Allied Tactics

[Chiteng]

Originally posted by Mike Scholl
Historically, this is pretty much a "no-go" as well. Yes, there
IS a rail connection from French Indo-China up into China itself.
But it ain't the B&O by a LONG shot. The weight of the rail in
almost all of these railroads was much lighter than a standard
US Railroad, the rolling stock and engine capacity lighter as well.
The roads are still dirt, and there are a fair sized group of
mountains on the China/Indo China border (which is why China
ends where it does, and Viet Nam/Laos begin). If 2by3 have
done their homework, you will find it VERY difficult to support
even a Corps advance along this route.., and it still really doesn't
go anywhere useful for several hundred additional miles.

Whoever it was that pointed out that if you had come this far
you would be better off going to Formosa had the right idea.
Most of the "freight' in China travelled on rivers and canals at
this time---and they don't go where you want to go. ONE Liberty
Ship can dump thousands of tons of supply right on the Formosa
docks (weight depends more on what's being shipped than the
actual capacity). Bringing the same amount north on trains that
far will need anything up to 25 trainloads---if the Japanese have
left the rails, bridges, water supplies, and tunnels intact. And if
the Chinese don't steal half of it before it arrives.

The best way to put it is to think of the Asian Continent as a
VERY BIG, VERY DRY, sponge. It will SUCK UP a HUGE amount of
effort, men, and material before a "trickle" oozes from the other
side. Islands (of any size) provide far easier access and control
for your forces---and if you don't need them you can by-pass 'em
and not have to worry about their garrisons. Plus staging a
major advance out of the Indian Ocean requires that EVERYTHING
be shipped half-way around the world before you even START.
It's fun to dream about, but logistically it's a screaming, cold-sweat, NIGHTMARE!!

If 2by3 is on it's toes, supply available in Karachi will be limited
and take a BIG investment in shipping to increase. It takes a
LOT more ships "in transit" to deliver the same tonnage over
15,000 miles than it does over 5,000---and building them means you can't build something else. Guess we'll see....

Ok then say ramp up production of C-47
Each only delivers two tons per flight?

in a short period of time you would have a great airlift capacity.
Unless the game artificially constrains you. which Gary's game tend to do.

[Mike Scholl]

Originally posted by Snigbert
I hope I am excited for no reason..., and UV does give some

Mike, you should try to take people's speculation about the game with a grain of salt, keep in mind only the developers and beta testers have played it an anyone else is just guessing at how and what may be implemented.

Mogami, Couldnt you supply Hanoi through Haiphong? I dont have the map in front of me but I seem to recall that being the deep water port that served Hanoi, while Cam Rahn Bay served Saigon.

What about the Burma road? IIRC correctly most of the British effort in Burma initially was an attempt to open that supply route to China. Does that cross the Himalayas or lower country? I realize a supply route isn't neccessarily enough to move and supply an army through, but it was seen as a while as a lifeline for Chinese forces so I imagine it must have had significant capacity.

You're probably right, but I get frustraited when I see player
speculation wandering so far from the constraints of reality. If
it's speculation people want, then they should try WORLD IN FLAMES or PACIFIC WAR. I'm hoping for an "engine" that will
saddle me with the "chains of reality" logistics-wise so that I
can deal with the problems faced by the historic commanders
and "second guess" them where I don't agree.

Cam Ran Bay was a magnificent harbor that served NO inland
area at this time. The Japanese used it as a naval staging area
because it was isolated (and therefor less observed). The Americans in the 60's were the first to use it as a major entre-
port "in country"---and we had to build the facilities. Saigon
is a fair sized port up the Mekong River, much as New Orleans
is up the Mississippi.

The 'Burma Road" was more of a psychological "crutch" for
keeping the Chinese going than a real source in supply. And the
Brits expended virtually NO effort to get it re-opened, correctly
recognizing China as a "rat-hole" for material and supply (dump
a lot in..., get nothing out.) They were trying to move down the
Arrykan Coast early, and directly into central Burma later. Only
the Americans (especially Roosevelt) felt supporting China to be
worthwhile. And even then Stillwill wasn't given much to work with. And while the "Road" doesn't cross the Himalayas proper,
it still crosses quite a "Hump".

[Mike Scholl]

Originally posted by Chiteng
Ok then say ramp up production of C-47
Each only delivers two tons per flight?

in a short period of time you would have a great airlift capacity.
Unless the game artificially constrains you. which Gary's game tend to do.

You are TRUELY the "eternal optimist", arent you? OK, so your
C-47 delivers two tons into China, right? Now half of that 2 tons
has to be feul, oil, and spare parts just to fly your C-47 back to
India. And the aircraft loss rate on the "Hump" was high, so for
every 8-10 C-47's you put on the route, you can count on losing
at least one a month---so your WHOLE force has to be replaced
every year before you get any increase! And every ton you use
(as well as every aircraft) STILL has to come half-way around the world just to START. And remember, you started this whole conversation talking about putting an armored force in China---
how do you get anything bigger than a jeep into a c-47? At
about 30 tons apiece, even a single Sherman "broken down"
is going to take a lot of flights. Keeping Chenault's small "Air
Force" active in China during the war strained the air supply
route heavily. When the attempt was made to fly B-29's out
of China, the bombers wound up flying far more missions to
bring up their own supply than they did to attack Japan. It
just doesn't work!

Air supply was a useful tool for getting essential parts to
locations in a hurry. And late in the war for flying casualties back.
They could keep an Airborne Unit going for a while in a vertical
envelopment. And MacArthur used it successfully to help his
advance over the Owen Stanley's at the tail of New Guinea.
But it was a very expensive and wastefull way of moving supplies
and equipment and totally unsuited to maintaining a major
effort over any significant distance. Trucks on roads are many times as effecient, and Trains on track are many times as effecient
as Trucks, and ships on the sea are many times as effecient as
trains. Even today, with much better and more effecient aircraft that are actually capable of carrying a tank, when the 4th Infantry
had to go to Kuwait rather than Turkey, only the men (and women) flew---everything else went through the Suez Canal on ships.

[Chiteng]

Originally posted by Mike Scholl
You are TRUELY the "eternal optimist", arent you? OK, so your
C-47 delivers two tons into China, right? Now half of that 2 tons
has to be feul, oil, and spare parts just to fly your C-47 back to
India. And the aircraft loss rate on the "Hump" was high, so for
every 8-10 C-47's you put on the route, you can count on losing
at least one a month---so your WHOLE force has to be replaced
every year before you get any increase! And every ton you use
(as well as every aircraft) STILL has to come half-way around the world just to START. And remember, you started this whole conversation talking about putting an armored force in China---
how do you get anything bigger than a jeep into a c-47? At
about 30 tons apiece, even a single Sherman "broken down"
is going to take a lot of flights. Keeping Chenault's small "Air
Force" active in China during the war strained the air supply
route heavily. When the attempt was made to fly B-29's out
of China, the bombers wound up flying far more missions to
bring up their own supply than they did to attack Japan. It
just doesn't work!

Air supply was a useful tool for getting essential parts to
locations in a hurry. And late in the war for flying casualties back.
They could keep an Airborne Unit going for a while in a vertical
envelopment. And MacArthur used it successfully to help his
advance over the Owen Stanley's at the tail of New Guinea.
But it was a very expensive and wastefull way of moving supplies
and equipment and totally unsuited to maintaining a major
effort over any significant distance. Trucks on roads are many times as effecient, and Trains on track are many times as effecient
as Trucks, and ships on the sea are many times as effecient as
trains. Even today, with much better and more effecient aircraft that are actually capable of carrying a tank, when the 4th Infantry
had to go to Kuwait rather than Turkey, only the men (and women) flew---everything else went through the Suez Canal on ships.

Actually I am quite well versed on such topics. I am well aware
that it would be difficult. However, there is a difference between difficult, impractical, and immpossible.

First, the supposition that the number of C-47 produced remains fixxed. That by no means needs to be true.
Second that you cant expand airlift, that also need not be true.

In a realistic game, that gives you the ACTUAL production capability of the USA, rather than arificially constrained
production that serves to prevent things you dont want to deal with, is my real issue.

If the intent is to produce a kind of enhanced World in Flames
I would like to have input on that.

You assume that new railroads cant be laid down. Why is that again? Haiphong is not a visible port on the web pictures.
Why is that? It WAS.

Not just any port could handle Subs. It took special facilities.
Is that recognized? It sure ISNT in UV.

Reality, is in the hands of the designer.

Just like the B-17 being turned into an A-10 in UV. It wasnt used that way. It was too expensive a weapon system.
But that doesnt matter in UV does it?

You claim a different strategy isnt 'realistic' on one hand
and you embrace 'unrealism' on the other. make up your mind please.

[Mike Scholl]

Originally posted by Chiteng
Actually I am quite well versed on such topics. I am well aware
that it would be difficult. However, there is a difference between difficult, impractical, and immpossible.

First, the supposition that the number of C-47 produced remains fixxed. That by no means needs to be true.
Second that you cant expand airlift, that also need not be true.

In a realistic game, that gives you the ACTUAL production capability of the USA, rather than arificially constrained
production that serves to prevent things you dont want to deal with, is my real issue.

If the intent is to produce a kind of enhanced World in Flames
I would like to have input on that.

You assume that new railroads cant be laid down. Why is that again? Haiphong is not a visible port on the web pictures.
Why is that? It WAS.

Not just any port could handle Subs. It took special facilities.
Is that recognized? It sure ISNT in UV.

Reality, is in the hands of the designer.

Just like the B-17 being turned into an A-10 in UV. It wasnt used that way. It was too expensive a weapon system.
But that doesnt matter in UV does it?

You claim a different strategy isnt 'realistic' on one hand
and you embrace 'unrealism' on the other. make up your mind please.

By point and paragraph...Just how many transport planes do
you intend to build? And what are you going to give up to get them? As I recall, the US built about 18,000 transports of various
types during the war---and the effort you describe is going to need at least triple that. Plus hundreds of additional merchant ships to carry all that stuff to India and beyond.

I'm certainly hoping for a realistic US production capacity---with
a realistic European Campaign draining off a considerable amount
of it. There are also certain realistic limits to how much change
that production can undergo. Exchanging aircraft types is a
matter of retooling plants---but Electric Boat or the Brooklyn Naval
Yard can't be switched to aircraft production. Most major Naval
Construction had been authorized BEFORE the war began. You
could cut back some on landing craft if you aren't going to need
as many in the Pacific---but Europe still needs them.

Sure you can build new railroads---how many years is this going to take? By the time the Japanese managed to get the
Burma-Thailand linkage up and working (a narrow-gage and light
loading route), they were on the verge of being driven out of
Burma. US railroads were badly in need of repair and replacement by the end of the war do to the volumn of traffic and
the unavailability of new rail because of the war effort. Finding
rail for several hundred miles of heavy gage double tracked new
construction (and yards and sidings and loading bays) is going
to need a lot of steel from something else. As for Haiphong, I
just figured they hadn't finished putting all the symbology on the map---it was certainly a port.

Actually, almost any port could handle submarines..., if you
had the Submarine Tenders there to do it with. But you are right
that UV could use some of these to go along with the Seaplane
tenders rather than allowing any port the capibility. Subs did need specialized servicing and should probably be limited to operating from a few Major Ports, and need Submarine Tender support anywhere else.

I've been pressing for months to get 2by3 to adopt an air system that matches aircraft capability to aircraft missions! Which
would make a B-17 much less effective when used for ground support or naval attack than it would be used in it's proper role.
In the old WITP board game the ultimate anti-naval weapon was
the B-24 used for "skip-bombing"---utterly absurd, but it slipped through the testing.

I'm not defending UV.., it's a good "first step" but it still has problems. And I agree with you on several you've mentioned.
But a "land war in Asia" still isn't a realistic option for the US and
Britian. The logistics just don't make it a feasible proposition.
If you want to drive tanks through Northern China, you realistically are going to have to wait for Soviet intervention.
I'm all for looking at different strategic options---that's a good portion of wanting to play the game. A "China Offensive" just
isn't one of those options---far to much effort and material required for far too little possibility of return.

I don't mean to sound like I'm picking on you---I like your enthusiasm and enjoy the exchanges. It's just that IF the strategy
you are proposing IS a viable game option, it will mean the logistics system (and the game) is broken. And I'm hoping for more.

[Chiteng]

Originally posted by Mike Scholl
By point and paragraph...Just how many transport planes do
you intend to build? And what are you going to give up to get them? As I recall, the US built about 18,000 transports of various
types during the war---and the effort you describe is going to need at least triple that. Plus hundreds of additional merchant ships to carry all that stuff to India and beyond.

I'm certainly hoping for a realistic US production capacity---with
a realistic European Campaign draining off a considerable amount
of it. There are also certain realistic limits to how much change
that production can undergo. Exchanging aircraft types is a
matter of retooling plants---but Electric Boat or the Brooklyn Naval
Yard can't be switched to aircraft production. Most major Naval
Construction had been authorized BEFORE the war began. You
could cut back some on landing craft if you aren't going to need
as many in the Pacific---but Europe still needs them.

Sure you can build new railroads---how many years is this going to take? By the time the Japanese managed to get the
Burma-Thailand linkage up and working (a narrow-gage and light
loading route), they were on the verge of being driven out of
Burma. US railroads were badly in need of repair and replacement by the end of the war do to the volumn of traffic and
the unavailability of new rail because of the war effort. Finding
rail for several hundred miles of heavy gage double tracked new
construction (and yards and sidings and loading bays) is going
to need a lot of steel from something else. As for Haiphong, I
just figured they hadn't finished putting all the symbology on the map---it was certainly a port.

Actually, almost any port could handle submarines..., if you
had the Submarine Tenders there to do it with. But you are right
that UV could use some of these to go along with the Seaplane
tenders rather than allowing any port the capibility. Subs did need specialized servicing and should probably be limited to operating from a few Major Ports, and need Submarine Tender support anywhere else.

I've been pressing for months to get 2by3 to adopt an air system that matches aircraft capability to aircraft missions! Which
would make a B-17 much less effective when used for ground support or naval attack than it would be used in it's proper role.
In the old WITP board game the ultimate anti-naval weapon was
the B-24 used for "skip-bombing"---utterly absurd, but it slipped through the testing.

I'm not defending UV.., it's a good "first step" but it still has problems. And I agree with you on several you've mentioned.
But a "land war in Asia" still isn't a realistic option for the US and
Britian. The logistics just don't make it a feasible proposition.
If you want to drive tanks through Northern China, you realistically are going to have to wait for Soviet intervention.
I'm all for looking at different strategic options---that's a good portion of wanting to play the game. A "China Offensive" just
isn't one of those options---far to much effort and material required for far too little possibility of return.

I don't mean to sound like I'm picking on you---I like your enthusiasm and enjoy the exchanges. It's just that IF the strategy
you are proposing IS a viable game option, it will mean the logistics system (and the game) is broken. And I'm hoping for more.

So am I

I dont recall ANY instance of a WARSHIP being sunk in port
by a B-17 strike. I do recall ONE Destroyer off Guadalcanal
being hit ONCE with w a one ton bomb and it sank.

I do recall in 1945 lots of warhips inport being hit by B-29.
B-29 are NOT B-17.

I find matrix refusal to recognize that reality galling.

As for trying to use China, a realistic supply rule would simply make the attempt too supply intensive...that is all.
The amount of supply delivered to the available ports
simply not being enough. No roads, no infrastructure,
bad idea.
Still you could send supply to China and let THEM do it.

[Mike Scholl]

Originally posted by Chiteng
So am I

I dont recall ANY instance of a WARSHIP being sunk in port
by a B-17 strike. I do recall ONE Destroyer off Guadalcanal
being hit ONCE with w a one ton bomb and it sank.

I do recall in 1945 lots of warhips inport being hit by B-29.
B-29 are NOT B-17.

I find matrix refusal to recognize that reality galling.

As for trying to use China, a realistic supply rule would simply make the attempt too supply intensive...that is all.
The amount of supply delivered to the available ports
simply not being enough. No roads, no infrastructure,
bad idea.
Still you could send supply to China and let THEM do it.

Think we're coming to a meeting of the minds here. I recall
the B-17 sinking of a DD being viewed with suprise by BOTH sides.
Theoretically, if you drop enough bombs I guess you'll eventually hit something. B-24 patrol bombers did nail a number of submarines, but not much else in the warship category. And
I don't think it was B-29's sinking ships in port during 1945 as much as Halsey's carrier strikes on the home islands. B-29's
sank a fair amount of shipping..., but it was as long-ranged
Mine-layers.

I get irritated that 2by3 doesn't accept all my ideas for
improving the system as well---and they probably get irritated
listening to me. But I'm keeping my soap box handy as long as
there seems a chance to "save them from themselves".

My thinking is that there isn't much purpose in sending any
increased supply to China because they won't use it---they'll
squander it or go after the Communists with it. You should
probably be required to get some basic amount of supply into Chinese hands during a WITP game to keep Chaing and Roosevelt
happy---but any more seems like good money spent after bad.

[TIMJOT]

Originally posted by Mike Scholl
But a "land war in Asia" still isn't a realistic option for the US andBritian. The logistics just don't make it a feasible proposition.
If you want to drive tanks through Northern China, you realistically are going to have to wait for Soviet intervention.
I'm all for looking at different strategic options---that's a good portion of wanting to play the game. A "China Offensive" just
isn't one of those options---far to much effort and material required for far too little possibility of return.

Mike
(DISCLAIMER) I am not espouseing the merits of a China option.

Its not something I would try, but in defence of Chiteng. I think you overstate a bit. True it may not have been feasible in the context of the historical situation. However what if in the game the historical context changes? What if the Malaya Barrier is held or at least Malaya/Burma? Then all of a sudden a land/sea advance along the south china coast not only becomes feasible it looks pretty logical. Just such a strategy was envisioned in Rainbow-2 (which assumed Singapore is held). Indo-China is a hellavu lot closer to Japan than Australia. You got much better ports (CamRahn, Hiaphong, Canton, HongKong) than anything in the SWPAC. You have an ally (albeit an unreliable one) on the mainland, that open up joint op possisbilities.

Regarding logistics, I am not sure what the 5,000mi/15,000mi is refering to, but the distance between the east coast to Karachi via Suez ( The Med is pretty much cleared by 43 ) is approx 9000mi. The distance between the west coast and Brisbane via the south seas ferry route is approx 8000mi. Karachi is closer to Indo-China than Australia is to the PI and the Allies were able to stage a successful advance via that route.

Again it wouldnt be my strategy, nor do I believe it a better strategy than a centpac thrust, but under the right circumstances it could be feasible, logistically possible and in the end possibly successful.

[Mike Scholl]

Originally posted by TIMJOT
Mike
(DISCLAIMER) I am not espouseing the merits of a China option.

Its not something I would try, but in defence of Chiteng. I think you overstate a bit. True it may not have been feasible in the context of the historical situation. However what if in the game the historical context changes? What if the Malaya Barrier is held or at least Malaya/Burma? Then all of a sudden a land/sea advance along the south china coast not only becomes feasible it looks pretty logical. Just such a strategy was envisioned in Rainbow-2 (which assumed Singapore is held). Indo-China is a hellavu lot closer to Japan than Australia. You got much better ports (CamRahn, Hiaphong, Canton, HongKong) than anything in the SWPAC. You have an ally (albeit an unreliable one) on the mainland, that open up joint op possisbilities.

Regarding logistics, I am not sure what the 5,000mi/15,000mi is refering to, but the distance between the east coast to Karachi via Suez ( The Med is pretty much cleared by 43 ) is approx 9000mi. The distance between the west coast and Brisbane via the south seas ferry route is approx 8000mi. Karachi is closer to Indo-China than Australia is to the PI and the Allies were able to stage a successful advance via that route.

Again it wouldnt be my strategy, nor do I believe it a better strategy than a centpac thrust, but under the right circumstances it could be feasible, logistically possible and in the end possibly successful.

My distance figures were based (as I stated in one message,
but don't ask me which) on the Med NOT being cleared until
September of 1943; meaning most of the initial build-up would
have to be done around Africa. Also from Karachi it's still a good piece to Calcutta and the Burma front. Because of the Geography,
the distance from the US West Coast doesn't increase as fast
because it is Northeast of most of the Pacific theatre and an
advance towards the Marianas is generally Northwest---making
the Marianas actually closer to San Francisco than Sydney is.

If, by some chance, the Allies hold the Malay Barrier the Japanese should simply commit Hari Kari---Without the "Southern
Resource Area" they are totally screwed. But if you wanted to
fight it you would still be better off going through the Islands---
Borneo/Celebes to the Philippines etc. The Chinese Coast had
been held by the Japanese years before the war started as part
of the effort to isolate the Chinese. Failure in the Barrier would
leave the Japanese weak in the East Indies---and if we are going
to speculate, an intelligent MacArthur might still be holding Bataan. Either way, the Japanese "hold" would be weaker and easier to break.

I'm sure some folks will have fun fooling around with odd approaches to strategy..., and I wish them well. But the fact
remains that by water (the only practical supply route), Japan
is a hell of a lot closer across the Pacific from San Francisco
than it is from New York in the other direction---and Japan is
where you want to go.

[TIMJOT]

Originally posted by LTCMTS
Quick note. Please read chap.XIII, Watson's "The War Department - Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Operations", United States Army in World War II, Historical Division, Dept of the Army, Washington, DC, 1950

1. No respectable amount of .50 ammo before late spring 1942 (add shipping time)

2. The 12in guns would be coastal mounts and not available before 1943 (add shipping and mounting time)

3. 25 of the 155mm guns would not be manufactured before 1942 (add processing and shipping time)

Admitted, if all shipping was available and everything went right, the garrison would have been significantly enhanced, at least in personnel and equipment O/H. There would have still been significant shortages of ammo and supplies, among them such as .50 ammo and 3in HE for the M3 and M4 AA Guns.

Still think that until, say 1944 on the Philippines Defense Plan timeline, that Japanese control of seas and air around the Philippines would allow them to choose the time and place of engagement. Assets that would have engaged the USN (the Kido Butai, which is what the IGHQ wanted in the first staff) under the "Through Ticket" Orange Plan of the '20's would be available whether the USN was attacked at Pearl Harbor or executed "Rainbow 5" and the cautionary advance to the Philippines (the initial carrier raids would not have begun until Mar '42)

According to Col.Stephan Mellnik (Philipine War Diary) the man reponsible for the "Inland Sea Defence Project", 24 of the 155s and 7 of the 8" guns were allready in theater. All 8 battery positions had been sited, construction of mounts and casements on 3 had begun by Dec 8 1941 and all were scheduled to be completed by April 1,1942.

I believe the guns to which you refer were ones requested by USAFFE and approved by the War Dept. to expand the project to include North Luzon. I agree that this expanded program would not have been completed by April 42.

Japan could certainly have picked anywhere in linguyen and Linguyen is a fairly big area, but if they picked or chosed anywhere other than Linguyen for their *main landings*, USAFFE would have jumped for joy.

I agree that IJN assets would have been availble for either approach, just not sure what your point is. To me that just makes the Bataan strategy look even less attactive, since it make it even less likely that there would be a timely relief.

BTW, Kimmels Plan WPPac-46 (Dated Oct 41) envisioned an initial sweep through the Marshalls on M+5, followed by additional sweeps in hopes of lureing the IJN into a decisive battle around Wake by as early as M+14:eek:

[TIMJOT]

Originally posted by Mike Scholl

I'm sure some folks will have fun fooling around with odd approaches to strategy..., and I wish them well. But the fact
remains that by water (the only practical supply route), Japan
is a hell of a lot closer across the Pacific from San Francisco
than it is from New York in the other direction---and Japan is
where you want to go.

Yes it is, and as I said the Centpac is the best route IMHO, but that didnt stop the US from sending a hellavu lot stuff the long way (and IMO the wrong way) to Australia for the advance through the SWPAC for IMO less than sound strategic reasons than for political ones. What a waste in time, effort and lives.

[Raverdave]

Originally posted by TIMJOT
Yes it is, and as I said the Centpac is the best route IMHO, but that didnt stop the US from sending a hellavu lot stuff the long way (and IMO the wrong way) to Australia for the advance through the SWPAC for IMO less than sound strategic reasons than for political ones. What a waste in time, effort and lives.

But politics is always linked to war.........yes the merits of a long campaign in SWPAC were floured but it was important that the Japanese were removed form PNG, if only to reduce the pressure on Australia at the time. Once that was achieved the Allies should have concentrated everything on CENPAC. However, China could not be ignored for political reasons, the main one being that the Allied leadership (mainly Churchill) was alarmed at the prospects of China filling the vacuum once the Japanese had been defeated. Indeed, the Chinese were already dissatisfied with the Allied efforts in the region and had already voiced the view that maybe if the allies could not be counted on to help (or were unable to), the Chinese should take matters into their own hands after the Japanese had been expelled and take on the mantle of regional leader.
This prospect horrified Churchill, who was worried about the possible loss of the sub continent to not only the Japanese but also to nationalistic forces within countries such as India, Burma etc etc etc. Hence, the reason for the "wastage" of men and resources to that theatre, when they would have been better used in CENPAC for the quicker defeat of Japan.

[Mike Scholl]

Originally posted by TIMJOT
Yes it is, and as I said the Centpac is the best route IMHO, but that didnt stop the US from sending a hellavu lot stuff the long way (and IMO the wrong way) to Australia for the advance through the SWPAC for IMO less than sound strategic reasons than for political ones. What a waste in time, effort and lives.

Only problem with the CentPac Offensive is that it really needs
to await the arrival of the Essex Class and the "Fleet Train" to
be viable (especially if the Japanese have not been so gracious
as to suffer a Midway-style catastrophe for you). So what do you
do until 1944?

You have a basic need to keep the Australian Supply Routes
open through 1942-43, so forces are going to be sent there
anyway. The SouthWest Pacific is far enough from the Home
Islands to stretch Japanese supply capacities---and you have
major Ports for support in Australia/New Zealand. So the "CARTWHEEL" operation makes excellent sense in the interium. Chance to engage and "write-down" Japanese assets,
score some much-needed good news for the "Home Front", and
pushing back the Japanese threat considerably shortens the
supply route to Australia, saving shipping. With it's successfull
conclusion, you fire MacArthur for his performance in the Philippines, cut the SW Pacific to a trickle, and head for the
Marianas via the Gilberts and the Marshalls.

The only problem with the "Single Prong" offensive is it will
allow an inferior enemy to concentrate against you, and once
you start it in the Central Pacific, he's going to know your are
headed for the Marianas. You could run into one awfully big
pile of Japanese units by the time you get there. But every plan
has it's risks....

[Chiteng]

You have a basic need to keep the Australian Supply Routes
open through 1942-43, so forces are going to be sent there
anyway
***************************************************

Why? Australia isnt in any danger.

[TIMJOT]

Originally posted by Raverdave
But politics is always linked to war.........yes the merits of a long campaign in SWPAC were floured but it was important that the Japanese were removed form PNG, if only to reduce the pressure on Australia at the time.

Raverdave,

I absolutely agree war is inexorably linked to politics, effecting both strategic aims and or retraints. I think it would be great to something on the lines of a variable politcal event engine ala (TOAW) included in the game.

I do agree it was neccessary to hold PM and possibly secure Milne Bay, I dont think "clearing" the rest of NG was neccessary at all. IMO

[LTCMTS]

Yes, and we should be glad that Kimmel was unable to execute his design for a "Pacific Jutland" off Wake Island. The probability is that the unsupported carrier raids in the Mandates would not do any real damage, enough to provoke the IJN to commit major fleet units beyond the Mandates. The IJN battle doctrine required that the major fleet units be retained in reserve and protected from attrition until the climactic battle. It took the Battle of Coral Sea and the "Doolittle Raid" to shake the IJN's faith in their operational planning for a great battle off the Marianas and provoke a major offensive into the Western Pacific.
But if Kimmel did provoke the battle he was saving the Fleet and Naval Aviation in the Pacific for (one reason why the Fleet was in port and that VP squadrons weren't fully engaged in security sweeps around Hawaii), he would probably have lost it, and extended the war in the Pacific by at least a year. The three USN carriers could have suffered attrition of assets during the raids that they would need to fend off the six CVs of the "Kido Butai" (if they could. As "Fleet Tactics" points out, carrier vs. carrier warfare in 1942 essentially turned on the first strike and that the loss ratio was proportional to the number of carriers involved). The VPs would have provided EW but would not have been effective as bombers. The IJN would apply "Long Lances" and torpedo bombers to the US Battle Fleet and at ten to nine odds (Lancaster's Rule of square, 100 to 81), victory for the USN would have been hard to achieve. And every ship, CV, BB, cruisers and destroyers, lost off Wake Island would be unrecoverable. Even if the Japanese had foregone the attack on Pearl Harbor, the presence of the Battle Fleet would not have sped up the USN's Central Pacific counteroffensive enough to have relieved the Philippine garrison before 1944.
But of course, the reason we are all awaiting the game is to try out the alternative strategies.
As further reading, may I suggest Morton's "The War in the Pacific - Strategy and Command: The First Two Years". Also his, "The War in the Pacific: The Fall of the Philippines". You've obviously read "War Plan Orange" and Willmott's "Empires in the Balance".

[mdiehl]

It depends on how the stratregy is implemented. Frankly, given the US ability to decrypt the J19, purple, and various other codes, and the US manifest superiority in traffic analysis, it is likely that the US would know largely where and when the Combined Fleet would concentrate and with which elements. The Japanese would probably have lost the decisive battle, had it occurred.

[Mike Scholl]

Originally posted by Chiteng
You have a basic need to keep the Australian Supply Routes
open through 1942-43, so forces are going to be sent there
anyway
***************************************************

Why? Australia isnt in any danger.

The Australians THOUGHT they were in danger of invasion..,
especially with all their best units engaged elsewhere. In reality,
logistics and distance protected them from any REAL threat---but
they didn't KNOW that. Realistically, there was NO chance that
the Japanese could invade California. But there was still a panic,
and the "battle of Los Angeles", and rounding up the Japanese
Americans, and all sorts of unnessary horse-**** to keep the
populace excited.

Hopefully, the game will reflect Political "perceptions" as well
as reality. If the Japanese can establish a presense anywhere
in Australia or the Aleutians and hold on to it for a period of time
they ought to get victory points for "embarrassing" their opponants. Democracies have to worry about Public Opinion---
and very little of the public is really knowledgeable about what
constitutes a REAL threat and what's "just a damned nuisance."

It's the same kind of thinking that would force the US to try
and get a certain minimum amount of supply to China---Roosevelt
was worried the Chinese might quit, and he TREMENDOUSLY OVERESTIMATED their value to the war effort. So again, something would have to be done just to keep the President and
the "China Faction" happy---another chance for the Japanese to score some points.

That's why I assume an effort will have to be made to keep open the ANZAC pipeline.

[LTCMTS]

Again, a reason for having multiple non-state players with their own victory conditions. Having a Nationalist Chinese (Chungking), a Communist Chinese player (Yunan) and a colloborationist Chinese player (Nanking), each with specific control over resources, military assets, alliances and sources of supply would help replicate the confused and ineffective situation in China from 1941-45. Just as having an IJN, an IJA and a Japanese civilian player, again, each with their own victory conditions, to replicate, the confusions and redundancies (three seperate merchant fleets!!) in the Japanese war effort. Lunch over, back on our heads, mates.

[TIMJOT]

Originally posted by Mike Scholl
Only problem with the CentPac Offensive is that it really needs
to await the arrival of the Essex Class and the "Fleet Train" to
be viable (especially if the Japanese have not been so gracious
as to suffer a Midway-style catastrophe for you). So what do you
do until 1944?

You have a basic need to keep the Australian Supply Routes
open through 1942-43, so forces are going to be sent there
anyway. The SouthWest Pacific is far enough from the Home
Islands to stretch Japanese supply capacities---and you have
major Ports for support in Australia/New Zealand. So the "CARTWHEEL" operation makes excellent sense in the interium. Chance to engage and "write-down" Japanese assets,
score some much-needed good news for the "Home Front", and
pushing back the Japanese threat considerably shortens the
supply route to Australia, saving shipping. With it's successfull
conclusion, you fire MacArthur for his performance in the Philippines, cut the SW Pacific to a trickle, and head for the
Marianas via the Gilberts and the Marshalls.

The only problem with the "Single Prong" offensive is it will
allow an inferior enemy to concentrate against you, and once
you start it in the Central Pacific, he's going to know your are
headed for the Marianas. You could run into one awfully big
pile of Japanese units by the time you get there. But every plan
has it's risks....

Mike,

I disagree on several levels. First I agree that thru May 42, protecting the S.Seas Ferry Route was a neccessary priority. However after Midway, the IJN were no longer in any position to threaten it seriously. With the Aussies firmly holding PM, the Americal in New Caladonia, Fiji and New Herbrides adequately garrisoned; at best the IJN limited to ineffectual nuisiance raids.

A HUGE door opened after Midway. A door slamed shut more by Rainbow-5 than tactical limitations. After the first week of June the IJN had zero CVs operational. The USN had 3 CVs and could have easily re-taken Wake and or taken key islands in the Marshalls which were weekly held at that time. The IJN would be more or less helpless to react. If Yamamoto did attempt to force the issue, his Main body would have been sitting ducks for the USN CVs.

Just to re-emphisize, Eniwetok June 42 was not Tarawa 43. The USN had enough assetts including the 1st Marines, 8 BBs, and enough fleet train for a limited operations in the Marshalls. Consolidate there and then strike either the Carolines or Mariannas ( the Gilberts could be bypassed) at the time of their choosing. Which I agree would probably have to wait until the Essex's, much larger fleet train, specialize amphib craft ect....

With the US firmly established in the Marshalls/Wake in 42 the Japanese would be in a precarious position, forced to defend its vast perimeter with a Knife at its throat.