Near Mobile, Alabama, the Union besiegers finally made a breach in Spanish Fort. The outnumbered Confederates rapidly evacuated it, some escaping to the second defensive point, Fort Blakely. However, the Yankees had also begun operations against Blakely, so the majority of the Rebel garrison fled to Mobile.
In Virginia, the pursuit of the Army of Northern Virginia would reach a climax. However, the day seemed to start off without combat, which gave time for another heated discussion about surrender:
[font="Times New Roman"]The road was clear at eleven o’clock, and we marched at twelve. The enemy left us to a quiet day’s march on the 8th, nothing disturbing the rear-guard, and our left flank being but little annoyed, but our animals were worn and reduced in strength by the heavy haul through rain and mud during the march from Petersburg, and the troops of our broken columns were troubled and faint of heart. We passed abandoned wagons in flames, and limbers and caissons of artillery burning sometimes in the middle of the road. One of my battery commanders reported his horses too weak to haul his guns. He was ordered to bury the guns and cover their burial-places with old leaves and brushwood. Many weary soldiers were picked up, and many came to the column from the woodlands, some with, many without, arms,—all asking for food.
[...]
In the forenoon, General Pendleton came to me and reported the proceedings of the self-constituted council of war of the night before, and stated that he had been requested to make the report and ask to have me bear it to General Lee, in the name of the members of the council. Much surprised, I turned and asked if he did not know that the Articles of War provided that officers or soldiers who asked commanding officers to surrender should be shot, and said,— “If General Lee doesn’t know when to surrender until I tell him, he will never know.” It seems that General Pendleton then went to General Lee and made the report. General Long’s account of the interview, as reported by Pendleton, is as follows: “General Lee was lying on the ground. No others heard the conversation between him and myself. He received my communication with the reply, ‘Oh, no, I trust that it has not come to that,’ and added, ‘General, we have yet too many bold men to think of laying down our arms. The enemy do not fight with spirit, while our boys still do. Besides, if I were to say a word to the Federal commander, he would regard it as such a confession of weakness as to make it the condition of demanding an unconditional surrender, a proposal to which I will never listen...'
[center]--James Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox: Memoirs of The Civil War in America[/center][/font]
Since Grant had been nicknamed "Unconditional Surrender" Grant, it was not surprising that the correspondence between Grant and Lee was not going well. Grant knew perfectly well that Lee had not conceded anything in his reply to the first note. Still, he "regarded it as deserving another letter", and wrote back:
[font="Times New Roman"][right]April 8, 1865.
GENERAL R. E. LEE, Commanding C. S. A.[/right]
Your note of last evening in reply to mine of same date, asking the condition on which I will accept the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia is just received. In reply I would say that, peace being my great desire, there is but one condition I would insist upon, namely: that the men and officers surrendered shall be disqualified for taking up arms again against the Government of the United States until properly exchanged. I will meet you, or will designate officers to meet any officers you may name for the same purpose, at any point agreeable to you, for the purpose of arranging definitely the terms upon which the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia will be received.
U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General. [/font]
But late in the afternoon, another disaster befell the Confederates, which changed the situation. The Southerners had be aiming for Lynchburg, where they expected to get supplies. Since it was still some distance, and Lee's army was in desperate condition, several train-loads of provisions had been sent ahead to Appomattox Station. But the Yankees got there first:
[font="Times New Roman"]Although Sheridan had been marching all day, his troops moved with alacrity and without any straggling. They began to see the end of what they had been fighting four years for. Nothing seemed to fatigue them. They were ready to move without rations and travel without rest until the end. Straggling had entirely ceased, and every man was now a rival for the front. The infantry marched about as rapidly as the cavalry could. Sheridan sent Custer with his division to move south of Appomattox Station, which is about five miles south-west of the Court House, to get west of the trains and destroy the roads to the rear. They got there the night of the 8th, and succeeded partially; but some of the train men had just discovered the movement of our troops and succeeded in running off three of the trains. The other four were held by Custer.
[center]--The Personal Memoirs of General U. S. Grant[/center][/font]
Map by Hal Jespersen, www.cwmaps.com
Naturally, the Southerners made an effort to get the trains back, but as it happened the units closest to the scene were artillery and engineers. Thus, the Battle of Appomattox Station was unusual in that neither side had significant numbers of infantry. It was cavalry on the Union side, and artillery on the Confederate side, ironic considering artillery had generally been the Southerners' weak point and cavalry had been the Northerners' weak point for the first two years of the war. Although the Federals were commanded by the notoriously aggressive George Custer, their first few charges were not coordinated or energetic. Few troopers wanted to be shredded by Rebel grapeshot.
After almost five hours of engagement, Custer put together a concerted charge as darkness began to fall. This one was successful, with the Yankees capturing nearly 1,000 Confederates and as many as 30 guns. Appomattox Station and its trains of rations were in the grip of the Northerners, and it would take a major assault to get them back.
However, Grant had not yet heard the good news, and he had reasons to be in a less than positive mood:
[font="Times New Roman"]On the 8th I had followed the Army of the Potomac in rear of Lee. I was suffering very severely with a sick headache, and stopped at a farmhouse on the road some distance in rear of the main body of the army. I spent the night in bathing my feet in hot water and mustard, and putting mustard plasters on my wrists and the back part of my neck, hoping to be cured by morning.
[center]--The Personal Memoirs of General U. S. Grant[/center][/font]
Close to midnight, Grant received Lee's second reply. If anything, it was even less promising than the first:
[font="Times New Roman"][right]April 8, 1865
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT.[/right]
GENERAL:--I received, at a late hour, your note of to-day. In mine of yesterday I did not intend to propose the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia, but to ask the terms of your proposition. To be frank, I do not think the emergency has arisen to call for the surrender of this army; but as the restoration of peace should be the sole object of all, I desired to know whether your proposals would lead to that end. I cannot, therefore, meet you with a view to the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia; but as far as your proposal may affect the Confederate States forces under my command, and tend to the restoration of peace, I should be pleased to meet you at ten A.M. to-morrow on the old stage-road to Richmond, between the picket-lines of the two armies.
R. E. LEE, General.[/font]
Since Lee was the General-in-Chief of the Confederacy, the "forces under my command" could amount to all the Southern armies. This meant something more like a peace treaty than the surrender of an individual force, and Grant had been explicitly told that political questions were out of his hands, and to be resolved by the President.
