Civil War 150th

[Orm]

Once again I want to thank you for this awesome thread. [&o][:)]

Do you plan to continue this thread to the peace proclamation?

[Capt. Harlock]

At the moment, my plan is to go to May 10 (the capture of Jefferson Davis) and then include a summary of what happened next.

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

Near Bentonville, North Carolina, Joseph Johnston at last had his chance to strike at Sherman's army. The Union left wing was threatening the state capital of Raleigh, but Sherman's real objective was to unite with the Federal forces from the coast at the key rail hub of Goldsborough. Sherman therefore went to join his right wing:

[font="Times New Roman"]... I remained with this wing until the night of the 18th, when we were within twenty-seven miles of Goldsboro' and five from Bentonsville; and, supposing that all danger was over, I crossed over to join Howard's column, to the right, so as to be nearer to Generals Schofield and Terry, known to be approaching Goldsboro'.

[center]--Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman[/center][/font]

But in this area the Confederate cavalry now had the edge over the Union horsemen since the fight at Munroe's Crossroads, and that meant Johnston had more information about Sherman's position than Sherman had about Johnston:

[font="Times New Roman"]About daybreak, on the 18th, information came to me from General Hampton, that the Federal army was marching toward Goldsboroa: the right wing, on the direct road from Fayetteville, had crossed Black River; the left wing, on the road from Averysboroa, had not reached that stream, and was more than a day’s march from the point in its route opposite to the hamlet of Bentonville, where the two roads, according to the map of North Carolina, were ten or twelve miles apart. The hamlet itself is about two miles from the road and to the north of it, and sixteen from Smithfield. According to the reports of our cavalry, the Federal right wing was about half a day’s march in advance of the left; so that there was probably an interval of a day’s march between the heads of the two columns.

[center]-- Joseph E. Johnston, Narrative of Military Operations during the Civil War[/center] [/font]

If Johnston could ambush and crush the Union left wing, he might then attack and defeat the right wing in turn. It was a slim chance, but better than nothing, and for once "The Great Retreater" gave the orders for attack.


On this date, the entry in the Journal of the Congress of the Confederate States of America concludes: "The hour of 2 o'clock having arrived, the Speaker announced that the House stood adjourned sine die." According to the standard rules of order, adjournment sine die means the group is adjourned without having yet agreed upon a date for the next session. (The group can later be summoned by someone with the appropriate authority, such as the president, or by agreement among the members.) But as it happened, this would be the final entry: the Confederate Congress was destined never to be gaveled to order again.

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

On the outskirts of Bentonville, North Carolina, Joseph Johnston was assembling a force of about 22,000 Southerners. They were having some trouble with maps, however, and so did not find each other or their Union opposition in as timely a manner as Johnston would have wished. Advance Yankee scouts and foragers found the Rebel forces, but Union commander Henry Slocum believed at first that he faced only cavalry. He ordered an attack to clear the way. The assault was quickly driven back, however, and the true size of the opposition became apparent.

Then it was the Southerners' turn to lauch an assault:

[font="Times New Roman"]... the result of the charge was not for five minutes doubtful. The Confederates passed over three hundred yards of the space between the two lines in quick time, and in excellent order, and the remaining distance in double quick, without pausing to fire until their near approach had driven the enemy from the shelter of their intrenchments, in full retreat, to their second line. After firing a few rounds, the Confederates again pressed forward, and, when they were near the second intrenchment, now manned by both lines of Federal troops, Lieut.-Gen. Hardee, after commanding the double-quick, led the charge, and, with his knightly gallantry, dashed over the enemy’s breastworks on horseback, in front of his men. Some distance in the rear there was a very thick wood of young pines, into which the Federal troops were pursued, and in which they rallied and renewed the fight. But the Confederates continued to advance, driving the enemy back slowly, notwithstanding the advantage given to the party on the defensive by the thicket. . .

[center]-- Joseph E. Johnston, Narrative of Military Operations during the Civil War[/font][/center]

In the meantime, Sherman learned of the battle underway. However, he also had trouble with maps:

[font="Times New Roman"]I overtook General Howard at Falling- Creek Church, and found his column well drawn out, by reason of the bad roads. I had heard some cannonading over about Slocum's head of column, and supposed it to indicate about the same measure of opposition by Hardee's troops and Hampton's cavalry before experienced; but during the day a messenger overtook me, and notified me that near Bentonsville General Slocum had run up against Johnston's whole army. I sent back orders for him to fight defensively to save time, and that I would come up with reenforcements from the direction of Cog's Bridge, by the road which we had reached near Falling-Creek Church. The country was very obscure, and the maps extremely defective.

[center]--Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman[/center][/font]

Nonetheless, Northern reinforcements began to arrive at the scene of combat. The Rebels could make no further progress, though not for lack of trying, for their assaults continued well after dark. It was almost midnight when the Southerners withdrew and began entrenching lines of their own. They could claim the honors of the day, but, as Johnston admitted, it was more a moral victory than a practical one.

[font="Times New Roman"]Four pieces of artillery were taken; but, as we had only spare harnessed horses enough to draw off three, one was left on the field. The impossibility of concentrating the Confederate forces in time to attack the Federal left wing, while in column on the march, made complete success also impossible, from the enemy’s great numerical superiority. One important object was gained, however — that of restoring the confidence of our troops, who had either lost it in the defeat at Wilmington, or in those of Tennessee. All were greatly elated by the event. There was now no object in remaining in presence of the enemy, but that of covering the bearing off of our wounded. The orders necessary for this duty were given without delay; but very bad roads, and the want of comfortable means of transportation, compelled us to devote two days to the operation.

[center]-- Joseph E. Johnston, Narrative of Military Operations during the Civil War [/font][/center]

Map by Hal Jespersen, www.cwmaps.com

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

At Bentonville, given that the bulk of two hostile armies were now in contact with each other, there was surprisingly little action on this date. Confederate commander Joe Johnston was now well aware that he was outnumbered, and had no desire to attack outside the fortifications his men had put up. On the other side, Sherman was also reluctant to mount an assault:

[font="Times New Roman"] After deploying, I ordered General Howard to proceed with due caution, using skirmishers alone, till he had made junction with General Slocum, on his left. These deployments occupied all day, during which two divisions of the Seventeenth Corps also got up. At that time General Johnston's army occupied the form of a V, the angle reaching the road leading from Averysboro' to Goldsboro', and the flanks resting on Mill Creek, his lines embracing the village of Bentonsville.
General Slocum's wing faced one of these lines and General Howard's the other; and, in the uncertainty of General Johnston's strength, I did not feel disposed to invite a general battle, for we had been out from Savannah since the latter part of January, and our wagon- trains contained but little food. I had also received messages during the day from General Schofield, at Kinston, and General Terry, at Faison's Depot, approaching Goldsboro', both expecting to reach it by March 21st. During the 20th we simply held our ground and started our trains back to Kinston for provisions, which would be needed in the event of being forced to fight a general battle at Bentonsville.

[center] --Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman[/center][/font]

It is true the Northerners had been foraging off the country as they moved (though the pickings were not as rich as they had been in Georgia), and now that they were stopped, they had to live on what was in their wagons. Nonetheless, Sherman seems to have been unusually cautious about attacking, and Johnston seems to have been unusually reckless in staying in place while the Yankees hemmed him in from two sides. By the end of the day, the Confederates had only one route of retreat left open. And the 22,000 Rebels now faced roughly 60,000 Federals -- even before they had linked up with the columns of Schofield and Terry.

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

At Bentonville, the morning was almost as calm as the day before, thanks in part to occasional rain showers. After noon, however, the Yankees became more active:

[font="Times New Roman"]On the 21st the skirmishing was resumed with spirit by the enemy ... During the whole afternoon a very brisk fire was directed against our centre and left. About four o’clock the cavalry was so pressed that the little infantry reserves and Taliaferro’s division were ordered to the left to support it. A few minutes later Lieutenant-General Hampton reported that the Seventeenth Corps had broken through the mere “skirmish-line” of his left, and was pressing rapidly toward Bentonville, in rear of our centre and on the only route of retreat. Lieutenant-General Hardee was directed to unite the troops then marching to the left, and to oppose this movement with them. But the rapid march of the leading Federal troops, Mower’s division, left no time for this union.

[center]-- Joseph E. Johnston, Narrative of Military Operations during the Civil War[/center][/font]

General Joseph A. Mower (below), probably the most aggressive division commander in Sherman's army, had requested permission from his superior to do a "little reconnaissance". Permission being granted, Mower had done a reconnaissance in force, to say the least:


[font="Times New Roman"]. . . General Mower, ever rash, broke through the rebel line on his extreme left flank, and was pushing straight for Bentonsville and the bridge across Mill Creek. I ordered him back to connect with his own corps; and, lest the enemy should concentrate on him, ordered the whole rebel line to be engaged with a strong skirmish-fire.
I think I made a mistake there, and should rapidly have followed Mower's lead with the whole of the right wing, which would have brought on a general battle, and it could not have resulted otherwise than successfully to us, by reason of our vastly superior numbers; but at the moment, for the reasons given, I preferred to make junction with Generals Terry and Schofield, before engaging Johnston's army, the strength of which was utterly unknown.

[center]--Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman[/center][/font]

Joseph Johnston needed no second warning that he was outnumbered and nearly surrounded. He pulled his troops out during the night. A number of historians, this humble writer included, have expressed skepticism about Sherman's rationale for allowing the Southerners to get away. He usually showed more aggressiveness than was evident on this occasion. It seems possible that he deliberately chose not to do his full duty, gambling that since the war was clearly nearing its end, he could eventually bring about a surrender without the bloodshed of another major battle. If so, he would be right by subsequent events: there would be no further significant battles between his forces and Johnston's, and when the surrender happened, it would encompass considerably more Confederates than could have been bagged at Bentonville.

Bentonville was nonetheless a Union victory. According to Sherman, his losses were 1,604 total, of whom 191 were killed. Johnston claimed that his losses were 2,343 in all, but as Sherman wrote, "Wide discrepancies exist in these figures." The National Park Service estimates total Southern casualties at 3,092. Whatever the total, the already under-equipped Confederate Army of the South had lost at least a tenth of its strength. Johnston and his troops had shot their bolt. If any miracle was to save the Confederacy, it would have to come from the Army of Northern Virginia and Robert E. Lee.

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

In North Carolina, Johnston had retreated his army back towards the state capital of Raleigh. There had been little choice, but the move uncovered the much more militarily valuable rail hub city of Goldsborough. On this date, John Schofield's corps, having cleared the Confederates out of Kinston, began occupying the city from the east. At the same time, the bulk of Sherman's army began the march towards it from the west. North Carolina's resources were now largely cut off from Richmond.

Map by Hal Jespersen, www.cwmaps.com

Ironically, also on this date began the cavalry raid from Tennessee into Alabama which Grant had originally meant as a distraction from Sherman's march through the Carolinas. Brigadier General James Wilson had taken his time assembling and equipping a massive body of Northern troopers. At over 13,000 men, it would be the largest cavalry raid of the war, indeed, it would not be going too far to describe it as an invading army rather than a simple raiding force. And the majority were armed with the lethal Spencer repeating carbine, making them as effective as infantry in open-field combat. But Wilson believed he would need this strength, for he would be facing Southern cavalry led by the redoubtable Nathan Bedford Forrest.

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

Ulysses S. Grant had invited Abraham Lincoln back down to his headquarters at City Point, Virgina, suggesting that the President could use the rest. Indeed he could; among his many other worries, Lincoln was being pestered by "office-seekers" from morning to evening. Orders had been given to prepare the Bat, a small but fast gunboat, for the trip. This time, however, Mary Lincoln was not going to be left behind. The Bat was not considered suitable for a Victorian-era lady, so the River Queen, the vessel which had hosted the Hampton Roads Peace conference, was also made ready. On this date the presidential party set sail on the River Queen, with the Bat escorting.

It is possible that Lincoln guessed that the siege of Richmond and Petersburg was approaching its climax. It was now spring, and the roads in the area had begun to dry. In addition, Grant had brought Philip Sheridan and the bulk of his force down from the Shenandoah Valley. Their travels had been made very difficult by rain, mud, and detours caused by Rebel units, so the Northern horsemen needed a few days' rest. But when they were ready, Grant intended to make his final moves.

Robert E. Lee had guessed as much, and so decided to move even earlier. He also was thinking of City Point, for he knew it was the main supply depot for the Union force besieging Richmond and Petersburg. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia was disappearing slowly but steadily through desertion and disease, as his under-fed soldiers either fell sick or decided to abandon their posts. It was necessary to leave, even though that meant abandoning the Confederate capital. The problem was that by this time, the Union lines had grown so far that they actually ran south and west of Petersburg. The retreating Confederates would be very vulnerable to a flank attack while on the march from already established Northern positions. If he could engineer a break in the lines and threaten, or better yet damage, the main supply depot, the Federals would be forced to contract their lines and give the Rebels a chance to get away in safety.

Lee had chosen Major General John B. Gordon (below) to plan such an attack at a strongpoint in the Union lines named Fort Steadman. On this date, Gordon submitted his plan to Lee, and it was promptly approved.



At Goldsborough, North Carolina, the bulk of the Union armies arrived, including W. T. Sherman. Goldsborough was lost to the Confederacy as a rail hub, but it would rapidly be added to the assets of the Union. Engineers were already working to repair the rail lines and the locomotives and rolling stock in the area. Although Sherman's forces had now swelled to over 80,000 men, he would soon have a secure supply line, and access to speedy travel. He began making plans for a reunion with Grant -- which would of course be at City Point.

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

At Fort Stedman, the Confederate assault plan went into action. The Union had begun paying southern deserters eight dollars for every firearm they brought with them into Union lines, so it was not considered alarming when a batch of Confederate soldiers approached the Northern pickets carrying their muskets. Matters took a different aspect when the muskets were pointed at the Federals, and the first line of defense was quietly captured. The main assault then quickly overran the fort, and the Rebels fanned out along the entrenchments to widen the gap. For a moment the way seemed to be open to attack City Point, which was now an even richer prize since Abraham Lincoln had arrived there.

Map by Hal Jespersen, www.cwmaps.com

However, three major things now went wrong with the Confederate attack. First, there was a breakdown in the railroad that was supposed to deliver the reserve troops to exploit the hoped-for breach in the Union lines. Second, there was not yet a breakthrough: there were other Union defenses behind the fort, now alerted and manned. Third, although neither Grant nor George Meade could reach the scene in time, the Northern generals on the spot headed by John G. Parke (below) met the crisis superbly.


[font="Times New Roman"] Meade happened to be at City Point that night, and this break in his line cut him off from all communication with his headquarters. Parke, however, commanding the 9th corps when this breach took place, telegraphed the facts to Meade's headquarters, and learning that the general was away, assumed command himself and with commendable promptitude made all preparations to drive the enemy back. General Tidball gathered a large number of pieces of artillery and planted them in rear of the captured works so as to sweep the narrow space of ground between the lines very thoroughly. Hartranft was soon out with his division, as also was Willcox. Hartranft to the right of the breach headed the rebels off in that direction and rapidly drove them back into Fort Stedman. On the other side they were driven back into the intrenchments which they had captured, and batteries eleven and twelve were retaken by Willcox early in the morning.
Parke then threw a line around outside of the captured fort and batteries, and communication was once more established. The artillery fire was kept up so continuously that it was impossible for the Confederates to retreat, and equally impossible for reinforcements to join them. They all, therefore, fell captives into our hands.

[center]--The Personal Memoirs of General U. S. Grant[/center][/font]

But the Northerners weren't through yet. Parke launched a counter-attack in such strength that the Federals overran an outer line of Confederate defenses. (There are reports that the Southern troops themselves had taken down the wooden defensive stakes for firewood.) When the fighting died down late in the day, it was the Yankees rather than the Rebels who had gained ground. And Lee had lost roughly 4,000 men in all, with 600 killed, 2,400 wounded, and 1,000 captured. Union losses are reported as 1,044 total, with 72 killed, 450 wounded, and 522 missing or captured.

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

Another part of what Grant had intended to be a coordinated winter offensive got under way. Under General Edward Canby, a Union army from Louisiana began the long-delayed drive to capture Mobile, Alabama. First, however, they had to deal with the strongpoints of Spanish Fort and Fort Blakely. On this date, the Northerners began the siege of Spanish Fort.


W. T. Sherman and U. S. Grant had not met face-to-face for nearly a year. On this date they were re-united:

[font="Times New Roman"]We put to sea at once and steamed up the coast, reaching Fortress Monroe on the morning of the 27th, where I landed and telegraphed to my brother, Senator Sherman, at Washington, inviting him to come down and return with me to Goldsboro. We proceeded on up James River to City Point, which we reached the same afternoon. I found General Grant, with his family and staff, occupying a pretty group of huts on the bank of James River, overlooking the harbor, which was full of vessels of all classes, both war and merchant, with wharves and warehouses on an extensive scale. The general received me most heartily, and we talked over matters very fully. After I had been with him an hour or so, he remarked that the President, Mr. Lincoln, was then on board the steamer River Queen, lying at the wharf, and he proposed that we should call and see him. We walked down to the wharf, went on board, and found Mr. Lincoln alone, in the after-cabin. He remembered me perfectly, and at once engaged in a most interesting conversation.

[center]--Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman[/center][/font]

A large part of the conversation was Sherman recounting the incidents of his marches through Georgia and the Carolinas. Lincoln was famously fond of telling stories, but he also liked to listen to them. Grant and Sherman left the River Queen for the evening and returned to Grant's quarters -- where Mrs. Grant scolded them for not paying their respects to Mary Lincoln. The two top Union generals, suitably chastened, promised to repair the omission the next day.

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

At City Point, Virginia, the war's last great conference of Union commanders took place.

[font="Times New Roman"]Early the next day, March 28th, all the principal officers of the army and navy called to see me, Generals Meade, Ord, Ingalls, etc., and Admiral Porter. At this time the River Queen was at anchor out in the river, abreast of the wharf, and we again started to visit Mr. and Mrs. Lincoln. Admiral Porter accompanied us. We took a small, tug at the wharf, which conveyed us on board, where we were again received most courteously by the President, who conducted us to the after-cabin. After the general compliments, General Grant inquired after Mrs. Lincoln, when the President went to her state- room, returned, and begged us to excuse her, as she was not well. We then again entered upon a general conversation, during which General Grant explained to the President that at that very instant of time General Sheridan was crossing James River from the north, by a pontoon-bridge below City Point; that he had a large, well-appointed force of cavalry, with which he proposed to strike the Southside and Danville Railroads, by which alone General Lee, in Richmond, supplied his army; and that, in his judgment, matters were drawing to a crisis, his only apprehension being that General Lee would not wait long enough.

[center]--Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman[/center][/font]

It was agreed that the one possible risk was if Robert E. Lee and his army could slip away from Petersburg, unite with Joseph Johnston's army in North Carolina, and attack Sherman's force. Sherman declared that he had no fear of even this, for his army of over 80,000 men could hold off Lee's army (now below 50,000 men) and Johnston's army (now below 20,000 men). Grant would come up behind with his combined force of 130,000 men. And then, said Sherman, they would have the Confederates "between our thumb and forefinger".

This moment in the council of war was the subject of the painting, "The Peacemakers" by George Peter Alexander Healy, in 1868. Grant, Sherman, and Admiral Porter sat for Healy, but of course Lincoln had to be painted from memory.


The discussion then turned to what would come after the war had been concluded:

[font="Times New Roman"]During this interview I inquired of the President if he was all ready for the end of the war. What was to be done with the rebel armies when defeated? And what should be done with the political leaders, such as Jeff. Davis, etc.? Should we allow them to escape, etc.? He said he was all ready; all he wanted of us was to defeat the opposing armies, and to get the men composing the Confederate armies back to their homes, at work on their farms and in their shops. As to Jeff. Davis, he was hardly at liberty to speak his mind fully, but intimated that he ought to clear out, "escape the country," only it would not do for him to say so openly. As usual, he illustrated his meaning by a story:

A man had once taken the total abstinence pledge. When visiting a friend, he was invited to take a drink, but declined, on the score of his pledge; when his friend suggested lemonade, which was accepted. In preparing the lemonade, the friend pointed to the brandy-bottle, and said the lemonade would be more palatable if he were to pour in a little brandy; when his guest said, if he could do so "unbeknown" to him, he would "not object." From which illustration I inferred that Mr. Lincoln wanted Davis to escape, "unbeknown" to him.

[...]

Mr. Lincoln was full and frank in his conversation, assuring me that in his mind he was all ready for the civil reorganization of affairs at the South as soon as the war was over; and he distinctly authorized me to assure Governor Vance and the people of North Carolina that, as soon as the rebel armies laid down their arms, and resumed their civil pursuits, they would at once be guaranteed all their rights as citizens of a common country; and that to avoid anarchy the State governments then in existence, with their civil functionaries, would be recognized by him as the government de facto till Congress could provide others.

[center]--Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman[/center][/font]

This was somewhat different than the message to Grant from Secretary of War Stanton, which had stated that all political questions were to be decided by the President alone. But Sherman apparently never received Stanton's instructions, and so he left that evening to return to his army, believing he had some leeway.

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

The proverbial axe fell on Jubal Early. Of the corps commanders in the Army of Northern Virginia after Stonewall Jackson and James Longstreet, Early is considered to have been the best. But his defeats at the hands of Philip Sheridan, though all but inevitable given the odds, had made the Confederate soldiers lose confidence in him. As General-in-Chief, Robert E. Lee had the responsibility to relieve him or keep him, and on this date he made the painful decision:

[font="Times New Roman"]We then returned to Abingdon, and while I was engaged in endeavoring to organize the small force in that section, so as to meet the enemy in the best way we could, I received, on the 30th of March, a telegraphic despatch from General Lee, directing me to turn over the command in Southwestern Virginia to General Echols, and in the Valley to General Lomax, and informing me that he would address a letter to me at my home. I complied at once with this order and thus terminated my military career.

[center]--Jubal Early, Autobiographical Sketch and Narrative of the War Between the States[/center][/font]

Early would never receive another assignment.


W. T. Sherman had returned to his command at Goldsborough, North Carolina, which he admitted in a letter was "decidedly mixed". He continued the job of reorganization, putting the reinforcements he had received into a right wing and a left wing. It was clear that the job of replacing the worn-out draft animals and expended ammunition (there had been rather more fighting in the Carolinas than in Georgia) would take a little longer. He wired to Grant that he would be ready to move around April 10.

Grant was not willing to wait that long. Philip Sheridan's force was back from the Shenandoah Valley, and recovered from the march. Originally Grant had planned to send Sheridan and his cavalry to Sherman, much to Sheridan's unhappiness. But Lee's army had been weakend by the battle of Fort Stedman, and Grant believed the time was right for a counter-stroke. He decided to try once more to get around the left of the Rebel lines and attack the Southside Railroad, whose loss would make it impossible to feed the Confederate army around Petersburg. According to his memoirs, he did not expect to achieve surprise, but counted on Lee rushing so many troops to defend the railroad that an attack straight into the center of the lines could be successful.

The Federals did indeed fail to catch Lee napping. The rains had paused for a few days, allowing the movement to begin, but then the weather turned again:

[font="Times New Roman"]It soon set in raining again however, and in a very short time the roads became practically impassable for teams, and almost so for cavalry. Sometimes a horse or mule would be standing apparently on firm ground, when all at once one foot would sink, and as he commenced scrambling to catch himself all his feet would sink and he would have to be drawn by hand out of the quicksands so common in that part of Virginia and other southern States. It became necessary therefore to build corduroy roads every foot of the way as we advanced, to move our artillery upon. The army had become so accustomed to this kind of work, and were so well prepared for it, that it was done very rapidly.

[center]--The Personal Memoirs of General U. S. Grant[/center][/font]

However, in the meantime Lee had realized what was going on, and sent nearly about five brigades of troops to the area. Strangely, to command them he selected George Pickett, one of the few generals in his army who disliked Lee (because of the disastrous Pickett's Charge).

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

In Alabama, James Wilson's massive cavalry force was making contact with the Rebels under Nathan Bedford Forrest at the town of Montevallo. As had happened once or twice before, the Confederate high command had taken away most of Forrest's veteran troopers. Granted, they were desperately needed in the Eastern theater against Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan, but it still left Forrest with inexperienced men, and not enough of them. On this date, the unprecedented happened: Forrest's force was routed from the battlefield. To add to the woes of the Southerners, Forrest's own headquarters was overrun. He himself managed to escape, but there was not time to destroy all of the documents, which fell into Yankee hands.


South and west of Petersburg, the Union infantry advanced to White Oak Road, while the cavalry attempted to capture the key crossroad of Five Forks. Philip Sheridan moved his cavalry out promptly, but had difficulty for two reasons. First, the roads were not yet dry, and second, his opponent George Pickett now proved himself a competent battlefield commander:

[font="Times New Roman"]On the 31st, the rain having ceased, directions were given at an early hour to both Merritt and Crook to make reconnoissances preparatory to securing Five Forks, and about 9 o'clock Merritt started for the crossroads, Davies's brigade supporting him. His march was necessarily slow because of the mud, and the enemy's pickets resisted with obstinacy also, but the coveted crossroads fell to Merritt without much trouble, as the bulk of the enemy was just then bent on other things. At the same hour that Merritt started, Crook moved Smith's brigade out northwest from Dinwiddie to Fitzgerald's crossing of Chamberlain's Creek, to cover Merritt's left, supporting Smith by placing Gregg to his right and rear. The occupation of this ford was timely, for Pickett, now in command of both the cavalry and infantry, was already marching to get in Merritt's rear by crossing Chamberlain's Creek. To hold on to Fitzgerald's ford Smith had to make a sharp fight, but Mumford's cavalry attacking Devin, the enemy's infantry succeeded in getting over Chamberlain's Creek at a point higher up than Fitzgerald's ford, and assailing Davies, forced him back in a northeasterly direction toward the Dinwiddie and Five Forks road in company with Devin. The retreat of Davies permitted Pickett to pass between Crook and Merritt, which he promptly did, effectually separating them and cutting off both Davies and Devin from the road to Dinwiddie. . .

[center]--Personal Memoirs of P. H. Sheridan, General, United States Army[/center][/font]

Map by Hal Jespersen, www.cwmaps.com


In the meantime, the Union infantry were also being roughly handled at White Oak Road. Because the Federal movements were not coordinated, just four brigades of Rebels managed to drive back two divisions of Yankees, a brigade at a time. It might have turned into a complete rout had the last Northern brigade (under a Colonel) made a fighting retreat across Gravelly Run creek while V Corps commander Gouverneur Warren personally rallied his broken regiments.

Warren then called upon the hero of Little Round Top, Joshua Chamberlain, who was now a Brigadier General. Chamberlain had been wounded the day before, but he went with his men back across the Gravelly Run, followed by Warren's recovered units. Now it was the Yankees' turn to push back the Rebels, but only as far back as the Confederates' main line of fortifications. It was far enough, however, to cut White Oak Road. Then the Southerners discovered they had another problem. Sheridan and his cavalry were not yet ready to give up:

[font="Times New Roman"]. . . Merritt assailed fiercely, compelling Pickett to halt and face a new foe, thus interrupting an advance that would finally have carried Pickett into the rear of Warren's corps. It was now about 4 o'clock in the afternoon and we were in a critical situation, but having ordered Merritt to bring Devin and Davies to Dinwiddie by the Boydton road, staff-officers were sent to hurry Custer to the same point, for with its several diverging roads the Court House was of vital importance, and I determined to stay there at all hazards.

[...]

When halted by the attack of Gregg and Gibbs, Pickett, desisting from his pursuit of Devin, as already stated, turned his undivided attention to this unexpected force, and with his preponderating infantry pressed it back on the Five Forks road toward Dinwiddie, though our men, fighting dismounted behind barricades at different points, displayed such obstinacy as to make Pickett's progress slow, and thus give me time to look out a line for defending the Court House. I selected a place about three-fourths of a mile northwest of the crossroads, and Custer coming up quickly with Capehart's brigade, took position on the left of the road to Five Forks in some open ground along the crest of a gentle ridge . . . By this time our horse-artillery, which for two days had been stuck in the mud, was all up, and every gun was posted in this line. It was now near sunset, and the enemy's cavalry thinking the day was theirs, made a dash at Smith, but just as the assailants appeared in the open fields, Capehart's men opened so suddenly on their left flank as to cause it to recoil in astonishment, which permitted Smith to connect his brigade with Custer unmolested. We were now in good shape behind the familiar barricades, and having a continuous line, excepting only the gap to be filled with Pennington, that covered Dinwiddie and the Boydton Road. My left rested in the woods about half a mile west of the Court House, and the barricades extended from this flank in a semicircle through the open fields in a northeasterly direction, to a piece-of thick timber on the right, near the Boydton Road. A little before the sun went down the Confederate infantry was formed for the attack, and, fortunately for us, Pennington's brigade came up and filled the space to which it was assigned between Capehart and Gibbs, just as Pickett moved out across the cleared fields in front of Custer, in deep lines that plainly told how greatly we were outnumbered. Accompanied by Generals Merritt and Custer and my staff, I now rode along the barricades to encourage the men. Our enthusiastic reception showed that they were determined to stay. The cavalcade drew the enemy's fire, which emptied several of the saddles—among others Mr. Theodore Wilson, correspondent of the New York Herald, being wounded. In reply our horse-artillery opened on the advancing Confederates, but the men behind the barricades lay still till Pickett's troops were within short range. Then they opened, Custer's repeating rifles pouring out such a shower of lead that nothing could stand up against it. The repulse was very quick...
[center]--Personal Memoirs of P. H. Sheridan, General, United States Army[/center][/font]

It is generally agreed that the actions of March 31 amounted to a Confederate victory. They had halted the Northern attack, and inflicted more casualties than they had sustained. But the Yankees, Philip Sheridan especially, had no intention of leaving things as they stood. A cavalry assault against infantry had been unsuccessful, as it generally was in the Civil War. The next day they would try a combined cavalry and infantry attack. Sheridan and George Meade wired a request to Grant to move up Gouvernor Warren's V Corps, and received Grant's full authorization, even though Warren was technically senior to Sheridan:

[font="Times New Roman"]HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES, DABNEY'S MILLS, March 31, 1865. 10:15 P. M.

MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE, Commanding Army of the Potomac.
Let Warren move in the way you propose, and urge him not to stop for anything. Let Griffin go on as he was first directed.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut. General.[/font]

Meade passed this order on, and added to Warren, "You must be very prompt in this movement ... Don't encumber yourself with anything that will impede your progress." But Warren would not move quickly enough to satisfy his superiors.

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

Near Five Forks, Virginia, George Pickett apparently believed he had successfully driven off the Union attacks of the day before. He and cavalry commander Fitzhugh Lee left his headquarters to enjoy a lunch of baked shad. But it was indeed April Fool's Day; the cutting of White Oak Road had left his forces isolated from the rest of the Army of Northern Virginia. And the Yankees were coming back.

[font="Times New Roman"]With daylight came a slight fog, but it lifted almost immediately, and Merritt moved Custer and Devin forward. As these divisions advanced the enemy's infantry fell back on the Five Forks road, Devin pressing him along the road, while Custer extended on the left over toward Chamberlain's Run, Crook being held in watch along Stony Creek, meanwhile, to be utilized as circumstances might require when Warren attacked.

[center]--Personal Memoirs of P. H. Sheridan, General, United States Army[/center][/font]

Map by Hal Jespersen, www.cwmaps.com

But Gouverneur Warren did not attack for quite some time. The early part of the battle was done by Sheridan's cavalry, which could not deliver the knock-out blow that Sheridan wanted.

[font="Times New Roman"]That we had accomplished nothing but to oblige our foe to retreat was to me bitterly disappointing, but still feeling sure that he would not give up the Five Forks crossroads without a fight, I pressed him back there with Merritt's cavalry, Custer advancing on the Scott road, while Devin drove the rearguard along that leading from J.[G] Boisseau's to Five Forks. By 2 o'clock in the afternoon Merritt had forced the enemy inside his intrenchments, which began with a short return about three-quarters of a mile east of the Forks and ran along the south side of the White Oak road to a point about a mile west of the Forks.

[center]--Personal Memoirs of P. H. Sheridan, General, United States Army[/center][/font]

Finally, units of Warren's V Corps, along with Warren himself, began to arrive. Sheridan explained his plan, hoping for prompt execution. It didn't happen:

[font="Times New Roman"]General Warren seemed to understand me clearly, and then left to join his command, while I turned my attention to the cavalry, instructing Merritt to begin by making demonstrations as though to turn the enemy's right, and to assault the front of the works with his dismounted cavalry as soon as Warren became engaged. Afterward I rode around to Gravelly Run Church, and found the head of Warren's column just appearing, while he was sitting under a tree making a rough sketch of the ground. I was disappointed that more of the corps was not already up, and as the precious minutes went by without any apparent effort to hurry the troops on to the field, this disappointment grew into disgust. At last I expressed to Warren my fears that the cavalry might expend all their ammunition before the attack could be made, that the sun would go down before the battle could be begun, or that troops from Lee's right, which, be it remembered, was less than three miles away from my right, might, by striking my rear, or even by threatening it, prevent the attack on Pickett. Warren did not seem to me to be at all solicitous; his manner exhibited decided apathy, and he remarked with indifference that "Bobby Lee was always getting people into trouble."

[center]--Personal Memoirs of P. H. Sheridan, General, United States Army[/center][/font]

There was much confusion in the Union ranks, with one division temporarily marching away from the front instead of towards it. This, however, was something that Sheridan had dealt with before. Riding back and forth among the Federal columns, with much energy and profanity he straightened out traffic jams and got the bluecoats to the front. Time had almost run out, but there was just enough daylight to mount the charges against the Confederate lines. And then:

[font="Times New Roman"]The charge was repeated, but held in check until Crawford’s division found a way under cover of a woodland beyond the Confederate works, and marched to that advantage. Ransom drew his brigade from the intrenched line to meet that march, but it was one brigade against three—and those supported by part of Griffin’s division. Ransom’s horse was killed, falling on him; his adjutant-general, Captain Gee, was killed, and the brigade was forced back. This formidable move by open field to Pickett’s rear made his position untenable. Feeling this, the veteran soldiers of the left brigades realized that their battle was irretrievable. Those who could find escape from that end of the works fell back in broken ranks, while many others, finding the enemy closing in on their rear, thought it more soldierly to surrender to Ayres’s brave assaulting columns, and not a few were the captives of Crawford’s division. It was not until that period that General Pickett knew, by the noise of battle, that it was on. He rode through the fire to his command, but his cavalry chief, riding later, was cut off from the field and failed to take part in the action. When Pickett got to the Forks, Colonel Pegram, of the artillery, had been mortally wounded, the battery commander was killed, and many of the cannoneers killed or wounded.

[center]--James Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox: Memoirs of The Civil War in America[/center][/font]

The Confederate defenses had collapsed completely. As had happened the third day of Gettysburg, George Pickett was left with a decimated and broken force.

[font="Times New Roman"]. . . night came to cover the disastrous field. The remnants of the command were collected as soon and as well as they could be in the dead of night and marched towards Exeter Mills, where Pickett proposed to cross the Appomattox and return to the army, but early movements of the next morning changed the face of the military zodiac. The position was not of General Pickett’s choosing, but of his orders, and from his orders he assumed that he would be reinforced. His execution was all that a skilful commander could apply. He reported as to his position and the movements of the enemy threatening to cut his command from the army, but no force came to guard his right. The reinforcements joined him after night, when his battle had been lost and his command disorganized.

[center]--James Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox: Memoirs of The Civil War in America[/center] [/font]

It was a bad day for Union General Warren as well as for Pickett. U. S. Grant had given Sheridan the authority to relieve Warren as commander of V Corps "and if his removal was necessary to success, not to hesitate." That evening Sheridan used it -- but after the victory had been won. Warren would spend nearly two decades trying to clear his name, and finally a court of inquiry would find in his favor.

Five Forks has sometimes been called "The Waterloo of the Confederacy". It certainly did not compare in scale with Napoleon’s disaster (whose 200th anniversary will be in June), for the 65,000 casualties of Waterloo were an order of magnitude greater than those of Five Forks. Modern estimates believe that a number of Confederates managed to evade capture in the confusion of the battlefield and make their way back to the Southern army, so that the total losses were only about 3,000 instead of the 5,000 to 6,000 estimated by the Northerners at the time. (Union casualties were 830 in all.)

Nonetheless, Five Forks was decisive. However many the losses were, they were more than the Confederacy could afford. There were not enough troops remaining to hold the extended lines against the massive Union forces. Grant shrewdly guessed it, ordering a general attack early the next morning.

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

Ulysses S. Grant had wanted his general assault to begin as early as possible. But it was still pitch-dark at 4:00, and so the advance had to wait for another half-hour. When it came, however, it was with more determination than the Army of the Potomac had shown since before Cold Harbor. The Rebels fought desperately, and in a few places managed to bring the Northerners to a halt. In other places, however, the defenders were driven back, and near the Boydton Plank road the VI Corps achieved a major break-through.

[font="Times New Roman"]Before the first rays of morning we found general head-quarters. Some members of the staff were up and dressed, but the general was yet on his couch. When told of my presence, he called me to a seat at his bedside, and gave orders for our march to support the broken forces about Five Forks. He had no censure for any one, but mentioned the great numbers of the enemy and the superior repeating rifles of his cavalry. He was ill, suffering from the rheumatic ailment that he had been afflicted with for years, but keener trouble of mind made him in a measure superior to the shooting pains of his disease. From the line gained by the Sixth Corps on the 25th it was a run of but two or three minutes across to the Confederate works. At 4.45, General Wright advanced as the signal for general assault. General Lee was not through with his instructions for our march when a staff-officer came in and reported that the lines in front of his head-quarters were broken. Drawing his wrapper about him, he walked with me to the front door and saw, as far as the eye could cover the field, a line of skirmishers in quiet march towards us. It was hardly light enough to distinguish the blue from the gray.

[center]-- James Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox; Memoirs of The Civil War in America[/center][/font]

Lee withdrew from his headquarters to a safer place. One of his corps commanders wasn't as prudent: A. P. Hill, accompanied by a single aide, rode forward to try to reform his units. The two encountered an advance pair of Union skirmishers. The Confederates tried to bluff the Northerners into surrender, but they opened fire, and Hill was shot through the heart.

[font="Times New Roman"]During a few moments of quiet, General Lee despatched to Richmond of affairs at Petersburg, and to advise that our troops must abandon their lines and march in retreat as soon as night could cover the move.

[...]

It was eleven o’clock of the morning when the despatch reached Richmond. It was the Sabbath-day. The city was at profound worship. The President was at St. Paul’s Church. My wife was there (rest her spirit!) and heard the pastor, Mr. Minnegerode, read, “The Lord is in his holy temple: let all the earth keep silence before him.” The full congregation rose, and the air whispered silence. The solemnity was broken as a swift despatch-bearer entered the portals and walked with quiet but rapid steps up the aisle to the chancel. He handed the President a sealed envelope. After reading, the President took his hat and walked with dignity down the aisle. Service was resumed, but presently came another messenger for some of the ladies, then another, and still another, and in a few moments the congregation, followed by the minister, giving up the sacred service, passed out and to their homes to prepare, in silent resignation, for whatever was to come. The tragic scenes of the south side, in a different way, were as impressive as these.

[center]-- James Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox; Memoirs of The Civil War in America[/center][/font]

According to the accounts, Davis did not speak a word. But his expression, the fact that he left before the service was over, and the arrival of other messengers told the congregation what was about to happen. The news quickly spread through Richmond. Those who could buy or borrow transport tried to escape the city, but the horses were mostly being used by the military, and the trains were reserved to members of the government.

In the afternoon, the President and most of his cabinet embarked on a train heading west. (Secretary of War Breckenridge stayed behind to supervise the destruction of anything militarily useful, though he took care to try to preserve the archives.) Naturally, they had taken the coin and bullion from the Confederate Treasury with them. Rumors, which have continued to this day, started that it amounted to a fabulous sum, but the best estimates from the records are that it was worth only a little over half a million Union dollars.


"Petersburg Apr2" by Map by Hal Jespersen, www.posix.com/CW.

[font="Times New Roman"]Lee made frantic efforts to recover at least part of the lost ground. Parke on our right was repeatedly assaulted, but repulsed every effort. Before noon Longstreet was ordered up from the north side of the James River thus bringing the bulk of Lee's army around to the support of his extreme right. As soon as I learned this I notified Weitzel and directed him to keep up close to the enemy and to have Hartsuff, commanding the Bermuda Hundred front, to do the same thing, and if they found any break to go in;

[. . .]

The enemy had in addition to their intrenched line close up to Petersburg, two enclosed works outside of it, Fort Gregg and Fort Whitworth. We thought it had now become necessary to carry them by assault. About one o'clock in the day, Fort Gregg was assaulted by Foster's division of the 24th corps (Gibbon's), supported by two brigades from Ord's command. The battle was desperate and the National troops were repulsed several times; but it was finally carried, and immediately the troops in Fort Whitworth evacuated the place. The guns of Fort Gregg were turned upon the retreating enemy, and the commanding officer with some sixty of the men of Fort Whitworth surrendered.

[center]--The Personal Memoirs of General U. S. Grant[/center][/font]

However, the two forts had bought the time for the remnants of Lee's army to assemble and begin the march to the west. The pursuit along the Appomattox River was about to begin. Casualties for the day are estimated at 3,500 for the Union and 4,250 for the Confederates. The Army of Northern Virginia had been sharply reduced from what it had been just a week ago; probably to less than 40,000 men.



At Selma, Alabama, Nathan Bedford Forrest had scraped together a force of about 4,000 men to man the hastily-built fortifications of the city. But most of them were militia rather than the troopers Forrest was used to leading. Union commander James Wilson had 9,000 cavalry on the scene, and he meant to take the city.

As a general rule, cavalry do not do well attacking fortifications, but on this date there was an exception. Many of the Yankees dismounted and swarmed the barricades, using their repeating Spencers at first and then fighting hand-to-hand. General Wilson spotted an unfinished portion of the Southern lines and personally led a mounted charge against it. Elsewhere, the inexperienced Rebel militiamen broke and ran, and the defenses collapsed. Forrest managed to escape, though he was wounded, but 2,700 of his 4,000 men were killed or taken prisoner.The Northerners would spend some time in Selma, destroying ironworks and military facilities.

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

Those who had fled Richmond the evening before turned out to be wise. There were three ironclads under construction at the docks, and the Southerners were determined not to let the Yankees capture them. (Though it is hard to imagine what difference it would have made at that point in the war.) The warships were set on fire, apparently in the belief that the magazines would go up in single large explosions, and the remains of the ships would go to the bottom of the James. But for at least one of them, it didn't work out that way. The initial explosion did not immediately detonate all of the shells, many of which were sent arcing across the riverfront, to start fires where they landed. It is also reported that stores of tobacco were put to the torch, and the wind spread burning tobacco leaves. Sunrise revealed a fair part of Richmond billowing smoke and flames.

[font="Times New Roman"]By this time the fire appeared to be general. Some magazine or depot for the manufacture of ordnance stores was on fire about the center of the city; it was marked by the peculiar blackness of smoke; from the middle of it would come the roar of bursting shells and boxes of fixed ammunition, with flashes that gave the appearance of a thunder cloud of huge proportions with lightning playing through it. On our right was the navy yard, at which were several steamers and gunboats on fire, and burning in the river, from which the cannon were thundering as the fire reached them. The old war-scarred city seemed to prefer annihilation to conquest -- a useless sacrifice, as it afterwards proved, however much it may have added to the grandeur of the closing scene; but such is war.

[center]--Edward M. Boykin, The Falling Flag[/center][/font]


It is estimated that there were 750,000 artillery shells stored in the Richmond Arsenal and the navy yard. Explosion after explosion erupted, and a number of people were killed by the blasts or burned in the houses that were set alight. The authorities had been wise enough to order all of the liquor they could find dumped into the gutters, but this did not stop more than a few men from dipping their hands into the rivulets running down the streets, and getting drunk. Since order had broken down completely, the Mayor hurried to the Union lines to surrender the city: the Northern troops were now the only body of men organized enough to fight the fires. Major General Godfrey Weitzel (below) had the honor of accepting the surrender of the Confederate capital. His XXV Corps, including some "colored" units, promptly went to work putting out the fires and restoring order.


In contrast, the streets of Petersburg were empty except for the evacuating Confederates:

[font="Times New Roman"]General Meade and I entered Petersburg on the morning of the 3d and took a position under cover of a house which protected us from the enemy's musketry which was flying thick and fast there. As we would occasionally look around the corner we could see the streets and the Appomattox bottom, presumably near the bridge, packed with the Confederate army. I did not have artillery brought up, because I was sure Lee was trying to make his escape, and I wanted to push immediately in pursuit. At all events I had not the heart to turn the artillery upon such a mass of defeated and fleeing men, and I hoped to capture them soon.

[center]--The Personal Memoirs of General U. S. Grant[/center][/font]

But it would not be an easy chase. The Rebels were traveling lighter, and had a night's head start on the bulk of Grant's forces. Still, the Federals had the ever-aggressive Philip Sheridan:

[font="Times New Roman"]I notified Sheridan and directed him to move out on the Danville Railroad to the south side of the Appomattox River as speedily as possible. He replied that he already had some of his command nine miles out. I then ordered the rest of the Army of the Potomac under Meade to follow the same road in the morning. Parke's corps followed by the same road, and the Army of the James was directed to follow the road which ran alongside of the South Side Railroad to Burke's Station, and to repair the railroad and telegraph as they proceeded. That road was a 5 feet gauge, while our rolling stock was all of the 4 feet 8 1/2 inches gauge; consequently the rail on one side of the track had to be taken up throughout the whole length and relaid so as to conform to the gauge of our cars and locomotives.

[center]--The Personal Memoirs of General U. S. Grant[/center][/font]


Map by Hal Jespersen, www.cwmaps.com

There was just time for President Lincoln to ride out to Petersburg and congratulate Grant on his victory. Then Lincoln returned to the headquarters at City Point, and told Admiral David Porter, "Thank God I have lived to see this. It seems to me that I have been dreaming a horrid dream for four years, and now the nightmare is gone. I want to see Richmond."

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

It was not surprising that Lincoln would not want to wait long before entering the Confederate capital, but it was still a great worry for the senior Union officers in the area. To have the President killed while under their responsibility would be a major setback for the Union cause, as well as a personal dishonor. Few troops could be spared from those fighting fires and suppressing looting, so it was a party of just ten sailors hastily put together that served as the Commander-in-chief's bodyguard.

On the Richmond streets, the men of the guard detail were understandably anxious that they would be mobbed. Their worries were half right: in minutes they were surrounded by a shouting crowd. But the shouts were of joy, and the crowd was made up of the part of Richmond’s population that truly could not have been happier to see Lincoln -- the newly freed ex-slaves. For them, Lincoln's presence was the final proof of their emancipation. Several insisted on touching him to assure themselves, and one old woman shouted, "I know I am free, for I have seen Father Abraham and felt him."


The first stop was the recently vacated office of Jefferson Davis. It was not quite 40 hours since the President of the Confederate States had quitted his desk, when the President of the United States sat down at it. He asked for a glass of water, which was quickly provided (along with some whiskey), for Mrs. Davis had instructed that the house be left in good order.

That was not quite the case in the Confederate Capitol building. There was every sign of hurried departure: desks overturned and papers scattered. But one reporter for the Philadelphia Press found an upright desk and used it to compose his report to his newspaper. He was T. Morris Chester, a black man.


Having reached Danville by train, Jefferson Davis was still not willing to admit defeat. He put out a statement announcing that the Confederate forces were now "relieved from the necessity of guarding cities" and "nothing is now needed to render our triumph certain but . . . our own unquenchable resolve."


South and west of the fallen Southern capital, the marching duel of the Army of Northern Virginia and the Army of the Potomac was in full swing. The Union cavalry harried the retreating Confederates, and they leaked stragglers by hundreds, but this wasn't enough for Grant. He wanted to bag the entire army, and Lee as well. He knew, and so did almost everyone else, that for practical purposes it would be the end of the war.

As a general rule, Confederate armies were able to march faster than Union ones during most of the war. During his campaigns, Stonewall Jackson had been able to move his troops so rapidly that they referred to themselves as "foot cavalry". But now the difference between men who had decent meals and good footwear, and men who had neither, showed itself. Nor were the famished Southern horses and mules able to keep ahead of the Yankees' draft animals in pulling equipment wagons and artillery. Grant knew his soldiers were gaining when he spotted Confederate cannons abandoned by the side of the road, their weight too much for the horses.

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

In Virginia, the retreating Confederates needed a natural barrier such as a major river or a line of hills to stop the massive Northern force. But above all they needed food: with every passing hour there were fewer men able to effectively fight, and more who could only put one foot in front of the other. They were having no luck with either.

On this date, the Confederates had reached the railroad station at Amelia Court House, where they were met by a train. But there had been a mix-up, not surprising since the Confederate government was still disrupted from having to flee Richmond. The train carried no rations, but only cannon, ammunition, and caissons. This was useless to Lee and his troops, for their horses were already having trouble pulling the ordnance they had.

Map by Hal Jespersen, www.cwmaps.com


But Lee decided his men and horses must have more food. He halted the main body of his army and sent out foragers to gather what they could from the countryside. It was a major mistake. There had not been enough time since the end of winter for much to grow. Some foragers returned with only handfuls, and others did not return at all. A crucial day of marching had been lost, and the Federals took good advantage of it. Sheridan's cavalry arrived at Jetersville, cutting off the Richmond and Danville Railroad for the Southerners. They were now compelled to continue west instead of swinging to the south. Some of Lee's defenders maintain that the Rebels had no choice but to pause, because it took a day for the nearly exhausted draft animals to bring up the pontoons and other bridging material.


In Washington, Secretary of State William Seward had a nearly fatal carriage accident. The horses began to run away, and he attempted to leap clear. But he landed badly on the pavement, breaking his jaw and dislocating his shoulder. His daughter Fanny was horrified to see him in his bed, for his faced was so bruised he was almost unrecognizable. The normally stern Secretary of War Stanton rushed to Seward's bedside to comfort his fellow Cabinet member, then sent a telegram requesting that Lincoln return to Washington.

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

The next action was a place now called Sayler's Creek, but marked as Sailor's Creek on the maps of the time -- when maps were in hand, which was not always. Farmville was the next place were rations could be had for the fleeing Confederates, but the route was not clear. Advance divisions under Richard Anderson and Richard Ewell found themselves separated from the rest of Lee's army, and then faced with disaster from the pursuing Northerners:

[font="Times New Roman"]Just after crossing Sailor's Greek, a favorable opportunity offering, both Merritt and Crook attacked vigorously, gained the Rice's Station road, destroyed several hundred wagons, made many prisoners, and captured sixteen pieces of artillery. This was important, but more valuable still was the fact that we were astride the enemy's line of retreat, and had cut off from joining Longstreet, waiting at Rice's Station, a corps of Confederate infantry under General Ewell, composed of Anderson's, Kershaw's, and Custis Lee's divisions. Stagg's brigade and Miller's battery, which, as I have said, had been left at the forks of the Deatonsville road, had meanwhile broken in between the rear of Ewell's column and the head of Gordon's, forcing Gordon to abandon his march for Rice's Station, and to take the right-hand road at the forks, on which he was pursued by General Humphreys. The complete isolation of Ewell from Longstreet in his front and Gordon in his rear led to the battle of Sailor's Creek, one of the severest conflicts of the war, for the enemy fought with desperation to escape capture, and we, bent on his destruction, were no less eager and determined.

[center]--Personal Memoirs of P. H. Sheridan, General, United States Army[/center][/font]

Map by Hal Jespersen, www.cwmaps.com

On the Confederate side, James Longstreet agreed that the combat had been furious, but the Yankees had too many advantages:

[font="Times New Roman"]Anderson crossed Sailor’s Creek, closely followed by Ewell. The route by which they were to march was by High Bridge, but they were on strange ground, without maps, or instructions, or commander. In the absence of orders Anderson thought to march for the noise of battle, at Rice’s Station. They had no artillery or cavalry. The chief of cavalry was there, but his troopers were elsewhere, and he rode away, advising the force to follow him. The rear-guard came up rapidly and essayed to deploy for defence, but the close pursuit of Humphreys’s corps forced its continued march for High Bridge, letting the pursuit in upon Ewell’s rear. As Anderson marched he found Merritt’s cavalry square across his route. Humphreys was close upon Ewell, but the former awaited battle for the arrival of the Sixth Corps. There was yet a way of escape from the closing clutches of the enemy by filing to their right and marching to the rear of the command at Rice’s Station; but they were true soldiers, and decided to fight, even to sacrifice their commands if necessary, to break or delay the pursuit until the trains and rear-guard could find safety beyond High Bridge.

[...]

Ewell received the assaults with resolute coolness, and at one moment pushed his fight to aggressive return, but the enemy, finding that there was no artillery with the Confederates, dashed their batteries into closer range, putting in artillery and infantry fire, front and flanks, until the Confederate rear was crushed to fragments. General Ewell surrendered; so also did General G. W. C. Lee with his division. General Kershaw advised such of his men as could to make their escape, and surrendered with his division. General Anderson got away with the greater part of B. R. Johnson’s division, and Pickett with six hundred men. Generals Corse and Hunton and others of Pickett’s men were captured. About two hundred of Kershaw’s division got away.

[...]

General Mahone writes of the scenes that he witnessed as follows: “As we were moving up in line of battle, General Lee riding with me and remonstrating about the severity of my note in respect to Colonel Marshall’s interference with my division the night before, up rode Colonel Venable, of General Lee’s staff, and wanted to know if he, General Lee, had received his message. General Lee replied ‘No,’ when Colonel Venable informed him that the enemy had captured the wagon-trains at Sailor’s Creek. General Lee exclaimed, ‘Where is Anderson? Where is Ewell? It is strange I can’t hear from them.’ Then turning to me, he said, ‘General Mahone, I have no other troops, will you take your division to Sailor’s Creek?’ and I promptly gave the order by the left flank, and off we were for Sailor’s Creek, where the disaster had occurred. General Lee rode with me, Colonel Venable a little in the rear. On reaching the south crest of the high ground at the crossing of the river road overlooking Sailor’s Creek, the disaster which had overtaken our army was in full view, and the scene beggars description,—hurrying teamsters with their teams and dangling traces (no wagons), retreating infantry without guns, many without hats, a harmless mob, with the massive columns of the enemy moving orderly on. At this spectacle General Lee straightened himself in his saddle, and, looking more the soldier than ever, exclaimed, as if talking to himself, ‘My God! has the army dissolved?’

[center]-- James Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox; Memoirs of The Civil War in America[/center][/font]

The victory cost the Union a total of 1,148 casualties. In return, they captured at least 7,700 Confederates including at least six general officers. An additional but unknown number were killed or wounded. It amounted to a fourth of the remaining Army of Northern Virginia.

[font="Times New Roman"]Near midnight I sent a despatch giving the names of the generals captured. These were Ewell, Kershaw, Barton, Corse, Dubose, and Custis Lee. In the same despatch I wrote: "If the thing is pressed, I think that Lee will surrender." When Mr. Lincoln, at City Point, received this word from General Grant, who was transmitting every item of news to the President, he telegraphed Grant the laconic message: "Let the thing be pressed."

[center]--Personal Memoirs of P. H. Sheridan, General, United States Army[/center][/font]

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

Jefferson Davis had spoken of "our unquenchable resolve". But throughout the South, more and more people were seeing their cause as lost:

[font="Times New Roman"] April 7th. - Richmond has fallen and I have no heart to write about it. Grant broke through our lines and Sherman cut through them. Stoneman is this side of Danville. They are too many for us. Everything is lost in Richmond, even our archives. Blue black is our horizon. Hood says we shall all be obliged to go West - to Texas, I mean, for our own part of the country will be overrun.
Yes, a solitude and a wild waste it may become, but, as to that, we can rough it in the bush at home.
De Fontaine, in his newspaper, continues the old cry. "Now Richmond is given up," he says, "it was too heavy a load to carry, and we are stronger than ever." "Stronger than ever?" Nine-tenths of our army are under ground and where is another army to come from? Will they wait until we grow one?

[center]-- Mary Boykin Chesnut, A Diary From Dixie[/center][/font]

In the Army of Northern Virginia, men continued to drop out, some because they could go no further, and others because they had had enough:

[font="Times New Roman"]Lee's army was rapidly crumbling. Many of his soldiers had enlisted from that part of the State where they now were, and were continually dropping out of the ranks and going to their homes. I know that I occupied a hotel almost destitute of furniture at Farmville, which had probably been used as a Confederate hospital. The next morning when I came out I found a Confederate colonel there, who reported to me and said that he was the proprietor of that house, and that he was a colonel of a regiment that had been raised in that neighborhood. He said that when he came along past home, he found that he was the only man of the regiment remaining with Lee's army, so he just dropped out, and now wanted to surrender himself. I told him to stay there and he would not be molested.

[center]--The Personal Memoirs of General U. S. Grant[/center][/font]

Even among the higher officers, there was dissention. Lee talked to Major General Henry A. Wise, who had once been Governor of Virginia and an ardent secessionist, and got an earful:

[font="Times New Roman"]... Gen. Lee inquired what he thought of the situation. “Situation?” said the bold old man. “There is no situation. Nothing remains, Gen. Lee, but to put your poor men on your poor mules and send them home in time for the spring ploughing. This army is hopelessly whipped, and is fast becoming demoralized. These men have already endured more than I believed flesh and blood could stand, and I say to you, Sir, emphatically, that to prolong the struggle is murder, and the blood of every man who is killed from this time forth is on your head, Gen. Lee.” This last expression seemed to cause Gen. Lee great pain. With a gesture of remonstrance, and even of impatience, he protested. “Oh, General, do not talk so wildly. My burdens are heavy enough! What would the country think of me, if I did what you suggest?” “Country be d—d,” was the quick reply. “There is no country. There has been no country, General, for a year or more. You are the country to these men. They have fought for you. They have shivered through a long winter for you. Without pay or clothes or care of any sort their devotion to you and faith in you have been the only things that have held this army together. If you demand the sacrifice, there are still left thousands of us who will die for you. You know the game is desperate beyond redemption, and that, if you so announce, no man, or government, or people will gainsay your decision. That is why I repeat that the blood of any man killed hereafter is on your head.” Gen. Lee stood for some time at an open window looking out at the throng now surging by upon the roads and in the fields, and made no response.

[center]--Edward Porter Alexander, Military Memoirs of a Confederate[/center][/font]

General Wise was indeed a "bold old man", for Confederate military regulations forbade any junior officer to suggest surrender to a superior. The penalty could be the firing squad.
Knowing the Confederate desertion rate, and having been informed of the Confederate debacle at Sailor's Creek, Grant believed the time had come to start surrender negotiations. He wrote out a quick message for Lee. But the Confederate commander and his chief lieutenant Longstreet were not as convinced of the end as Grant was:

[font="Times New Roman"][right]Head-quarters Armies of the United States, 5 P.M., April 7, 1865.
General R. E. Lee, Commanding Confederate States Army:[/right]

General,—The results of the last week must convince you of the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia in this struggle. I feel that it is so, and regard it as my duty to shift from myself the responsibility of any further effusion of blood by asking of you the surrender of that portion of the Confederate army known as the Army of Northern Virginia.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-General, Commanding Armies of the United States.

I was sitting at his side when the note was delivered. He read it and handed it to me without referring to its contents. After reading it I gave it back, saying, “Not yet.”
[center]-- James Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox; Memoirs of The Civil War in America[/center][/font]

Lee promptly wrote a reply, opening the possibility, but not committing himself:

[font="Times New Roman"][right]April 7, 1865.
LIEUT.-GENERAL U. S. GRANT, Commanding Armies of the U. S.[/right]

GENERAL: I have received your note of this day. Though not entertaining the opinion you express on the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia, I reciprocate your desire to avoid useless effusion of blood, and therefore before considering your proposition, ask the terms you will offer on condition of its surrender.

R. E. LEE, General.[/font]


Also on this date, the "reconstructed" (in other words, Union-installed) state legislature of Tennessee approved the 13th amendment. The total now stood at 20, with 7 more needed.