Single Ship TF Dispersion of Large Vulnerable TFs in danger

[Symon]

Bun-bun is so glad that nonesense is over. Now ... we got three Posleen Decs looking to land the hungry boys in the Dover/Channel Ports area. The only SHe-VA is in West Virginia; Bun-bun is getting an upgrade; looks like it's thresh time from where I sit.

[wdolson]

A bit late for this, but if this thread continues, please drop the name calling. There was a bit of it, a page or so back. I was concerned this thread was going to go pear shaped, so far only a little bit.

Bill

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Symon

Bun-bun is so glad that nonesense is over. Now ... we got three Posleen Decs looking to land the hungry boys in the Dover/Channel Ports area. The only SHe-VA is in West Virginia; Bun-bun is getting an upgrade; looks like it's thresh time from where I sit.

warspite1

No idea who/what bun bun is (or indeed the rest of the post [&:]), but I wouldn't classify this as nonsense. It's been a robust discussion that could have gone awry, but the people on the forum are sufficiently grown-up to bring it back.

The only real shame is that the one person who could potentially add something really new over and above what was discussed in the last thread devoted to this subject declines to do so. Fair enough, his call, but a shame nonetheless as it could have been interesting.

[LoBaron]

TBH warspite, as much as I admire your patience in this debate, the word 'nonsense' applies pretty well to a discussion kept alive by nitpicking on the true meaning of the word 'impossible'.

On topic, IMHO, there are two posts worth reading over the last 4 pages of this thread:

ORIGINAL: WriterNotViking
There is a difference between "impossible" and "practically impossible". People who mean the latter frequently use the former for convenience. I'm inclined to forgive them for that, since, for practical purposes, they mean the same thing. If that is truly the crux of the argument here, then a lot of time has been wasted. Does it really matter if the operation had a 0%, 1% or 5% chance of success? None of those would be enough for a sane military commander interested in victory for his own side to commit to its execution, unless the subject was some crucial "succeed at all costs or lose the war anyway" kind of matter. Which, we may assume, it wasn't.

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy
Why did the Germans bother planning such an operation? Because that's what military planning staffs do-they plan for all manner of contingencies that likely will never come to pass. Witness our Plan Orange for the Pacific War. God forbid that we should have executed our War Plan Red against the United Kingdom. Just because one draws up plans doesn't mean that they will be carried out or even have a chance for success.

The Germans didn't have a 'practical' plan for invading the UK. That's not my choice of words for the plan or its likelihood of success. Better words to describe something would have been 'far-fetched', 'vainglorious' or 'long-shot'. "Practical" wouldn't be in my top-10 list of adjectives to describe this planning / goal.

Understanding the content and accepting the implications of those two posts - perfectly summarizing what was actually quite clear from the start of the discussion - would made this, and 90% of the debate in that other thread, unneccesary.

[bobsteele]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Symon

Bun-bun is so glad that nonesense is over. Now ... we got three Posleen Decs looking to land the hungry boys in the Dover/Channel Ports area. The only SHe-VA is in West Virginia; Bun-bun is getting an upgrade; looks like it's thresh time from where I sit.

warspite1

No idea who/what bun bun is (or indeed the rest of the post [&:]), but I wouldn't classify this as nonsense. It's been a robust discussion that could have gone awry, but the people on the forum are sufficiently grown-up to bring it back.

The only real shame is that the one person who could potentially add something really new over and above what was discussed in the last thread devoted to this subject declines to do so. Fair enough, his call, but a shame nonetheless as it could have been interesting.

warspite, re: bun-bun.
Look at the avatar.
I haven't deciphered the rest of it yet.


i

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: LoBaron

TBH warspite, as much as I admire your patience in this debate, the word 'nonsense' applies pretty well to a discussion kept alive by nitpicking on the true meaning of the word 'impossible'.

On topic, IMHO, there are two posts worth reading over the last 4 pages of this thread:

ORIGINAL: WriterNotViking
There is a difference between "impossible" and "practically impossible". People who mean the latter frequently use the former for convenience. I'm inclined to forgive them for that, since, for practical purposes, they mean the same thing. If that is truly the crux of the argument here, then a lot of time has been wasted. Does it really matter if the operation had a 0%, 1% or 5% chance of success? None of those would be enough for a sane military commander interested in victory for his own side to commit to its execution, unless the subject was some crucial "succeed at all costs or lose the war anyway" kind of matter. Which, we may assume, it wasn't.

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy
Why did the Germans bother planning such an operation? Because that's what military planning staffs do-they plan for all manner of contingencies that likely will never come to pass. Witness our Plan Orange for the Pacific War. God forbid that we should have executed our War Plan Red against the United Kingdom. Just because one draws up plans doesn't mean that they will be carried out or even have a chance for success.

The Germans didn't have a 'practical' plan for invading the UK. That's not my choice of words for the plan or its likelihood of success. Better words to describe something would have been 'far-fetched', 'vainglorious' or 'long-shot'. "Practical" wouldn't be in my top-10 list of adjectives to describe this planning / goal.

Understanding the content and accepting the implications of those two posts - perfectly summarizing what was actually quite clear from the start of the discussion - would made this, and 90% of the debate in that other thread, unneccesary.

warspite1

Well LoBaron, unsurprisingly I like to feel that I have contributed a worthwhile post! [;)] The top post you quote was pretty much what I had said in the earlier thread on the subject.

Warspite1

Isn't this now splitting hairs?

You yourself have admitted that without air superiority (which, in September 1940, the Germans most definitely did not have) there would be a 1% chance of success. Even with it, you have suggested the chance of a successful outcome increases to just 5%.

For all intents and purposes therefore we are talking "pipe-dream or fantasy".

Unless you are Japan at the end of the war when you are down to sending Yamato on her final mission - and even the Japanese knew it was a one way trip - no commander is going to launch an attack with a 5% chance of success. When does a plan become a pipe-dream? 10%, 1%, 0%? Few people would have thought France would collapse in the timescale she did (although there was 1870) but the German General Staff at least believed victory was possible.

The head of the navy told Hitler in no uncertain terms that the Kriegsmarine could not do what was being asked of it. The Luftwaffe was being bled white. Read the plan of action for how the Barges were to operate once they got to the UK (those that did) and just how long those vessels would need to be at the beachhead then hooking up with the tugs so they can try and make it back to France. All of this - and the countless reasons given in previous posts - adds up to an impossible mission - hell even Rafe MacCauley couldn't pull this one off.

But that aside, I am still hopefully that the discussion will move on with Leandros adding some of the detailed information he says he has on the subject. But in the absence of compelling evidence to the contrary, then yes, Sealion will always for me be a case of Impossible (no air superiority) vs Practically Impossible (air superiority) unless the latter scenario is met with a set of circumstances (favourable to the Germans and unfavourable to the British) that needs to continue for an extreme and indeed unimaginable length of time.

[Leandros]

Sorry, WS1 - I wasn't aware it was me you were missing. That said, I really do not have the time for this now, I have a new Project going - Saving MacArthur - for which I had planned to use the WitP as a sort of filing instrument. However, my computer and WitP is not cooperating very well so it's taking much of my time to reason out the problems. But, here comes:

I am quite happy you brought up the Crete Campaign as it is quite relevant (just my opinion) as a comparison to Sealion, except as you write, the Luftwaffe had air supremacy over Crete, in spite of operating from bases many times the distance from the actual area as over the Channel. While the Sealion air support would operate from a hundred well-prepared airfields in Belgium and France - Holland, too, the German Luftflotte in Greece flew from a few dusty, ill-prepared fields in Greece, they had only been there for a couple of weeks. Not to mention that the Sealion Luftwaffe was many times larger.

The RN had exactly the same problem as they would have had in the Channel, that to depart their bases, or patrol area outside Luftwaffe range, early afternoon or after dark to arrive in the operational area several hours later (those being nearest) and leave it long before dawn to be back in their base before that. That is the naval problem. The Luftwaffe took the naval problem very seriously. Around Crete the myth that the Luftwaffe couldn’t hit moving targets was crushed. Well, Dunkirk and the Kanalkampf showed that well enough, but nevertheless.

Crete also showed something else, the difference in quality between the German and British armies. How can it be described otherwise with a 25.000 man strong army, among them the cream of the Commonwealth, The Anzacs, in prepared positions, supported by a Greek regiment and a warlike population - updated daily by Ultra messages revealing the enemy’s intentions - chased away in ten days by a German parachute division that was half-massacred during the landings and a part of an air-lifted mountain division. How many British troops were captured, was it 12.000? I’m not sure.

Oh, yes – a caigue convoy carrying a mountain infantry battalion was intercepted. That battalion never made it to Crete. The other convoy got away, that one also remained in Greece. In other words, the Mountain division that was air-lifted to Crete was somewhat reduced. To that came that the German mountain division only had two infantry regiments. Originally, the convoys had planned to travel during daytime to reach Crete in the afternoon but their departure was delayed which gave the RN their opening.

Incidentally, the Kriegsmarine wanted to cross the Channel in daylight but the army insisted on landing at dawn. As the Kriegsmarine would control the resupply they could as well have used the daytime for resupply. It should be mentioned that the invasion fleet also consisted of about 170 freighters, averaging 4.000 tons displacement. It is interesting to note that the British War Office in its “Notes on the German preparations for invasion of the United Kingdom” estimated the available German ship’s pool to 5.350 vessels totaling five million tons. That added to, in all, the 3.200 rebuilt invasion barges – only 1.150 were to be used on S-day, indicates a generous reserve pool.

Warspite1 wrote: The point being made was that, even if you believe the nonsense about the RAF (who I repeat were winning the BoB at that time) taking no action against the invasion fleet…

Firstly, the BoB did not take place over the Channel. What took place over the Channel was the Dunkirk evacuation and the Kanalkampf. On both occasions RAF fighters were not able to keep the Luftwaffe away from their ships. A little story from the Channel. As German aircrafts approached them the CO of destroyer Atherstone reported.

“The navigational position of the attack could hardly have been better chosen as the ships had no maneuvering room and minesweepers were just passing ahead of the escort in order to stream their sweeps. Convoy was in single line ahead with Atherstone leading and Fernie in the rear. In order to attack the convoy the bombers had to pass over Atherstone. Eleven of the 21 attacked Atherstone from the bow and right ahead, the remaining ten being held in reserve until the escort had been dealt with. During their descent two broke off to attack the mine-sweepers, the remaining nine synchronised their attack from right ahead and fine on the bows. In all, the ship received three direct hits and five misses within 60 yards of the ship. During the dive bombers’ attack Messerschmitt 110’s machine-gunned the ship and possibly one or two of the ships in the convoy. During both the raids fighter assistance was asked for but was not forthcoming. The same thing occurred during convoy CW10. The reasons for this are not known”.

Atherstone survived to fight another day. She was towed back to Nore, but was crippled for a long time. During speed trials after repairs in Portsmouth she hit a mine and went down. This example shows how the minefields not only could sink ships but also expose them to other dangers by limiting the maneuvering freedom of the intruder.

As for Dunkirk, some would say: “But the RAF had to fly all the way from England”. Well, the Germans had it no better, they had still not moved forward and operated from their airfields in Germany. Both parties flew about 1.500 fighter sorties over Dunkirk – in other words parity. Still, about 230 allied vessels were sunk, most of them by aircraft bombs, but also by U-boat and S-boats. About 80 were commissioned ships. Both parties lost about 100 planes but the German were all types and some shot down by AAA. Of course, a day after the landings the Home Chain, the British early warning radars, would go down.

As an example on how the British air forces would have fared I believe the Channel Dash is a good example. An operation fully expected, and planned for by the British, that was totally bungled.

One problem for the RAF (Fighter Command) was that the German low-level air defense was so murderous, as shown by the fate of the AASF in Belgium and France. They were massacred by the same weapons that followed the invasion fleet. FAA….some Swordfish planes, some Skuas, two squadrons of torpedo Beauforts which still wasn’t operational on torpedo. Bomber Command I honestly don’t know other than at the time they were massacred as soon as a German fighter was in the vicinity. During daytime, anyway. Bombing fixed and known congested installations on the Continent was one thing, targets spread along the beaches or in the Channel another. Coastal Command…they had their regular missions, the waters around UK had to be kept under supervision. Remember, Churchill feared an invasion across the North Sea from Norway. Actually much of the British defense was disposed for such an eventuality. Same goes for the British auxiliary naval units. They all had their daily chores, sweeping, guarding, patrolling, moving torpedo nets and harbour hindrances all around the UK.

A fighter strafing the invasion low-level would have met several times its fire power every time it dived down. The invasion fleet bristled with 20 mm automatic cannons and 37 mm guns, but most of all the venerable MG34’s. Every barge had two fixed ones and the infantry were to have their own mg’s mounted on deck. As a personnel transport the medium-sized barges would carry 70-80 soldiers. That amounts to approx. 10 MG34’s in addition to the AAA on tugs, escorts and the large transports. This weapon was not inferior to those carried by the Hurricane and Spit. A towing train consisted of three tugs each towing two barges. As to low-level attacks the invasion fleet could take care of itself.

….or the beaches as you state, all it would require was a reasonable sized naval force to get in amongst the head of the invasion flotilla to cause total and utter carnage.

Oh, yes – every BFB’s wet dream….But first they had to pass Dönitz’s submarine screen, the minefields (no jokes), the radar-guided coastal artillery (which guarded
the minefields and was never used for its proper purpose), the outer escort, the inner escort, the armed transports, the dedicated artillery ships, the S-boats,
the R-boats, the porcupine barges, the 1,200 small motor boats meant for command control and maneuvering of the barges close to shore. In the dark they would
probably be perceived as S-boats by the wary RN crews. Talk about congestion of targets…..Oh yes - I forgot - the Luftwaffe wasn't unknown to the art of night flying, either.

Once I made a cool scenario on this in the Silent Hunter's game editor. It was quite illustrative.

Remember we are talking about attacking vulnerable, slow moving, low in the water, barges and tugs.

Except from all the other vessels, yes…..that said, how low in the water is a barge of 750 tons displacement carrying four tanks each weighing 15 tons? Tugs...low in the water...getting desperate now...?

This would be at night so your vaunted Luftwaffe and the cowardly and quite useless RAF are not factors.

Oh, yes naval night fighting….I wonder, who excelled in that. The statistics are clear but nevertheless misleading. This wouldn’t be a scenario where the U-boats, S-boats and the Luftwaffe went for the civilian ships first, thereby losing their opportunity for the first shots at the enemy war vessels.

Finally – to Warspite1:

You never got back to me confirming which Pink List you are quoting, did you? It doesn’t matter really because the Pink Lists weren’t what you have used it for, anyway. The Pink Lists said very little about where a ship actually was, or its condition. It merely states what Naval Command it was assigned to. I am not sure if you were aware of this but if you were, what you are stating here…..:

Warspite1 wrote: Note: All the above are readily available in September i.e. there are no units above undergoing repair or otherwise out of action. No allowance has been made for vessels used for convoy purposes – which of course can be recalled in extremis. Finally I have referred to the Town-class as CA (the 6-inch/8-inch distinction was blurred by then).

….is not good. If you are not aware of it, it’s merely ignorance. That can be forgiven.

As an example, at this time ships also operating in escort service in the Western or North-Western Approaches, and other areas for that matter, were usually (officially) assigned to the Portsmouth Command. Therefore they can easily be read as actually being based (or present) in Portsmouth, which they weren’t. The list also did not specify if ships were out of service or in repair.

This exact question generated one of the more laborious tasks in my book, to check each destroyer for its whereabouts in the last part of September 1940. The result was quite depressing (for a BFB, anyway). Of the 26 (6 French) destroyers (in four flotillas) listed as stationed in Portsmouth, Southampton and Plymouth my investigation found that only very few was actually based in the Channel end of September, excepted the six French of which I had no information. I may be faulted on details in this but the general impression is overwhelming. Almost the same applies to the Eastern side of the Channel.

All this said, the Germans had all the advantages an attacker always has.

Fred

[LoBaron]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: LoBaron

TBH warspite, as much as I admire your patience in this debate, the word 'nonsense' applies pretty well to a discussion kept alive by nitpicking on the true meaning of the word 'impossible'.

On topic, IMHO, there are two posts worth reading over the last 4 pages of this thread:

ORIGINAL: WriterNotViking
There is a difference between "impossible" and "practically impossible". People who mean the latter frequently use the former for convenience. I'm inclined to forgive them for that, since, for practical purposes, they mean the same thing. If that is truly the crux of the argument here, then a lot of time has been wasted. Does it really matter if the operation had a 0%, 1% or 5% chance of success? None of those would be enough for a sane military commander interested in victory for his own side to commit to its execution, unless the subject was some crucial "succeed at all costs or lose the war anyway" kind of matter. Which, we may assume, it wasn't.

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy
Why did the Germans bother planning such an operation? Because that's what military planning staffs do-they plan for all manner of contingencies that likely will never come to pass. Witness our Plan Orange for the Pacific War. God forbid that we should have executed our War Plan Red against the United Kingdom. Just because one draws up plans doesn't mean that they will be carried out or even have a chance for success.

The Germans didn't have a 'practical' plan for invading the UK. That's not my choice of words for the plan or its likelihood of success. Better words to describe something would have been 'far-fetched', 'vainglorious' or 'long-shot'. "Practical" wouldn't be in my top-10 list of adjectives to describe this planning / goal.

Understanding the content and accepting the implications of those two posts - perfectly summarizing what was actually quite clear from the start of the discussion - would made this, and 90% of the debate in that other thread, unneccesary.

warspite1

Well LoBaron, unsurprisingly I like to feel that I have contributed a worthwhile post! [;)] The top post you quote was pretty much what I had said in the earlier thread on the subject.

Ok let me rephrase: No information provided by you, mm, or Leandros, has any impact on the outcome of core topic of the debate - the possibility of Seelöwe to succeed (defining 'success' as landing and supporting a large enough force to initiate and potentially conclude the conquest of Great Britain - to avoid potential nitpicking on the definition [;)]) and the resulting chance of a sane military leadership to attempt such an operation given the odds.

All of you are providing interesting details though, so taking that at face value without relating it to a general context surely makes a number of your posts a worthwhile read.

[Cap Mandrake]

Operation Sealion was invented so Admiral Raeder could do a "best of" list.

[Leandros]

ORIGINAL: LoBaron


Ok let me rephrase: No information provided by you, mm, or Leandros, has any impact on the outcome of core topic of the debate - the possibility of Seelöwe to succeed (defining 'success' as landing and supporting a large enough force to initiate and potentially conclude the conquest of Great Britain - to avoid potential nitpicking on the definition [;)]) and the resulting chance of a sane military leadership to attempt such an operation given the odds.

All of you are providing interesting details though, so taking that at face value without relating it to a general context surely makes a number of your posts a worthwhile read.

If you say so....[;)]...too bad you weren't there before Weserubung, France, Greece, Crete, Singapore and Barbarossa. Maybe they all could have been avoided on
your advice.. Well, those werent invasions of UK so I suppose much easier to accomplish.

Anyway, I'm needed elsewhere. To be more exact, in the Pacific.

Fred

[warspite1]

No problem Leandros, if you are busy on other projects then fair enough.

Having read your latest post I think I can summarise by saying this is very much more of the same – one interesting point, some opinion we cannot agree on and some irrelevant points. As I said, to convince me – rightly or wrongly – I need answers to the questions I asked because it is those points that I believe are truly key to this operation.

So taking your points in order:

I am quite happy you brought up the Crete Campaign as it is quite relevant

1. Crete – sorry totally irrelevant in this context. Why? Well a) You go to lengths to mention the difference in quality of armies. But if you read the previous thread I stated exactly that, across the two threads, unless I have missed something, NO ONE has tried to make the case otherwise. It's a non-point. Thus you are seeking to prove something that is not even under consideration (as opposed to the areas I have asked you to add further detail and that you say you have knowledge of). b) the invasion of Crete, and the RN operations there, are irrelevant to the discussion as Crete was won and lost in the skies and the use of paratroopers alone. The only reason I mentioned Crete at all previously was to show that despite operating miles from the area of operations, despite enemy air supremacy (which the Luftwaffe didn't even have in Sept 1940), the RN could get amongst enemy naval units at night and cause havoc.

Firstly, the BoB did not take place over the Channel.

2. The comment that the BoB did not take place over the Channel. Again totally irrelevant to the point I was making and the basis of this discussion. My understanding of both threads has been: what happened historically happened, and now we come to September. If Hitler gives the order to go, what happens next? That being the case, the Battle of Britain has been fought as per historically up to now. I repeat, at this point the Luftwaffe is losing the battle - badly and losses are mounting. Goering may well change tactics for Sealion, but what has happened has happened; the Luftwaffe is smaller than when it started and the RAF is larger. At no point is this taken into account in these arguments, nor the fact that, with the order to launch Sealion, the Luftwaffe (who have been unable to achieve what they have been tasked with to date) have suddenly got a whole load more tasks to deal with: attacking RN shipping, attacking RAF/FAA and Coastal Command bombers, providing CAP over the invasion barges and follow-up vessels and keep bombers away from the invasion beaches – and all that before they are used in their designed role as support for the army (assuming some get ashore). I assume you are not now suddenly adding in a load of counterfactuals i.e. Goering fought the BoB differently? Because if so that's a whole different discussion.

3. All arguments seem to follow roughly the same theme too. The Germans can sink Allied vessels off Dunkirk – but the same cannot possibly be true of British aircraft against German ships. I wondered how you could compare Fairey Battles against dug in German AA in France with operations against the vulnerable convoy – and now I know - its by the way you have described the invasion fleet’s defences! What was Raeder thinking? This operation was going to be a walk in the park!! So when the RAF sunk 10% of the invasion shipping in harbour, were the AA guns not being manned at the time? The RAF cannot defend the RN ships apparently but for the Germans?…….not a problem!

Oh, yes – every BFB’s wet dream

4. Then there is the unfortunate “Wet Dream” oh dear…..

But first they had to pass Dönitz’s submarine screen, the minefields (no jokes), the radar-guided coastal artillery (which guarded
the minefields and was never used for its proper purpose), the outer escort, the inner escort, the armed transports, the dedicated artillery ships, the S-boats, the R-boats, the porcupine barges, the 1,200 small motor boats meant for command control and maneuvering of the barges close to shore. In the dark they would probably be perceived as S-boats by the wary RN crews. Talk about congestion of targets…..Oh yes - I forgot - the Luftwaffe wasn't unknown to the art of night flying, either.

5. The point about Donitz’s submarine screen, minefields radar guided coastal artillery, inner escort, outer escort, armed transports, artillery ships! S-boats on and on and on…..Yes I see where the Wet Dream comes into play (no pun intended) and it isn’t on the Allied side. Oh and now the Luftwaffe are experts in night flying over water!! Wow! We really did have no chance did we? By the way, how many minesweepers did the RN have? How many smaller craft? What happened to them? And as for the Coastal Artillery.... How many ships did they damage – not sink, because that was nil, how many did they even damage during the entire war?

And speaking of coastal artillery here is a quote from you I took from the Wargammer? Forum. The reason I repeat it here is for one reason; it confirms my accusation above about how, regardless of real life events, the answer is always the same – the Germans are superhuman and incapable of making mistakes - unlike their enemy (no doubt the British coastal guns are crap in your scenario):

“That this artillery did not sink many vessels on the far side of the Channel during the war does not necessarily mean that they would not have done so in a heated, and more necessary, combat situation. These large guns were very expensive to fire. Not just their ammunition but especially the wearing out of their barrels had to be considered - they were spared. I don't think ever a concentrated barrage was fired from all these batteries”.

So basically, these guns that never sunk jack, would, come the invasion, suddenly start playing for real and destroy the RN? But the RN and RAF never get to "step up a gear" and play for real now that they are deperately defending their homeland?

This line of thought continues with the most important aspect of the operation. The Allies trained and trained and trained for D-Day. The Germans? One, small-scale, exercise in perfect weather and with no enemy interference. Result? It was something of a shambles. But apparently – or so you stated the other day – the Germans did not need plans and training – come Sealion it would all go perfectly…… I ask again, how were the barges to co-ordinate their manouevres and in the dark so that they all get to the beach at the same time and the army lands as a cohesive fighting force?

getting desperate now...?

What was it you said? Getting desperate now?

6. Sorry no idea what the response re civilian ships was about….

7. And finally to the Pink List. As I said, this Pink List was from early September. And this Leandros is where what you argue gets really interesting; here is your chance to make your case. I have taken on face value from a decent source that the Pink List was accurate. You say that is not the case and you have researched every Destroyer (you do not mention TB, MTB or other small craft but lets ignore that for the moment - although how many ships/boats smaller than a destroyer did the Luftwaffe sink in WWII?) to prove it. But you give no detail. Here is a key – possibly THE key element of your argument (tha actual landing procedure aside) – and you choose not to use it? Why? Very strange.

[LoBaron]

ORIGINAL: Leandros
If you say so....[;)]...too bad you weren't there before Weserubung, France, Greece, Crete, Singapore and Barbarossa. Maybe they all could have been avoided on
your advice.. Well, those werent invasions of UK so I suppose much easier to accomplish.

I reread this several times but fail to make any sense out of it. In what way is Weserubung, France, Greece, Crete, Singapore and Barbarossa relevant for Seelöwe?

Am aware you are trying to be sarcastic but in case you wanted to point out anything beyond that it seems to get lost in translation...

[Symon]

ORIGINAL: LoBaron
I reread this several times but fail to make any sense out of it.

This entire thread is nonsensical. It's nothing but the Warspite/Leandros Seelowe crap re-ported to another place. Would you two please find somewhere else to carry on your stuff. What do your proclivities about German Amphib capabilities have to do with Single Ship TFs in WiTPAE?

[AW1Steve]

ORIGINAL: Symon

ORIGINAL: LoBaron
I reread this several times but fail to make any sense out of it.

This entire thread is nonsensical. It's nothing but the Warspite/Leandros Seelowe crap re-ported to another place. Would you two please find somewhere else to carry on your stuff. What do your proclivities about German Amphib capabilities have to do with Single Ship TFs in WiTPAE?

Leandros

Let's be honest , Leandros hijacked the thread to flack his book(s) and his pet fantasy theory. He really PO'd Warspite , and it's been off to the races ever since. Bill's had to gently remind these two to keep it civil , and they barely did. They would (and we would) probably be better off if they just exchanged emails and went ahead and debated this till kingdom come (or Leandros does a new book). So how about it guys? Why not take this off somewhere private (where it probably should have been all along? [:D]

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Symon

ORIGINAL: LoBaron
I reread this several times but fail to make any sense out of it.

This entire thread is nonsensical. It's nothing but the Warspite/Leandros Seelowe crap re-ported to another place. Would you two please find somewhere else to carry on your stuff. What do your proclivities about German Amphib capabilities have to do with Single Ship TFs in WiTPAE?

warspite1

The thread may be nonsensical to you, but some posters have found it interesting, interesting enough to pass comment and have a good, robust debate.

Yes the thread subject matter veered off topic from where it started, but there was no objection from the OP and no requests to move the debate elsewhere - indeed the OP was for a time, part of the new discussion. As a result it continued where it started.

You have now requested it be moved and indeed said please which was well mannered and would, I assure you, have been acted upon accordingly and with a simple apology from me.

Sadly however, you preceeded the please with reference to the discussion being Crap, which rather spoilt the effect.

Shame that, but par for the course sadly.... [:(]

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: AW1Steve

ORIGINAL: Symon

ORIGINAL: LoBaron
I reread this several times but fail to make any sense out of it.

This entire thread is nonsensical. It's nothing but the Warspite/Leandros Seelowe crap re-ported to another place. Would you two please find somewhere else to carry on your stuff. What do your proclivities about German Amphib capabilities have to do with Single Ship TFs in WiTPAE?

Leandros

Let's be honest , Leandros hijacked the thread to flack his book(s) and his pet fantasy theory. He really PO'd Warspite , and it's been off to the races ever since. Bill's had to gently remind these two to keep it civil , and they barely did. They would (and we would) probably be better off if they just exchanged emails and went ahead and debated this till kingdom come (or Leandros does a new book). So how about it guys? Why not take this off somewhere private (where it probably should have been all along? [:D]

warspite1

No sorry AW1Steve but this is not quite correct. Yes, Leandros has a pet theory and worked that theory into the thread discussion, but there was no complaint about doing so from the OP and others joined in the discussion quite freely.

The request to keep civil was more to do with myself and mind_messing than Leandros. Barely civil? I think that is a tad harsh - it was robust - but nothing to scare the children and dealt with between us before Bill got involved.

Sorry but this is a WWII related topic (although I fully accept it should have been on a separate OT thread) but absolutely no reason why it could not be debated here.

[LoBaron]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Symon
This entire thread is nonsensical.

warspite1

The thread may be nonsensical to you, but some posters have found it interesting, interesting enough to pass comment and have a good, robust debate.

While I find calling the whole thread 'nonsensical' harsh - as I have already pointed out, some of the information provided indeed is interesting - the continued discussion is nonsensical indeed.

This has not so much to do with yourself, rather with the people you are engaging in the discussion with.

The debate about success chances of Seelöwe (the recent one, not including the other dozens on similar topic over the years) has been concluded 1.8 threads ago. Reason being is because most of the rational souls on the forum agree with your PoV, give or take a few. Not surprising as the evidence is overwhelming.

Stupidity left aside for the moment as it does not apply here - the reason to continue the debate with you - meaning to continue to disagree with you - obviously is not the topic itself. It has to be something else.

In this specific discussion is is mainly:

1) an addiction to opportunism and semantics and ignorance of the fact that it is of no value to the discussion if those semantics already have been clearified or are clear to all participants, and there is agreement on the main topic anyway.
2) the understandable desire to defend one´s own work and the fact that conceding to your points would essentially mean admitting the conclusions from that work are erroneous.

Both stances are difficult to engage with facts, and so the only interesting open question left is who loses patience first - which leads us back to the term 'nonsensical'.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: LoBaron

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Symon
This entire thread is nonsensical.

warspite1

The thread may be nonsensical to you, but some posters have found it interesting, interesting enough to pass comment and have a good, robust debate.

While I find calling the whole thread 'nonsensical' harsh - as I have already pointed out, some of the information provided indeed is interesting - the continued discussion is nonsensical indeed.

This has not so much to do with yourself, rather with the people you are engaging in the discussion with.

The debate about success chances of Seelöwe (the recent one, not including the other dozens on similar topic over the years) has been concluded 1.8 threads ago. Reason being is because most of the rational souls on the forum agree with your PoV, give or take a few. Not surprising as the evidence is overwhelming.

Stupidity left aside for the moment as it does not apply here - the reason to continue the debate with you - meaning to continue to disagree with you - obviously is not the topic itself. It has to be something else.

In this specific discussion is is mainly:

1) an addiction to opportunism and semantics and ignorance of the fact that it is of no value to the discussion if those semantics already have been clearified or are clear to all participants, and there is agreement on the main topic anyway.
2) the understandable desire to defend one´s own work and the fact that conceding to your points would essentially mean admitting the conclusions from that work are erroneous.

Both stances are difficult to engage with facts, and so the only interesting open question left is who loses patience first - which leads us back to the term 'nonsensical'.

warspite1

LoBaron believe me I have no wish to flog a dead horse but there is potentially an interesting element to this conversation - and is the only reason why I re-entered the debate.

Leandros has written a book about the subject. In so doing he says he has researched in detail the German plan to get troops across and, more importantly still, he says he has researched the starting positions of the RN forces and the actual number of vessels available to the RN during the September window of opportunity.

It is THIS detail that I find of potential interest.

Discussing the quality of each army is pointless - it is known and accepted by anyone with a rational mind that if the Germans were capable of landing a proper cohesive fighting force (with support) in sufficient numbers, then the UK would be defeated.

Discussing what would have happened had the Luftwaffe been used "properly" in the first place i.e. as part of a Sealion operation as opposed to a separate, badly planned operation is an interesting subject, but not what is being discussed here because the fact is Goering didn't.

Ignoring the weaknesses of the German "plan" and treating everything they would have done during Sealion as a given and where everything goes according to plan (the coastal artillery being a prime example) - while the British forces engaged amount to little more than the "Keystone Cops do naval and air warfare" is nonsensical, but to be expected from someone trying to make a case for such an operation.

Presenting one off statements, and not necessarily in context, by high ranking British commanders to "prove" points, while equally ignoring quotes from Admiral Raeder (and others) about the impossibility of the operation in their view, is also totally pointless and indeed disingenuous (but again not unexpected).

So why is this interesting to me?

The fact is, the conerstones of this debate, the key points, first and foremost, rest on the actions of two services. It's not about the RAF nor the Luftwaffe (though they are clearly not unimportant) and its not about the British Army or German Army (even if the latter land as the Germans intended) - its about the RN and the Kriegsmarine.

How do the Kriegsmarine intend to get the men ashore? What is the drill from the time they reach the invasion beaches to the landing of the men? What is the procedure for re-attaching the barges and getting these back to the embarkation ports? How long does all this take? Forget for the moment what would happen in practice with units totally untrained for this operation, operating in the dark by megaphone, with thousands of vessels all over the place, spread over many many miles, and under fire. Forget all that initially, and focus on what is the actual plan in detail for the procedure?

How do the RN stop the invasion in the first place and/or cut off those that have landed once ashore? What do the RN actually have to oppose the invasion and where are those units? I have used the usual sources to convince myself that there were more than sufficient units; CL, DD and literally hundreds upon hundreds of smaller craft, to achieve destruction of the invading force. Leandros suggests he has researched this point thoroughly and the situation was completely different. I have asked him to provide the detail.

Those are the interesting points and can either be satisfactorily explained or not. If they can then Leandros may have a point, if not then its just the same old bunkum.

[Bullwinkle58]

ORIGINAL: LoBaron

While I find calling the whole thread 'nonsensical' harsh - as I have already pointed out, some of the information provided indeed is interesting - the continued discussion is nonsensical indeed.

FWIW I agree with you but would add that it is odd that folks consider a forum with "WWII in the PTO" as its topic cares about the war in the Atlantic, let alone over and over and over (and over.) This is not a general-purpose WWII forum. It is the busiest forum on the site sure, and it has a lot of WWII-interested readers, but it's not about the ETO. I doubt the WitW forum would appreciate me constantly plopping down to discuss the Saipan campaign while they try to figure out how to play that thing.

[Symon]

This is not a WW-2 forum. It is a WiTP-AE forum. War in the Pacific, with an emphasis on the AE title.

Otherwise, LoBaron is quite right, calling the whole thread nonsensical is indeed harsh and unintended. In fact the original premise of the thread is interesting and I contributed to it on that basis.

Main forum is where people should go to argue their OT issues; not here.