ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Skyros

Tactical failings? What are you talking about. If the RN smashed the invasion and took similar losses as Crete it would be a resounding success. German heavy forces would be just as vulnerable as the RNs. The light units, DDs and cruisers would slice and dice the invasion at night. The RN was not shy about sailing into harms way and would take the losses if it meant crushing the invasion. The political blow back would be devastating for Germany and further inspire the underground movements and neutral nations to resist. This would impact Barbarossa and Marita Merkur in the Balkans.

The Royal Navy would get bloodied, but they are defending there home turf and it would fUrther damage the armed forces of Germany .

warspite1

Indeed Skyros - in fact more so because the RN have proper ship killers; land based and carrier based torpedo bombers and dive bombers - just ask Bismarck and Konigsberg [;)].

[mind_messing]

Damned forum ate my reply. That's the second time it's happened this week [:@]

Let's find something we can agree on.

1. The German plan was poor, and had several flaws.
2. The requirements for Sea Lion (namely Luftwaffe air superiority) could have been attained.
3. The German plan had only a small chance for success, but it's success was not an impossibility.

At least, whilst not addressing the points I made, you at least seem to have taken them on board with the 5%/1% comment.

The 5%/1% distinction is mine.

Your original statement was that it was impossible for Sea Lion to succeed.

Have you, in light of the discussions in this thread, changed your mind?

ORIGINAL: LoBaron

ORIGINAL: JeffK

Now we have come to argue about the definitions of phrases rather than the actual argument.

Time to toss in the flag.

Ah, but the invasion is NOT impossible. It REALLY isn´t.

It also is not impossible that a cold glass of water starts to boil in front of you without the help of any external energy source.

mm tries to make a point. Don´t you see?

At least someone gets it.

Possibility =/= Impossibility.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

Damned forum ate my reply. That's the second time it's happened this week [:@]

Let's find something we can agree on.

1. The German plan was poor, and had several flaws.
2. The requirements for Sea Lion (namely Luftwaffe air superiority) could have been attained.
3. The German plan had only a small chance for success, but it's success was not an impossibility.

At least, whilst not addressing the points I made, you at least seem to have taken them on board with the 5%/1% comment.

The 5%/1% distinction is mine.

Your original statement was that it was impossible for Sea Lion to succeed.

Have you, in light of the discussions in this thread, changed your mind?

ORIGINAL: LoBaron

ORIGINAL: JeffK

Now we have come to argue about the definitions of phrases rather than the actual argument.

Time to toss in the flag.

Ah, but the invasion is NOT impossible. It REALLY isn´t.

It also is not impossible that a cold glass of water starts to boil in front of you without the help of any external energy source.

mm tries to make a point. Don´t you see?

At least someone gets it.

Possibility =/= Impossibility.

warspite1

No I haven't changed my mind (see post 58). These were your numbers but sufficiently low that its not worth arguing over.

As for what we can agree on, I think that is a forlorn hope - we might as well be married given the constant arguing and inability to agree [;)]

1. The German plan was poor and had several flaws. I truly do not believe this. The plan was simply pie in the sky (and I bow to the wisdom of Admiral Raeder on this. He advised Hitler he couldn't protect such a wide landing area - Hitler simply agreed for him that that is what the navy would do regardless).

2. The requirements for Sealion could have been attained? Not really. We both agree that Air Superiority is absolutely vital (and further agree that even with it, the chances of success are still hopelessly small). Were there tactics that the Luftwaffe could have employed to win the BoB? Yes, given their numerical advantage at the start, I strongly suspect so (although would probably need Goering to accidently cut his head off while shaving - and be replaced with someone with a greater tactical appreciation (and understanding of the importance of radar and what those strange looking towers were all about). Also the destruction of the BEF is possible with different decisions made - and that increases the % a bit further.
But the problem is that the additional elements - that would have taken the chances to 60%-70%+ needed to have been taken years before, namely - proper landing craft, amphibious operation training, torpedo bombers, a bigger navy - or at least a navy built with this operation in mind.

3. As I agreed, in war bizarre things happen - France 1940 being pretty extreme, and with air superiority I can accept your argument that there is a possibility of success - albeit suicidally slim. But for the reasons stated in older posts I just cannot accept that the Germans could have achieved victory over the United Kingdom in 1940 if air superiority has not been won i.e a RL situation in September 1940. For it to happen, the RAF and Coastal Command would have had to decide to abandon the Channel - but then decide to abandon the beaches too (along with Bomber Command). The Royal Navy would have had to decide not to sail or they do and... well I just cannot think of a scenario where the navy simply don't destroy sufficient of the invasion force and precious barges that any that do land can achieve no more than holding out for a few days until their supplies run out. What could happen? The RN get lost in the vast expanse of the Channel and fail to find the slow moving barges, strung out like ducks at a fairground shooting range? Its not like the Germans can take different routes. All their torpedoes, guns, depth charges + anything they can get their hands on - don't work. The large minesweeping fleet miss all the mines and all the RN ships following do find them? At the same time the invasion flotilla fail to find any of the British mines.
That view may be wrong - but its just not something I could begin to understand I'm afraid.




Happy for you to respond and have the last word as you see fit, but I think that is me done on this subject.

[pontiouspilot]

Can someone tell me how many of the Brit farmers in June and July had shotguns versus pitch forks! How many actual units were available? Did they have any weapons? All my reading over the years leads me to believe the actual armed and effective Brit forces were minimal. The window for the Krauts was June-July....Sept was too late without a major effort.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: pontiouspilot

Can someone tell me how many of the Brit farmers in June and July had shotguns versus pitch forks! How many actual units were available? Did they have any weapons? All my reading over the years leads me to believe the actual armed and effective Brit forces were minimal. The window for the Krauts was June-July....Sept was too late without a major effort.

warspite1

This is it - in its entirety [:D]

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: pontiouspilot

Can someone tell me how many of the Brit farmers in June and July had shotguns versus pitch forks! How many actual units were available? Did they have any weapons? All my reading over the years leads me to believe the actual armed and effective Brit forces were minimal. The window for the Krauts was June-July....Sept was too late without a major effort.

warspite1

This is it - in its entirety [:D]

warspite1

According to one source we have (immediately after Dunkirk)

- 15 divisions (one in Northern Ireland)
- One armoured division

The infantry divisions were at roughly half strength (circa 11,000 men each).
There were just 54 anti-tank guns, 2,300 Bren guns, 37 armoured cars 395 light tanks, 33 cruiser tanks, 72 Heavy (Infantry) tanks, 420 field guns and 163 medium and heavy guns.

However, ammunition and supplies from the US and at home were coming in all the time and by September were appreciably greater in number in all areas.

As I mentioned before, the best time for landing may have been June - July in terms of the opposition, but the Germans were simply not ready in terms of not only barges but also the small matter that until late June the French were still being fought (and they needed rest and refit when concluded). What do the Luftwaffe do in that situation? They can't be in two places at once.

[Chickenboy]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

However, ammunition and supplies from the US and at home were coming in all the time and by September were appreciably greater in number in all areas.

Ah-HA! I knew it! Clearly we-the good 'ole US of freakin' A won the so-called "Battle of Britain" and defeated a nazi invasion apriori. When ze Germans heard that we were involved they hung it up. A little credit where credit is due please Warspite1.

And rightly so that ze Germans should hang it up when they did. This guy was gonna come back after 'em. And he was kinda pissed. Here he is earnestly walking the flight line dressed inexplicably for a formal gathering.

[Chickenboy]

On a serious note:

What, exactly, were we shipping over that could be of immediate use (armaments) to the British in that critical window? Our sidearms, long arms, artillery, ammunition, tanks, etc. etc. were different from your own. It's not like we had vast stores of Lee-Enfields sitting in some warehouse in Baltimore, right? I could understand food, gasoline (petrol to you lot), diesel, lubricants, and uniformly interchangeable supplies being useful, but arms and armaments weren't 'plug and play' standards back then.

On a related note: There was an American series of series a few years back: Frontier house, Victorian house, Blitz house (I think) and so forth. They dealt with reality TV, but in a realistic manner. Participants were precluded from living differently than pioneers, victorian-era families and circa 1940s London families were for a period of time. The transformation and adoption of the hardships was fascinating television.

In the Blitz house, the family received food aid from America. They-in real life-were choked up about the unexpected bonanza from their American cousins. It wasn't great food-I recall dehydrated eggs-but it supplemented their meager rations nicely. That gratitude has stuck with me ever since. It likely was as heartfelt on the show as it was in reality back then.

[IronDuke_slith]

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

Damned forum ate my reply. That's the second time it's happened this week [:@]

Let's find something we can agree on.

1. The German plan was poor, and had several flaws.
2. The requirements for Sea Lion (namely Luftwaffe air superiority) could have been attained.
3. The German plan had only a small chance for success, but it's success was not an impossibility.

1. The German plan was actually hopeless, poor makes it sound like it stood a chance.

2. They were simply never that close during the BOB. Conventional wisdom says they might have managed it but for the switch to City bombing, but they had largely shot their bolt before that occurred. What the Luftwaffe could do was achieve very temporary air superiority over clearly defined areas with large scale sweeps. That would not nearly have been enough. Air superiority was not the only pre-requisite. Naval superiority was another and the Germans would never have attained that...ever.

3. I disagree. Some of the German barges were being loaded and started off from ports that would require a 24 hour travel time from the start to the beach. The British would have known they were coming and swamped the channel with every aircraft they had. Machine guns would have been enough to create catastrophic havoc. As the invasion fleet (actually long lines of river barges) reached the mid channel, swarms of smaller craft from MTBs to destroyers to fishing boats with a Bren gun attached would have moved in and shot the barges out of the water. The KM would have been brushed aside. They may have got a destroyer or two but their remaining surface units would have been sunk and the invasion broken up as panicked barge crews attempted to escape.

It is feasible that some isolated barges might have reached shore, but the vast majority of Germans on the beach would have washed ashore rather than waded. The friction in the hours before the dawn as tracer swept the surface and barges were raked with gunfire would have led to a complete catastrophe as crews panicked, collided with other boats, turned unilaterally for home and sank. What Germans made it ashore would have run out of ammo within 36 hours and been rounded up. What was left of the barge fleet would have limped home and been in no state to load with a second wave and supplies and return. The RN would surely have committed capital ships to the channel if the safety of the Home Islands was at stake, so what Germans made it ashore would have been isolated and easily dealt with.

Sorry, but it's a fantasy.

Regards,
ID.

[AW1Steve]

They didn't need to shoot the barges. A wake from a high speed destroyer would swamp most of the barges.

[bigred]

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

ORIGINAL: warspite1

However, ammunition and supplies from the US and at home were coming in all the time and by September were appreciably greater in number in all areas.

Ah-HA! I knew it! Clearly we-the good 'ole US of freakin' A won the so-called "Battle of Britain" and defeated a nazi invasion apriori. When ze Germans heard that we were involved they hung it up. A little credit where credit is due please Warspite1.

And rightly so that ze Germans should hang it up when they did. This guy was gonna come back after 'em. And he was kinda pissed. Here he is earnestly walking the flight line dressed inexplicably for a formal gathering.

IRC Ben even fought the japs in that outfit.

[AW1Steve]

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

On a serious note:

What, exactly, were we shipping over that could be of immediate use (armaments) to the British in that critical window? Our sidearms, long arms, artillery, ammunition, tanks, etc. etc. were different from your own. It's not like we had vast stores of Lee-Enfields sitting in some warehouse in Baltimore, right? I could understand food, gasoline (petrol to you lot), diesel, lubricants, and uniformly interchangeable supplies being useful, but arms and armaments weren't 'plug and play' standards back then.

On a related note: There was an American series of series a few years back: Frontier house, Victorian house, Blitz house (I think) and so forth. They dealt with reality TV, but in a realistic manner. Participants were precluded from living differently than pioneers, victorian-era families and circa 1940s London families were for a period of time. The transformation and adoption of the hardships was fascinating television.

In the Blitz house, the family received food aid from America. They-in real life-were choked up about the unexpected bonanza from their American cousins. It wasn't great food-I recall dehydrated eggs-but it supplemented their meager rations nicely. That gratitude has stuck with me ever since. It likely was as heartfelt on the show as it was in reality back then.

Here's the answer to your question : http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/ref ... index.html

And yes , 1917 Enfield 303 rifles WERE sitting around in warehouses. I recall that there was a problem with some of those rifles in 1940 , causing a minor scandal as many of the rifles had been treated with mineral oil vice linseed oil causing their stocks to shattered when used.

[Yaab]

Basically, the Germans would have needed to take some English port by suprise with a huge para drop. Then rush ship convoys - xAKs with troops and heavy equipment.

[Chickenboy]

ORIGINAL: Yaab

Basically, the Germans would have needed to take some English port by suprise with a huge para drop. Then rush ship convoys - xAKs with troops and heavy equipment.

My POV, for those few that are still paying attention to this thread, is that there are ways (such as you've identified) that the Germans might have had a better chance of success. But Sealion per se-with what they had and what they had planned-was a non-starter.

Yeah, a para drop / "fast transport" surface capture of a port with subsequent 'real' (non river-barge nonsense) shipping reinforcement would have been MORE feasible. A few larger ships with neutral or friendly flags could have been mustered up to try for a reinforcement from the Atlantic as well-this would have been more difficult to defend against.

But none of these things were given much credence at the time. Sealion would have gone down as a monumental German defeat and a signal British victory.

[Chickenboy]

ORIGINAL: AW1Steve

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

On a serious note:

What, exactly, were we shipping over that could be of immediate use (armaments) to the British in that critical window? Our sidearms, long arms, artillery, ammunition, tanks, etc. etc. were different from your own. It's not like we had vast stores of Lee-Enfields sitting in some warehouse in Baltimore, right? I could understand food, gasoline (petrol to you lot), diesel, lubricants, and uniformly interchangeable supplies being useful, but arms and armaments weren't 'plug and play' standards back then.

On a related note: There was an American series of series a few years back: Frontier house, Victorian house, Blitz house (I think) and so forth. They dealt with reality TV, but in a realistic manner. Participants were precluded from living differently than pioneers, victorian-era families and circa 1940s London families were for a period of time. The transformation and adoption of the hardships was fascinating television.

In the Blitz house, the family received food aid from America. They-in real life-were choked up about the unexpected bonanza from their American cousins. It wasn't great food-I recall dehydrated eggs-but it supplemented their meager rations nicely. That gratitude has stuck with me ever since. It likely was as heartfelt on the show as it was in reality back then.

Here's the answer to your question : http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/ref ... index.html

And yes , 1917 Enfield 303 rifles WERE sitting around in warehouses. I recall that there was a problem with some of those rifles in 1940 , causing a minor scandal as many of the rifles had been treated with mineral oil vice linseed oil causing their stocks to shattered when used.

Sorry, Steve-without wading through hundreds of pages of general "Lend-Lease" information, was there some place that had the information that I was seeking in that link? Specifically, I'm interested in materials sent to the UK between July-September 1940-the period in question for the BoB and Sealion discussions.

[warspite1]

I was referring specifically to the delivery of 200,000 rifles + ammunition on the 9th July.

[Symon]

They weren't .303s Stevo.

In 1940 it was 500,000, In 1941, it was 120,000, all of the US Rifle, cal .30, M1917: a US mod and production of the Lee-Enfield, cal .303, P14. Roughly 2,200,000 manufactured by Remington and Winchester from 1916. It was chambered and rifled for the US .30-06 cartridge. Lend/lease weapons were specially marked so as to avoid confusion with the similar British P14 that used the .303 cartridge.

US actually made 3 times more Enfield M1917s than Springfield M1903s.

[wdolson]

While the Germans had a very slim chance of succeeding in an invasion, I suspect if they had tried, it would have fallen apart due to logistics. During WW II, the only time amphibious operations worked was under one of two conditions:

1) The enemy was completely unprepared and they had a thin supply/reinforcement chain.
2) The enemy was completely isolated from the outside world before the invasion and the invader brought a massive naval force for support.

Neither of these existed in 1940 Britain. The Germans could possibly have achieved air superiority over the Channel and southeast England, but the back door was wide open. Atlantic convoys from North America had little trouble getting through and they were bringing a constant stream of supplies and resources. The British army was in bad shape after Dunkirk and there was little they could have done if the Wehrmacht had landed in force, but the Royal Navy was around 90% strength and the Home Fleet would have been thrown into defending the island. The RN would have likely committed everything they had and damn the losses. Stukas flying in skies free of the RAF might have sunk a few ships, but every small ship with a gun would be out attacking barges. And as someone pointed out, the barges would have had to be out in the middle of the Channel at night where the RN could have operated at will.

The RN would have likely held back the heavier ships to oppose the larger German ships if they had been committed. If the German large ships had been committed, the RN would have outnumbered them.

Even if the RAF Fighter Command had been broken, German aircraft losses and crews would have still been high and the RAF fighter threat would not have been eliminated completely. Even a badly weakened Fighter Command could have defended the BBs when they sailed cutting apart and attack planes from the Luftwaffe outside the short radius of German fighters.

German losses crossing the Channel from both natural causes and British warships would have probably been high, but lets say they manage to get a beachhead established. They now have an expeditionary force with a toehold on a large island with supply pouring in out of range of their bombers. Even if German aircraft have managed to pick off some ships, the Royal Navy is still active and cutting apart the barges on the return trip as well as sinking any supply vessels they find.

The Germans don't have any specialized landing craft like the Allies did by 1942. Everything either has to be landed at a port, or via inefficient boats not intended to unload cargo over a beach. The expeditionary force would be bogged down with low supply on beaches that are heavily mined with barbed wire and other beach defenses. Bomber Command which was not involved in the battle to this point is engaged attacking the landed forces and/or the supply ships coming in.

The Luftwaffe may have air superiority, but they don't have air supremacy. That would have been impossible to achieve. German fighter pilots, exhausted and depleted after a long campaign to break Fighter Command now has to cover the beaches and naval assets supporting the operation. They have poor range, so they have to cycle CAP a lot, leaving only a few fighters over the objective at a time. Bomber Command would take losses, but some would get through.

The Germans might have been able to capture a port with paratroops, but the British would have likely committed what reserves they had to take it back and Bomber Command and the Royal Navy would be committed to shutting down the port. The Germans barely made any use of Tobruk after it was taken in large part because the rather weak Desert Air Force kept the port interdicted. They couldn't bring anything into Tobruk without facing long range British bombers and fighter bombers. In the fall of 1940, the British would have been able to throw a lot more air power at any port in German hands.

The Allied invasions of the continent succeeded because Axis supply into the invasion zone was essentially paralyzed in the days before and after the invasion and the two largest navies in the world supported the efforts with ships specifically designed for amphibious operations. The Germans were dug in and prepared in June 1944 far better than the British were in 1940, but the Germans just didn't have the logistics for a major amphibious operation in 1940. Their invasion force in 1940 was an ad hoc effort compared to a professional operation in 1944. They barely succeeded in Norway and that was only because they had surprise on their side and neither France nor Britain were willing or able to commit large forces to stop them. Norway got a trickle of support from the Allies, but they mostly stood alone. German naval losses in that campaign were bad, they would have been significantly worse invading England.

If the Germans somehow managed to get a large force ashore and supplied it adequately, Britain was doomed, but they would have had a very difficult (if not impossible) time getting the land forces ashore and supplied.

There is a concept in military science of the continental power and a naval nation. In the 1940s, the two preeminent continental powers in the world were Germany and the USSR. The two top naval powers were the UK and Japan. The US was/is a weird hybrid of both (pretty much unique in history). The UK and Japan both had armies and they could be quite good, but they were at their strongest when operating along a coastline where a navy could give support.

I read an analysis of Dunkirk that pointed out that because Germany was a continental power and Britain was a naval one, that operation went down the way it did. For a continental power, being backed up with your back to the sea is essentially isolation. The BEF was in the Germans' way of thinking, neutralized and isolated, to be dealt with later. For a naval power, being backed up onto water was a major opportunity. It gave the BEF a chance to escape and fight another day. The Germans didn't see it coming until it was too late.

Continental powers don't tend to invest in large navies. When they put anything into navies, it's an extravagance or intended to deny the seas to a naval power. Which is pretty much what the Kriegsmarine was. When the war went badly, the Kriegsmarine surface force was holed up in port and essentially stood down. It had only a minor contribution to the war effort compared to what the army and air force did. The only place where the Kriegsmarine got any attention was building u-boats which were used to deny the free use of the Atlantic by the Royal Navy (and later USN). The Germans had no hope of ever controlling the Atlantic, all they could do was make life miserable for the RN and disrupt supply into the UK.

For a continental power, their primary challenges are neighbors with land borders, so investing in armies is the wisest course. Naval powers are dependent on overseas trade for their existence, so investing in a navy to protect their trade is paramount. The RN was the premiere service in the UK before and during WW II because they recognized this. In Japan the story was a bit more complicated. In reality, the Japanese Empire would not have existed at all without a strong navy, but politically the army had a lot of power and the struggle between the two branches was at the core of most Japanese politics at the time. Ultimately the navy should have been the premiere service and the army should have been used in conjunction with the naval capabilities. Instead the army got bogged down in a land war on the continent they couldn't really win even if China was weak and internally very divided. Japan simply didn't have enough young men to garrison China.

Back to the point about the BoB. The Germans had some chance of breaking RAF Fighter Command, and they had an even slimmer chance of getting a force ashore in SE England. However, their chances of supplying that force and reinforcing it with mechanized forces was slim as long as Bomber Command and the Royal Navy remained intact and supplies continued to flow into the UK from North America. All things the Germans were not terribly well equipped to stop in the summer of 1940.

Bill

Bill

[AW1Steve]

ORIGINAL: Symon

They weren't .303s Stevo.

In 1940 it was 500,000, In 1941, it was 120,000, all of the US Rifle, cal .30, M1917: a US mod and production of the Lee-Enfield, cal .303, P14. Roughly 2,200,000 manufactured by Remington and Winchester from 1916. It was chambered and rifled for the US .30-06 cartridge. Lend/lease weapons were specially marked so as to avoid confusion with the similar British P14 that used the .303 cartridge.

US actually made 3 times more Enfield M1917s than Springfield M1903s.

John I don't know if they were 303 or 30-06. I wasn't there. But the report listed both types of ammo and weapons. Don't tell me. Tell the report. I'm just they guy who linked it. But I tend to believe the report myself.[:D]I don't think your that old. [:D] My feeling for why the USA would have 303 rifles in storage? The US government is the biggest pack rat on the planet. Old stuff is always turning up. In ww1 we made lots of 303 , some for England , some for Canada. But I also recall in my youth talking to two different WW1 vets who told me that They trained on 303 while in the USA. I myself own a ww2 38 s&w revolver that had been US Army , even though the weapon and caliber had never been accepted or used by the US Army (38 s&w , not to be confused with 38 special , sometimes called 38-200 , was strictly used by the British , but somehow this one missed the boat). I'd not be surprised that somewhere there was a warehouse of the weapons left over because the war ended much sooner than expected.[:)]

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: wdolson

The RN would have likely held back the heavier ships to oppose the larger German ships if they had been committed. If the German large ships had been committed, the RN would have outnumbered them.

.....Everything either has to be landed at a port, or via inefficient boats not intended to unload cargo over a beach. The expeditionary force would be bogged down with low supply on beaches that are heavily mined with barbed wire and other beach defenses. Bomber Command which was not involved in the battle to this point is engaged attacking the landed forces and/or the supply ships coming in.

Bill

warspite1

Just picking up on two points Bill, the first for context as the disparity in forces needs to be emphasised. This to dispel any notion that RN heavy units could be committed to deal with the KM heavy units or assist the cutting of the supply route. The second is to put right a factual inaccuracy - another fallacy about the BoB that sadly seems to have become "fact".

1. Larger German ships. In September 1940 this amounted to:

Admiral Scheer 11-inch PB
Admiral Hipper 8-inch CA
Possibly 3 x 6-inch CL

Home Fleet capital ships only
Nelson and Rodney 16-inch BB
Repulse and Hood 15-inch BC
Valiant and Barham 15-inch BB
Furious CV

2. Bomber Command was very much part of the BoB and the defence of the UK. And I am not talking about the attacks on Germany itself (in the context of the war, sadly a non-event in 1940).

What cannot be ignored is the day and night Bomber Command attacks on German airfields (yes we did that too) and, equally important for this discussion, the "Battle of the Barges".

As I previously mentioned Bomber Command had accounted for some c.10% of Barges by the time Hitler called for the postponement of the operation (214 had been lost or damaged by the 21st September). Just as worryingly for the Germans were the losses at the key invasion ports. For example, by that time Boulogne was 30% short on its Barge requirement.

No doubt the fact that even light bombers contained more than one aircrew (unlike fighters) was a factor here, but nonetheless, more RAF Bomber Command personnel died during the BoB than fighter pilots.

BTW, and at the risk of "embarrassing myself" [8|] the youngest VC of the war went to an 18-year old Scot, John Hannah (during an attack against invasion shipping in Antwerp on the 15th September 1940) [&o]