can reach with the
minimum feul needed for a very short engagement; a "normal"
range at which they can make full use of all their capabilities for
a more lengthly engagement; and a "fighter-bomber" range to
which they can drag meaningfull amounts of strap-on ordinance.
Their best air-to-air capabilities are at the "normal" range, where
they have plenty of reserve feul to climb and manuever and are
unencumbered with external loads and fittings.

The same thing is true for bomber type aircraft. Maximum range and performance are achieved with maximum feul and
no ordinance load (for reccon or transfer). The range with a
"maximum ordinance" load is the shortest, and puts the most
"bang" on the target. But most attacks (especially with the ranges in the Pacific) involved a trade-off with smaller bomb-
load allowing feul for a greater strike range. B-17's and 24's
could carry their 'maximum loads" to only about half the range
they could carry a "minimum useful load". A Betty could carry
an 1100 lb bomb load about half again as far as it could carry
an 1800 lb. torpedo (which required the removal of the bomb-
bay doors in most of the earlier models). They could bomb Singapore from Indo-China, but they couldn't torpedo any ships
unless they came north a way.

The early reporting I've seen from the WITP testing seems
to indicate that the system still doesn't really make these distinctions well. Any of you playtestors out ther who would confirm or dispute this? What's the "extended" range of a P-40,
as opposed to it's "normal" range, as opposed to it's "fighter-bomber" range?

[Snigbert]

Mike, the way that UV and WitP make this distinction (my understanding) is as follows:

Take a Val for example. If it is attacking a target withing a certain distance (I dont have any exact figures off hand) it will use the 250kg bomb. However, if it attacking a target at a further than optimal distance it will use the 60kg bombs which give it a longer range due to less weight.

I havent made enough observations on Fighter bombers to see if this holds true for bombing missions vs fighter sweeps, CAP, etc.

Another example is the Betty, which can attack targets with torpedos up to a certain range, or with bombs at a different range.

I wasnt sure why my Vals were attacking with 60 kg bombs sometime and 250kg other time, and getting frustrated by it until I realized it was the range factor.

[mdiehl]

OK. Matrix needs to reconsider the combat stats for the F4F-3, IMO. I have three sources that consistently give the F4F-3 a max level flight speed of 330 mph (making it dead even with the A6M) above 20K feet. My sources vary on climb rate; it is possible that Matrix rate of 2200 is a little too high.

Here's an internet source that you can examine that gives the stats for the F4F-3 (most just say "F4F" and then proceed to give the stats for the F4F-4, or just give the stats for the latter):

http://www.csd.uwo.ca/~pettypi/elevon/b ... r/f4f.html

Engine: Pratt & Whitney R-1830-76 Twin Wasp, 14-cylinder, two-row radial engine, with a two-speed, two-stage mechanical supercharger. Three-bladed Curtiss Electric C5315(S) propeller with a diameter of 9ft 9in. Power of 1200hp at 2700rpm for take-off. Military power 1100hp at 2550rpm, sea level; 1000hp at 19000ft. 147 US gallons in internal fuel tanks, provision for one 58 US gallon external tank under each wing.

Performance: 278mph at sea level, 330mph at 22000ft. Max range cruise 185mph. Initial climb rate 2050ft/min. Service ceiling 31000ft, absolute ceiling 32600ft. Max endurance 9.4 hrs. Take-off distance 228ft into a 25kn wind.

Weights: 5293lb empty, 7467lb normal, 3978kg max take-off.

Dimensions: Wing span 38ft, length 28ft 9 3/8in, height 8ft, wing area 260ft2. Wing root chord 8ft 7in, wing tip chord 5ft 1 5/8in.

Armament: Four Colt-Browning 0.50 guns. Two 100lb bombs.

Naturally the bomb load would be an unusual load out for an F4F, although they used bombs to great effect in the defense of Wake Island, sinking (IIRC) one ship and contributing to the destructoin of three others (in combination with coast defense artillery).

[mdiehl]

On my understanding, the first 6 months of 1942 covers only 2 engagements that involved clashes between the USN F4Fs and the IJN A6Ms. Are you stating that the overall exchange rate in head to head aerial combat between those 2 a/c types during that period favoured the F4F (almost) 2 to 1?

About 1.6:1. (The 2:1 was apparently my recollection of Halsey's estimates that he found to be an unacceptable loss ratio in August 1942.) My error on the reference. Lundstrom's "1st Team" pair of books is the one. When you go over the tallies in "~at Guadalcanal" the Japanese come out a little ahead in direct clashes between A6M types and F4Fs, but as Lundstrom points out, there was one surprise strike in late August that makes all the difference. In direct clashes between CVs, the USN fighter pilots consistently shot down more Japanese fighters than the Americans lost. If the EXP/combat stat combinations are leading to results that consistently put the Japanese in the victory column, then things need to be tweaked. I would expect any good simulation to engineer parity in losses or better as the expected outcome for the USN prior to September 1942 in CV engagements. Thereafter, improvements in Allied CAP CAC should result in the Jpns carriers being gradually left behind, regardless of pilot or carrier attrition. (Assuming that there is no "research" function or anything like that akin to, for example, Avalon Hill's "Empire of the Rising Sun.")