mind_messing wrote: These things tend to depend on what perspective you take. The RN leadership strikes me as the king to take the long, long view.
mind_messing wrote: Now, I'm not saying the RN wouldn't have opposed Sealion, merely that I don't think they wouldn't have been been sending anything that was armed and could float against the Germans. Think less of the Yamato sailing to it'd fate, and more of the Marine National following the Fall of France.
You are right about that. Just my opinion. Admiral Forbes, CIC Home Fleet simply did not see his Home Fleet as the tool to defend against an invasion. That was
mainly an army mission. Not to say that the RN should not intervene at all, but not the Home Fleet. It was a strategic tool.
Officially, this did not influence on him being exchanged for Admiral Tovey as CIC Home Fleet in November 1940 but I am hard put to believe this. Only if the German
heavies showed up in connection with an invasion attempt should the Home Fleet venture out. To Churchill’s despair Admiral Tovey took the same position.
Admiral Forbes had first-hand experience on the efficiency of the Luftwaffe, he was onboard the Rodney when a 500 kg. armor-piercing bomb penetrated her aft deck
in April 1940.
Actually, the Germans had a plan to draw the Home Fleet out, a diversionary operation named “Herbstreise” – Autumn Journey. To keep it busy, but also to make it
available to the Luftwaffe. To that effect about 100 recce planes were positioned on both entrances of the Channel.
A little known fact is that the Germans had an equivalent to the Coastal Command – the Küstenfliegers. While Göring did his best to destroy this organization,
in September 1940 they were still a force to be reckoned with, flying, among other types, torpedo-armed He115’s.
The Luftwaffe’s special anti-ship units, the 26th and 30th Bomber Wings had been transferred to Holland. Not to mention the concentration of their replenished
Stuka units in the Calais area – they were withdrawn in August to get up to speed again after their summer efforts.
mind_messing wrote: Even moderate losses to the RN is a bad exchange in the long run - Germany could replace troops and equipment lost in the invasion far
quicker than the British can capital ships lost trying to stop them.
The Sandhurst Sealion war games in 1974 are often quoted as the answer to the questions whether Sealion would have succeeded or not. The conclusion was the
invasion as such would have succeeded but not the resupply, therefore a failure in the end.
This war game had some serious flaws, notably in the pre-requisites of the scenario. One was that the bombing of London (had to) be continued as before and when
requested to have this changed when things went badly, it was refused by Hitler. The other point was lack of German air supremacy. Apart from using this, the
strongest expression – not air superiority – there was little need for air supremacy because the British Fighter, Bomber and Coastal Commands could do little
with the invasion as such – simply because the German army and navy were able to take care of themselves in that respect. This is shown by the massacring of the RAF
units performing ground attacks in France and bombers operating in daylight in the presence of Luftwaffe fighters.
The Germans may not have neither air supremacy nor superiority but that didn’t make much difference during the struggle for the Channel. In 1940, anyway. This is
proven by the fact that the RN had to restrict operations in the Channel in daylight. To me it seems as if they are confusing eventual air superiority over the
Channel - and over London. The latter had little to do with Sealion.
While one can always discuss this point the first one is really ludicrous, that the bombing of London should continue. I don’t know how the panel came to this,
other than rigging the war game for a given result. The Sealion plan and orders specifically describe the Luftwaffe missions in connection with a Sealion. That was
not continued bombing of London. On the contrary, in the 10-day warning period before S-day, what had direct importance for the UK coastal defense was to be the
target. On S-day minus 1, all efforts were on interdiction - assembly points, transport routes, rail and roads leading to the invasion areas. Much like the tactics
used to break the Fighter Command in the beginning of September. On S-day the invasion areas were the targets.
Playing the German side were Adolf Galland and Friedrich Ruge. While Galland probably knew little about the Sealion planning, Ruge was in the middle of it as
Commander Coastal Area West (France). I don't see why these two old gentlemen should use much effort in convincing their British hosts that they were on the
losing side. They surely enjoyed the British hospitality....[;)]..
Fred
